Date: 20140918
Docket: T-2019-13
Citation:
2014 FC 898
Ottawa, Ontario, September 18, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice LeBlanc
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BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Applicant
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and
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YOUSEF MUSTAFA BANI AHMAD
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This case is an appeal by the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister) under subsection 14(5) of the Citizenship
Act, RSC, 1985, c C-29 (the Act) and section 21 of the Federal Courts
Act, RSC 1985, c C-7, of a decision of a Citizenship judge approving the
respondent’s application for Canadian citizenship.
I.
Background
[2]
Mr. Bani-Ahmad is a national of Jordan. He arrived in Canada in 1999 and became a permanent resident in October, 2006,
following a positive inland application for Humanitarian and Compassionate
grounds under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (SC 2001, c 27).
[3]
On July 11, 2009, he submitted an application
for Canadian citizenship. Therefore, the relevant four year period for
the purposes of the residency requirement Mr. Bani-Ahmad had to meet as a
condition for being granted Canadian citizenship was July 11, 2005 to July 11,
2009.
[4]
In the citizenship application and subsequent
Citizenship Questionnaire he was asked to complete, Mr. Bani-Ahmad declared
three absences from Canada during that four year period. In the course of processing
of his citizenship application, Mr. Bani-Ahmad was asked to provide documents
to demonstrate that he met the residency requirement but he failed to do so.
[5]
His citizenship application was eventually
referred to a Citizenship judge for a hearing that was held on September 30,
2013. After reviewing the record before him, the Citizenship judge requested
translation of a foreign language stamp in Mr. Bani-Ahmad’s passport and
reserved his final decision for the outcome of the translation.
[6]
On October 15, 2013, the Citizenship judge
approved Mr. Bani-Ahmad’s application. In a rather short decision, the
Citizenship judge listed factors which appear to have been considered in
reaching his decision. The Citizenship judge first stated that Mr. Bani-Ahmad had less than 1095 days of physical presence in Canada as
required by paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act “because
he applied too soon for Citizenship”. He then indicated that
Mr. Bani-Ahmad was in Canada since 1999, that his passport corroborated
his testimony, that three of his children were born in Canada, that he owned a
restaurant and a house in Toronto, that the restaurant was the only source of
income for he and his family and that some members of his family (brothers,
sister and mother) were in Canada.
[7]
Under the heading “Decision”,
the Citizenship judge wrote the following:
Considering all of the above, and based on my
careful assessment of the applicant’s testimony, as well as my consideration of
the information and evidence before me, I am satisfied that the applicant was
actually living and was physically present in Canada on the number of days
sufficient to comply with the Citizenship Act.
[8]
The Minister claims that this decision must be
quashed for two reasons. First, the Minister contends that the Citizenship
judge failed to identify which of the three residency tests was used, resulting
in his decision not meeting the test of clarity, precision and intelligibility
established in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. Second,
the Minister submits, in the alternative, that the impugned decision is
unreasonable as the Citizenship judge reached conclusions about Mr. Bani-Ahmad’s
ties to Canada that are not supported by the evidence.
II.
Issue and Standard of Review
[9]
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is
whether the impugned decision warrants intervention by this Court. In order to
answer that question I have applied the standard of reasonableness which is the
standard of review applicable in citizenship appeals dealing with the residency
requirement.
[10]
It is indeed generally accepted in this
Court’s jurisprudence “that a
citizenship judge’s application of evidence to a specific test for residency
under paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act raises questions of mixed fact and
law and is thus reviewable on a standard of reasonableness”: Saad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 570, 433 FTR 174, at para 18, and see also Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Rahman, 2013 FC 1274 at para
13; Balta v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC
1509, 403 FTR 134 at para 5; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v Baron, 2011 FC 480, 388 FTR 261 at para 9; Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Diallo, 2012 FC 1537, 424 FTR
156 at para 13; Huang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2013
FC 576 at paras 24 to 26).
[11]
There is no dispute between the parties that the
standard of review applicable to the present appeal is the standard of
reasonableness.
III.
Analysis
A.
The Legal Principles Applicable to the
Citizenship Residency Requirement
[12]
Paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act provides for
the residency requirements citizenship applicants need to meet in order to be
successful with their application. It reads as follows:
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Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29
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Loi sur la citoyenneté (LRC (1985), ch C-29)
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Grant of citizenship
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Attribution de la citoyenneté
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5. (1) The Minister shall grant citizenship to any person who
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5. (1) Le ministre attribue la citoyenneté à toute personne qui, à
la fois:
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[…]
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[…]
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(c) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and has, within the
four years immediately preceding the date of his or her application,
accumulated at least three years of residence in Canada calculated in the
following manner:
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c) est un résident permanent au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi
sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés et a, dans les quatre ans
qui ont précédé la date de sa demande, résidé au Canada pendant au moins
trois ans en tout, la durée de sa résidence étant calculée de la manière
suivante:
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(i) for every day during which the person was resident in Canada
before his lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person
shall be deemed to have accumulated one-half of a day of residence, and
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(i) un demi-jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada avant son
admission à titre de résident permanent,
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(ii) for every day during which the person was resident in Canada
after his lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall
be deemed to have accumulated one day of residence;
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(ii) un jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada après son
admission à titre de résident permanent;
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[13]
There is an ongoing debate within this Court as
to what paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act means exactly. Competing views
have emerged from that debate with the result that three different tests are
available to Citizenship judges in assessing the residency requirement in any
given case (Sinanan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
2011 FC 1347 at paras 6 to 8; Huang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2013 FC 576, [2013] FCJ No 629 (QL), at paras 17 and 18).
[14]
The first test involves the strict counting of
days of physical presence in Canada which must total 1095 days in the four
years preceding the application. It is often referred to as the quantitative
test or the Pourghasemi test (Pourghasemi (Re) (FCTD) [1993] 62
FTR 122, [1993] FCJ No 232 (QL)).
[15]
The second test is less stringent. It recognizes
that a person can be resident in Canada, even while temporarily absent, if
there remains a strong attachment to Canada. This test is generally known as
the Re Papadogiorgakis test (Re Papadogiorgakis, [1978] 2 FC 208, [1978] FCJ No 31 (QL)).
[16]
The third test builds on the second one by
defining residence as the place where one has centralized his or her mode of
living. It is described in the jurisprudence as the Koo test (Re Koo, 59 FTR 27, [1992] FCJ No 1107 (QL); see also Paez
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 204 at para 13, Sinanan,
above at paras 6 to 8; Huang, above at paras 37 to 40).
[17]
The last two tests are often referred to as
qualitative tests (Huang, above at para 17).
[18]
The dominant view in the case law is that Citizenship
judges are entitled to choose which test they desire to use among these three
tests and that they cannot be faulted for choosing one over the other (Pourzand
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 395 at para 16; Xu
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC 700 at paras 15
and 16; Rizvi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FC
1641 at para 12).
[19]
However, they can be faulted if they fail to
articulate which residency test was applied in a given case (Dina v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2013 FC 712, 435 FTR 184, at para 8).
[20]
This is, in my view, what happened in this case.
For the reasons that follow, this is fatal to the Citizenship judge’s decision.
B.
The Citizenship Judge’s Failure to Articulate
Expressly or Impliedly the Residency Test
[21]
It is undisputed that the Citizenship judge
did not expressly state or articulate which of the three residency tests was
used in his assessment of Mr. Bani-Ahmad’s citizenship application.
[22]
Mr. Bani-Ahmad asserts that since the Supreme Court
of Canada’s judgment in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, deference
is owed to administrative decision makers, even if the reasons given in support
of findings are not entirely adequate. As a result, he says the Citizenship judge
was under no obligation to expressly identify the test applied.
[23]
Mr. Bani-Ahmad further submits that it
appears clear from the impugned decision, when read as a whole, that the test
applied was the one set out in Koo, above, and that, as a result, the
decision possesses the qualities of clarity, transparency and intelligibility
required by the case law.
[24]
It is true that administrative decision makers
are owed deference even where the reasons supporting a finding are not entirely
adequate. However, Newfoundland Nurses, above, still requires reasons
for decisions to be intelligible enough to allow the reviewing court to
understand why and how the decision maker reached his or her conclusion and to
permit it to determine whether the conclusion reached by the decision-maker
falls within the range of possible outcomes (Newfoundland Nurses, at
para 16).
[25]
As I have indicated previously, the case law, as
it stands now, allows Citizenship judges to choose which of the three residency
tests they will apply in any given case. In such singular circumstances, which
are less than optimal from the standpoint of ensuring consistency and certainty
of the law, the least that can be expected from Citizenship judges is that they
articulate as clearly as possible, in each and every case, which test was
chosen to assess the Act’s residency requirement. In this context, this
requirement, in my view, is vital in order to allow this Court to understand
why a Citizenship judge made his or her finding on the residency requirement.
[26]
As the Minister points out in his written
submissions, the dominant view within this Court is that in order to be clear,
precise and intelligible, reasons for decisions in the citizenship context must,
at the very least, indicate which residency test was used and why that test was
met or not (Canada v Jeizan 2010 FC 323, 386 FTR 1, at para 17-18; Dina
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2013 FC 712, 435 FTR 184
at para 8; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Al-Showaiter,
2012 FC 12, at para 21, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v
Baron, 2011 FC 480, 388 FTR 261, at para 13-18, Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v Saad, 2011 FC 1508, 404 FTR 9, at paras
18-24).
[27]
This view has prevailed in the post-Newfoundland
Nurses jurisprudence of this Court (Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v Abdallah, 2012 FC 985, 417 FTR 13 and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Raphaël, 2012 FC 1039, 417
FTR 177).
[28]
Here, the Citizenship judge did not refer to
any of the three tests in his reasons for decision. It is not possible either to
infer from his reasons which test he may have applied. In fact, the
Citizenship judge made a number of findings that are impossible to comprehensively
and reasonably associate with one of the three tests. These findings
read as it follows:
•
The applicant as less day of physical presence
in Canada (1088) only because he applied too soon for Citizenship after being
landed. However, he is in Canada since 1999.
•
A throughout examination of the relevant
passport confirms what stated by the applicant about his physical presence but
I asked for a professional translation because there is one foreign language
stamp. (I personally photocopied all and only the stamped pages of the relevant
passport – see attached)
•
The applicant is married with four children
(three of them born in Canada).
•
The applicant is the owner of a restaurant in
downtown Toronto.
•
He is married and they own the house where they
live.
•
He has the profit from the restaurant as the
only source of income for the family.
•
His five brothers, the sister and his mother are
all established in Canada.
[29]
It follows that it is not possible to determine with
any degree of precision the residency test in relation to which these findings
were applied. In particular, when it comes to the findings related to
Mr. Bani-Ahmad’s ties to Canada, it is not possible to discern in relation to which
of the two qualitative tests, that is the Papadogiorgakis test or the Koo
test, these findings would have been made.
[30]
Furthermore, the reasons for decision are
irreconcilable with each other. On the one hand, the Citizenship judge noted
that Mr. Bani-Ahmad was short of the 1095 days of physical presence required by
paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act. On the other hand, he approved Mr. Bani-Ahmad’s
citizenship application on the basis that he was satisfied that Mr. Bani-Ahmad “was actually living and was physically present in Canada on the number of days sufficient to comply with the Citizenship Act”.
[31]
As the Minister points out, these statements,
when read in isolation, might indicate that the Citizenship judge applied the
physical presence test. However, the Citizenship judge could not possibly have
applied that test given that Mr. Bani-Ahmad had not accumulated the threshold
number of days of physical presence in Canada. If he did, then his decision
falls squarely outside the range of possible outcomes, as required by Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190.
[32]
In sum, since it is impossible to identify which
test was used, it is impossible for this Court to understand why and how the
Citizenship judge reached his conclusion and to determine whether that
conclusion falls within the range of possible outcomes.
[33]
This is a clear case of a decision lacking in
clarity, transparency and intelligibility. For that reason alone, the impugned
decision is unreasonable and must be set aside. It is therefore not necessary
to examine the other ground of appeal raised by the Minister.
[34]
The Minister is seeking that the appeal be
granted and that Mr. Bani-Ahmad’s citizenship application be re-determined by a
different Citizenship judge. This would presumably avoid Mr. Bani Ahmad to
have to re-apply for Canadian citizenship, at least for the time being.
[35]
The appeal will be granted accordingly.
[36]
The Minister is not claiming his costs.
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