Docket: T-743-13
Citation:
2014 FC 914
Ottawa, Ontario, September 24, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
BETWEEN:
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CAROLYN BAGNATO
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Applicant
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and
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CANADA POST CORPORATION and
CANADIAN UNION OF POSTAL WORKERS
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Respondents
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision [Decision] by the Canadian Human Rights Commission [Commission]
pursuant to s 41(1)(a) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC
1985, c H-6 [Act], not to deal with the Applicant’s complaint pending the
Applicant having exhausted other remedies, particularly the grievance procedure
provided for in the Collective Agreement.
[2]
The governing provision of the Act, s 41(1),
reads:
41. (1) Subject to section 40, the Commission shall deal with any
complaint filed with it unless in respect of that complaint it appears to the
Commission that
|
41. (1) Sous
réserve de l’article 40, la Commission statue sur toute plainte dont elle est
saisie à moins qu’elle estime celle-ci irrecevable pour un des motifs
suivants :
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(a) the alleged victim of the
discriminatory practice to which the complaint relates ought to exhaust
grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available;
|
a)
la victime présumée de l’acte discriminatoire devrait épuiser d’abord les
recours internes ou les procédures d’appel ou de règlement des griefs qui lui
sont normalement ouverts;
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(b) the complaint is one that could
more appropriately be dealt with, initially or completely, according to a procedure
provided for under an Act of Parliament other than this Act;
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b) la plainte pourrait avantageusement être
instruite, dans un premier temps ou à toutes les étapes, selon des procédures
prévues par une autre loi fédérale;
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(c) the complaint is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Commission;
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c) la plainte n’est pas de sa compétence;
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(d) the complaint is trivial,
frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; or
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d) la plainte est frivole, vexatoire ou
entachée de mauvaise foi;
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(e) the complaint is based on acts or
omissions the last of which occurred more than one year, or such longer
period of time as the Commission considers appropriate in the circumstances,
before receipt of the complaint.
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e) la plainte a été déposée après l’expiration
d’un délai d’un an après le dernier des faits sur lesquels elle est fondée,
ou de tout délai supérieur que la Commission estime indiqué dans les
circonstances.
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(Court underlining)
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II.
Background
[3]
The Applicant is an employee of the Canada Post
Corporation [CPC] and a member of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers [Union]. The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for CPC employees.
The
collective agreement between CPC and the Union contains a grievance and
arbitration procedure to resolve complaints.
[4]
Between June 2012 and September 2012, the Union filed a number of grievance complaints, on the Applicant’s behalf, all flowing from
CPC’s treatment of her and a workplace injury which she suffered. These
complaints ranged from a failure to accommodate the Applicant to harassment and
threatening actions by management.
[5]
The human rights complaint [Complaint] at issue
was filed September 7, 2012, alleging that CPC had engaged in adverse
differential treatment, failed to provide a harassment-free environment and had
discriminatory policies or practices.
[6]
In response to the Complaint, CPC wrote to the
Commission requesting that pursuant to s 41(1)(a) of the Act, the
Commission should not deal with the Complaint because the Applicant had
commenced an internal grievance procedure, which should first be exhausted.
[7]
The matter was investigated and a section 40/41
report [Report] was produced stating that the issue to decide is whether the
Commission should refuse to deal with the Complaint pursuant to s 41(1)(a)
of the Act. The Report contained a recommendation that the Complaint should not
be dealt with by the Commission.
[8]
The Applicant took the position that she had
exhausted the grievance procedure and was not satisfied with the result. Her
accusations were far ranging and in particular, she alleged that she had been
harassed and humiliated by management and her own union president. In
responding to the Report, the Applicant described another incident that she
desired to add to the Complaint. She alleged that, in a public notice of
implementation of a grievance decision, the union president had deliberately
misspelled her name “BagnaHo” – the allegation is
that there was a sexual connotation (or intended humiliation) in the
misspelling. This allegation was the subject of a separate grievance and
complaint to the Canadian Industrial Relations Board [CIRB].
[9]
On April 3, 2013, the Commission issued its
Decision. The ultimate conclusion was:
The Commission decided, … , not to deal with
the complaint at this time under paragraph 41(1)(a) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act, as the complainant ought to exhaust grievance or review
procedures otherwise reasonably available. At the end of the grievance or
review procedures, the complainant may ask the Commission to reactivate the
complaint.
[10]
In the Report, which formed the factual basis
for the Decision, it was noted that five grievances had been filed that dealt
with the issues in the Complaint. At the time of the Report, all these
grievances had been scheduled or were awaiting scheduling to be heard by an arbitrator.
By
the time this judicial review was argued, some of the grievances had been
settled or withdrawn. The Applicant took grave exception to the reference in
the Report regarding the pending grievances and the fact that some had been
withdrawn or settled.
[11]
In deciding not to proceed with the Complaint,
the Commission considered a number of factors; the principal ones being:
•
the decision maker on any grievance would be a
neutral and independent labour arbitrator;
•
while noting the Applicant’s objections to the
grievance process, the Commission’s task was to assess the accessibility of
alternate redress mechanisms; not to assess the merits of her objections;
•
the Applicant did not indicate that she is
vulnerable or that pursuing the grievance procedure would cause her harm;
•
a labour arbitrator has jurisdiction to
interpret and apply the Act; and
•
a labour arbitrator can award much the same kind
of remedies as those available under the Act.
[12]
There is only one issue: was the Commission’s
Decision reasonable?
III.
Analysis
[13]
The situation and governing legal principles in
this case are much the same as in Shiferaw v Canada Post Corp, 2011
FC 1046, 207 ACWS (3d) 131. For much the same reasons, this judicial review
will be dismissed.
[14]
The Applicant’s position was to essentially
reargue the Complaint. It would appear that the core of her argument was the
bias of the grievance officer at CPC. However, there was no linkage between
this allegation of bias (an inapplicable concept in these circumstances) and
the Commission’s Decision. There was no suggestion of bias directed at the
Commission or its investigator.
[15]
The Applicant also raised concerns that she is still
being harassed, threatened with phone calls and e-mails from her Union and her employer and is otherwise distressed by the whole process.
[16]
These matters are not the matter before this
Court. The Applicant has failed to show how the Decision not to take up the
Complaint now and leaving open the Applicant’s ability to return to the
Commission, when the grievance procedures are complete, is somehow
unreasonable.
[17]
The Decision is reasonable in accordance with
the principles laid down in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008]
1 SCR 190 – that a decision is reasonable when it falls within a range of
acceptable, defensible outcomes based on the facts and the law.
[18]
The Commission considered all the relevant
factors (see paragraph 11 of these Reasons) as well as the timeliness of the
grievance process.
[19]
The fact that the Applicant has the ability to
come back to the Commission should relieve her concerns about the grievance
process. Such a “safety net” is not strictly necessary; the reasonableness of
the Decision would stand without it but its inclusion eliminates any legitimate
subjective or objective concerns.
IV.
Conclusion
[20]
Therefore, this judicial review will be
dismissed with costs.