Date:
20130508
Docket:
IMM-7817-12
Citation:
2013 FC 447
Ottawa, Ontario,
May 8, 2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Applicant
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and
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B344
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Respondent
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PUBLIC REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
(Confidential Reasons
for Judgment and Judgment
released April 30,
2013)
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review under section 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] of a
decision by the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the Immigration and
Refugee Board, dated July 19, 2012, granting the Respondent refugee status.
I. Facts
[2]
The
Respondent is a Tamil male from Sri Lanka who arrived in Canada on August 10, 2010 on the MV Sun Sea.
[3]
The
Respondent was displaced within Sri Lanka in [redacted] and [redacted] until
the Sri Lankan Army [SLA] gained control over Jaffna.
[4]
The
Respondent completed his university studies in [redacted] and started working
in [redacted] in Jaffna. [Redacted].
[5]
On
[redacted], the [redacted] interrogated. The officers [redacted] Respondent was
detained [redacted] and tortured. A [redacted].
[6]
[Redacted].
[7]
[Redacted].
He obtained a passport and [redacted] paid for his ticket to Thailand. While in Thailand, he met an agent and made arrangements to take a trip to Canada on the MV Sun Sea.
II. Decision
under review
[8]
The
RPD found that the Respondent did not have a well-founded fear of persecution
when he left Sri Lanka because of credibility issues. The RPD determined that
it was implausible that the [redacted] and that he omitted important
information in his Personal Information Form. The RPD also found it implausible
that the Respondent applied for a passport and was able to leave the country,
despite there being stringent security checks in place in Sri Lanka at the time, particularly for those suspected of having ties to the LTTE. Therefore, the
RPD concluded that the Respondent cannot be found to have a well-founded fear
of persecution on the sole basis that he is a Tamil from the north of Sri Lanka.
[9]
The
RPD however found that the Respondent has a valid sur place claim.
Indeed, the RPD determined that the Sri Lankan government suspects the MV
Sun Sea to be linked to the LTTE and that passengers returning to Sri Lanka would be subjected to questioning. Relying on the documentary evidence, which
establishes that Sri Lankan authorities use torture as a mean of securing
information, the RPD concluded that the Respondent has a well-founded fear of
persecution.
[10]
The
RPD reviewed a number of documentary evidence on human rights abuse by the
government of Sri Lanka and determined that the Respondent faced a risk as a
former passenger of the MV Sun Sea. This finding was based on the human
rights reports of several international organizations and the United States
Department of State Report, which also claim that the widespread use of torture
has not abated since the civil war, and that the anti-terrorism legislative
regime in Sri Lanka continues to provide structures enabling human rights
violations with impunity.
[11]
On
the issue of nexus to a Convention ground under section 96 of the IRPA, the RPD
concluded that being a passenger on a ship alone is not sufficient to establish
nexus and that there are “mixed motives” on the part of the agent of
persecution. The Respondent’s Tamil ethnicity was considered to be a
contributing factor to the risk he would face should he return to Sri Lanka.
[12]
The evidence is
clear that the Respondent would be questioned by Sri Lankan authorities upon
his return to Sri Lanka and that his status as a former MV Sun Sea
passenger would become known.
[13]
The
evidence also establishes that the Sri Lankan government perceives the MV
Sun Sea to be part of an LTTE-administered trafficking operation,
regardless of the Respondent’s previous perceived association with the LTTE.
[14]
As
for Sri Lankan authorities’ treatment of returnees, there is
evidence that they use torture and abusive force against suspected terrorists
and also against those who may have information about suspected terrorists. The
Respondent would therefore face more than a mere possibility of being
persecuted as a Tamil who traveled on the MV Sun Sea.
[15]
As
for state protection, the RPD concluded that the Sri Lankan Government itself
is a potential agent of persecution, and that there is no ability to report
abuses to the state. The RPD also determined that the Respondent does not have
an internal flight alternative available to him as government agents would be
able to locate him in Colombo.
III. Applicant’s
submissions
[16]
The
Applicant first submits that the RPD erred in determining that the Respondent’s
fear has a nexus to a Convention ground. In the present case, the RPD’s reasons
for its nexus finding are not intelligible or transparent as it is not clear
which of the five grounds is engaged. Moreover, the Respondent’s situation
should not have been characterized as a case of mixed motives as the RPD did
not determine that the Respondent would be targeted because of his ethnicity.
The RPD’s decision to grant refugee protection on the basis that the
Respondent’s ethnicity is a contributing factor to his risk is contrary to the
principles established in Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Huntley, 2010
FC 1175 at para 129, 93 Imm LR (3d) (36), Russell J [Huntley] as
ethnicity should be an independent basis for the persecution.
[17]
Second,
the Applicant submits that the RPD erred in determining that the Respondent is
part of a particular social group that is targeted as he was a passenger on the
MV Sun Sea and therefore suspected of being linked to the LTTE. Choosing
to travel aboard an illegal human smuggling operation has nothing to do with
the defence of human rights and is unrelated to the anti-discrimination and
human right purpose of the Convention as established in Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) v B380, 2012 FC 1334, 224 ACWS (3d) 177, Crampton CJ [B380].
[18]
Third,
the Applicant submits that the RPD’s determination that the Sri Lankan authorities’
perception that the Respondent has information on the LTTE might amount to a
perceived political opinion is unreasonable. Indeed, even if the Sri Lankan
authorities might question the Respondent, there is no evidentiary basis for a
finding that he will be deemed to share the political opinions of the LTTE. Information about criminal activity is not a political opinion within the meaning of the grounds
for refugee protection.
[19]
Finally,
the Applicant concludes that the RPD committed an error as it did not state
that the Respondent has established the facts underlying his claim on a balance
of probabilities. Moreover, it came to an unreasonable conclusion because its
finding that the Respondent would face a risk of persecution is based on
evidence that is out of date and there is no reliable evidence as to the
treatment of MV Sun Sea passengers who returned to Sri Lanka.
IV. Respondent’s
submissions
[20]
The
Respondent submits that the reasons provided by the RPD with respect to nexus
to a Convention ground are intelligible and transparent. It has been recognized
that mixed motives of persecution may form the basis of a well-founded fear of
persecution. Nexus is established when at least one of the motives is based on
a Convention ground. In the present case, the RPD concluded that “the
claimant’s Tamil ethnicity is a contributing factor to his risk.” It has been
established in Veeravagu
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FCJ 468, 1992 CarswellNat 1270 (FCA), Hugessen JA [Veeravagu] as well as in other case law from this Court that when
a person faces risk because he belongs to a group, one of whose defining
characteristics is race, then that person has a nexus to a Convention ground. As
it has been recognized that Tamils from the north of Sri Lanka are a particular
social group, in addition to the nexus of race, it is reasonable to conclude
that Tamils from Sri Lanka who travelled on the MV Sun Sea also meet
this definition. As for the decision B380, above, cited by the
Applicant, the Respondent submits that the reasoning in the decision ignores
who the passengers of the MV Sun Sea are and that the reasons why they
came together in the first place was to escape the denial of their human
rights. The RPD reasonably found that the Respondent would be at risk of
torture, a mean used by Sri Lankan authorities to secure information on
terrorist activities.
[21]
The
Respondent further submits that the Applicant’s reliance on Huntley,
above is misplaced as this case does not stand for the proposition that the
race element must be sufficient to put the Respondent at risk, regardless of
other aspects of the case, and that it is therefore distinguishable from the
case at bar.
[22]
The
Respondent submits that the debate on whether, in addition to nexus on the
basis of race and particular social group, the Respondent also has a nexus on
the basis of “perceived political opinion” is academic as the RPD determined
that he would face persecution on the basis of his Tamil ethnicity and found
his presence on the MV Sun Sea to be an additional risk factor.
Moreover, the Government of Sri Lanka clearly indicated that it considers the MV
Sun Sea to be a human smuggling operation organized by the LTTE. Whether
the Respondent is perceived as an LTTE supporter or simply as having
information on the LTTE, he is at greater risk than other refugee returnees.
Therefore, the RPD’s decision on nexus is reasonable.
[23]
Finally,
the Respondent submits that the evidence relied on by the RPD was not out of
date. As an example, it considered a declaration by the Sri Lankan government
that was made a month before the hearing. Moreover, contrary to what is alleged
by the Applicant, there is evidence about a returnee who was a passenger on the
MV Sun Sea. He was detained upon arrival and tortured. The RPD is
entitled to consider evidence of similarly situated claimants such as a case
where Sri Lankan nationals who fled to Australia were tortured while detained
in Boosa upon their return to Sri Lanka. The RPD reasonably found that evidence
such as in cases where there is monitoring by international governmental
agents, Sri Lankan authorities pay attention to standards of procedure does not
solve the issue of what happens to returnees who do not benefit from this level
of protection. Considering human rights abuses in Sri Lanka, it is reasonable
to determine that returnees who do not benefit from this monitoring process are
at risk. The Respondent submits that the RPD’s conclusion that he is at risk of
being tortured if returned to Sri Lanka is reasonable.
V. Applicant’s
reply
[24]
The
Applicant submits that Veeravagu, above should be distinguished from the
present case because in that case, the RPD did not find that the Applicant’s
race was a causal factor and that case was decided over twenty years ago.
[25]
Second,
the Applicant argues that the RPD disregarded the evidence before it that Tamils
do not face persecution by reason of their ethnicity anymore.
[26]
The
Applicant further submits that some evidence was ignored by the RPD. Indeed,
the RPD dismissed evidence showing that many returnees from abroad were able to
resettle in the country without encountering significant difficulties but
speculated that this would not apply in the Respondent’s case as he was a
passenger on the MV Sun Sea. The Applicant is of the view that the RPD’s
reliance on an outdated and unclear evidence of Boosa detainees is insufficient
to meet the threshold to establish more than a mere possibility of risk.
[27]
Finally,
the Applicant is of the view that the RPD does not rely on evidence
demonstrating that the authorities use torture with cooperative witnesses.
Nothing in the RPD’s analysis indicates that the Respondent would be unwilling
to provide information to Sri Lankan authorities. This Court found in two
decisions: (P.M. v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 77 at para 21, 2013 CarswellNat 206, Snider J and S.K. v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 78 at para 21, 2013
CarswellNat 207, Snider J.) that although returnees who traveled on the MV
Sun Sea would be subjected to questioning upon return, such evidence is
insufficient to establish that these particular returnees would be persecuted
or tortured.
VI. Issues
1.
Is the RPD’s finding that the Respondent is a Convention refugee based on an
established nexus to a Convention ground unreasonable?
2.
Did the RPD apply a wrong standard of proof to its findings of fact by
basing critical elements of its decision on speculation and outdated, unclear
evidence?
VII. Standard
of review
[28]
Both
parties agree that the standard of reasonableness applies to both issues as
they raise mixed question of fact and law (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 51,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190
[Dunsmuir]).
I agree. When assessing the reasonableness of a decision, a Court looks for
justification, evidentiary foundation and understandable reasoning. As for the
conclusion arrived at by the administrative body, a Court needs to consider
whether it falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible
in respect of the facts and the applicable law (see Dunsmuir, above at
paras 47-48).
VIII. Statutory
provision
[29]
Section
96 of the IRPA reads as follows:
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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27
Convention Refugee
96.
A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their
countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling
to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is
outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
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Loi
sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, LC 2001,
ch
27
Définition
de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de
réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques:
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve
hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du
fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
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IX. Analysis
[30]
The
RPD’s determination based on section 96 of the IRPA reads as follows:
I find, on the evidence before me in this claim that
various factors combine to demonstrate more than a mere possibility that the
claimant faces treatment constituting persecution upon his return to Sri Lanka because he is a Tamil who was a passenger on the Sun Sea. (See para 26 of
the decision.)
[31]
Before
coming to this conclusion, the Board member made a number of successive
detailed findings as her analysis shows, the most relevant points of which are
summarized as follows:
- The
Board member found that all Tamils in Sri Lanka still face state-sponsored
discrimination but that Tamil ethnicity alone was not a sufficient ground
to establish a serious possibility of persecution. In the RPD’s view, it
was a contributing factor to be considered along with other relevant
components. It is important to note that in its decision, the RPD referred
to the Respondent’s Tamil ethnicity on numerous occasions to highlight the
fact that it was a contributing factor to the risk of persecution as well
as an aggravating consideration in the treatment he may get upon return at
the hands of the Sri Lankan authorities. The RPD noted that his Tamil
ethnicity needs to be considered along with the fact that the Sri Lankan
government may draw conclusions regarding his political opinions based on
his status as a former passenger on the MV Sun Sea.
- The
Board member found that the Respondent’s presence on the MV Sun Sea
was a factor that added to the risk of persecution.
- The
Board member also found that the Respondent would be questioned by
government authorities upon return. The RPD determined that he would have
to explain how he left Sri Lanka and that as a result of this, his status
as a former passenger on the MV Sun Sea would become known to the
authorities.
- The
decision maker, after explaining how the Sri Lanka government perceives
the MV Sun Sea and links it to an LTTE operation, found that there
is a serious possibility that the Respondent who was a passenger on the MV
Sun Sea, would face persecution at the time of arrival or after even
though he does not have a past which relates him to the LTTE. Because of
the attitude of the government towards the MV Sun Sea, associating
it to the LTTE, the perception of the authorities would be that he is linked
to or has potentially valuable information on this group and its role in
the smuggling operation.
- The
RPD also considered the evidence to the effect that returnees are treated
poorly upon return and that torture is a technique of questioning frequently
used by government authorities in Sri Lanka.
[32]
The
cumulative effect of these findings led the RPD to identify race (Tamil
ethnicity) and the Respondent’s status as a former MV Sun Sea passenger
as contributing factors of risk of persecution. Through the doctrine of mixed
motives, the RPD determined that race and status as a former passenger on the MV
Sun Sea, which is perceived by the Sri Lankan government to be a
LTTE-driven operation, would trigger a risk of persecution at the hands of the
agents of persecution upon his return. Moreover, in its decision, the RPD
explained that the Respondent will be perceived as having information on the
LTTE, as he travelled on the MV Sun Sea, which is considered by the Sri Lankan
authorities to be LTTE-driven. As such the Board member found that there is a
serious possibility that the Respondent would be persecuted.
[33]
The
Applicant submits that the Respondent’s potential knowledge about the LTTE is
insufficient to establish a nexus based on political opinions as a claimant who
fears persecution because he is perceived as having information about an
organization as opposed to sharing the political views of that organization
does not have a nexus to the Convention ground of “political opinion.”
[34]
Such
argument cannot be accepted. In Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v B420, 2013 FC 321 at para 21,
Blanchard, J, a case dealing with a similar issue, this Court stated the following
regarding the RPD’s finding regarding imputed knowledge about the LTTE:
[21]
The RPD’s findings are not as clear as they could have been and in some
cases arguably deficient. For instance, the RPD could not rely upon imputed knowledge
of LTTE activities to support its finding of imputed political opinion. I am
nevertheless satisfied that the evidence referred to by the Tribunal in its
reasons supports a finding that the Respondent, as a young, Tamil male from
northern Sri Lanka, has a well-founded fear of persecution by reasons of his
race and his imputed political opinion by reason of his perceived association
with the LTTE. I am satisfied that that the RPD’s conclusion is reasonable.
[35]
In
its decision, the RPD made it clear that the basis for its finding that the
Respondent would be at risk of persecution is based in part on his status as a
former passenger on the MV Sun Sea, which is associated to the LTTE by
the Sri Lankan authorities, as shown by the statement by the Defence Secretary.
There is therefore a sufficient basis to conclude that there is a nexus to
political opinion as he would be perceived as being associated to the LTTE.
[36]
The
Applicant further argues that the RPD’s finding that the Respondent’s Tamil
ethnicity in combination with other factors was, sufficient to create a valid
nexus to a Convention ground pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA is unreasonable
as it is not a determination of mixed motives based on ethnicity but rather an
erroneous conclusion that passengers on the MV Sun Sea have a nexus to a
Convention ground. It is submitted that in order to be successful in
establishing mixed motives of persecution, one of the motives must be connected
to a Convention ground. The Applicant argues that as the Board member did not
connect Tamil ethnicity as such, to a Convention ground, there cannot be a
nexus established pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA.
[37]
I
disagree with such a limited interpretation of the doctrine of mixed motives
which goes against the spirit of the Convention. Section 96 of the IRPA has one
objective which is to prevent people from being subjected to persecution as
long as it is linked to a Convention ground. If one of the motivations of the
agent of persecution is race but only in combination with another factor, how
could that not be sufficient to meet the requirements of section 96 of the
IRPA? After all, section 96 of the IRPA as written, is not to be interpreted in
a narrow restrictive fashion: its purpose, as outlined, is to address fear of
persecution and to protect any person who suffers from persecution based on
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion. Moreover,
section 3(2)(d) of the IRPA clearly states that one of the main purposes
of Canada’s refugee system is to “offer safe haven to persons with a
well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
political opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those
at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” Section 96 of
the IRPA needs to be interpreted in light of this objective.
[38]
The
mixed motives approach to a finding related to section 96 of the IRPA is not
new. The Federal Court of Appeal has been recognizing the validity of this type
of analysis for more than 20 years. Indeed, in both Salibian v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 11 Imm LR (2d) 165 at paras 17-19, 73 DLR (4th)
551 (FCA), Décary JA and Veeravagu, above, the Federal Court of Appeal
recognized that race can be a “causal factor” when an individual is at risk to
suffer persecution at the hands of state agents and that this causal factor,
considered along with other motivations can establish a serious possibility of
persecution:
In our view, it is obvious beyond any need of demonstration that
if a person faces "real and oppressive" risks, including a risk of
"substantial violence," from state sponsored sources (the IPKF)
because he or she belongs to a group one of whose defining characteristics is
race, (young Tamil males), it is simply impossible to say that such person does
not have an objective fear of persecution for reasons of race.
(See Veeravagu,
above at 2.)
It
is not a question of whether the persecution can be connected to a Convention
ground but rather an issue of whether a ground such as race can be a
contributing or causal factor.
[39]
The
notion of mixed motives in the context of refugee protection claims was first
recognized in Zhu v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] FCJ 80 at para 2, 1994 CarswellNat 1600 (FCA),
MacGuigan JA when the Federal Court of Appeal noted that: “People
frequently act out of mixed motives, and it is enough for the existence of
political motivation that one of the motives [be] political.”
[40]
From then on, this Court has applied the mixed
motives approach to many decisions under section 96 of the IRPA. For example, a
mixed motives finding based on race and age as a contributing factor, was
recognized as a valid basis for a Convention ground in Jeyaseelan v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 356 at para 8, 218 FTR 221, McKeown J. Moreover,
mixed motives have also been associated with the perception of state agents of
situations and their motives when assessing those situations. In a 2003 case,
this Court noted that political opinions that an applicant “had or might have
been imputed to [him] by government authority” may constitute the basis of a
finding of mixed motives (see Sopiqoti v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 95 at para 14, 34 Imm LR (3d) 126,
Martineau J.). In another decision of this Court, it was noted that if at least
one of the motives can be related to a Convention ground, nexus may be
established (see Katwaru
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 612 at para 12, 62 Imm LR (3d) 140,
Teitelbaum J.).
[41]
More
recently, this Court addressed the issue of mixed motives when it recognized
that a motive can be not considered “purely” economic if the evidence indicates
that there was a racial component to it. Mixed motives may then be found if one
of the motives is related to a Convention ground (see Gonsalves v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 648 at para 29, 2 Imm LR
(4th) 113, Zinn J.).
[42]
Counsel
for the Applicant relies on Huntley, above to argue that racially
motivated acts constitute persecution only if, taken individually, they are
sufficient to establish a Convention ground. Respectfully, this is not my
interpretation of this decision, to my mind, it was determined that if it had
been considered that based on the evidence, there was a racial component to
what the claimant suffered, a finding of “mixed motivation” could have been
“conceivably possible” but such was not the case.
[…] I agree with respondent's counsel that such
mixed motivation is conceivably possible. What is lacking in the present case,
in my view, is objective evidence that the attacks, at least in part, were made
to persecute the respondent for being white. […]
(See Huntley, above at para 129.)
[43]
Therefore,
it was a matter of sufficiency of the evidence on the racial motivation. If the
racial component of the assault had been demonstrated, then mixed motives on
the part of the aggressor could have been established and race may have been
found to be a contributing factor to the main motivation which was to rob the
Applicant.
[44]
The
RPD found that the Respondent’s Tamil ethnicity was a contributing and
aggravating factor to the risk of persecution he faces should he return to Sri Lanka. The Board member found that this established a nexus to a Convention ground in
conjunction with the fact that he was a passenger on the MV Sun Sea,
which is perceived by the Sri Lankan government as a LTTE-driven operation. I
consider this nexus finding to be reasonable and in line with the historical
view of the mixed motives doctrine adopted by both the Federal Court of Appeal
and this Court.
[45]
In
order to come to this conclusion, the Respondent’s Tamil ethnicity was a prime
contributing factor to the possibility of risk of persecution upon arrival in Sri Lanka. When considered individually, the motivations, which are based on the
Respondent’s Tamil ethnicity as well as his status as a former passenger on the
MV Sun Sea, which is perceived by the government as a LTTE-driven
operation, were not sufficient to establish a nexus to the Convention ground of
race on their own, however, when taken together they cumulatively established a
serious possibility of risk of persecution upon return. Without one of the
contributing factors, the Convention ground would not be satisfactorily
established but taken together, these motivations form the basis of the ground
of race. Therefore, the nexus to race was essential to the RPD’s conclusion
that the risk of persecution upon return was a serious scenario to be
envisaged.
[46]
As
a second argument, the Applicant submits that the findings of fact made
regarding the Sri Lankan government’s perception of the MV Sun Sea as a
LTTE-related operation, its determination that the Respondent, as a former
passenger of the MV Sun Sea would be subjected to questioning and that
such status would become known to the authorities and its determination that
there is evidence of torture of returnees by government agents were not done in
accordance with the evidence submitted or assessed on a balance of
probabilities.
[47]
The
decision under review is very well-written. It was meticulously drafted, well
researched and is in conformity with the applicable law and jurisprudence. It
is certainly a reasonable decision, as it falls
within “a range of possible, acceptable outcomes” (Dunsmuir, above at
para 47).
[48]
The
review of the documentary evidence on all matters including the attitude of the
Sri Lanka government towards Sri Lankan returnees, its use of torture, its
perception of the MV Sun Sea including the most recent statement by the
Defence Secretary that the voyage of the MV Sun Sea is an example of the
LTTE’s international shipping criminal operations to smuggle people to western
countries which is used to raise money for the separatist cause was well done,
balanced and the conclusions arrived at were well justified. I do not find any
speculation done by the RPD in its assessment of the evidence nor do I find
that any of its findings was based on outdated or unclear evidence. The
Applicant disagrees with the RPD’s determinations and would like this Court to review
the evidence and come to a different result. The RPD’s findings were reasonable
and the intervention of this Court is therefore not warranted.
[49]
Counsel
were invited to submit questions for certification but declined to do so.
Confidentiality
[50]
The
Parties shall file written submissions setting out their respective positions
on the content of the Reasons to be released publicly no later than ten (10)
days from receipt of these reasons.
JUDGMENT
FOR
ALL THESE REASONS, THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES THAT the
judicial review of the July 19, 2012 decision is dismissed and no question will
be certified.
“Simon Noël”
____________________________
Judge
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