Docket: IMM-1468-13
Citation: 2014 FC 47
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED
TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, January 16,
2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
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BETWEEN:
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TAREK MOHAMED KHALIFA
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and
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SAMAH SAYED ABDEL MEGUID
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Applicants
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and
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MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
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AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of
the decision of an immigration officer, rendered on January 31, 2013, refusing
to grant the applicants a exemption from the requirement to obtain an immigrant
visa abroad on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, in accordance with subsection 25(1)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA).
II. Facts
[2]
The applicants are Egyptian citizens. They have
two Canadian-born, minor daughters. The applicant, Tarek Mohamed Khalifa, arrived
in Canada on October 21, 2006, and the female applicant, Samah Sayed Abdel
Meguid, arrived on October 28, 2006.
[3]
On November 24, 2006, the applicants filed
a refugee claim that was refused on September 21, 2009, on the ground that
they lacked credibility. This decision was not disputed before the Federal Court.
[4]
On September 20, 2010, the applicants filed
an application for permanent residence for humanitarian and compassionate
considerations. This application was dismissed by an immigration officer on
January 31, 2013. This application for judicial review concerns that
decision.
[5]
On March 29, 2011, the applicants’ Pre-Removal
Risk Assessment (PRRA) application was also dismissed.
III. Legislation
[6]
Section 25(1) of the IRPA provides:
25. (1) The Minister must, on request of a foreign national in Canada
who is inadmissible or who does not meet the requirements of this Act, and may,
on request of a foreign national outside Canada, examine the circumstances
concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign national permanent
resident status or an exemption from any applicable criteria or obligations of
this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian
and compassionate considerations relating to the foreign national, taking into
account the best interests of a child directly affected.
Payment of fees
(1.1) The Minister is
seized of a request referred to in subsection (1) only if the applicable fees
in respect of that request have been paid.
Exceptions
(1.2) The Minister
may not examine the request if the foreign national has already made such a
request and the request is pending.
Non-application of
certain factors
(1.3) In examining
the request of a foreign national in Canada, the Minister may not consider the
factors that are taken into account in the determination of whether a person is
a Convention refugee under section 96 or a person in need of protection under
subsection 97(1) but must consider elements related to the hardships that
affect the foreign national.
Provincial criteria
(2) The Minister may
not grant permanent resident status to a foreign national referred to in
subsection 9(1) if the foreign national does not meet the province's selection
criteria applicable to that foreign national.
IV. Issues and
standard of review
A. Issues
[7]
The parties identified the following issues:
1)
Did the officer consider all the evidence filed
by the applicants?
2)
Did the officer apply the correct test in her
assessment of the best interests of the children?
3)
Did the officer fail to consider the impact of
the prevailing situation in Egypt on the children?
[8]
The Court considers that this application for
judicial review presented the following questions:
1)
Did the officer respect procedural
fairness?
2)
Did the officer apply the correct
test in her assessment of the best interests of the children?
3)
Is the decision reasonable?
B. Standard
of review
[9]
The Supreme Court, in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9 (Dunsmuir), at paragraph 57, stated that
57. An exhaustive review is not required in every case to determine the
proper standard of review. Here again, existing jurisprudence may be helpful in
identifying some of the questions that generally fall to be determined
according to the correctness standard (Cartaway Resources Corp. (Re),
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 672, 2004 SCC 26). This simply means that the analysis required
is already deemed to have been performed and need not be repeated.
[10]
The Court, in Thandal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2008 FC 489, determined, at paragraph 7, that the standard
of review applicable to decisions relating to applications on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds is that of reasonableness, while the standard applicable to
questions of procedural fairness is that of the correctness (see also Sun v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 206, at para 16 (Sun)).
[11]
As for the choice of test applicable to the assessment
of the best interests of the children, in the context of an application based
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, it must be reviewed on a standard of
correctness (see Montivero v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 720, at paras 5 and 6).
V.
Arguments of the Parties
A.
The Applicants
Procedural
fairness
[12]
The applicants pointed out the fact that the immigration
officer failed to note, in her reasons, that she had received the documents that
were sent following the application of September 20, 2010, including the
letter of July 3, 2011, the document entitled “Raisons humanitaires et motifs
de compassion” and the letter of July 18, 2011. They point out, moreover, that
the officer did not refer, in her reasons, to the documents entitled “Raisons
humanitaires et motifs de compassion”, nor those that were attached to the letter
of July 18, 2011. They relied on Koo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 931, at para 23 (Koo), where the Court recalled
the rule that the officer must take into account all of the documents presented
to her.
[13]
The applicants argued that the rules of natural
justice required that the officer rule on all the evidence presented or to set
out the reasons why she was not doing so. They claimed that the officer’s failure
to note all the documents filed in section 6 of her decision suggests that she
did not consult or consider them. Further, according to the applicants, the
officer neglected to note the reasons that led her to disregard these documents.
That is why the applicants argued that procedural fairness was not respected, which
would justify the intervention of the Court in this matter.
Assessment
criteria
[14]
The applicants recalled that the immigration
officer had to be [translation] “alert,
alive and sensitive” to the best interests of the children concerned by the
application (Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999]
SCR 817). The interests of the children had to be considered and weighed with
the other humanitarian and compassionate considerations. The applicants argued
that the immigration officer applied the wrong legal test to assess the best
interests of the children. She should have instead verified whether the
children or their parents would experience [translation]
“hardships” if the application for permanent residence for humanitarian and
compassionate considerations was dismissed. Moreover, they claim that the test
for hardships is not appropriate for assessing the best interests of the
children. The applicants relied on Sun, above; Beharry v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 110 (Beharry) and Shchegolevich
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 527 (Shchegolevich)).
[15]
The applicants stated that the officer did not
analyze the consequences of their deportation to Egypt on the daughters, who
have never lived there and are 6 and 4 years old and specifically the resulting
social, cultural and economic changes. They pointed out that the officer limited
herself to considering the possibility that the children would be victims of female
genital mutilation without, however, ruling on the other aspects described in the
application. They argued that the fact that the officer limited her analysis in
this way does not show that she was alert, alive and sensitive to the best
interests of the children.
[16]
The applicants considered that the officer made
an error of law since she used the wrong test when she stated that the mother
of the children had not faced hardships in completing her education or finding
a job and that the applicants failed to explain why it would be different for
their daughters. Similarly, the officer allegedly erred in assessing the prevailing
situation in Egypt since she argued that the applicants had the burden to explain
the nature of the hardships that they would face (BL v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 538).
Reasonableness
[17]
The applicants then stated that the officer
failed to take into account the hardships raised by the applicant and his
spouse if they were limited to filing their claim from Egypt. They placed
particular emphasis on security, access to education and health services. The
applicants claimed that this was another error reviewable by the Court.
B.
The Respondent
[18]
The respondent argued a preliminary objection on
the admissibility of Exhibit “B” of the affidavit of Tarek Mohamed Khalifa,
i.e. a letter dated July 3, 2011. He argued that since this document was not in
the file submitted to the officer, it cannot then be considered by the Court. The
respondent referred to the decisions Nyoka v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 568, at para 17 (Nyoka); Jakhu
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 159, at para 18
and Lalane v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 6
at para 20 (Lalane), in support of this claim.
[19]
The respondent then recalls the discretionary
nature of the exemption provided in subsection 25(1) of the IRPA and
the burden resting on the applicants to show that the hardships that they would
face if they had to submit their residence application from Egypt, would be unusual
and undeserved or disproportionate. The respondent refers to the decisions Legault
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 125, at paras
23 to 27 (Legault); Tikhonova v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 847, at para 17 and Begum v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1015, at para 12.
[20]
He also pointed out that the exercise of
weighing humanitarian factors belongs to immigration officers and, if they take
into account relevant factors, the Court must then confirm their decisions even
if it had made a different assessment of the factors and made a different finding
(see Legault, above, at para 11).
Procedural fairness
[21]
The respondent argued that the officer considered
all of the evidence and clearly stated in her reasons the humanitarian and
compassionate considerations raised by the applicants, i.e. their integration into
Canadian society, their connections with Canada, the best interests of the
children and the general adverse conditions prevalent in Egypt (evidence raised
by the applicants in the letter dated July 18, 2011). The respondent reiterated
his objection to the admissibility of the letter of July 3 on the ground
that it was not before the officer.
[22]
The respondent referred to the grounds contained
in the officer’s decision showing that the various factors raised by the
applicants in support of their application were duly considered by her. The
respondent referred, as an example, to the fact that the officer considered the
allegations of genital mutilation and discrimination toward women raised by the
applicants in their document entitled [translation]
“Raisons humanitaires et motifs de compassion”. The respondent also pointed out
the fact that the officer had noted the applicants’ allegation that the Canadian
government could probably not help their daughters if needed, an allegation contained
in the letter of July 18, 2011. And finally, he recalled that the officer stated
that she considered all of the evidence submitted in support of the application.
[23]
The respondent recalled the existence of the
presumption that an administrative decision-maker has considered all of the
evidence. He also pointed out the case-law rule establishing that the officer does
not have to note every piece of evidence considered in her reasons, or the reasons
leading her to accept or refuse each piece of evidence filed in support of an
application. The respondent relies on the following decisions: Placide v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1056, at para 44 and
Anand v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC
234, at para 21 (Anand). Finally, he explained that an administrative
decision-maker is not required to comment on each piece of documentary evidence
submitted, unless it goes directly against the decision rendered (Anand, above,
at para 21 and Kulasekaram v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2013 FC 388, at para 41 (Kulasekaram)).
Assessment
criteria
[24]
The respondent stated that the officer’s analysis
is in accordance with the principles set out by the Supreme Court and by the Federal
Court of Appeal. He pointed out the fact that even though the administrative
decision-maker must give substantial weight to the best interests of the
children, this does not mean that the interests will always outweigh other considerations,
or that there will not be other reasons to dismiss the application. The
respondent relies on Legault, above, at para 12, which states that
12. ... It is not
because the interests of the children favour the fact that a parent residing
illegally in Canada should remain in Canada (which, as justly stated by Justice
Nadon, will generally be the case), that the Minister must exercise his
discretion in favour of said parent. Parliament has not decided, as of yet,
that the presence of children in Canada constitutes in itself an impediment to
any "refoulement" of a parent illegally residing in Canada.
[25]
The respondent then argued the principles of
case law relating to the assessment of the best interests of the children and
referred to the decisions Kisana v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2009 FCA 189 (Kisana) and Hawthorne v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 475 (Hawthorne).
In Kisana, above, Justice Nadon, at paragraph 42, recalled the key
principles contained in paragraphs 4 to 8 of Hawthorne. The respondent found
that those cases have established that an officer is presumed to know that in general
it is in the best interests of the children to live with their parents in
Canada. It is therefore not determinative to compare the better life in Canada and
life in the country of origin when assessing the best interests of the children.
[26]
The respondent pointed out that there is no formal
requirement to describe and analyze facts and factors. Further, the decision-making
process is discretionary (see Khoja v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2010 FC 142, at paras 47 and 48). He argued that the
applicants cannot criticize the officer for neglecting to considerer the
situation of their daughters if they stayed in Canada, while they clearly
showed that they intended to bring them to Egypt.
[27]
Moreover, the respondent noted the failure of
the applicants to submit evidence that clearly established that their departure
would have harmful consequences on their daughters if they had to stay in Canada
without them. The respondent referred to Garas v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1247, which specified that the argument
that the officer did not review the consequences on the children if they were
to stay in Canada without their mother had to be rejected when this scenario was
not suggested in the record (see paragraph 44 of this decision). The Court, in
this matter, at paragraph 46, recalls that:
46. … The officer does not have the responsibility to consider all
possible scenarios that could possibly result from the applicant’s removal, nor
does she have to address issues that are purely speculative. The officer’s role
is to assess the special circumstances that the applicant raises and to
determine whether they warrant the application of an exceptional exemption.
[28]
The respondent argued that it became reasonable for
the officer to find that the best interests of the applicants’ children would
not be compromised if their parents had to apply for permanent residence from
outside Canada, because she had identified and considered the various factors
concerning their best interests.
[29]
The respondent claimed that it was up to the applicants
to raise these grounds in a concrete manner, with evidence supporting them. The
applicants should have proved the harmful consequences of a return to Egypt on
their daughters’ safety, access to education and health services. The
respondent reiterated that the burden of proof is on the applicants. They must present
their humanitarian and compassionate grounds and file evidence to concretely
establish the merits of any claim. Failure to do so makes it reasonable for the
officer to find that the claim is without merit (Persaud v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1133, at paras 63 and 64).
Reasonableness
[30]
The respondent rebutted the applicants’ argument
that the officer did not consider the revolution in Egypt. He reiterated that she
did not have to assess speculative matters and referred again to Garas, above,
at paragraph 46. The applicants raised the general adverse conditions that all
citizens of Egypt face, both adults and children, without establishing a direct
connection with their personal situation or without filing concrete and objective
evidence in support of their claim, failing which the respondent points out
that every national of a country with problems would have to be assessed
positively, regardless of the individual’s personal situation, and this is not
the aim and objective of a humanitarian and compassionate exemption (Dorlean
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1024, at paras
35 and 36 and Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 1075, at paras 38 and 39).
VI. Analysis
[31]
The Court recognizes the merits of the respondent’s
preliminary objection relating to the admissibility of Exhibit “B” of the affidavit
of Tarek Mohamed Khalifa, i.e. the letter dated July 3, 2011. The case law
and the rules of this Court clearly establish that evidence that is not before
the decision-maker cannot be considered (see Vong v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1480, at para 35 and Nyoka, above,
at para 17).
[32]
The affidavit of Sheila Markland, filed on May
24, 2013, persuaded us that the letter filed on July 3, 2011, by the
applicants, was never placed in the tribunal record and, therefore, was not put
before the officer.
1)
Did the officer respect procedural
fairness?
[33]
The Court found that the officer respected the rules
of procedural fairness for the following reasons. The applicants alleged that the
officer should have noted that she had received the documents sent following the
application of September 20. Moreover, on reading the officer’s reasons, there
was no doubt that these elements were considered. The applicants relied on Koo,
above, in support of their claim. The Court wants to stress that this decision does
not impose an obligation on the officer to list all the documents received, only
the obligation to consider all the information submitted before her (see
paragraph 23 of this decision).
[34]
The Court also rejects the applicants’ claim
that the officer had to rule on all the evidence or that she had the obligation
outline the reasons for which she did not do so. An administrative
decision-maker is not required to comment on each piece of documentary evidence
unless it goes directly against the decision rendered (see Anand, above,
at para 21 and Kulasekaram, above, at para 41). In Terigho
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 835, it is
stated at paragraph 9 that:
9. There is generally a presumption that a tribunal, such as an officer
conducting an H&C assessment, will have considered all of the evidence that
was before it. But, where there is relevant evidence that contradicts the
tribunal's finding on a central issue, there is an obligation on the tribunal
to analyse that evidence and to explain in its decision why it does not accept
it or prefers other evidence on the point in question. The greater the
relevance of the evidence, the greater the need for the tribunal to explain its
reasons for not attributing weight to them: Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), (1998) 157 F.T.R. 35, [1998] F.C.J. No.
1425 (QL) (T.D.); Hilo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) (1991), 130 N.R. 236, 15 Imm. L.R. (2d) 199 (F.C.A.). [Emphasis
added.]
[35]
The Court cannot agree with the applicants’
claim that the officer failed to consult or consider the documents filed
because they were not listed in section 6 of the decision. This section instead
notes the external sources consulted by the officer, in this case, documents such
as the “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” of the U.S Department of
State (see applicants’ record, page 11). Therefore, the absence of a list
of documents filed by the applicants does not mean that they were not consulted
or considered.
[36]
The Court considered the document entitled “Raisons
humanitaires et motifs de compassion ” submitted by the applicants, and the
letter from counsel for the applicants of July 18, 2011. A reading of the
documentary evidence shows that the subjects addressed by the officer
correspond in all respects to the evidence submitted. Therefore, two of the
four pages of the first document relate to female circumcision while the
following documents entitled “La situation contrastée des femmes égyptiennes” and
“Économie Égypte : Pour l’indépendance financière des femmes et la liberté
de choisir” relate to the lower status of women in the labour market in Egypt, followed
by a third document that deals with terrorism. The letter of Mr. Beauchemin draws
the officer’s attention to the level of education of his clients, their integration
into Canadian society, the travel advisory issued by the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade on the current situation in Egypt and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child of which Canada is a signatory.
[37]
Therefore, the applicants were not able to reject
the presumption that the officer did not take into account all of the evidence contained
in the record. The Court found that there was no breach of procedural fairness.
2)
Did the officer apply the correct
test in her assessment of the best interests of the children?
[38]
The applicants alleged that the immigration
officer applied the wrong legal test to assess the best interests of the
children. They claimed that she did not have to analyze the hardships faced by
the applicants’ daughters if they had to return to Egypt. The case law cited by
the applicants does not prohibit officers from considering and analyzing the
general hardships that the applicants will face, but they specify that the
applicable test is that of “unusual or disproportionate” hardship (see Beharry
above at para 11 and Shchegolevich, above, at para 12).
Moreover, contrary to the applicants claims, Sun, which they cite, refers
to the hardships that the children are exposed to (see paras 17 and 45). Indeed,
Sun (at paragraph 17), refers to the Federal Court of Appeal decision Hawthorne
above at paragraph 6:
6. [in an H&C
application] the officer's task is to determine, in the circumstances of each
case, the likely degree of hardship to the child caused by the removal of the
parent and to weigh this degree of hardship together with other factors,
including public policy considerations, that militate in favour of or against
the removal of the parent. [Emphasis added.]
[39]
Therefore, the officer did not err simply
because she analyzed the hardships to which the children would be exposed. The
Court also wants to point out that the officer did not apply the test of “unusual
or disproportionate” hardships in her analysis of the best interests of the
children.
[40]
In sum, the Court does not accept the applicants’
claim that the officer applied the wrong legal test.
3)
Is the decision reasonable?
[41]
The Court found that this decision is reasonable
for the following reasons. Beharry, above, states, at paragraph 14, that:
14. … immigration officers are presumed to know that living in
Canada can afford many opportunities to a child that may not be available in
the child's country of origin. The task of the officer is thus to assess the
degree of hardship that is likely to result from the removal of the child from
Canada, and then to balance that hardship against other factors that might
mitigate the consequences of removal: see also Ruiz v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1175, [2009] FCJ No. 1474, at para
31. [Emphasis added.]
[42]
When the officer considered the best interests
of the children she noted that:
[translation]
The applicants raised the best interests of their 2 daughters who were born in
Canada, aged 4 and 6 years old. [T]hey stated that if they were to be removed
to Egypt, they would be faced with a very different world than they know, where
discrimination toward women is pervasive. There, they would have fewer chances to
pursue higher education and find a good job. They also point out that female
genital mutilation (FGM) is generalized and that the daughters could be victims
of it. Finally, they add that because of their dual citizenship, Canadian by birth
and Egyptian by descent, the Egyptian government would probably not let the Canadian
government intervene in favour of the daughters if needed.
[43]
It appears from this excerpt of the decision that
the officer was aware of the hardships listed by the applicants and of the consequences
that could result from the removal of the children from Canada. The officer then
considered the other elements of the record to weigh these hardships.
[44]
Indeed, the officer noted that the mother of the
children went to university and obtained a baccalaureate while she was in Egypt,
while arguing that there is no evidence that helps to consider that it would be
different for the daughters. The mother of the children also did not state that
she had difficulty finding employment. She did not submit any evidence to establish
that her daughters would experience a different environment. As to the risk of female
genital mutilation, the officer noted that this type de practice has diminished
and that the applicants did not indicate that it is part of their family
culture, that the female applicant had been a victim of it or that there had
been pressure for the daughters to undergo such a procedure. According to the reports
consulted by the officer, Egypt has criminalized this practice. The officer’s
finding on this topic falls within the range of possible outcomes since no
concrete evidence was placed in the record that would lead one to believe that
the young girls truly were at risk of experiencing such harm. The Court cannot
accept the applicants’ claim that the officer failed to consider the risks
other than that of female genital mutilation.
[45]
Finally, the Court agreed with the officer’s
analysis relating to the applicants’ claim that the Government of Canada cannot
intervene on behalf of their children given their dual citizenship. The officer
rightly noted that the applicants did not explain what they feared or why the
Egyptian government could not help the children if the situation called for it.
[46]
Based on the foregoing, the officer correctly applied
the test described in Beharry and Hawthorne, above.
[47]
The officer considered the situation in Egypt in
the section [translation] “Adverse
conditions in Egypt” of her reasons. She correctly noted that the applicants failed
to present evidence establishing how, because of the recent and generally
prevalent conditions in Egypt, they would be personally subjected to hardships
justifying granting the requested exemption.
[48]
In Pierre v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2010 FC 825 (Pierre), the Court recalled that both
personalized and generalized risk are relevant factors in assessing an
application on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (see paragraph 33 of the
decision). At paragraph 34, the Court also referred to Justice Harrington’s decision
in Chand v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 964,
at para 6, where he stated:
6. In considering the best interests of the children, the Officer not
only took into account Dr. Pilowski's opinion but also country conditions. He
accepted that both the children and the parents might suffer trauma if returned
to Guyana and are acutely afraid about their future. However, the point the
officer made, which was quite reasonable, is that there are a great many
victims of crime in Guyana and if, as country reports indicate, abuses are
rampant in the schools, the Chands would not find themselves in an unusual
situation. They should not be in a better position because they left Guyana,
while others had to stay behind. As stated in Ramatar v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 362,[2009] F.C.J. No. 472, it is
not enough to be a likely victim of generalized crime. There must be something
more. [Emphasis added.]
[49]
The Court, in Pierre, above, concluded by
stating, at paragraph 35, that:
35. It is clear to the Court that the officer was aware of the general
country conditions in St. Lucia, but could not find the existence of unusual
and/or disproportionate hardship in the absence of something more than that
which impacts all St. Lucians.
[50]
The Court agreed with the respondents’ arguments
that the allegation of the risks must be linked to the applicants’ personal situation,
otherwise every national from a country with problems would have to be assessed
positively, and this is not the objective of this type of exemption (see Lalane,
above, at para 1).
[51]
The officer, in this decision, was aware of the general
situation in Egypt, but found that [translation]
“[the applicants] did not state, however, how the new conditions would cause
them unusual and undeserved or disproportionate personal hardships that could
justify granting the requested exemption”. Unfortunately, the applicants did
not raise or file evidence to establish that they would find themselves in a
worse situation than that of other Egyptians.
[52]
In matters of judicial review, it is not the
Court’s role to substitute its assessment of the evidence to that of the first-instance
decision maker (see para 31 of Pierre, above). Its role, in this case, is
limited to verifying whether the officer’s decision falls within the “falls
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect
of the facts and law” (see Dunsmuir, above, at para 47). The officer, having
analyzed correctly all the evidence submitted to it, the Court has no grounds to
intervene. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
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