Docket: T-1929-13
Citation:
2014 FC 982
Ottawa, Ontario, October 16, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Roy
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BETWEEN:
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NUSRAT MASHOOQULLAH
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ALEEZA MUNSHI
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The applicants seek the judicial review of the
decision made by the respondent, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
through his delegate, to deny citizenship to Aleeza Munshi, one of the
applicants. The application for judicial review is made pursuant to section
18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7.
I.
Facts
[2]
The facts of this case are not controversial.
Nusrat Mashooqullah was born in Pakistan in 1968. For a reason that remains
unknown, the documentation involving her court proceedings in Pakistan in order to gain the guardianship of Aleeza Munshi is produced under the name
Nusrat Munshi. A review of the file would lead to the possible conclusion that
“Mashooqullah” was the name of her husband. They have since divorced. Remains
unclear why proceedings in Pakistan are initiated under one name while those
initiated in Canada are under another. At any rate, it has not been contested
that the applicant is the same person as the one having the guardianship of
Aleeza Munshi.
[3]
It appears that Nusrat Mashooqullah was granted
Canadian citizenship in 2007, after she successfully concluded an MBA degree at
Queen’s University, in Kingston, Ontario. Following her obtaining the Canadian
citizenship, she decided to go back to Pakistan where she has been since.
Indeed, she is gainfully employed in Pakistan and it is acknowledged that she
is not a resident of Canada.
[4]
Aleeza Munshi was born on or about March 3, 2012
in Karachi, Pakistan. She was abandoned on March 3, 2012. Nusrat Mashooqullah
made an application on April 24, 2012 under the Guardians and Wards Act,
1890 of Pakistan before the Family Court, in Karachi. On May 22, the Court
granted Nusrat Mashooqullah the order sought. It reads:
I have heard the learned counsel of the
applicant and perused the record of the case. In my humble opinion, the
applicant is fit person to be appointed as Guardian, in respect of the person
of the minor baby girl ALEEZA MUNSHI. She will look after the welfare of the
minor properly and would safeguard her rights and interests. As such, the
applicant is appointed as Guardians [sic] of the person of the minor
baby girl ALEEZA MUNSHI. She is also allowed to take the custody of the minor
baby out of the jurisdiction of this Court, to the CANADA/ABROAD for
immigration and adoption purpose. The present application stands allowed as
prayed, in terms of the above order. Let the Guardian Ship Certificate be
prepared and the petitioner are allowed to collect the Guardian Ship
Certificate.
[5]
In the view of the applicants, being awarded the
guardianship of baby Aleeza is enough to avail themselves of section 5.1 of the
Citizenship Act, RSC, 1985, c C-29 [the Act]. The Minister disagrees
and, in my view, an examination of the legislative regime leads to the
conclusion that section 5.1 cannot find application in the circumstances of this
case.
II.
Decision under review
[6]
The Minister’s delegate, in the decision issued
on October 2, 2013, concluded that citizenship could not be granted. The gist
of the decision is to be found in the following three paragraphs:
Under Pakistan’s Muslim Family Law
Ordinance, 1961 or Sharia Law, there is no provision for adoption.
The Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, provides for a guardianship known
as kafala. Kafala being a form of guardianship, is not an adoption, and
is commonly viewed as a commitment to take charge of the needs, upbringing and
protection of a minor child and does not create permanent parent-child
relationship.
As such, no adoption as it is understood in Canada or under the framework provided by Hague Convention on Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption has taken place. Therefore
the application for Canadian Citizenship for a person under the guardianship of
a Canadian Citizen to be adopted cannot be processed.
Based on the information provided and the legal
framework that is in place in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, you have failed
to establish that your child meets the requirements for a grant of Canadian
citizenship as per subsection 5.1(1) of the Citizenship Act and your
application has not resulted in a grant of citizenship.
III.
Issue
[7]
Usually, the standard of review applicable in a
case like this is determined first. Once the standard of review has been
ascertained, the question will be whether the guardianship granted to Nusrat
Mashooqullah satisfies the requirements of section 5.1 of the Citizenship
Act. In my view, this case does not turn on whether the standard of review
is correctness or reasonableness as to the question of law raised herein.
Either way, the applicants cannot succeed.
[8]
It is subsection 5.1(1) of the Citizenship
Act which is at issue and, in particular, paragraph (c). The subsection
reads:
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Adoptees — minors
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Cas de personnes adoptées — mineurs
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5.1 (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), the Minister shall, on
application, grant citizenship to a person who was adopted by a citizen on or
after January 1, 1947 while the person was a minor child if the adoption
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5.1 (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3) et (4), le ministre
attribue, sur demande, la citoyenneté à la personne adoptée par un citoyen le
1er janvier 1947 ou subséquemment lorsqu’elle était un enfant mineur.
L’adoption doit par ailleurs satisfaire aux conditions suivantes :
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(a) was in the best interests of the child;
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a) elle a été faite dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant;
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(b) created a genuine relationship of parent and child;
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b) elle a créé un véritable lien affectif parent-enfant entre
l’adoptant et l’adopté;
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(c) was in accordance with the laws of the place where the
adoption took place and the laws of the country of residence of the adopting
citizen; and
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c) elle a été faite conformément au droit du lieu de l’adoption et
du pays de résidence de l’adoptant;
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(d) was not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a
status or privilege in relation to immigration or citizenship.
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d) elle ne visait pas principalement l’acquisition d’un statut ou
d’un privilège relatifs à l’immigration ou à la citoyenneté.
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As we shall see, the heart of the matter
will be the meaning to be ascribed to the word “adoption” in subsection 5.1(1)
and whether guardianship under the Pakistani statute satisfies that definition.
I have concluded that there is only one interpretation of the word that can be
made reasonably or correctly.
IV.
Argument on behalf of the parties
[9]
The applicants did not discuss in their
Memorandum of Fact and Law or at the hearing before this Court what the
standard of review ought to be in this case. They seem to take the position
that whatever it is, their application for judicial review should succeed. In
their Memorandum of Fact and Law, the applicants refer to the decision of this
Court in Dufour v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 340
where the Court states that a standard of correctness should apply as “the Court is better placed than a citizenship officer to
interpret domestic and foreign adoption law” (at para 16).
[10]
As best as I can understand it, the argument of
the applicants boils down to something rather simple. They claim that the
guardianship that was awarded by the Family Court in Pakistan is the equivalent
of adoption in the particular circumstances of this case. These circumstances,
they claim, are the fact that the child was abandoned less than a day after her
birth and that, therefore, there is no child-parent relationship that can be a bar
to the equivalency they seek. There is no pre-existing parent-child
relationship between the child and the biological parents such that the
guardianship in this case is the equivalent of a full adoption and, therefore,
satisfies the requirement of paragraph 5.1(1)(c). The officer’s error lies in
the fact that he did not recognize the special circumstances of abandonment.
[11]
The only authority cited in support of that
proposition is the case of Reza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2009 FC 606 [Reza]. The applicants cited in their Memorandum of Fact and
Law only a portion of paragraph 13 of the Reasons for Judgment in this case. We
find the following in the Memorandum of Fact and Law:
The IRB also refused to accept Mr. Ali’s
allegation that he would be prohibited from adopting the applicant in Pakistan because the concept of adoption does not exist in that country. The IRB based
itself on documentary evidence in stating that abandoned
children were indeed adopted in Pakistan... . [Emphasis in the Memorandum of
Fact and Law]
Actually, the full paragraph reads:
[13] The IRB also refused to accept Mr.
Ali’s allegation that he would be prohibited from adopting the applicant in Pakistan because the concept of adoption does not exist in that country. The IRB based
itself on documentary evidence in stating that abandoned children were indeed
adopted in Pakistan, and that Mr. Ali, as the child’s uncle, would be an ideal
candidate, given that his biological parents had given him custody of the
applicant and that Mr. and Mrs. Ali were his legal guardians. The IRB therefore
found that there was no risk of their being separated from him in Pakistan.
[12]
This case is of no assistance to the applicant
as the issue before the Court was an application for judicial review of a
decision to refuse refugee status; the applicant in that case, a child under
the age of 18, could be returned to Pakistan. In Pakistan, it would be possible
for his uncle and his aunt to take care of him. The issue in the case at hand
is completely different. The Court is not faced with a child under 18 going
back to Pakistan where the central issue would be the availability of care for
the child and the alleged statelessness. Indeed, the Court in the case of Reza
concluded:
[33] Having read through all of the
documentary evidence, I am satisfied that the panel did not err in finding that
the applicant would not face persecution in Pakistan because of the mother’s
religion and ethnicity. In this regard, I would note that, if the applicant
were to return to Pakistan, it would most likely be to live with his guardians,
Mr. and Mrs. Ali, who are Sunni and do not appear to have any connection with
his biological mother’s family.
Accordingly, the Court can only conclude
that the applicants did not offer any authority in support of their position.
[13]
On the other hand, the Minister argues that
guardianship under Pakistani law does not equate with adoption. In the view of
the Minister, the concept of adoption found in section 5.1 requires more than
what is possible under the law of Pakistan. To put it bluntly, the position of
the Minister is that Pakistani law does not recognize our concept of adoption.
Indeed, counsel for the Minister used some of the documentation presented in
bulk by the applicants on this application to bolster his argument that
guardianship and adoption are two different things. A document presented as “Pakistan
Adoption” states:
2. What Islam says about adoption?
There are often misconceptions about the role
of adoption in Islam. The fact is that the Islamic form of “adoption” is called
kafâla, which literally means sponsorship, but comes from the root word meaning
“to feed.” It is best translated as “foster parenting.” Algerian family law
defines the concept thusly: “Kafala, or legal fostering, is the promise to
undertake without payment the upkeep, education and protection of a minor, in
the same way as a father would do for his son”.
…
Some of the confusion centers around the issues
of changing the child's name or the inheritance of money. Addressing such
issues, Dr. Muzammil H. Siddiqi, former President of the Islamic Society of
North America, states:
May Allah bless you and reward you for
your concern to help those who are in need. I strongly recommend that you take
care of the orphans. As far as adoption is concerned, I can say that according
to the Shari`ah it is not allowed to deprive a child of his/her biological
parents’ name. You can keep the child, provide him/her good home and take good
care of him, but do not give him/her your last name. Allah says in the Qur'an,
He (Allah) has
not made your adopted sons as your sons. Such is only your speech by your
mouths. But Allah tells you the truth and He shows you the right way. Call them
by the names of their fathers, that is more just in the sight of Allah. But if
you do not know their fathers' names, call them your brothers in faith or your
friends. There is no blame on you in whatever mistakes you made in this matter,
but what counts is the intention of your hearts. Allah is oft-Forgiving and
most Merciful. (Al-Ahzab: 4-5)
In US for the purpose of tax-exemptions,
health insurance, school admissions etc. you may need to give the adopted child
your last names. Such names can be provided with a clear understanding that you
are only the guardians. The orphan children should be told about the names of
their real parents. In your own home you and your children should be aware of
this fact that these children are not your biological children and you are not
their biological parents.
It stands to reason that when those
orphans grow up then they will not be mahram (unmarriageable) to you, to your
spouse and to your own sons and daughters. They will also not inherit anything
from your property unless you give them something as a special gift through the
provision of will.
[14]
The respondent also relies on the Consideration
of Reports Submitted by States parties Under Article 44 of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (United Nations. Committee on the Rights of the
Child. Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 44
of the Convention, Thirty-fourth Session, CRC/C/15/Add.215 (2003)) which
discussed the situation in Pakistan. While the applicants relied on paragraph
205, the respondent referred to paragraph 204. He could have referred also to
paragraph 203. They read:
F.
Children deprived of a family environment (art. 20)
203. Foster placement is not recognized in Pakistan under any law. Adoption is also not permitted in Pakistan under Islamic law.
Courts have given a ruling that there is nothing in Islamic law that is similar
to adoption as recognized under Roman legal systems. Yet the concept of
guardianship assures protection of family life. Guardianship ensures that the child
knows his/her paternity.
G.
Adoption (art. 21)
204. As stated above, adoption is not
permitted under Islamic laws, and provisions of the Convention pertaining to
adoption cannot be enforced in Pakistan. As a substitute to adoption, Islamic
law provides for a very strong system of guardianship through the immediate as
well as the extended family.
205. The Guardians and Wards Act (Annex 7,
Appendix XVIII), however, provides for the care of children without parents.
One provision of this Act states that “in appointing or declaring a guardian
under this section, the Court shall be guided by the law, consistent with the
law to which the minor is subject, that appears in the given circumstances to
be for the welfare of the minor”. The appointment of the court-guardian is
similar in some cases to adoption and the recommendation in this article of the
Convention is not totally alien to the law in Pakistan.
V.
Analysis
[15]
To state that the applicants have offered a
paucity of evidence in support of their application for citizenship would be an
understatement. For all intents and purposes, they rely on the view that
guardianship in the circumstances of this case is the equivalent of adoption in
the face of other statements to the effect that the notion of adoption does not
exist because it is not permitted under Islamic laws.
[16]
The peculiar circumstances of this case take us
to consider what is meant by adoption in section 5.1. Indeed, adoption is
referred to elsewhere in the Citizenship Act and it must be taken that
the meaning given to the word in other sections would have to be consistent
with the meaning to be ascribed in section 5.1.
[17]
In The Construction of Statutes (Ruth
Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on The Construction of Statutes, 4th
ed (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths Canada, 2002)) Driedger and Sullivan can
only confirm that the same words in a statute must be given the same meaning:
It is presumed that the legislature uses
language carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other
legislative instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words
have different meanings. (p 162)
Indeed, Justice Sopinka put it very bluntly
in R v Zeolkowski, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1378, where he agreed with Driedger
(1983): “Giving the same words the same meaning throughout
a statute is a basic principle of statutory interpretation” (p 1387).
[18]
It would appear that section 5.1 of the Citizenship
Act seeks to make easier the granting of citizenship to children involved
in intercountry adoption (An Act to amend the Citizenship Act (adoption),
SC 2007, c 24, tabled in the House of Commons as Bill C-14). Instead of relying
on sponsorship under section 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227, the Citizenship Act cuts to the chase and
grants (the Act speaks of “shall on application
grant citizenship”; see section 11 of the Interpretation Act, RSC,
1985, c I-21) citizenship once the four conditions listed in subsection 5.1(1)
are met. Bur first and foremost, there must be an adoption.
[19]
In the case at hand, the decision under review
speaks of the requirements of subsection 5.1(1) not being met. It does not
appear that paragraph (a) (best interest of the child) and paragraph (d) (for
the purpose of acquiring status) are truly in play and were challenged by the
Minister’s delegate. On the other hand, the Minister’s delegate concluded that
the guardianship declared in Pakistan does not create a permanent relationship
of parent and child and it does not constitute an adoption. That in my view
begs the question of what constitutes an adoption in paragraph 5.1(1)(c).
[20]
Not only should the word “adoption” receive the
same meaning throughout the Act, but it must be understood that the meaning to
be given to a term of art like “adoption” must be its meaning in Canadian law.
There is nothing to suggest that anything short of adoption, or something
presented as akin to adoption, will do. Surely, when Parliament states that the
“adoption” must meet certain conditions, the only meaning intended is that it
is an adoption as understood under Canadian law. It would be absurd to seek to
read anything other than adoption as understood in Canada when considering the
word throughout the Citizenship Act. If the use of the word “adoption”
can relate to something other than adoption in Canadian law, then what can that
be?
[21]
The effect of adoption in Canada is determined by provincial legislation. The common denominator is that the adoptive
parent becomes the parent of the adopted child. Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, Infants and Children (Markham, On: LexisNexis Canada, 2014 Reissue), while
referring specifically to legislation in every province and territory of the
country, summarizes the effect of adoption in the following fashion:
HIC-68 Child of adoptive parent. Once an adoption order is made, subject to appeal or the expiration
of the time limit for commencing an appeal, the adopted child becomes the child
of the adoptive parent and the adoptive parent becomes the parent of the
adopted child. In addition, the adopted child ceases to be the child of the
person who was his or her parent before the adoption order was made, and that
person ceases to be the parent of the adopted child, except where the person is
the spouse of the adoptive parent. All support obligations of the original parents
cease upon the event of an adoption.
[22]
The order issued by the Pakistani Court in this
case is clear. It is an order of guardianship that was made. It is an order of
guardianship that allows the guardian to take the custody of a child outside of
the jurisdiction. The taking of the child outside of the jurisdiction would be
for adoption purposes. That would seem to confirm that no adoption has taken
place in Pakistan.
[23]
That inference is consistent with the
legislation under which Ms. Mashooqullah was made the guardian of Aleeza
Munshi. The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 does not provide on its face for
an adoption that has the features of provincial legislation to that effect.
[24]
A “guardian” is defined as the “person having the care of the person of a minor or his
property.” Section 24 provides for the duties of the guardian of the
person as:
24. Duties of guardian of the person. - A guardian of the person of a ward is charged with the custody of
the ward and must look to his support, health and education, and such other
matters as the law to which the ward is subject requires.
[25]
The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890
provides that the guardian stands in a fiduciary relationship with the ward
(section 20), but she may receive remuneration “as the
Court thinks fit for his care and pains in the execution of his duties”
(section 22). A guardian may be removed (section 39) or discharged (section
40), and someone else may be appointed in her stead. In fact, a plain reading
of the statute leads to the conclusion that when considered in its entirety,
one is hard pressed to see anything that would suggest that there exists a
child-parent relationship. At best, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides
for a guardianship regime that is perhaps analogous to foster care for children.
Indeed, the child has no right or duty toward an “adoptive parent”. The duties
go from the guardian toward the child (ward). The applicants have not offered
anything that could contradict the plain reading.
[26]
These findings are of course completely consistent
with the international instruments submitted to the Court. Reference has
already been made to the Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
parties Under Article 44 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child with
respect to Pakistan where it is said that “adoption is
not permitted under Islamic laws, and provisions of the Convention pertaining
to adoption cannot be enforced in Pakistan.” An examination of the Convention
(Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, entered into
force 2 September 1990), in accordance with article 49 itself leads inexorably
to the conclusion that parenthood and guardianship are different. Article 21 of
the Convention speaks in terms of “States Parties that
recognize and/or permit the system of adoption...”, thus acknowledging
specifically that adoption is not universally recognized. Article 20 had
already shown that foster care and kafalah (guardianship) and adoption are all
different:
Article 20
1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived
of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be
allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection
and assistance provided by the State.
2. States Parties shall in accordance with
their national laws ensure alternative care for such a child.
3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster
placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in
suitable institutions for the care of children. When considering solutions, due
regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a child's upbringing
and to the child's ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.
[27]
In the case at bar, because both applicants
reside in Pakistan, the requirements that would usually apply to an
intercountry adoption do not apply. The only condition under paragraph
5.1(1)(c) of the Act is that there be an adoption under the laws of the country
of residence of both applicants, that is, Pakistan in the instant case.
However, there must be an adoption. Not only is there uncontroverted evidence
that adoption does not exist in Pakistan, but the Act under which the order
presented as the equivalent to an adoption does not allow even one hint that
guardianship might be a close substitute to adoption, as it is understood in
our law. As stated earlier, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides
for, at best, what we would call foster care.
[28]
In an ultimate effort, the applicants argue
that, in this case, the child has been abandoned by the birth mother and that
the Pakistani Court has allowed the custody of the child to be taken out of the
jurisdiction for adoption purposes. Surely, the argument goes, this
court-guardian arrangement is similar to adoption. Although this Court is
sympathetic to the applicants, the argument falls short. In fact, the Pakistani
Court order confirms that no adoption could have taken place in Pakistan. Adoption is a requirement that cannot be avoided. The fact that the child was
abandoned, without more, is of no great moment. Without an adoption having
occurred in Pakistan, there can be no adoption in this case.
[29]
As a result, the Minister’s delegate was right
to deny granting citizenship. It follows that it does not matter whether the
standard of review is reasonableness or correctness. Had I had to pronounce on
this issue, I would have had to follow the jurisprudence of the Federal Court
of Appeal in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Kandola, 2014 FCA 85,
[2014] 372 DLR (4th) 342 [Kandola]. The stare decisis doctrine
commands that precedent be followed. In it, the Federal Court of Appeal
concludes that the presumption of reasonableness (Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association,
2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654) applies to decision-makers even where they do
not exercise adjudicative functions. However, the Court found that “presumption can be quickly rebutted” (Kandola, at
para 42) and proceeded to displace it:
[43] Specifically, there is no privative
clause and the citizenship officer was saddled with a pure question of
statutory construction embodying no discretionary element. The question which
he was called upon to decide is challenging and the citizenship officer cannot
claim to have any expertise over and above that of a Court of Appeal whose sole
reason for being is resolving such questions.
[30]
In Kinsel v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 FCA 126 [Kinsel], another case concerned with the
interpretation of a provision of the Citizenship Act, the Court received
the findings of Kandola, supra, and concluded that the analysis
conducted therein applied in the Kinsel case:
[28] In Kandola, the Court found
this presumption could be quickly rebutted for a number of reasons, including
the following:
•
The absence of a privative clause.
•
The nature of the question; namely, a pure
question of statutory interpretation.
•
The absence of any discretionary element in the
decision.
•
The absence of anything in the structure or
scheme of the Act suggestive of the notion that deference should be accorded to
the delegate on the question he or she had to decide.
[29] These factors are also present in
this case.
(See also Canada (Citoyenneté et
Immigration) c Dufour, 2014 CAF 81.)
[31]
There is not, in my view, any distinguishing
feature in the case at hand that could justify departing from the results
reached by the Court of Appeal in three cases involving the same statute. This
case and the three appellate decisions were concerned with the interpretation
of provisions of the Citizenship Act. The Court of Appeal found that the
presumption of reasonableness can be quickly rebutted and this Court finds
itself bound by this approach. Correctness is the standard.
[32]
Nevertheless, I note that the Supreme Court
asserted again in Canadian National Railway Co v Canada (Attorney General),
2014 SCC 40, a decision released after Kandola, supra, and Kinsel,
supra, that “deference will usually result where a
decision maker is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to
its function, with which it will have particular familiarity [references to
case law omitted]” (at para 55). The Supreme Court then examined the
categories that call for a correctness standard (constitutionality, competing
jurisdiction between tribunals, questions of central importance to the legal
system as a whole and true questions of jurisdiction or vires) and found
that none applied in that case. One was not left with the impression that the
presumption can be quickly rebutted.
[33]
Be that as it may, the alternative approach used
by the Court of Appeal in Kinsel, supra, would find equally
application in this case:
[31] In the event I am wrong in this
conclusion and, as the Attorney General submits, Kandola should be
distinguished, I rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in McLean.
[32] In McLean, the Supreme Court
considered the standard of review to be applied to a securities commission’s
interpretation of a limitation period contained in its home statute. Justice
Moldaver (writing for the majority) observed that where the ordinary tools of
statutory interpretation lead to a single reasonable interpretation and the
administrative decision-maker adopts a different interpretation, that
interpretation will of necessity be unreasonable (McLean, paragraph 38).
[33] For reasons developed below, I have
conducted the required textual, contextual and purposive analysis of the
relevant legislation. I am satisfied that there is only one reasonable
interpretation of the legislation.
[34]
In the case at hand, the interpretation of the
word “adoption” in section 5.1 of the Act simply does not accord with the
guardianship order issued in Pakistan on the basis of the Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890, which ostensibly was used in this case. In my view, there
is only one reasonable interpretation of the legislation here. Whether the
standard of review is reasonableness or correctness, the result is the same.
[35]
As a result, the application for judicial review
is dismissed. As with other cases involving the interpretation of the Citizenship
Act, I see no reason to depart from the principle that costs follow the
event. Costs are awarded to the respondent.
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