Date:
20130503
Docket:
T-952-12
Citation:
2013 FC 464
Ottawa, Ontario,
this 3rd day of May 2013
Present: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Roy
BETWEEN:
WANDA MACFARLANE
Applicant
and
DAY & ROSS INC. and
E. THOMAS CHRISTIE
Respondents
REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review in respect of a decision issued on April
30, 2012, by an adjudicator, Mr. E. Thomas Christie (the “adjudicator”),
appointed pursuant to subsection 241(3) of the Canada Labour Code, RSC
1985, c L-2 (the “Code”). Ms. Wanda MacFarlane (the “applicant”) saw her
complaint of unjust dismissal dismissed by the adjudicator.
[2]
The
applicant has represented herself in this case which has come to this Court on
two occasions already in order to deal with preliminary matters of
jurisdiction. It will be important to refer to these two decisions as they will
help frame the debate on the merits of the case.
Facts
[3]
The
applicant was employed by the respondent from February 2001 to July 4, 2008.
The respondent, Day & Ross Inc., is a trucking company. The applicant
worked as an entry level Help Desk Programmer during the period of time. She
had trained as a computer programmer and her responsibilities involved
resolving information technology issues raised by other departments.
[4]
The
respondent has approximately 3,000 employees and also contracts with some 1,500
independent owner-operators and brokers. The payments to those operators and
brokers are done through a computerized system, whose information is controlled
by the company’s broker pay manager. It is the pay manager who authorizes the
Help Desk to actually make changes to the records.
[5]
The
facts in cases of this nature are, of course, important. The impugned decision
relates the facts as found by the adjudicator in some details. It will suffice
for the purpose of this judicial review to consider the following summary.
[6]
During
the early part of 2008, Ms. MacFarlane was experiencing an increased frequency
of migraines. On April 3, 2008, the applicant complained to her supervisor that
changes in her duties in the last six months had led to her spending a great
deal of time in front of “scrolling” computer screens which triggered her
symptoms and her supervisor noted that there had been an increase in the number
of tickets routed to the Help Desk.
[7]
The
applicant voiced her desire for a promotion, but was told that higher positions
were beyond her training and experience. Short-term disability leave was taken
by the applicant for most of the rest of April. No medical evidence was
produced before the adjudicator in support of that disability leave.
[8]
The
adjudicator then noted that on April 29, 2008, there was a return to work
meeting involving the applicant and management representatives of the
respondent. No medical documentation was brought to the meeting but, based on
the word of the applicant, the supervisors agreed that she could stop work
immediately if any task caused the applicant the onset of symptoms; she was
authorized to hand the task off to someone else in those circumstances.
[9]
The
applicant returned to work on April 30th. It was her view that this
return to work was on a trial basis, but her supervisor indicated that if she
wished to cease work again under short-term disability, she would need to apply
again and that medical evidence would be needed in support of such an
application. The applicant was displeased by this state of affairs and she
slammed a book on her desk. Around mid-May 2008, students were hired by the
respondent and arrived to work in the department where the applicant was
employed. One of the students was given a more advanced position than that of
Ms. MacFarlane which, again, displeased the applicant. She told her supervisor
that she wanted that position and was told that she would not be getting it.
Again the applicant showed frustration by slamming books on her desk.
[10]
On
May 22nd, the Accounts Payable Manager approached the applicant’s
supervisor about problems with the broker pay accounts. The supervisor called
Ms. MacFarlane at home to ask if she had any idea what was wrong, since she was
one of the few people with access to the computer records. The applicant
responded that she did not know anything about that.
[11]
However,
an investigation soon revealed that the applicant had deleted 148 records over
the course of 20 minutes on the afternoon of Friday, May 16, 2008; she then
spent two days re-entering them. The evidence shows that some of the
information was re-entered incorrectly, causing further problems. The evidence
also shows that the applicant did not tell anyone that there had been a
problem. During this period of time the applicant did not indicate either to
anyone that she had been suffering from a migraine or some other condition.
[12]
The
supervisor confronted the applicant, who said that she did not know why she
would have deleted the records and that she had restored 27 of them, but did
not know of other deletions. The supervisor and members of the staff were
successful in recreating the records from a system backup of May 15th.
[13]
On
Monday, May 26, 2008, the applicant wrote to the Vice President of Information
Systems, a person who had been present at her return to work meeting on April
29th, in order to offer the explanation that her reasoning had been
impaired at the time when she made the deletions and she could not remember
exactly what she had done or why she had done it. She suggested that she had
been in a pre-migraine state and asked for a change of position, to one which
would not precipitate migraines.
[14]
The
applicant’s last day worked was May 26, 2008 as she went on leave. On May 30th,
she applied for short-term disability benefits.
[15]
The
request for short-term disability benefits was denied on June 24th
because the medical evidence did not support her claim. She was notified that
she was expected to return to work. On or about June 27, 2008, she contacted
the plan administrator to indicate that she would appeal the denial. On June
30, 2008, she was advised by letter that she was absent from work without authorization
and summoned to a meeting on July 4th. On July 4, 2008, the
applicant called to say that she could not come in to work and asked whether
the meeting was to deal with her termination. She was advised that such was the
case.
[16]
A
termination letter was prepared on the same day, citing four reasons for the
termination: grossly negligent conduct in the deletion of records; subsequent
attempt to cover the incident up; recent absence without authorization; and
expressed unwillingness to continue working in the current position. The
employer offered continued payments of salary until January 3, 2009 in the
event no alternate employment was secured, continued health and dental benefits
and continuation in the pension plan. In return, the respondent was expecting a
full and complete release. Finally, the termination would be recorded as for
reasons other than cause, thus permitting the applicant to apply for Employment
Insurance benefits.
[17]
The
testimony of a few witnesses should be noted for the purpose of understanding
more fully the case before the adjudicator.
[18]
A
witness from the company’s disability management division testified that the
applicant had never provided sufficient objective medical evidence to justify
disability benefits. It was acknowledged that one doctor’s note from February
2008 indicated that scrolling computer screens could trigger migraines and
should therefore be avoided, while a second one said that the applicant had
experienced a severe migraine and should have two days off. However, the
applicant was asked for a more specific diagnosis, a treatment plan, and
details of limitations on duties and equipment on several occasions. On March
10, 2008, the applicant provided another doctor’s note saying that she had a
ten-year history of migraines and should avoid visual triggers, in particular
being required to search for information on a screen for a prolonged period of
time. It is based on this note that the company had approved her claim for
benefits for the period of April 1 to April 28, 2008. The return to work
meeting of April 29th followed.
[19]
The
Vice President of Information Services also testified. He explained that the
deletions that took place on May 16, 2008 had not been accidental. They could
only be deliberate. The witness could not see the correlation between the
deletions made by the applicant and her migraine issues. The actions of the
applicant destroyed the necessary trust that must exist between an employer and
an employee.
[20]
Finally,
the applicant testified before the adjudicator. She gave her work history with
the respondent. She entered the company on a Work Ability Program in February
of 2001. She was offered and accepted a permanent position in May 2001. It is
in 2004 that she asked about being moved off the Help Desk and promoted. This
was refused. During the terminal illness suffered by a very close family
member, she asked for flex time and hours; she was refused. She also asked to
work from home, but this too was denied. She sought to apply for compassionate
leave through a government program but that request was refused because she
could not provide the date on which she would return to work. Thus, in March
2004, the applicant’s doctor certified that she was under too much stress to
work. She went on short-term disability, which turned into long-term disability
in July 2004. The applicant’s disability leave continued until April/May 2006.
[21]
Upon
her return to work, her duties started to evolve. She began to get support
calls for programs written in a different code, requiring her to scroll through
multiple screens within an application. A new call-tracker was introduced which
also required her to move through various screens. In the summer of 2007, she
asked for assistance with the increasing workload and it was indicated to her
that others in the office would share the calls. The applicant then provided an
explanation for what took place on May 16th. She said that she
received a request to make adjustments to ten transactions in the broker
settlement application. The record contains several emails about invalid
records which had to be deleted. The applicant testified that in the process of
dealing with the request from May 15th, she discovered invalid
records and decided to correct this by deleting them. She only realized later
that she had deleted valid information and tried to restore the records. The
applicant denied trying to cover anything up and emphasized that she had been
trying to fix the mistake. She conceded that she had not considered herself to
be disabled at the time of the incident, but she complained that the respondent
had not been as accommodating as it should have been.
[22]
Finally,
when she left work on May 26th, she was confident that her new claim
for short-term disability benefits would be approved because, she asserted, she
believed that company policy required automatic approval of recurrent claims.
When she was called to the meeting on July 4th, she believed that
she could not be dismissed while on disability. The night of her dismissal, she
was taken to the hospital with symptoms of a heart attack. She subsequently
applied for and was granted sick benefits under the Employment Insurance
program and eventually the Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefits which she
continues to receive.
Proceedings
[23]
A
complaint was made by the applicant against the respondent under section 240 of
the Code alleging unjust dismissal. An adjudicator was appointed under
subsection 242(1) of the Code and the matter was set down for hearing the
complaint on August 25 and 26, 2009. However, in the meantime the applicant
filed a complaint to the Canadian Human Rights Commission on May 28, 2009 in
which she alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of age and
disability. She claimed of having been disabled since May 23, 2008 and
that she was terminated while disabled.
[24]
On
August 13, 2009, some ten days prior to the hearing before the adjudicator, the
respondent claimed that the adjudicator lacked jurisdiction in view of the
pending complaint before the Canadian Human Rights Commission [CHRC]. On
September 2, 2009, that adjudicator concluded that he could not hear a wrongful
dismissal case on its merits because of that pending human rights complaint.
[25]
It
is that initial decision of the adjudicator that Ms. MacFarlane challenged
before the Federal Court. That resulted in a decision of Justice Robert
Mainville, then of this Court, who, on May 26, 2010 (2010 FC 556) concluded
that the adjudicator was in part right, but that he had interpreted his
jurisdiction without considering whether the matter could be heard if referred
to the adjudicator pursuant to section 44 of the Canadian Human Rights Act,
RSC 1985, c H-6. At paragraph 84 of the decision, one can read:
In conclusion, I rule
that the adjudicator did not violate any principles of natural justice or
procedural fairness in conducting the proceedings and rendering his decision. I
also rule that the adjudicator correctly decided not to hear the complaint
before him on the merits. Consequently, the decision of the adjudicator in this
case is largely upheld, save to the extent that the adjudicator declined
jurisdiction in a manner which would preclude the complaint being referred back
to him by the Canadian Human Rights Commission in the exercise of its authority
pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(b) or paragraph 44(2)(b) of the Canadian
Human Rights Act.
[26]
That
takes us to the second judicial review heard by this Court in this matter. The
Canadian Human Rights Commission had provided the parties with its section 41
investigation report, and it decided on December 2, 2009 not to proceed with
Ms. MacFarlane’s complaint because it was “one that could more
appropriately be dealt with initially by the adjudicator”.
[27]
The
applicant had written the adjudicator to hear the wrongful dismissal case
following the decision on the first judicial review. The adjudicator did not
proceed to hear the matter either because he concluded that the decision of the
CHRC not to deal with the complaint is not to be understood as being a referral
back to the adjudicator, as was contemplated in the decision of the Court in
the initial judicial review. It is from that decision that judicial review was
sought, this time before Justice Robert Barnes.
[28]
In
MacFarlane v Day & Ross Inc, 2011 FC 377, Justice Barnes found that
the adjudicator erred in law by declining jurisdiction. The Commission’s report
was to be understood to be a referral by the Commission to the adjudicator. One
can read at paragraph 13 of the Reasons for Judgment the following:
[13] … The Adjudicator
seems to have expected a formal requisition from the Commission before he could
hear the matter on the merits. Ms. MacFarlane is correct that no such step is
required. Section 44 of the CHRA stipulates that where the Commission
decides to defer to another authority it “shall refer the complainant to the
appropriate authority”. Under ss 44(4) the Commission “shall notify in writing”
the parties to a complaint of its decision to defer to another authority and it
“may in such manner as it sees fit, notify any other person”. When these
provisions are read together it is clear that to support the reference of a
complaint the Commission is only required to notify the parties of its decision
and it is then up to them to request that the other authority assume
jurisdiction. …
Justice Barnes concluded that, in
the circumstances of the case, there should be a new adjudicator appointed to
hear the matter on its merits. One was appointed and it is from his decision
that a third judicial review is now sought.
[29]
Accordingly,
the combination of the two Court rulings confirmed that the adjudicator, newly
appointed for the purpose of hearing the case on its merits, had jurisdiction
to deal with the complaint of unjust dismissal under section 240 of the Code,
as well as the jurisdiction to address the human rights complaint to the extent
that it relates to the dismissal. The adjudicator was right to state at
paragraph 2 of his decision:
There are really two
matters for determination. The first is whether the Complainant was terminated
unjustly? The second is the question of whether in the course of the
termination the Respondent violated the Complainant’s rights set out in the Canadian
Human Rights Act R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 (CHRA).
These two Court decisions also circumscribe
the issues before this Court. Neither of the decisions was appealed before the
Federal Court of Appeal and for the purpose of this judicial review, the
jurisdiction of the adjudicator is to be considered as settled, as long as he
remained within the parameters set by this Court. As we shall see, he did.
Issues
[30]
The
applicant proposed several issues for determination by this Court. They are:
(a) Did the
adjudicator exceed his jurisdiction by considering the CHRC complaint?
(b)
Did the adjudicator commit an error of law or exceed his jurisdiction by
basing his findings with regard to the unjust dismissal complaint on
conclusions reached in his consideration of the CHRC complaint?
(c)
Did the adjudicator exceed or fail to exercise his jurisdiction and commit an
error of law by failing to correctly identify the type of dismissal he was
addressing and failing to make a clear finding on the central question before
him?
(d) Did
the adjudicator exceed his jurisdiction by addressing reasons for dismissal
that were not contained in the letter of dismissal?
(e) Did
the adjudicator base his decision on erroneous findings of fact that he made
without regard to the material before him?
(f) Did
the contradictory findings contained in this decision render it unreasonable?
[31]
I
have already addressed issues (a) and (b) in finding that the Canadian Human
Rights Commission complaint was rightly before the adjudicator as per the
decisions of this Court. As long as he dealt with the dismissal, the
adjudicator was within his jurisdiction. The applicant seems to suggest that
the conclusions reached on whether or not the applicant was discriminated
against when she was dismissed while she claimed she was disabled (not when the
actions giving rise to the dismissal took place) were unduly used with regard
to the unjust dismissal complaint. Not only is the problem difficult to fathom,
this allegation does not have an air of reality. The adjudicator considered the
two issues separately and reached a conclusion on each. The applicant’s
submissions before the Court did not advance her case. There is no merit to
issues (a) and (b). As for issues (c), (d), (e) and (f), they are better
described in the respondent’s formulation:
(i) Did
the adjudicator err in dismissing the applicant’s human rights allegation?
(ii) Did
the adjudicator err in dismissing the applicant’s unjust dismissal allegation?
The more specific issues raised by
the applicant will be dealt with as I consider the two allegations. I shall
proceed on this basis.
Analysis
[32]
The
first issue to be addressed is a critical one in the circumstances. The
applicant sought to retry the case before this Court, attempting in effect to
show that the adjudicator was wrong in his analysis, as if the Court was
proceeding on a standard of correctness. Thus what constitutes the standard of
review applicable in a matter involving unjust dismissal will be important.
[33]
It
is not necessary to conduct an exhaustive analysis where the standard of review
applicable to a particular question has been well settled by past jurisprudence
(Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paragraph 57).
[34]
In
the first judicial review, MacFarlane v Day & Ross Inc, 2010 FC 556,
Justice Mainville examined the issue generally and concluded that the standard
of reasonableness applies. Similarly, the Federal Court of Appeal recently held
in another case of alleged unjust dismissal that the standard of review is
reasonableness. In Payne v Bank of Montreal, 2013 FCA 33, one can read
at paragraph 32:
The principal question
in dispute in this case is whether Mr. Payne’s dismissal was unjust. This
is a question of mixed fact and law because the answer depends on the
Adjudicator’s application of the relevant law to the facts that he found. The
inquiry involves an assessment of the facts within the proper legal framework.
The standard of review applicable to an administrative tribunal’s determination
of questions of mixed fact and law is presumed to be reasonableness: Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para 53.
This case will
therefore be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.
[35]
Paragraph
47 of Dunsmuir describes what is expected where a Court reviews an
administrative tribunal’s decision on a standard of reasonableness:
[47] Reasonableness is
a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development
of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come
before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific,
particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible,
reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the
range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for
reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable,
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In
judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making
process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.
[36]
The
first issue to be resolved on a standard of reasonableness is therefore whether
the adjudicator erred in dismissing the applicant’s human rights allegations.
[37]
On
that first issue, Ms. MacFarlane argues, by and large, that the
adjudicator was wrong to even consider the human rights complaint. As
indicated, the matter was rightly dealt with by the adjudicator, as a result of
two judicial reviews launched by the applicant herself. On a number of
occasions, she repeated that she was not taking issue with the facts as found
but rather her case was based on how some conclusions were reached. In effect,
both in her written material and in extensive oral arguments before this Court,
the applicant applied herself to litigate de novo her dismissal, instead
of seeking to show that the adjudicator’s finding was unreasonable as the
notion is understood in Dunsmuir, supra.
[38]
The
standard of reasonableness does not allow the Court to substitute its own
finding to that of the adjudicator.
[39]
The
applicant also argued that by ruling on the two complaints, one under the Canadian
Human Rights Act and one under the Canada Labour Code, the
adjudicator confused the issues and therefore “that his conclusions with regard
to my unjust dismissal complaint are not entitled to any deference because they
are tainted by the findings he made in his interpretation of the other process”
(paragraph 126 of the applicant’s submissions).
[40]
As
I have pointed out, the adjudicator was careful throughout his decision to
limit himself to discrimination based on age and disability in the context of
the dismissal when addressing the human rights complaint. The applicant in turn
limited her claim to discrimination by reason of her disability at the time of
her dismissal. The adjudicator concluded that the evidence in front of him did
not support the applicant’s position. Indeed, he pointed out that the
applicant, both in her evidence and in her closing argument, stated that at the
time of her dismissal she was not disabled (paragraph 143 of the adjudicator’s
Reasons for Decision). I have found nothing in the record in front of me to
suggest that the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable. He conducted a
careful and fair analysis of the evidence before him and provided reasons that
are transparent and intelligible. There was ample evidence to conclude as he
did that the dismissal was not based on discriminatory grounds. There was no
evidence to that effect. It was true of the disability claim, and even more so
of the age discrimination claim. There was no confusion between the complaints,
just a lack of evidence in support of the complaint that the adjudicator had to
address given the decisions of the Court in the previous two judicial reviews.
[41]
The
second issue, to be examined on a standard of reasonableness, is whether or not
the adjudicator erred in dismissing the applicant’s unjust dismissal allegation.
Again, the applicant applies herself largely to litigate the matter de novo
instead of showing the Court, on the balance of probabilities, that the
adjudicator’s decision was not reasonable under the circumstances.
[42]
As
part of her written argument, she asserted that the adjudicator “appears to
have adopted the respondent’s argument that the deletion of valid records was
an intentional act” (paragraph 148 of the applicant’s submissions).
Similarly, the applicant submits at paragraph 152 of her submissions that “The
respondent also cited absence without authority as a reason for my dismissal.
The adjudicator should have considered whether there was sufficient evidence to
prove that I was absent without authority”. The difficulty with those
submissions is that the adjudicator found that the acts leading to the deletion
of records were intentional and that the applicant’s absence from work was
unauthorized. The evidence to that effect was completely in favour of the
respondent.
[43]
Again,
the question is not whether the Court agrees with the adjudicator or, for that
matter, the applicant. Rather, the issue is whether the findings made by the
adjudicator were reasonable. On that account, there cannot be any doubt.
[44]
There
was ample evidence for the adjudicator to conclude that there was not only
gross negligence, but intentional actions leading to the deletion of data. The
evidence as to the steps needed to delete the records was cogent and
unequivocal. Furthermore, the adjudicator was entitled to conclude that the
applicant sought to cover up those actions. The technical evidence clearly
pointed in that direction. The account offered by the applicant is, to say the
least, contradictory. The findings of the adjudicator are remarkably clear. At
paragraph 158 of his decision, he states:
I do not accept what
Ms. MacFarlane did with respect to the deletion incident was gross negligence.
I find it was in fact intentional. Given the explanation of the steps that are
required to move through screens highlighting the information to be deleted and
then having to confirm that intention, it is hard to believe it was done by
accident. Perhaps once but not multiple times.
Further,
at paragraph 159, one can read:
If her actions were
deliberate, were they the result of, or caused by, her migraines? If so then
the culpability upon Ms. MacFarlane may be lessened. In fact
Ms. MacFarlane argued this point. But again there is no medical evidence
before me to establish that she did what she did on that day because of her
medical condition. I do not doubt that any time of the deletions Ms. MacFarlane
was suffering some type of migraine incident. But the leap to the conclusion
that her actions were caused by her condition is not a leap I am willing
to make in the absence of specific medical evidence on that point.
It is difficult to quarrel with the
adjudicator, in view of the evidence, when he concludes as he does about the
attempt to cover up the actions of May 16th at paragraph 154:
It was particularly
troubling to me that during the course of the hearing Ms. MacFarlane gave
conflicting rationales for the deletion incident. By way of example she sought
emails from 2004 to show that she was actually deleting information that had
been requested several years earlier. She said to her employer when first
confronted that she had no idea what Ms. Johnson was talking about. She
later said that she did delete records but not as many as the Respondent
alleges. At the hearing she says that she was in the broker pay system on authority
by virtue of a request from Ms. Wasson and, while in the application, came
across invalid data that she decided to correct. Frankly, none of the
explanations seemed plausible and the Complainant seemed to not accept the
magnitude of the problem she intentionally created. While Ms. MacFarlane
may be correct to question the magnitude of the impact on the systems caused by
her deletions, the real damage was to her credibility in the eyes of the
Respondent.
On the evidence available to the
adjudicator, these findings are perfectly reasonable. In my view, they are
unassailable.
[45]
The
adjudicator also found that if the applicant did not report to work after June
24, 2008 it was not by reason of illness. Once again, claims of some sort of
disability during the whole period, from mid-May 2008 and the applicant’s
dismissal on July 4th were not supported by any medical evidence.
Moreover, in the days following, the applicant indicated that she intended to
appeal the denial of her disability claim but no such appeal was underway and
steps had not even been taken in order to appeal the matter.
[46]
In
other words, the evidence pointed in the direction of intentional actions taken
by the applicant to destroy records she knew were important to her employer.
She was less than forthcoming with explanations of her involvement. After
denying involvement, the applicant provided different accounts, none of which
acknowledged her responsibility. Following those events, she did not come back
to work and provided no medical evidence in support of her contention that she
had to be on leave. It is hardly surprising that the employer would have lost
faith in the applicant. In the circumstances, the employer chose to dismiss its
employee and the adjudicator found that it “acted within reason in terminating
the Complainant’s employment” (at paragraph 161). It is not for this Court to
limit unduly the wide margin of appreciation an adjudicator, an expert in the
area, has in concluding that the misconduct is sufficiently serious to warrant
dismissal.
[47]
The
Court therefore concludes that:
(a) the
adjudicator discharged his duty and stayed within his jurisdiction in ruling on
both the complaint under the Canada Labour Code that the dismissal was
unjust and under the Canadian Human Rights Act that the applicant
suffered discrimination by reason of age and disability as part of the said
dismissal;
(b) it was
reasonable for the adjudicator to conclude as he did that the complaint under
the Canadian Human Rights Act ought to be dismissed; and
(c) the
adjudicator acted reasonably when he dismissed the complaint under the Canada
Labour Code.
JUDGMENT
The application for
judicial review of the decision rendered on April 30, 2012 by E. Thomas
Christie, an adjudicator appointed pursuant to subsection 241(3) of the Canada
Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2, is dismissed.
“Yvan Roy”
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