Docket:
T-615-13
Citation: 2014 FC 486
Ottawa, Ontario, May 21, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Gagné
BETWEEN:
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RANDALL SULLIVAN
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Applicant
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision rendered by a delegate for the Minister of National Revenue
[Minister], made on March 15, 2013, under subsection 152(4.2) of the Income
Tax Act, RSC (1985) c 1 (5th Supp), [Act]. The Minister partly
denied the applicant’s request for taxpayer relief and reassessment of the
employment expenses he had claimed for the 2002 and 2003 taxation years.
[2]
For the reasons discussed below, this
application for judicial review will be dismissed.
Background
[3]
As a result of an audit in 2005, the applicant
was reassessed for his 2002 and 2003 taxation years to include, among other
things, unreported T4A income from Steelmatic Wire Inc [Steelmatic] in the
amounts of $26,403 and $76,847, respectively. Commission expenses of $20,375
were disallowed for the 2003 taxation year as no documentation was provided to
support the claimed amount.
[4]
The applicant objected to the reassessment by
Notice of Objection dated October 17, 2005.
[5]
Meanwhile, on July 4, 2005, a ruling was
required from EI/CPP Rulings to determine the applicant’s status with
Steelmatic for those same years. The applicant was found to be an employee of
Steelmatic, having insurable and pensionable employment, rather than an
independent contractor. Steelmatic appealed the ruling decision, but it was
confirmed on March 3, 2006.
[6]
As a result, Steelmatic issued T4 slips showing
income in the amounts of $24,250 and $39,683 respectively, to replace the
previous T4A slips, and the applicant’s income was reassessed for the 2002 and
2003 taxation years accordingly.
[7]
The applicant filed a second Notice of
Objection, which was also rejected. He appealed that decision to the Tax Court
of Canada but subsequently withdrew his appeal.
[8]
On January 10, 2008, the applicant filed T1
adjustment requests, which were treated as Taxpayer Relief requests pursuant to
subsection 152(4.2) of the Act, as taxation years 2002 and 2003 were by then
statute-barred.
[9]
The applicant requested a second level review,
which was dismissed. He applied for judicial review of that decision but the
application was subsequently withdrawn, as the matter was remitted back to the
Minister on consent.
[10]
During the third administrative review of the
applicant’s taxpayer relief request conducted by the Minister, the following
facts were considered:
1.
On his Rev99 form, the applicant indicated that
Steelmatic did not require him to have his own office away from the employer’s
premises, contrary to subsection 8(13) of the Act which requires either that the
taxpayer principally performs the duties of office or employment in the home
office, or that the home office is used on a regular and continuous basis to
meet with customers or clients;
2.
On the same form, the applicant stated he was
reimbursed for expenses upon submitting expense sheets;
3.
The T2200 form (Declaration of Employment)
submitted by the applicant has not been completed and signed by an authorized
officer of Steelmatic, but rather by the applicant himself; and
4.
The information provided on the T2200 form was
inconsistent with what the applicant himself had represented in his description
of his conditions of employment on the Rev99 form. For example, on the T2200
form the applicant indicated that he was normally required to work away from
the employer’s place of business. However, on the Rev99 form, the applicant
stated that he was working 5 days a week from 8:30 am to 5:00 pm at the
employer’s office.
[11]
The applicant’s Taxpayer Relief requests were
partly allowed for items that are not at stake in this application for judicial
review, but denied with respect to his claimed employment expenses for 2002 and
2003, as well as the related GST rebate for 2002.
Issues and Standard of Review
[12]
This application for judicial review raises the
following issue:
Whether the Minister erred in the exercise of the discretion
conferred under subsection 152(4.2) of the Act when he only partly allowed the
applicant’s request for reassessment of his 2002 and 2003 taxation years.
[13]
In his memorandum of fact and law, the applicant
also argues that the Minister failed to observe the principles of natural
justice and procedural fairness. However, he does not indicate what that breach
would be and his counsel barely addressed that issue in reply, during his oral
submissions.
[14]
The sole issue then raised in this application
for judicial review is subject to the standard of reasonableness (Lanno v
Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2005 FCA 153; Canada (Attorney
General) v Abraham, 2012 FCA 266 at para 49; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9 at para 47). As emphasized by the respondent, the Minister’s
discretion is wide and policy based, and so is owed considerable deference.
Statutory Framework
[15]
The relevant provision of the Act is the
following:
Reassessment
with taxpayer’s consent
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Nouvelle cotisation et nouvelle
détermination
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152.(4.2)
Notwithstanding subsections (4), (4.1) and (5), for the purpose of
determining, at any time after the end of the normal reassessment period of a
taxpayer who is an individual (other than a trust) or a testamentary trust in
respect of a taxation year, the amount of any refund to which the taxpayer is
entitled at that time for the year, or a reduction of an amount payable under
this Part by the taxpayer for the year, the Minister may, if the taxpayer makes
an application for that determination on or before the day that is ten
calendar years after the end of that taxation year,
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152.(4.2)
Malgré les paragraphes (4), (4.1) et (5), pour déterminer, à un moment donné
après la fin de la période normale de nouvelle cotisation applicable à un
contribuable — particulier, autre qu’une fiducie, ou fiducie testamentaire —
pour une année d’imposition le remboursement auquel le contribuable a droit à
ce moment pour l’année ou la réduction d’un montant payable par le contribuable
pour l’année en vertu de la présente partie, le ministre peut, si le
contribuable demande pareille détermination au plus tard le jour qui suit de
dix années civiles la fin de cette année d’imposition, à la fois :
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(a) reassess tax, interest or penalties
payable under this Part by the taxpayer in respect of that year; and
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a) établir de
nouvelles cotisations concernant l’impôt, les intérêts ou les pénalités
payables par le contribuable pour l’année en vertu de la présente partie;
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(b) redetermine the amount, if
any, deemed by subsection 120(2) or (2.2), 122.5(3), 122.51(2), 122.7(2) or
(3), 127.1(1), 127.41(3) or 210.2(3) or (4) to be paid on account of the
taxpayer’s tax payable under this Part for the year or deemed by subsection
122.61(1) to be an overpayment on account of the taxpayer’s liability under
this Part for the year.
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b) déterminer
de nouveau l’impôt qui est réputé, par les paragraphes 120(2) ou (2.2),
122.5(3), 122.51(2), 122.7(2) ou (3), 127.1(1), 127.41(3) ou 210.2(3) ou (4),
avoir été payé au titre de l’impôt payable par le contribuable en vertu de la
présente partie pour l’année ou qui est réputé, par le paragraphe 122.61(1),
être un paiement en trop au titre des sommes dont le contribuable est
redevable en vertu de la présente partie pour l’année.
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Analysis
[16]
The applicant submits that the Minister
exercised his discretion in an unreasonable manner that cannot withstand
probing examination as well as based his conclusion upon erroneous findings of
fact made capriciously and without regard for the material before him. As such,
his decision should be overturned. No further detail is provided in the
applicant’s memorandum of fact and law. At the hearing, the applicant was more
specific and added that the Minister erroneously found that i) an adjustment of
his 2002 and 2003 assessments would increase his revenues for those years; ii)
the applicant did not encounter employment expenses during years 2002 and 2003;
and iii) the applicant was not justified to claim home office expenses for the same
years.
[17]
As for the respondent, he maintains that the
decision is reasonable and that the Minister’s delegate properly exercised his
discretion. In doing so, the Minister reviewed the taxpayer relief request and
all documents submitted in support thereof. The respondent argues that the
applicant is not seeking a tax benefit he otherwise would have been entitled to
if he had claimed it within the regular reassessment period. Rather his claim
for employment expenses was previously denied by the Audit and Appeals
divisions of the Canada Revenue Agency and the Applicant chose to withdraw his
appeal to the Tax Court of Canada. Subsection 152(4.2) of the Act is not
intended to be an alternative mechanism through which to challenge issues (see
Information Circular 07-1-Taxpayer Relief Provisions at para 73).
[18]
The respondent further argues that the applicant
cannot establish that he is legally entitled to the expenses he seeks to claim.
His evidence in support of his claim is, at best, contradictory and
self-serving. For this last point, the respondent points to the applicant’s
cross-examination when he was asked to explain discrepancies in his position
regarding his employment status.
[19]
During the hearing, counsel for the applicant
attempted to bring the debate back to the issue of whether the applicant should
have been considered, for the relevant period, an employee of Steelmatic or an
independent contractor. However, this Court is bound by the previous finding on
that issue. The issues then of whether Steelmatic deducted income tax at source
or whether the applicant consulted for a few clients on the side (and from
which, I note, he received a small percentage of his total revenues), were not
relevant for the Minister’s assessment of the expenses claimed from his principle
employment at Steelmatic.
[20]
As an employee, the applicant had to file the
T2200 Declaration of Employment duly signed by an authorized representative of
Steelmatic, along with the Rev99 form, in order to convince the Minister that
his general expenses and home office expenses met the requirements set out in
paragraphs 8(1)(h) and 8(1)(h.1) and subsection 8(13) of the Act.
[21]
The applicant invokes the fact that, by that
time, his relation with Steelmatic had deteriorated to such an extent that it
justified him signing the T2200 Declaration of Employment in lieu of
Steelmatic’s representative. Even if the Minister’s delegate knew of the
difficulties encountered by the applicant in obtaining a T2200 Declaration of
Employment signed by his former employer, it was reasonable for him not to
accept an incomplete document.
[22]
It was also reasonable for the Minister, considering
all of the contradictions and inconsistencies between the T2200 form (Declaration
of Employment) and the Rev99 form, to find that the applicant’s conditions of
employment did not include the obligation for him to pay for his claimed
expenses or to use part of his residence as his main office. The Minister’s
exercise of his discretion was reasonable, particularly considering the fact
that the applicant withdrew his appeal before the Tax Court of Canada, and the
fact that he had had several occasions to provide convincing and consistent
evidence that he met the requirements of the Act.
Conclusion
[23]
The applicant has not convinced the Court that
its intervention is warranted and this application for judicial review will be
dismissed with costs.