Date: 20140512
Dockets: T-1620-12
T-1673-12
T-1682-12
Citation: 2014 FC
443
Ottawa, Ontario, May 12, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Mosley
Docket: T-1620-12
|
BETWEEN:
|
KEVIN MACADAM
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Applicant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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Docket: T-1673-12
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AND
BETWEEN:
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KENT ESTABROOKS
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Applicant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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Docket: T-1682-12
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AND
BETWEEN:
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PATRICK DORSEY
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Applicant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
These are applications for judicial review,
under s 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act RSC, c F-7, of Public Service
Commission (PSC or Commission) decision #2012-085-IB dated August 8, 2012.
[2]
The decision followed an investigation pursuant
to sections 66 and 68 of the Public Service Employment Act, SC 2003, c
22 (the PSEA) into the appointment of Kevin MacAdam, under process number
10-ACO-EA-HO-68, to the position of Director General, Operations – PEI (DG
Operations) at the EX-2 group and level, by the Atlantic Canada Opportunities
Agency (ACOA).
[3]
The Commission found that the behaviour of
Patrick Dorsey, Kent Estabrooks, Paul LeBlanc and Monique Collette in the
appointment process constituted improper conduct that affected the selection of
Mr MacAdam for appointment to the position.
[4]
The three applications were initiated separately
but consolidated and heard together on consent. Messrs MacAdam and Estabrooks
seek an order quashing the Commission’s decision, remitting the matter to the
Commission for redetermination, and costs. Alternatively, Mr MacAdam seeks a
direction that the Commission appoint him to another position pursuant to s 73
of the PSEA, and costs. Mr Dorsey seeks an order quashing the Commission’s
decision and costs. The respondent seeks an order dismissing the applications
and costs.
[5]
For the reasons that follow, the applications
are dismissed.
I.
BACKGROUND:
[6]
The following facts are drawn from the record
and, in particular, from the Amended Investigation Report prepared by the
Commission. While inferences drawn from these facts by the Commission were
disputed by the applicants, the facts themselves were not seriously contested.
[7]
ACOA is a Canadian federal government agency
responsible for funding economic development in the Atlantic provinces. It is
based in Moncton, New Brunswick and has regional offices in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Charlottetown, PEI, Halifax, Nova Scotia and St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador. Appointments to positions within ACOA are made in accordance with the PSEA. The
authority to carry out staffing under the PSEA is delegated from the President
of the Public Service Commission to the President of ACOA. The President of
ACOA is responsible for decisions made regarding appointments to and within the
organization.
[8]
The DG Operations is the “second
in command” position in ACOA’s PEI office, and was established by
consolidating the responsibilities of two former positions: DG, Enterprise
Development and Policy, the former “second in command”
position, at the EX-02 level, and DG, Community Economic Development, at the
EX-01 level. ACOA’s three other regional offices have had a similar position
since 2006. Between 2006 and 2011, five internally advertised processes were
used to fill these positions. These advertisements were the same as the one used
in the case at bar, apart from the fact that they were all internally
advertised processes.
[9]
The applicant, Kevin MacAdam, was a researcher
and speech writer for the Leader of the Official Opposition (Progressive
Conservative Party) in Prince Edward Island following graduation from
university. Between 1996 and 2006, he was a Cabinet minister in the PEI government. In 2000, he was an unsuccessful Conservative candidate in the federal
election. From February 2006 to January 2010, Mr MacAdam occupied a political
staff position in the office of the Honourable Peter MacKay, then Minister of
Foreign Affairs and of ACOA. From January 2010 to February 2011, when Mr
MacAdam was appointed to the DG Operations position, Mr MacAdam was the Deputy
Chief of Staff to the Honourable Keith Ashfield, then Minister for the Atlantic
Gateway, Minister of National Revenue and Minister of ACOA.
[10]
Monique Collette was a career public servant and
President of ACOA from 2003 to 2010. Mme Collette was, therefore, responsible
for staffing of executive level positions at the time the appointment process
at question in these proceedings was initiated. However, she had delegated much
of the staffing responsibility to Paul LeBlanc, then Associate Deputy Minister
of ACOA.
[11]
Mr LeBlanc became President of ACOA on November
15, 2010 following Mme Collette’s retirement and, in that capacity, signed the
letter of offer to Mr MacAdam. From a discussion with Mr MacAdam, Mr LeBlanc
had known of Mr MacAdam’s interest in a position with ACOA for about a year
prior to the start of the appointment process. They had discussed anticipated
vacancies in ACOA in the region and in Ottawa. Mr LeBlanc had shared that
information with Mme Collette. Mr MacAdam had asked Mr LeBlanc about the
technicalities of joining the public service as a political staffer and sought
advice. Mr MacAdam was not aware before these discussions, according to Mr LeBlanc,
that an entitlement to priority consideration of former minister’s staff for
appointment to positions in the public service no longer existed.
[12]
When first interviewed, Mr MacAdam denied having
had these discussions with Mr LeBlanc or anyone else within ACOA. He stated
that he first knew of the opening for the DG Operations position when he saw it
advertised in November 2010. He said he had no inkling the opportunity might be
forthcoming and had not received any advance notice to look for the job
posting. He qualified those remarks following release of the initial report
prepared by the investigators to acknowledge that he had made general inquiries
about life in the public service.
[13]
The applicant, Patrick Dorsey, was the ACOA
Vice-President-PEI at the time of the appointment process and had held that
position since January 2007. He is described in the complaint that led to the
PSC investigation as “a long time Conservative organizer
and communications director to former PEI Premier Pat Binns”. In that
role he would have known Mr MacAdam, then a Minister in the Binns government.
They subsequently had further contacts through their respective roles in
relation to ACOA and contact at political events. In 2010 Mr Dorsey was
also chair of the Regional Federal Council for PEI, a forum for the exchange of
information between federal departments and agencies, and chair of the national
meetings of regional councils.
[14]
Wayne Hooper served as special advisor to Mr
Dorsey and has acted in the position as DG – Operations while Mr MacAdam has
been on language training. Mr Hooper was a friend of Mr MacAdam’s and from the
same community on the Island. He had served as Deputy Minister to Mr MacAdam in
the PEI Progressive Conservative government. The appointments of Messrs Dorsey
and Hooper to ACOA were the subject of separate PSC investigations. Mr Hooper
was acting Vice-President in the PEI ACOA office at the time that Mr MacAdam
discussed his interest in the position with Mr LeBlanc because Mr Dorsey was on
language training. Messrs LeBlanc and Hooper discussed proceeding with a
competition to staff the position.
[15]
The applicant, Kent Estabrooks, was the Director
General of Human Resources, ACOA at the time of the appointment. He replaced
Charlene Sullivan in that position while she was away on a one year assignment
from September 2010. Mr Estabrooks’ functional reporting relationship at ACOA PEI was to Mr Dorsey but his direct superior in the agency was Denise Frenette,
Vice-President Finance and Corporate Services.
[16]
Lorraine Léger served as Director, Staffing and
Human Resources Programs for ACOA and was the operational HR advisor during the
appointment process.
A.
Creation of the DG Operations position
[17]
In July 2010, Ms Sullivan, the DG Human
Resources at that time, advised Mr Dorsey that in her opinion, there would not,
subject to Mme Collette’s discretion as President, be any support for a bilingual
non-imperative staffing action given financial pressures on the agency and the
costs involved in second language training if the successful candidate did not
have the required level of language proficiency. In August 2010 she advised Mme
Léger of Mr Dorsey’s intent to staff the DG Operations position and of her
recommendation that it be staffed internally. Following a teleconference with Mr
Dorsey, Ms Sullivan advised him that he could proceed with staffing the
position on a bilingual imperative or non-imperative basis.
[18]
Brian Schmeisser who had been at ACOA for 22
years, was DG, Community Economic Development and Infrastructure at the EX-2
level until August 2010. At that time, Mr Schmeisser accepted an interchange
assignment to the Province of PEI, a process which, according to Mr Schmeisser,
had been initiated and encouraged by Mr Dorsey. ACOA officials agreed to pay
50% of his salary if the assignment was accepted. Following Mr Schmeisser’s
departure, the DG Operations position was created absorbing his
responsibilities. According to Mr Schmeisser, he had expressed interest in the
position to Mr Dorsey on a number of occasions, but Mr Dorsey had indicated
that he did not meet the language requirements. Ms Sullivan acknowledged, when
interviewed, that Mr Schmeisser’s departure was a factor in staffing of the DG
Operations position. Without it, she did not know that it would have gone ahead
as the organizational structure for a small branch like that in PEI would not have supported another DG at the EX-2 level.
[19]
When initially interviewed by the PSC
investigators, Mr Dorsey stated that no other options such as an Interchange
Canada assignment or an internal process were considered for staffing the
position. He did not recall any discussions with HR personnel about his
decision to use an external advertised process. No attempts were made to test
whether an internal pool of bilingual candidates could be established. Mr Dorsey
stated that he had a general sense of the potential candidates including Mr MacAdam
and had discussed Mr MacAdam’s interest with Mr LeBlanc. He did not send
information about the position to his Federal Regional Council network. He
wished to complete the process before he himself went on an additional period
of French language training in February 2011.
[20]
On October 27, 2010, Mme Léger advised Mr Estabrooks,
who by then had replaced Ms Sullivan, that a rationale for non-imperative
staffing was needed. She originally tried to send this information using her
BlackBerry’s PIN feature, which allows for device to device message
transmission, by-passing the internal departmental email servers. Mme Léger had
only used this feature once before to protect the confidentiality of certain
information. The following day, October 28, 2010, in an email, Mme Léger asked Mr
Dorsey to speak to Mr Estabrooks about his plans for the position.
[21]
Mr Estabrooks reported to Denise Frenette, Vice
President, Finance and Corporate Services, on the conversation that followed
within an hour of Mme Frenette’s contact with Mr Dorsey. In his email
message Mr Estabrooks wrote:
… I explained about
the three conditions we had discussed and Pat [Dorsey] wasn’t aware of the
condition related to “vacating the job”… With that in mind I recommended he go
external… He said he preferred to go internal, but that he understood the
dynamics/issue and he’d be okay with that; I explained that based on the
standard criteria in the SMC’s for DG Ops I’ve seen, external processes can be
reasonably tight in terms of requirements, which mitigates the volume of
applications and helps with the rationale for non-imperative.
[22]
Mr Dorsey was asked by the PSC investigators
about Mr Estabrooks’ references to “dynamics/issue”,
Mr Dorsey’s preference for an internal process, and the condition related to “vacating the job”. According to Mr Dorsey, the “dynamics/issue” comment referred to the timeframe and
ability to attract good candidates. He said that his preference for an
internal process was due to the workload that an external process could
generate. He stated that he did not know what the condition of “vacating the job” meant. He did not recall discussing
any particular candidate with Mr Estabrooks, nor the eligibility of ministers’
staff.
[23]
When shown this email during the investigation Mme
Frenette initially stated that it was a situation of giving Mr MacAdam access
to the process. He had expressed interest in the position. The factor that
changed the decision from using an internal process to an external process was
the fact that Mr MacAdam still had his job in the Minister’s office. Mr
Estabrooks had explained this to her. She later qualified her statements by
saying she did not know this to be a fact but assumed it was the case. She was
certain that Mr Estabrooks had discussed the implications of s. 35.2 of the
PSEA with Mr Dorsey.
[24]
S. 35.2 of the PSEA was enacted in 2006 as part
of the Federal Accountability Act, 1st Sess, 39th Parl, 2006, cl 10. The
intent was to eliminate preferential hiring for ministers’ political staff.
Previously, ministerial staff were entitled to bypass the normal public service
competitive hiring process and be appointed to positions in the public service
with priority over others. The intent of the amendment in 2006 was to reduce
the potential for politicizing the public service. As declared at the time,
this previous entitlement “undermined both the
non-partisan nature of the public service and its adherence to the merit
principle”: http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/faa-lfi/fs-fi/16/06fs-fi-eng.asp.
The amendment allowed persons who had been employed for three years with a
minister to apply for internal public service competitions for a period of one
year after the end of their employment. To be eligible to apply for these
internally advertised positions, they had to first resign or “vacate” their political job, as described by Mr Estabrooks
in the email to Mme Frenette.
[25]
Mr Estabrooks acknowledged that he researched
this provision when he was made aware that a person in the minister’s office
was interested in the position. He did not know at the time that it was Mr
MacAdam. His research was prompted by a question from Mr Dorsey.
[26]
On October 28, 2010 Mr Dorsey signed a Human
Resource Action Request to initiate an external advertised appointment process
with a bilingual non-imperative language requirement. A day later, he sent a
memorandum to Mme Colette seeking approval to staff the DG Operations position
on a non-imperative basis. He wrote:
The intent is to
advertise as broadly as possible through a national external advertised process,
which is expected to yield some very qualified candidates. However it is
anticipated that many applicants will be unilingual or have only a functional
(B) level proficiency in French. It is important to provide those individuals
with the opportunity to have access to this position.
[27]
On November 2, 2010 ACOA advertised the position
on the PSC’s website: jobs.gc.ca. The position was listed as being located in PEI and as having an indeterminate (permanent) tenure. The language requirements were
listed as bilingual non-imperative, meaning that the candidate selected for
appointment would be eligible for language training in the event they did not
meet the specified level of proficiency (CBC) at the time of appointment.
B.
The appointment process
[28]
The deadline for receipt of applications was
fixed at November 15, 2010. By that date, 73 applications were received but 48
were automatically screened out by the PSC’s automated resourcing system. That
left 25 applications that were referred to ACOA. Of those, 14 were screened
out by Mme Léger and the remainder referred to Mr Dorsey for further review.
He determined that 6 individuals met the screening requirements and they were
invited for an interview. Two withdrew from the process, leaving four,
including Mr MacAdam, to be interviewed by the assessment board.
[29]
The board was comprised of Mr Dorsey, Paul
Mills, VP, ACOA-Newfoundland and Labrador, and Melissa McEachern, a Deputy
Minister from the PEI provincial government. Mme Léger was in attendance to
provide guidance and take notes. On December 15, 2010 the assessment board
determined that only one of the four candidates interviewed met all of the
essential qualifications, that being Mr MacAdam. Following reference checks
over the next few days conducted by an external consultant, Mr MacAdam was sent
a letter offering him the DG Operations position which he accepted on January
4, 2011. This predated confirmation of his educational credentials which
occurred a few days later. The effective date of appointment was February 7,
2011. Mr MacAdam thereupon began language training.
[30]
At the hearing of this application in January
2014, counsel advised that Mr MacAdam hoped to be in a position to pass the
required language tests in the near future. It appears that he was on language
training in the National Capital Region continuously from January 2011.
C.
The complaint
[31]
In a letter dated February 4, 2011, Brian
Murphy, Chair of the Liberal Party of Canada, Atlantic Caucus, advised the PSC
of his concern over the political affiliation of the directors and managerial
personnel of the ACOA regional offices that had been appointed by the
Conservative Government. Mr Murphy referred to the hiring of Messrs Dorsey,
MacAdam and Hooper. Mr Murphy urged the PSC to consider the possibility of
overruling some of the nominations which, he said, were partisan and becoming
the norm at ACOA.
D.
The investigation
[32]
By letter dated March 18, 2011, the PSC
Investigation Directorate (the Investigation Directorate) advised Mr MacAdam of
Mr Murphy’s letter and allegations. The letter informed Mr MacAdam that
pursuant to s 66 of the PSEA, the Investigation Directorate would investigate
the possibility of irregularities concerning the appointment process which
might have an impact on the merit principle, or that there was an error, an
omission or improper conduct that affected the selection of the person
appointed. Pursuant to s 68 of the PSEA, the Directorate would investigate the
possibility that the appointment was not free from political influence.
[33]
Interviews were conducted in 2011. On April 11,
2012, those who had been interviewed were provided with an initial factual
report which summarized the relevant information gathered during the course of
the investigation. They were asked to provide any comments or submissions on
that collected information, which some chose to do.
[34]
In a letter dated July 12, 2012, those
interviewed were informed that the investigation was complete. They were
provided with a copy of the Investigation Report which set out the facts as
found by the investigators, their analysis, and conclusions. The recipients
were asked to provide comments and submissions on the Investigation Report and
the proposed corrective actions, which, again, some chose to do.
[35]
The Investigation Report concluded that Mr MacAdam
met the essential qualifications of the DG Operations position and that there
was no political interference in his appointment. However, the report found
that the behaviour of Patrick Dorsey, Kent Estabrooks, Paul LeBlanc and Monique
Collette in the staffing process constituted improper conduct that affected the
selection of Mr MacAdam.
[36]
Among other things, the investigators concluded
that Mr Dorsey’s assertion that the external process was chosen to address his
concern about attracting a sufficient pool of candidates was not credible. As
noted above, Mr Estabrooks had researched the conditions for political staff
applying to internal appointment processes on Mr Dorsey’s request. He
recommended an external process to Dorsey on the basis of this research. Mr MacAdam’s
eligibility to be considered in the appointment process was, therefore, a key
factor in Mr Dorsey’s decision to use an external process, the investigators
concluded.
[37]
Mr Dorsey’s initial preference for an internal
process had been documented by Mr Estabrooks in the email sent October 28,
2010. The investigators inferred that Mr Dorsey’s acceptance of Mr Estabrooks’
recommendation indicated that his decision was based on Mr MacAdam’s
personal circumstances.
[38]
Mme Léger had told the investigators that rumours
were circulating within ACOA around the time the process was advertised to the
effect that the job was for a particular individual. She recalled hearing Mr
MacAdam’s name being mentioned.
[39]
Mr MacAdam had little competition for the
position amongst the candidates interviewed. The investigators noted that while
Mr Dorsey was not obligated to share information on the job opportunity with
anyone, he acknowledged that he did not share the information with his Federal
Council network, an obvious source of potential candidates, or the PEI regional council.
[40]
Thus, the investigators concluded, on the
balance of probabilities, key decisions in the appointment process were based
on Mr MacAdam’s language abilities and position as a Minister’s staff member -
which they found to be unsuitable behaviour. These key decisions affected Mr MacAdam’s
appointment since he would not have been eligible to apply had they not been
made.
[41]
Mr Dorsey was the key decision-maker in the
process of creating and filling the DG Operations position. He was instrumental
in Mr Schmeisser’s external assignment, which allowed for the creation of the
new position. Mr Dorsey’s decision to advertise externally was based on Mr MacAdam’s
ineligibility if they advertised internally, the investigators found. Further, Mr
Dorsey’s recommendation to staff the position on a bilingual non-imperative
basis was not based on past experiences, past processes or attempts to fill
positions with similar attributes. His decisions and recommendations were
focused on Mr MacAdam’s eligibility. This approach was not in keeping with an
expectation for fair and transparent decision making in an appointment process,
the investigators concluded.
[42]
Mr Estabrooks’ behaviour was found to constitute
improper conduct that affected Mr MacAdam’s appointment. Mr Estabrooks
knew that someone at the Minister’s office was interested in applying for the
position, though he may not have known that it was Mr MacAdam. He researched
the conditions in which minister’s staff can apply to internal appointment
processes before recommending that an external process be used to ensure that
the person at the Minister’s office could apply. The investigators concluded
that Mr Estabrooks’ statements demonstrated that he was comfortable
recommending an external process on the basis of the circumstances of one
individual, that the focus of his recommendation was ensuring the eligibility
of the individual at the Minister’s office, and that he participated in making
decisions tailored to Mr MacAdam’s circumstances.
[43]
Mme Collette and Mr LeBlanc’s actions in
authorizing this process were also found to constitute improper behaviour that
affected Mr MacAdam’s appointment to the DG Operations position.
[44]
The final decision was issued by the Commission
on August 10, 2012.
II.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[45]
The Commission ordered that the Investigation
Report be amended to delete a paragraph and a sentence and to relocate a second
paragraph. Apart from those changes, the Commission accepted the Investigation
Report. It recognized that there was no improper conduct on the part of the
appointee, Mr MacAdam. However, improper conduct was found within the
appointment process bringing its integrity into question. In accordance with
its authority to take corrective action under s 66 of the PSEA, the Commission
ordered that:
MacAdam’s appointment to the position of
Director General, Operations – PEI, at the EX-2 group and level, be revoked;
Dorsey and Estabrooks complete two courses on
leadership and ethics at the Canada School of Public Service, within six months
of the Decision;
The President, ACOA not delegate or
sub-delegate appointment and appointment related authorities to Dorsey or
Estabrooks for a period of three years beginning on the date of the signing of
the Decision; and
Dorsey not exercise any duties related to
staffing for a period of three years beginning on the date of the signing of
the Decision.
[46]
On September 18, 2012, the Commission ordered
that the implementation of the order in the Record of Decision be suspended
pending the outcome of this judicial review application.
III.
ISSUES:
[47]
Having considered the issues proposed by the
parties, I conclude that they are as follows:
1.
Was the Commission’s decision finding improper
conduct in the appointment of Mr MacAdam reasonable?
2.
Were the corrective actions ordered against Messrs
MacAdam, Estabrooks and Dorsey reasonable?
IV.
APPLICABLE LEGISLATION:
[48]
The relevant provisions of the PSEA are found in
the Preamble, section 35.2 respecting the mobility of ministers’ staff members
and in Part 5, sections 66 and 68.
Public Service
Employment Act, SC 2003, c 22.
|
Loi sur l’emploi
dans la fonction publique, LC 2003, c 22.
|
Preamble
Recognizing
that
|
Préambule
Attendu :
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
Canada will continue to benefit from a public service that is based on
merit and non-partisanship and in which these values are independently
safeguarded;
|
qu’il demeure
avantageux pour le Canada de pouvoir compter sur une fonction publique non
partisane et axée sur le mérite et que ces valeurs doivent être protégées de
façon indépendante;
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
authority to make
appointments to and within the public service has been vested in the Public
Service Commission, which can delegate this authority to deputy heads;
|
que le pouvoir de
faire des nominations à la fonction publique et au sein de celle-ci est
conféré à la Commission de la fonction publique et que ce pouvoir peut être
délégué aux administrateurs généraux;
|
those to whom this
appointment authority is delegated must exercise it within a framework that ensures
that they are accountable for its proper use to the Commission, which in turn
is accountable to Parliament;
|
que ceux qui sont
investis du pouvoir délégué de dotation doivent l’exercer dans un cadre
exigeant qu’ils en rendent compte à la Commission, laquelle, à son tour, en
rend compte au Parlement;
|
delegation of
staffing authority should be to as low a level as possible within the public
service, and should afford public service managers the flexibility necessary
to staff, to manage and to lead their personnel to achieve results for
Canadians; and
|
que le pouvoir de
dotation devrait être délégué à l’échelon le plus bas possible dans la
fonction publique pour que les gestionnaires disposent de la marge de
manoeuvre dont ils ont besoin pour effectuer la dotation, et pour gérer et
diriger leur personnel de manière à obtenir des résultats pour les Canadiens;
|
the Government of Canada
is committed to a public service that embodies linguistic duality and that is
characterized by fair, transparent employment practices, respect for
employees, effective dialogue, and recourse aimed at resolving appointment
issues;
|
que le gouvernement
du Canada souscrit au principe d’une fonction publique qui incarne la dualité
linguistique et qui se distingue par ses pratiques d’emploi équitables et
transparentes, le respect de ses employés, sa volonté réelle de dialogue et
ses mécanismes de recours destinés à résoudre les questions touchant les
nominations,
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
Mobility — ministers’
staffs
35.2 A person who has been employed for at least three
years in the office of a minister or of a person holding the recognized
position of Leader of the Opposition in the Senate or Leader of the
Opposition in the House of Commons, or in any of those offices successively,
•
a) may, during a period of one year after they cease
to be so employed, participate in an advertised appointment process for which
the organizational criterion established under section 34 entitles all
employees to be considered, as long as they meet the other criteria, if any,
established under that section; and
•
(b) has the right to
make a complaint under section 77.
|
Mobilité — personnel du
ministre
35.2 La personne qui a été, pendant au moins
trois ans, employée dans le cabinet d’un ministre ou du titulaire des charges
de leader de l’Opposition au Sénat ou de chef de l’Opposition à la Chambre
des communes, ou employée successivement dans deux ou trois de ces
cabinets :
•
a) peut participer, pendant une période
d’un an à partir de la date de sa cessation d’emploi, à tout processus de
nomination annoncé pour lequel le critère organisationnel fixé en vertu de
l’article 34 vise tous les fonctionnaires, pourvu qu’elle satisfasse aux
autres critères fixés, le cas échéant, en vertu de cet article;
•
b) a le droit de présenter une plainte en
vertu de l’article 77.
|
PART
5
INVESTIGATIONS AND
COMPLAINTS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS
|
PARTIE 5
ENQUÊTES ET PLAINTES RELATIVES AUX NOMINATIONS
|
Investigation
of Appointments by Commission
|
Enquêtes
de la Commission sur les nominations
|
External appointments
66. The Commission may
investigate any external appointment process and, if it is satisfied that the
appointment was not made or proposed to be made on the basis of merit, or
that there was an error, an omission or improper conduct that affected the
selection of the person appointed or proposed for appointment, the Commission
may
|
Nominations externes
66. La Commission peut mener
une enquête sur tout processus de nomination externe; si elle est convaincue
que la nomination ou la proposition de nomination n’a pas été fondée sur le
mérite ou qu’une erreur, une omission ou une conduite irrégulière a influé
sur le choix de la personne nommée ou dont la nomination est proposée, la
Commission peut :
|
(a) revoke the appointment or not
make the appointment, as the case may be; and
|
a) révoquer la
nomination ou ne pas faire la nomination, selon le cas;
|
(b) take any corrective action that
it considers appropriate.
|
b) prendre les
mesures correctives qu’elle estime indiquées.
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
Political influence
68. If it
has reason to believe that an appointment or proposed appointment was not
free from political influence, the Commission may investigate the appointment
process and, if it is satisfied that the appointment or proposed appointment
was not free from political influence, the Commission may
|
Nomination fondée sur
des motifs d’ordre politique
68. La
Commission peut mener une enquête si elle a des raisons de croire que la
nomination ou proposition de nomination pourrait avoir résulté de l’exercice
d’une influence politique; si elle est convaincue que la nomination ou
proposition de nomination ne s’est pas faite indépendamment de toute
influence politique, elle peut :
|
(a) revoke the appointment or not make
the appointment, as the case may be; and
|
a) révoquer la nomination ou ne pas faire la nomination, selon le
cas;
|
(b) take any corrective action that it
considers appropriate.
|
b) prendre les mesures correctives qu’elle estime indiquées.
|
V.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
[49]
The parties are agreed that the standard of
review applicable to the Commission’s decision is reasonableness: Dunsmuir v
New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] at paras 43-64; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury
Board), 2011 SCC 62 [Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses] at paras
12-14, 18.
[50]
I agree with the parties that the question has
been satisfactorily determined by the prior jurisprudence and does not require
a standard of review analysis. The interpretation and application of sections
66 and 68 of the PSEA are, among other provisions, at the heart of the
Commission’s mandate and expertise: Seck v Canada (Attorney General),
2011 FC 1355 [Seck] at paras 10-11. As stated in Hughes v Canada
(Attorney General), 2009 FC 573 at para 26, the scope of discretion given
to the Commission, combined with the “discrete and
special” nature of the Public Service regime, and the Commission's
expertise within that regime signal that deference is due to decisions of the
Commission. Accordingly, the decision is reviewable on the standard of
reasonableness.
[51]
According to the instructions provided by the
Supreme Court in Dunsmuir, above, at para 47:
Reasonableness is a
deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development
of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come
before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific,
particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible,
reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the
range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for
reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable,
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In
judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making
process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.
VI.
ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS:
A.
Was the Commission’s decision finding improper
conduct in the appointment of Mr MacAdam reasonable?
(1)
Mr MacAdam’s arguments
[52]
Mr MacAdam contends that the Commission wrongly
determined that improper conduct influenced his selection, contrary to the
evidence that Mr Dorsey, Mr Estabrooks, Mr LeBlanc and Mme Collette acted with
no improper intent. The Commission had previously found that it was necessary
to consider the intent behind the actions taken in assessing whether there had
been improper conduct in the selection process: Public Service Commission –
Investigation Report Summary 2008 – Founded – Correctional Service of Canada
(http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca).
[53]
In this instance, Mr MacAdam argues, the evidence
demonstrated that ACOA managers sought to advertise the position as broadly as
possible through a national external process to ensure wide access. This is
supported in particular, he says, by Mr Dorsey’s evidence that recruiting
bilingual candidates in PEI was challenging. It is also reflected in ACOA’s
Human Resources Plan for 2010-2012 (the HR Plan) for that period, which
reflects previous difficulties recruiting experienced candidates. The steps
taken by Mr Dorsey, Mr Estabrooks, Mr LeBlanc and Mme Collette were consistent
with a shared understanding of this factor. Any knowledge they may have had
that he was likely to apply did not constitute improper conduct as he was an
example of the type of candidate they sought to attract.
[54]
Mr MacAdam submits that the establishment of
essential criteria and assessment of qualifications was within Mr Dorsey’s
authority as the staffing manager as this Court has previously recognized: Lavigne
v Canada (Deputy Minister of Justice), 2009 FC 684 at paras 1-3, 70. In the
result, he was the only qualified candidate who met all of the essential
qualifications as determined by the staffing manager with the consensus of the
two other members of the three-person selections panel.
[55]
The Commission erred, Mr MacAdam submits, in
concluding that the decision to post the DG, Operations position as bilingual
non-imperative was due to Mr MacAdam’s insufficient French proficiency and that
the use of the external process was intended to give him access to the
appointment process. There is no evidence, he contends, that the responsible
managers were aware of his language proficiency or, rather, lack thereof at the
time.
[56]
Further, the Commission unreasonably concluded,
without any supporting evidence, Mr MacAdam submits, that his personal
circumstances required an external posting. Mr MacAdam was entitled to
participate in an internal process for one year after he had ceased to be
employed in a Minister’s office. There was no evidence, he argues, that he was
not prepared to resign his position in order to be eligible to apply. There is
also no evidence, he says, as to whether Mr Dorsey, Mr Estabrooks, Mr LeBlanc
or Mme Collette presumed, as a result of his interest, that he would not likely
do so.
[57]
In general, Mr MacAdam argues, the Commission
relied on conjecture, assumptions, rumours and second-hand information relayed
by individuals not directly involved in the staffing process to make findings
of fact that cannot be supported by the evidence.
(2)
Mr Dorsey’s Arguments
[58]
Mr Dorsey submits that the Commission erred in
its interpretation of the term “improper conduct”.
The term is not defined in the PSEA. The Commission described it as “…unsuitable behaviour, whether by action or inaction… in
relation to an appointment process”. In Mr Dorsey’s view, a
contextual and purposive analysis makes it clear that Parliament did not intend
“improper conduct” to be a purely subjective
assessment of “suitable behaviour” by the
Commission. It was intended to capture conduct that was not necessarily wrong
in law, but nonetheless contrary to the rules and guidelines established by the
Commission pursuant to section 29(3) of the PSEA. Conduct contrary to these
policies is improper. Here, there was no breach of the policies and, hence, no
improper conduct.
Commission policies
29(3) The
Commission may establish policies respecting the manner of making and
revoking appointments and taking corrective action.
|
Lignes directrices
29(3) La Commission
peut établir des lignes directrices sur la façon de faire et de révoquer les
nominations et de prendre des mesures correctives.
|
[59]
The Commission failed to consider, Mr Dorsey
submits, the evidence that attracting candidates to PEI was a concern for ACOA
and that senior positions had previously been staffed through external processes
on a bilingual non-imperative basis. His own appointment was a case in point.
Neither the PSEA nor its policies required that the position be staffed on a
bilingual imperative basis. PEI is not a region designated as bilingual for
language-of-work purposes, such as New Brunswick. Moreover, there were existing
pools of candidates for the DG positions in the other Atlantic provinces. That
was not the case for the position in PEI. Thus it was important to have the widest
possible area of selection. Excluding Mr MacAdam, who had expressed an interest
in joining the public service, would not have been reasonable. A political
background should not exclude someone from consideration.
[60]
The appointment process chosen by ACOA was one
of many “options” available to it under the PSEA.
While the Commission may have taken a different approach, Parliament has seen
fit to authorize the delegation of appointment authority to persons other than
the Commission and to set the threshold for subsequent intervention by the Commission
at impropriety – not mere disagreement or unsuitability. It was unreasonable
and improper for the Commission to assess the recommendation by Mr Dorsey on
the basis of what it considered to be suitable in the circumstances.
[61]
Mr Dorsey submits that the remedial authority of
the Commission in section 66 of the PSEA is conditional upon a finding of “improper conduct that affected the selection of the person
appointed”. This is reflected in the Guideline on Corrective Action and
Revocation published by the Commission, which provides that in order to be
actionable, the defect must affect the person selected for appointment (http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/plcy-pltq/guides/revocation/guid-orie-eng.htm).
[62]
The Commission found that the recommendation
made by Mr Dorsey was “unsuitable behaviour in an
appointment process” and, consequently, “improper
conduct that affected the selection of [Mr MacAdam] for appointment”. Missing
from the Commission’s analysis, Mr Dorsey argues, is the necessary connection
between the allegedly “improper behaviour” and the
selection of Mr MacAdam. Mr MacAdam was found to be qualified by a properly
constituted selection board and had he not participated, no candidate would
have qualified.
(3)
Mr Estabrooks’ arguments
[63]
Mr Estabrooks submits that the Commission’s
determination that he had engaged in improper conduct is premised upon a single
finding: that his recommendation of an external selection process was based on
his knowledge of an interested outside candidate. The determination was unreasonable,
he submits, because he was merely an advisor in the process. Using his
knowledge and judgment, he recommended that the responsible manager (Mr Dorsey)
exercise his discretion by choosing an external process, and reasonably
concluded that an external process fulfilled the objectives of the PSEA in
staffing this position.
[64]
In his case, Mr Estabrooks submits, the
Commission failed to consider two areas of highly relevant evidence in reaching
its conclusion. First, he contends, the Commission ignored the evidence that it
was routine ACOA practice to consider the presence of potential candidates when
selecting an internal versus external process. Second, the Commission failed to
consider that, once the actual process occurred, none of the internal candidates
met the essential qualifications, confirming that an external process was
necessary to yield a qualified candidate for the position. This result
confirmed that Mr Estabrooks’ recommendation of an external process was not
improper, and was consistent with the principle that the area of selection must
be sufficient to provide a reasonable pool of candidates.
[65]
Further, Mr Estabrooks submits, it was
unreasonable for the Commission to rely on the fact that other ACOA DG
Operations positions had been filled using an internal process as there were
many other examples of external processes used to staff similar positions in
Atlantic Canada.
(4)
Respondent’s arguments
[66]
The respondent submits that the Commission’s
determination of improper conduct was reasonable. The term “improper conduct” must be interpreted according to a
textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious
with the PSEA as a whole: Seck v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 314
at paras 21-22 [Seck, FCA]. The context in which it is employed in this
instance includes behaviours that run contrary to the guiding values prescribed
by the PSEA and PSC policies.
[67]
The PSEA and the PSC Appointment Policy (the
Appointment Policy) are designed to ensure integrity in the appointment process
in the public service, and to foster the public’s confidence in the staffing
decisions that are made. The current PSEA replaced the old complex and slow
rules-based approach with a values-based approach, and requires that managers
be guided by and respect the values of the PSEA at each stage of an appointment
process. These values are highlighted in the preamble of the PSEA. Appointment
decisions must be guided by the values of fairness, transparency,
representativeness and access.
[68]
The PSC’s interpretation of “improper conduct” as meaning “unsuitable
behaviour whether by action or inaction in relation to an appointment process”
was inspired by the guiding values of the PSEA, the respondent submits.
Personal favouritism or concealment of true motives for decisions made during
an appointment process will constitute improper conduct if they undermine one
or more of the PSEA values. The old rules-based definition linked solely to
whether a PSC policy requirement has been breached is too rigid and would frustrate
Parliament’s intent.
[69]
The French version of “improper
conduct” in section 66 is “conduite irrégulière”. Neither the French nor the English terms require any bad faith
intention, the respondent argues. Further the PSC’s interpretation is
consistent with the ordinary meaning of the words and accords with dictionary
definitions:
Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “improper” as “1 Incorrect;
unsuitable or irregular. 2 Fraudulent or otherwise wrongful”;
Black’s Law
Dictionary online defines “improper conduct” as “The behaviour
that a reasonable person would not do”;
The Canadian
Oxford Dictionary defines “improper” as
“1(a) Unseemly; indecent; (b) not in accordance with accepted rules of
behaviour. 2 Wrong or incorrect. 3 Dishonest, irregular (improper business
practices).
[70]
The respondent submits that if intent is
required, improper conduct was established by the failure to provide
transparent written documentation or rationales for the choice of process
(external, bilingual non-imperative); that this was non-compliant with policy;
and that there was a deliberate intent by senior ACOA officials to create and
design this appointment to specifically allow Mr MacAdam to apply and
participate so that he could be appointed to the position. Messrs Dorsey and
Estabrooks concealed the real reason why an advertised external process was
chosen, and why the position was staffed on a bilingual non-imperative basis.
[71]
No transparent rationale was provided for
recommending a bilingual non-imperative appointment process and no pool for
bilingual candidates had been tested by first advertising the position with a
bilingual imperative, the respondent argues.
[72]
The concealment of the real motive for making
these choices, the respondent submits, breached the PSC policy requirement in
relation to the value of transparency, and supports a finding of improper
conduct. Furthermore, the fairness of the appointment process was tainted by
the fact that key decisions were made on the basis of ensuring that Mr MacAdam
could apply.
[73]
The respondent submits that Mr MacAdam’s
language profile was known to the officials at ACOA on the basis of his
previous and long-standing interactions with them, and notes, in particular,
that Mr Dorsey stated in a memo to Mme Collette that “it
is anticipated that many applicants will be unilingual or have only a
functional (B) level proficiency in French”. According to the Treasury
Board’s Directive on the Staffing of Bilingual Positions, “when non-imperative staffing is proposed, managers must
provide a justification in writing”. Mr Dorsey failed to provide an
adequate or transparent justification in recommending that the process be
bilingual non-imperative, the respondent contends.
[74]
Contrary to Mr MacAdam’s assertion that ACOA’s HR
Plan provided justification for the decision to staff the DG Operations
position on a bilingual non-imperative basis, Mr Dorsey never referred to it
and specifically stated when interviewed that it had no bearing on EX level
appointments. Further, none of the applicants referred to the HR Plan in their
commentary and submissions provided in response to the Investigation Report,
the respondent notes.
[75]
In the respondent’s submission, the context of
the appointment process for the DG Operations position includes the following
facts set out in the investigation report:
•
Mr Schmeisser was assigned to the provincial
government at the initiative of Mr Dorsey, after which he consolidated Mr Schmeisser’s
duties into the new DG Operations position. Mr Dorsey told Mr Schmeisser he
needed a change;
•
The appointment process was made external, as
opposed to the internal appointment process used in the other three Atlantic provinces to staff the same position;
•
Planning this appointment process began while Mr
Hooper, a childhood friend of Mr MacAdam, was acting Vice-President of the ACOA
in PEI, though Human Resource responsibilities were still handled by Mr Dorsey;
•
Mme Léger stated that the appointment process
was moving fast and that rumours existed to the effect that the job was for Mr MacAdam;
•
Ms Sullivan advised in an email that she would
recommend the position be advertised internally rather than externally;
•
Mme Frenette confirmed that “conditions relating to vacation the job” related to the
mobility of Minister’s staff – they could only have access to internal
advertisements if they left the Minister’s office; Mme Frenette stated that Mr
MacAdam’s employment with the Minister’s office was the factor that prompted
the change in the process from internal to external;
•
Mr Estabrooks stated that the interest of an
individual from the Minister’s office was a significant factor in his
recommendation to use an external process;
•
Mr Estabrooks stated that Mr Dorsey wanted to
provide the individual from the Minister’s office with an opportunity to
compete;
•
Mme Frenette stated that Mr Estabrooks had
informed her that the requirement for a Minister’s staff-member, Mr MacAdam, to
vacate his job was the reason for making the process external;
•
Mme Frenette testified that she was certain Mr Estabrooks
discussed the requirements of the PSEA with Mr Dorsey to determine how a
Minister’s staff-member, Mr MacAdam, could be given access to the process,
which is why Mr Estabrooks researched the conditions in section 35.2 of the PSEA;
•
Mme Collette said that the decision to use an external
appointment process rested with Mr Dorsey;
•
Mme Léger advised Mr Estabrooks that a rationale
for non-imperative staffing needed to address attempts that were made to staff
the position on a bilingual imperative basis; Mr Dorsey acknowledged that no
such attempts were made;
•
Mr MacAdam’s interest in the DG Operations
position was known to key ACOA employees and was known to Mr LeBlanc at least a
year before the position was posted. Mr LeBlanc, Mme Léger, Mme Frenette, Mme Collette,
Michael Zinck (Director of the Ministerial Liaison Office), and Mr Hooper knew
that Mr MacAdam was interested in the DG Operations position before it was
posted.
[76]
Ensuring that Mr MacAdam could participate in
the appointment process was a key factor in the decision to use an external
process, the respondent submits. The fact that this justification was concealed
undermines the value of transparency, violates the Appointment Policy, and was
therefore reasonably found to constitute improper conduct as per section 66 of
the PSEA.
(5)
Analysis
[77]
I agree with the respondent that the Commission
must be accorded significant deference in interpreting its home statute: Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association,
2011 SCC 61 at paras 30, 39. The purpose of the PSEA was to provide a more
flexible, values-based system, and this includes the administration of section
66 and the interpretation of “improper conduct”.
Improper conduct may reasonably be found where unsuitable behaviour related to
the appointment process undermines one or more of the PSEA’s guiding values.
Contrary to the submissions of the applicants, the definition employed by the
Commission is not overly subjective, and, on a plain language reading of the
legislation, a bad faith intent is not a necessary requirement notwithstanding
its incorporation in prior PSC decisions.
[78]
Under the applicable policies related to
appointments, a fair process requires that staffing decisions are made
objectively and free from political influence or personal favouritism. This
was, among other things, one of the objectives of the 2006 Accountability
Act. In this instance, there was no indication of political influence in
the appointment process by ministers or their staff. I agree with the
respondent, however, that the Commission’s finding that the process was tainted
by improper conduct was reasonable on the evidence.
[79]
All that I need to determine in these
proceedings is whether the Commission’s decision is intelligible, justified and
transparent and falls within the range of acceptable outcomes defensible on the
facts and the law: Dunsmuir, above, at para 47. I have no difficulty in
arriving at that conclusion.
[80]
From my reading of the record, the evidence
amply demonstrated the exercise of personal favouritism by Mr Dorsey to assist a
former associate in PEI provincial politics find a soft landing back home in a
secure and senior public service position. Mr MacAdam was the beneficiary of
that favour. Mr Estabrooks was neither an instigator nor a prime mover of this
process, but he facilitated Mr Dorsey’s efforts to smooth the way for Mr
MacAdam to obtain the position without first having to resign from his job in
the Minister’s office.
[81]
It was reasonable for the Commission
investigators to conclude from the evidence that ACOA officials, including Mr Dorsey,
were aware of Mr MacAdam’s interest in obtaining an indeterminate public
service position despite his testimony to the contrary. This was confirmed by
Mr LeBlanc, Mme Collette and other senior officials within ACOA that were
interviewed. Collectively, they were aware of Mr MacAdam’s interest in a
position within ACOA and in moving back to PEI. Mme Collette and Mr LeBlanc
were aware of it even before they were informed of this by Minister Ashfield,
as a courtesy, during one of their regular meetings with the Minister in the
fall of 2010.
[82]
Mr MacAdam’s role as Deputy Chief of Staff in
the Minister’s office included ACOA affairs. He used an ACOA email address and
worked closely with the President and other senior officials. According to the
evidence of Minister Ashfield’s Chief of Staff, Fred Nott, the person who
replaced Mr MacAdam when he was appointed to the ACOA position was hired in the
summer of 2010, in spite of there not being a vacancy, because she had related
experience at the Chief of Staff level and was bilingual. Mr. Nott’s evidence
also indicates that there was pressure on the staffing levels in the office due
to the merger of personnel when Minister Ashfield assumed responsibility for
the portfolio. One inference that may be drawn is that it then became more
pressing for Mr MacAdam to find another job. The evidence is that Mr MacAdam
was, in any event, interested in finding more stable and secure employment,
preferably back home on the Island.
[83]
Discussions had been underway from the summer of
2010 to create and staff a DG Operations position. The organization chart for
the PEI Branch would not accommodate two DG positions at the EX-2 level. That
was resolved when Mr Schmeisser, who had expressed an interest in the position,
was encouraged by Mr Dorsey to take a secondment to a position with the PEI
Government with financial support (50% of his salary) from ACOA. Steps were
then taken to staff the DG Operations position.
[84]
Mr Dorsey’s assertion that he had based his decision
to use an external appointment process because of his concern for attracting a
sufficient pool of candidates was found to be not credible by the
investigators. This finding was reasonably open to the investigators. They
noted that Mr Dorsey’s initial preference for using an internal process but agreement
to go external when informed of the results of research into the eligibility of
ministerial staff to apply for the competition was contemporaneously documented
in Mr Estabrooks’ email to Mme Frenette of October 28, 2010.
[85]
I agree with the respondent that Mr MacAdam’s
assertion that he would have resigned his position to participate in an
internal appointment process is a self-serving statement deserving little or no
weight. There is no evidence that any ACOA officials were under the impression
that he would resign in order to take part in the competition. Rather, the
evidence indicates that the ACOA officials acted to protect his employment
status by ensuring that he did not have to first resign in order to qualify. Mr
MacAdam did not at first inform his Minister of his application because he
would be without a job if it did not work out.
[86]
Among the key pieces of evidence cited by the
respondent in its argument is an email from Mme Léger to Mr Estabrooks dated
October 27, 2010. The subject line says “Tried to PIN but
would not send”. As noted above, this is a reference to the PIN-to-PIN
messaging component of the Blackberry smart phones available on standing offer
to federal government departments and agencies. It allows one Blackberry user
to send a message to another that by-passes the departmental networks. No
explanation was provided for the puzzling question of why Mme Léger would
want to transmit a message to Mr Estabrooks in this manner concerning a
staffing process. While the investigators did not resolve this question, one
inference that could be drawn is that Mme Léger did not want the message to be preserved
in the network data banks. However, it was ultimately sent through the network
and retrieved by the investigators.
[87]
In the message, Mme Léger refers to a prior
conversation between herself and Mr Estabrooks and then writes:
One of the key
elements I should have noted when we spoke is the whole element of what is the
pool of potential candidates who meet?
A process of this
kind at this level is going to be posted nationally so the likelyhood [sic]
of having qualified individuals who are bilingual is I would assume higher than
50% (???). The rationale needs to address the “attempts” we have made to “ensure”
there are no other qualified candidats [sic] who meet the language
requirements.
The other piece to
consider is that the non-imperative candidate who is selected has 2 years to
attain the required level. If they do not meet there is a possibility (one of 4
conditions) for 2 one year extenions [sic] or they must be deployed to a
position for which they meet all req’ts including language. We would need to
have a non-bilingual EX-02 in our back pocket. There are no exceptions to this
and we (President) report through the DSAR annually.
[88]
The “DSAR” in
public service parlance is the Departmental Staffing Accountability Report
which measures performance under the PSEA each year. This is intended to
provide assurance to Parliament that the core values of merit and
non-partisanship, and the guiding values of fairness, transparency, access and
representativeness are respected in appointments.
[89]
I think that it is clear from this message that
ACOA personnel were aware that they were at risk of being non-compliant with
the PSEA core values should the decision be made to proceed with the external
staffing process and also that they knew that there was likely to be a sizable
number of internal candidates who met the language requirements if the job was
posted nationally. Thus they had to provide a rationale that addressed the “attempts” made to “ensure”
there were no other qualified bilingual candidates. This does not suggest an
effort to meet the core values but rather a warning that Mr Estabrooks and the
responsible managers would have to cover their tracks if they were to proceed
otherwise.
[90]
It is also striking that Mme Léger points to the
consequences of proceeding with non-imperative staffing. Any successful
candidate who did not meet the language requirements of the position would be
entitled to two years training and possibly for two years longer to become
bilingual. And if he did not succeed in that time frame, the successful
candidate would be guaranteed an equivalent position elsewhere in the
organization. This followed an earlier warning from Ms Sullivan in July 2010
that there wouldn’t be support for non-imperative staffing for budgetary
reasons because of the cost implications of having to fill the position on an
interim basis in addition to paying the salary costs of the successful
candidate and possibly having to support an additional position at the EX-2
level. This warning was prescient. As noted above, Mr MacAdam had yet to meet
the language requirements of the position by January 2014.
[91]
In the result, Mr MacAdam went directly from his
position in the Minister’s office to a guaranteed EX-2 position whatever
success he might achieve in language training. Barring a more senior level
appointment or lucrative position in the private sector, this could not have
been a softer landing for a former political staffer looking for a more secure
position close to home.
[92]
One of the questions that I had in reviewing the
record of this staffing process is how it was possible that Mr MacAdam became
the only qualified candidate for what is a relatively senior and secure position
in the federal public service. EX-2 positions do not grow on trees,
particularly in Atlantic Canada. The applicants argue that it was understood by
ACOA management that potential candidates would not want to move to PEI for career and personal reasons. That may be a reasonable explanation but I wondered
whether there was another.
[93]
I agree with the applicants that rumour,
scuttlebutt and speculation that “the job was for MacAdam”,
should have no place in determining whether improper conduct took place in a
staffing competition. But if such rumours were circulating, as Mme Léger
stated, it is not difficult to draw the inference that they could have had a
chilling effect on other qualified candidates who might otherwise have been
interested in the position. This may go some way to explain why they did not
apply.
[94]
As for the actual assessment board interviews,
the scribbled notes taken at the time are of little help. There does not appear
to have been a serious effort made to record the interviews. And apart from a
bald statement that “Kevin MacAdam was the only qualified
candidate”, no explanation is provided for why the other candidates
interviewed did not qualify. Mr Dorsey acknowledged that he did not provide any
explanation to one of the candidates who had gone to the trouble of travelling to
Charlottetown for the interview. Another was told he did not succeed,
according to Mr Dorsey, because he had “never been in a
substantive EX” and “it was a significant leap”.
That candidate later raised the fairness and transparency of the process with Mr
Dorsey. Mr Dorsey says that the candidate “drew some conclusions because of who
was eventually successful” and that he, Mr Dorsey, had explained why the candidate
didn’t meet the requirements. Unfortunately, those explanations do not appear
in the notes.
[95]
This is not to suggest that Mr MacAdam was not
qualified for the position. It is unquestionable that he knew the economic
conditions on the island well and was very familiar with the ACOA process both
from his prior experience as a provincial minister and five years working for
the responsible federal minister. In a fair competition for the position, apart
from the language requirement, Mr MacAdam may well have come out on top of any
other candidates. But any likelihood of that outcome does not answer the
Commission’s conclusion that improper conduct helped him get the job.
[96]
The sole difficulty that I have with the amended
investigative report and the Commission’s decision is with regard to the
finding of improper conduct on the part of Mr Estabrooks. I understand
that the Commission considers that it is important to hold Human Resource
personnel accountable for the staffing advice they give managers. However, Mr Estabrooks’
involvement in the impugned process was marginal at best. He was subordinate to,
and took direction from, Mr Dorsey as the responsible manager.
[97]
In his response to the report and the proposed
corrective actions, Mr Estabrooks explained the rationale for his
recommendations with respect to the appointment process. He was made aware that
Mr Dorsey was interested in considering someone from the Minister’s office but
did not know who that was and did not understand that Mr Dorsey wanted to consider
only that person for the position. He was left with the sense that Mr Dorsey
wanted to ensure that the person could participate in the appointment process
with internal candidates. Moreover, Mr Estabrooks worked in an environment
where, as he indicated, ACOA management had a practice of using their knowledge
of potential candidates outside the federal government as a factor in their
determination to use external processes. His direct superior in the Human
Resources Branch, Mme Frenette, thought that the process had been fair once
everyone had an equal opportunity to apply.
[98]
Mr Estabrooks submits that the Commission failed
to take his representations into account in arriving at its final
determination. If I had been the decision-maker at that stage, I might have
agreed with Mr Estabrooks that his role was only advisory and that the
responsibility for the process rested with the position manager Mr Dorsey and
his superiors within the organization who had approved the form of the
competition. However, it is not my role to substitute my opinion for that of
the decision-maker. I am satisfied from reading the briefing note provided to
the Commission with the investigation report that Mr Estabrooks’
representations were brought to the Commission’s attention and taken into
consideration in the decision under review.
[99]
On the basis of the thorough and fair record
presented to the Commission, including the representations of each of the
applicants, I am satisfied that the decision to find improper conduct was
reasonable in the sense that it was justified, transparent and intelligible and
within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of the
facts and the law.
B.
Were the corrective actions ordered against Messrs
MacAdam, Estabrooks and Dorsey reasonable?
(1)
Mr MacAdam’s arguments
[100]
Even if the Commission’s finding of improper
conduct is reasonable, Mr MacAdam argues, the Commission erred in law in its
decision to order revocation of his appointment. Revocation is not a required
remedy under s 66 of the PSEA and does not further the remedial and corrective
goals of the section. As found in previous decisions, revocation is an
exceptional remedy. Deviation from the prior decisions in comparable cases suggests
the corrective action in this case is unreasonable. Revocation should be
reserved for the most serious of cases. It was not appropriate in these
circumstances as the Commission found that Mr MacAdam himself did not engage in
misconduct.
(2)
Mr Dorsey’s arguments
[101]
Mr Dorsey submits that corrective measures are
only valid exercises of the authority provided by section 66(b) of the PSEA
when they are tailored to the individual responsible for the defect in
question. The prohibition on delegating appointment authority to Mr Dorsey and
the suspension of his staffing privileges are not “corrective” within the
meaning of the PSEA. Nor are they consistent with measures taken in other
similar cases.
[102]
There was no evidence or finding that Mr Dorsey
used either of those powers improperly in relation to the appointment of Mr MacAdam.
There is no legal or factual basis for the order that Mr Dorsey complete the
two courses. He properly relied on the recommendations and advice that he
received from the human resource professionals at ACOA. Thus there was no
negligence or ethical lapse on the part of Mr Dorsey that required correction
through further study.
(3)
Mr Estabrooks’ arguments
[103]
The Commission’s remedial order was unreasonable
in his case, Mr Estabrooks submits, as the Commission ignored evidence that he
was simply following established practices at the ACOA. His actions were
supported by Mr LeBlanc, the President of ACOA and by his immediate superior Mme
Frenette. Mr LeBlanc stated in a letter to the Commission that a finding that Mr
Estabrooks acted improperly would be an injustice and would have a profound,
detrimental impact on staffing in the public service. Mme Frenette gave
evidence that if a potentially qualified individual is known, ACOA tried to
give that person access to the appointment process.
[104]
If it was reasonable for the Commission to find
that selecting an external process was improper conduct, Mr Estabrooks submits,
the corrective action in response ought to have been aimed at those responsible
for it. The practice of considering the existence of potential candidates in
choosing a selection process was consistent throughout ACOA. Therefore, any
remedy ought to have been systemic in nature, rather than penalizing Mr Estabrooks
for following standard practice.
(4)
Respondent’s arguments
[105]
The respondent submits that both the revocation
of Mr MacAdam’s appointment and the measures imposed on Messrs Dorsey and
Estabrooks are reasonable in the circumstances and within the jurisdiction of
the Commission on the basis of Seck FCA, above, at para 51.
[106]
While there was no finding of improper conduct
on the part of Mr MacAdam, the appointment process was affected by the fact
that key decisions were made in order to allow Mr MacAdam to apply and
participate in the process. Since the purpose of corrective actions is to
normalize the appointment process by remedying the errors that occurred, the
proper way to correct the defect in the process at bar is to revoke the
appointment, submits the respondent. Revocations do not require a finding of
wrongdoing on the part of the person appointed and therefore, the respondent
argues, the revocation of Mr MacAdam’s appointment is not a deviation from
prior practice. Revocation of an appointment pursuant to s 66 of the PSEA is
not a disciplinary action and the legal principles from the labour law context,
such as proportionality and the gradation of sanctions, do not apply: Seck,
FCA, above, at paras 48-51.
[107]
Mr Dorsey’s assertion that there is no
connection between the corrective measures imposed and his actions is
disingenuous. The President of ACOA decided to staff the DG Operations position
by way of an external, bilingual non-imperative staffing action on Mr Dorsey’s
recommendation. Mr LeBlanc testified that the decision for an external process
rested with Mr Dorsey and the HR officials.
[108]
Since Messrs Dorsey and Estabrooks’ actions ran
contrary to the guiding values of the PSEA, in particular the values of fairness
and transparency, the respondent submits that education in ethical leadership
and staffing serve a corrective purpose. Furthermore, the respondent argues
that the three-year prohibition on delegated appointment authority, and the
additional prohibition from exercising staffing duties in Mr Dorsey’s case,
ensured that staffing decisions in the immediate future did not contravene PSEA
values or the PSC policies.
(5)
Analysis
[109]
Although Seck, FCA above, at
paragraphs 48-51, dealt with corrective action under s 69 of the PSEA, I am of
the view that the principles set out by the Federal Court of Appeal are equally
applicable in reviewing corrective action under s 66 of the PSEA. Both sections
of the PSEA give the Commission the same powers of action where it finds that appointment
processes have been tainted by fraud, in the case of s 69, or improper conduct,
amongst other things, in the case of s 66. Those powers of action are: (a)
"revoke the appointment or not make the appointment",
or (b) "take any corrective action that it considers
appropriate".
[110]
In Seck FCA, above, at para 48, the
Federal Court of Appeal held that these corrective measures are:
48 […]
administrative measures intended to ensure the integrity of the appointment
process in the federal public service, not disciplinary measures per se. This distinction is important, both for the purpose of delimiting
the action that the Commission may take under the section in issue and for the
purpose of defining the Commission's duty to deal fairly with the people it
investigates.
[111]
In light of this distinction, the Federal Court
of Appeal then considered the Commission’s role and mandate in administering
these corrective measures as well as the remedy available in the face of such
measures: Seck FCA , above, at paras 49-51:
49 The
employers of public servants are responsible for the disciplinary action taken
against them, and disciplinary action is governed by the Public Service Labour Relations Act. The Commission therefore may not take disciplinary action under
section 69 of the Act. At most, it may, as it did in the appellant's case, pass
on to the employer any relevant information collected in the course of its
investigation. It will be up to the employer to take disciplinary action, if it
sees fit to do so. The Commission's role and mandate have to do with the
integrity of the appointment process in the public service rather than disciplining
delinquent employees.
50 When
the Commission revokes an appointment under section 69, it is not taking
disciplinary action, as such an appointment is void ab initio. This
is not a dismissal or a lay-off that may be grieved. Nor are the other corrective
measures that the Commission may take subject to grievance.
51 If
the Commission cannot take disciplinary action under section 69, the corrective
action that it takes under that section cannot be grieved under the Public Service Labour Relations Act. The appropriate remedy is, rather, an application for judicial
review before the Federal Court. Thus, labour law principles, such as
proportionality and progressive discipline, do not apply to corrective action
under section 69. Such corrective action must instead be reviewed using the
principles of administrative law, that is, it must be within the jurisdiction
of the Commission and be reasonable.
[112]
The revocation of Mr MacAdam’s appointment
cannot be found to be unreasonable on the basis that this is not one of the
most serious of cases since labour law principles such as proportionality and
progressive discipline do not apply to corrective action under section 66: Seck
FCA, above, at para 51. Furthermore, the revocation is not a disciplinary
measure taken by the Commission. Rather, it is a recognition of the fact that
the appointment process was tainted as a result of improper conduct and
therefore the appointment itself was void ab initio: Seck FCA,
above, at para 50.
[113]
I am also of the view that the corrective action
in relation to Messrs Dorsey and Estabrooks is reasonable. The corrective
measures were clearly designed to protect and reinforce the integrity of the
appointment process. While they may be considered harsh in the circumstances
with respect to Mr Estabrooks, they fall within the range of acceptable
outcomes defensible on the facts and the law.
[114]
In the result, the applications are dismissed
with costs awarded the respondent on the normal scale.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the
applications are dismissed. The respondent is awarded costs on the normal
scale. A copy of this Judgment and Reasons shall be placed on each file.
“Richard G. Mosley”