Date:
20130506
Docket:
T-2064-12
Citation:
2013 FC 475
Edmonton, Alberta,
May 6, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Gleason
BETWEEN:
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ROBERT T. STRICKLAND, GEORGE
CONNON, ROLAND AUER, IWONA AUER-GRZESIAK, MARK AUER, AND VLADIMIR AUER BY HIS
LITIGATION REPRESENTATIVE ROLAND AUER
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Applicants
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and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The
applicants allege that the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 [the
Guidelines] contradict the statutory provisions under which they were enacted
and have brought an application for judicial review in which they seek to have
this Court declare that the Guidelines are ultra vires the Divorce
Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp) [the Divorce Act or Act] due to their
alleged inconsistency with section 26.1 of the Act, the section pursuant to
which the Guidelines were promulgated.
[2]
The
Respondent, the Attorney General for Canada [AGC] has brought a motion under
Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 seeking to have the
application dismissed for the following reasons:
1.
the
applicants, Robert Strickland, George Connon, Iwona Auer-Grezesiak, Mark Auer
and Vladamir Auer lack direct standing to commence the application and do not
meet the test for public interest standing;
2.
in
the cases of Robert Strickland and Roland Auer, the application is an
impermissible collateral attack on a child support agreement and order made in
family law proceedings before the provincial superior courts or is otherwise an
abuse of process; or
3.
in
the alternative, this Court should exercise its discretion and decline to hear
the application.
The AGC argues in the further
alternative that if the application is not dismissed, interested third parties
(i.e. the recipients of the support payments made by certain of the applicants)
should be joined as respondents to the application and the application should
be brought under case management.
[3]
As
is more fully detailed below, I have determined that this application should be
dismissed for the following three reasons. First, George Connon, Iwona
Auer-Grezesiak, Mark Auer and Vladamir Auer lack direct standing to commence
the application and do not meet the test for public interest standing. Second,
the application is both an impermissible collateral attack and abuse of process
in the case of Robert Strickland. Finally, while Roland Auer does not lack
standing nor does his bringing of this application amount to an impermissible
collateral attack or abuse of process given the wording of his support order,
it is nonetheless inappropriate that his challenge to the Guidelines proceed
before this Court. In reaching this conclusion, I have determined that there is
concurrent jurisdiction between this Court and the provincial superior courts
to hear applications of this nature. However, in my view, this Court is not the
appropriate forum in which to address the issues raised in Mr. Auer’s
application given the very minor role this Court plays in issues under the Divorce
Act and the breadth of the jurisdiction and expertise of the provincial
superior courts in matters related to divorce and child support. I have
therefore granted the AGC’s motion, with costs. My reasons for these
determinations appear below.
Background
[4]
To
understand this Order, factual background is necessary. At the time the
application was filed, Robert Strickland was party to a divorce action. The
evidence before the Court does not indicate in which court the action was
commenced, but it was doubtless a provincial superior court in light of the
provisions of section 3 of the Divorce Act, which provide that, subject
to a very narrow exception, the provincial courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over divorce and child and spousal support collateral to divorce. The exception
to this requirement is contained in subsection 3(3) of the Divorce Act,
which provides that where both parties to a marriage commence a divorce action
on the same day in different provincial superior courts, this Court has
jurisdiction over the divorce and corollary relief arising in respect of the
divorce. Needless to say, a divorce action is virtually never commenced in this
Court.
[5]
In
the context of his divorce action, Mr. Strickland entered into an interim child
support agreement through a court-mandated mediation. His interest, like that
of all the payor applicants in this application, is to seek a downward
variation of the amount of child support he is paying. He argues that the
Guidelines do not appropriately reflect the requirements of the Divorce Act,
which mandate that support is a joint spousal obligation and is to be based on
the relative ability of the spouses to contribute to the support of the
children of the marriage. He (and the other applicants) argue that the
Guidelines overcompensate the former spouses where there is a joint custody
arrangement and the children reside part of the time with the payor parent.
[6]
George
Connon and his wife were separated at the time the application was commenced,
but had not yet started divorce proceedings. He voluntarily pays child support
to his wife, and calculated the amount payable with reference to the
Guidelines.
[7]
Three
of Robert Auer’s marriages are implicated in this application. He and his
former second wife, Aysel Auer, have one child. In 2008, the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench granted the Auers a divorce. Mr. Auer pays Ms. Auer child and
spousal support. The amount of the support payments were initially set through
an arbitration that the Auers voluntarily participated in after Ms. Auer
brought an application for child and spousal support in the context of the
divorce proceedings. The amount of child support payable was calculated with
reference to the Guidelines. Thereafter, the amount of child support payable by
Mr. Auer was twice varied by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. The second
variance order, issued on December 13, 2010, provides that the child support
the Court ordered paid was “made on a without prejudice basis so that if [Mr.
Auer] is successful with his federal challenge to the Federal Child Support
Guidelines, then [the amount of the required support payment] shall be
reviewable back to the date of this Order”. In its Order, the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench also provided that matters arising from the Order were to be
brought before one of the judges of that Court “for either interpretation or
implementation”.
[8]
Iwona
Auer-Gzesiak is the former first wife of Roland Auer, with whom she had two
children. It is unclear from the materials before the Court whether or not Mr.
Auer pays child support for these children. Mark Auer is a child of Mr. Auer’s
first marriage. Vladimir Auer is a child of Mr. Auer’s third marriage, which
was still subsisting at the time the application was filed. These three
individuals (Ms. Auer-Gzesiak, Mark Auer and Vladimir Auer) all support Mr.
Auer’s claim to vary downwards the amount of support Mr. Auer is paying on
account of the child of his second marriage.
[9]
As
is apparent from the foregoing, the following issues arise in this motion:
1.
Do
Robert Strickland, George Connon, Iwona Auer-Grezesiak, Mark Auer and Vladamir
Auer have standing to bring the application?
2.
Is
the application an impermissible collateral attack on the Order of the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench, made in Robert Auer’s case, or on the agreement made via
court-mandated mediation, in Robert Strickland’s case, or otherwise an abuse of
process?
3.
Should
this Court decline jurisdiction over this application?
[10]
Prior
to addressing these issues, it is necessary to first examine the jurisdiction
of this Court and of the provincial superior courts to hear applications like
the present because the issue of the respective jurisdiction of each court is
intertwined with the other issues that arise in this application.
Jurisdiction
over an application for a declaration that the Guidelines are ultra vires
the Divorce Act
[11]
As
noted, it is my view that there is concurrent jurisdiction between this Court
and the provincial superior courts over applications such as the present, which
involve a challenge to the vires of the Guidelines as a matter of
administrative as opposed to constitutional law. In this regard, the applicants
accept that the federal Governor in Council possesses constitutional authority
to issue the Guidelines. Their argument, rather, is that the Guidelines do not
conform to the statutory authority pursuant to which they were made; they argue
that as subordinate legislation (i.e. either a regulation or an instrument akin
to a regulation), the Guidelines must conform to the terms of the legislation
pursuant to which they were enacted.
Jurisdiction
of the Federal Court
[12]
Dealing,
first, with the Federal Court’s
jurisdiction, sections 18 and 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985,
c F-7 [FCA] have been
interpreted broadly to include jurisdiction over the review of subordinate
legislation in cases such as the present. Subsection 18(1) and 18.1(3) of the
FCA are particularly relevant in the present circumstances. They provide:
18.
(1) Subject to section 28, the Federal Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction
(a)
to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of
mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any
federal board, commission or other tribunal; and
(b)
to hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the
nature of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding
brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a
federal board, commission or other tribunal.
[…]
18.1
[…]
Powers
of Federal Court
(3)
On an application for judicial review, the Federal Court may
(a)
order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it
has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing;
or
(b)
declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back
for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be
appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a
federal board, commission or other tribunal.
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18.
(1) Sous réserve de l’article 28, la Cour fédérale a compétence exclusive, en
première instance, pour :
a)
décerner une injonction, un bref de certiorari, de mandamus, de prohibition
ou de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire contre tout
office fédéral;
b)
connaître de toute demande de réparation de la nature visée par l’alinéa a),
et notamment de toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada
afin d’obtenir réparation de la part d’un office fédéral.
[…]
18.1
[…]
Pouvoirs
de la Cour fédérale
(3) Sur
présentation d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire, la Cour fédérale
peut :
a) ordonner à l’office fédéral en cause d’accomplir tout acte
qu’il a illégalement omis ou refusé d’accomplir ou dont il a retardé
l’exécution de manière déraisonnable;
b) déclarer nul ou illégal, ou annuler, ou infirmer et renvoyer
pour jugement conformément aux instructions qu’elle estime appropriées, ou
prohiber ou encore restreindre toute décision, ordonnance, procédure ou tout
autre acte de l’office fédéral.
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[13]
In
Markevich v Canada, [1999] 3 FC 28, 163 FTR 209 at
para 11 (TD) (reversed on other grounds by 2001 FCA 144 and 2003 SCC 9) [Markevich],
Justice Evans determined that the scope of judicial review is governed by
subsection 18.1(3) and that a “decision, order, act or proceeding” includes a
challenge to subordinate legislation or regulations. His decision was followed
by Justice O’Reilly in Nunavut Tunngavik Inc v Canada (Attorney General),
2004 FC 85 at paras 8-9, who confirmed that judicial review under sections 18
and 18.1 is not limited to decisions, but noted that the challenged
administrative action must flow from a statutory power for it to be susceptible
to judicial review.
[14]
In
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] FCJ
No 902, 67 FTR 98 (TD), Justice Rothstein (then of this Court) held that the
Governor in Council, when enacting a regulation, was to be considered a federal
board pursuant to the FCA. Similarly, in Canadian Council for Refugees v
Canada, 2008 FCA 229, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that the vires
of regulations may be challenged by way of judicial review and that in such
cases the standard of review is that of correctness.
[15]
Thus,
it is clear that this Court possesses jurisdiction over this application.
Jurisdiction of
the Provincial Superior Courts
[16]
Turning,
then, to the issue of the provincial superior courts’ jurisdiction, it is the
applicants’ position that because the judicial review of the vires of
regulations is governed by subsection 18(1) of the FCA, the Federal Court’s
jurisdiction is exclusive due to the wording of the subsection which uses the
term “exclusive jurisdiction.” The applicants thus argue that their challenge
to the vires of the Guidelines on an administrative law basis cannot be
brought before a superior court either as a stand-alone proceeding or in the
context of divorce proceedings where the Guidelines are being applied.
[17]
The
AGC, on the other hand, takes the position that jurisdiction over challenges to
the vires of the Guidelines is shared between the Federal Court and
superior courts. I agree with the AGC’s position and believe that provincial
superior courts do possess jurisdiction to hear challenges like the present in
the context of divorce proceedings, which, indeed, are the only circumstances
in which someone seeking to challenge the Guidelines would possess standing to
do so, as is discussed below.
[18]
The
starting point for the discussion of the jurisdiction of the provincial
superior courts is the Divorce Act, which, as noted, provides that the
superior courts have virtually exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the Act, subject to the very narrow role afforded to this Court (see ss
3-5). Section 4 is particularly relevant and provides that the provincial
superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over child support corollary to
divorce, except in the near hypothetical case where the divorce proceeding
takes place before the Federal Court (i.e. where both spouses started divorce
proceedings on the same day in front of the courts in different provinces). The
Guidelines are mandated by the Divorce Act and, subject to the
exceptions provided in that Act, must be applied by judges making support
orders. Section 15.1 of the Divorce Act provides in relevant part in
this regard:
CHILD
SUPPORT ORDERS
Child
support order
15.1
(1) A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both
spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of any or
all children of the marriage.
[…]
Guidelines
apply
(3)
A court making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under
subsection (2) shall do so in accordance with the applicable guidelines.
[…]
Court
may take agreement, etc., into account
(5)
Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different
from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable
guidelines if the court is satisfied
(a)
that special provisions in an order, a judgment or a written agreement
respecting the financial obligations of the spouses, or the division or
transfer of their property, directly or indirectly benefit a child, or that
special provisions have otherwise been made for the benefit of a child; and
(b)
that the application of the applicable guidelines would result in an amount
of child support that is inequitable given those special provisions.
Reasons
(6)
Where the court awards, pursuant to subsection (5), an amount that is
different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the
applicable guidelines, the court shall record its reasons for having done so.
Consent
orders
(7)
Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different
from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable
guidelines on the consent of both spouses if it is satisfied that reasonable
arrangements have been made for the support of the child to whom the order
relates.
Reasonable
arrangements
(8)
For the purposes of subsection (7), in determining whether reasonable
arrangements have been made for the support of a child, the court shall have
regard to the applicable guidelines. However, the court shall not consider
the arrangements to be unreasonable solely because the amount of support
agreed to is not the same as the amount that would otherwise have been
determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines.
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ORDONNANCES
ALIMENTIARES AU PROFIT D’UN ENFANT
Ordonnance
alimentaire au profit d’un enfant
15.1
(1) Sur demande des époux ou de l’un d’eux, le tribunal compétent peut rendre
une ordonnance enjoignant à un époux de verser une prestation pour les
aliments des enfants à charge ou de l’un d’eux.
[…]
Application
des lignes directrices applicables
(3)
Le tribunal qui rend une ordonnance ou une ordonnance provisoire la rend conformément
aux lignes directrices applicables.
[…]
Ententes,
ordonnances, jugements, etc.
(5)
Par dérogation au paragraphe (3), le tribunal peut fixer un montant différent
de celui qui serait déterminé conformément aux lignes directrices applicables
s’il est convaincu, à la fois :
a)
que des dispositions spéciales d’un jugement, d’une ordonnance ou d’une
entente écrite relatif aux obligations financières des époux ou au partage ou
au transfert de leurs biens accordent directement ou indirectement un avantage
à un enfant pour qui les aliments sont demandés, ou que des dispositions
spéciales ont été prises pour lui accorder autrement un avantage;
b)
que le montant déterminé conformément aux lignes directrices applicables
serait inéquitable eu égard à ces dispositions.
Motifs
(6)
S’il fixe, au titre du paragraphe (5), un montant qui est différent de celui
qui serait déterminé conformément aux lignes directrices applicables, le
tribunal enregistre les motifs de sa décision.
Consentement
des époux
(7)
Par dérogation au paragraphe (3), le tribunal peut, avec le consentement des
époux, fixer un montant qui est différent de celui qui serait déterminé
conformément aux lignes directrices applicables s’il est convaincu que des
arrangements raisonnables ont été conclus pour les aliments de l’enfant visé
par l’ordonnance.
Arrangements
raisonnables
(8)
Pour l’application du paragraphe (7), le tribunal tient compte des lignes
directrices applicables pour déterminer si les arrangements sont
raisonnables. Toutefois, les arrangements ne sont pas déraisonnables du seul
fait que le montant sur lequel les conjoints s’entendent est différent de
celui qui serait déterminé conformément aux lignes directrices applicables.
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Thus, those to whom the Guidelines
will be applied will virtually invariably be before a provincial superior
court.
[19]
The
next point which must be considered is the jurisdiction to declare subordinate
legislation, like the Guidelines, ultra vires. In light of section 96 of
the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC
1985, App II, No 5, provincial superior courts possess jurisdiction to hear
challenges to the vires of subordinate federal legislation on
constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed this in Canada
(Attorney General) v Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307,
[1982] SCJ No 70 [LSBC], where it held that Parliament cannot oust the
inherent jurisdiction of superior courts to rule on the constitutionality of
federal legislation, which includes subordinate legislation.
[20]
The
case law, however, is divided on whether jurisdiction also extends to review of
the vires of subordinate legislation before the provincial superior
courts where the challenge is based on administrative law as opposed to
constitutional grounds.
[21]
In
Williams v Canada (Auditor General) (1983), 45 OR (2d) 291, 6 DLR (4th)
329 (Ont Div Ct) [Williams], Justice Osler held, on the basis of LSBC,
that the vires of federal regulations could be challenged directly
before a superior court, even if constitutionality is not the basis of the
challenge. In
Groupe des éleveurs de volailles de l’est de l’Ontario v Canadian Chicken
Marketing Agency (1984), 14 DLR (4th) 151, [1985] 1 FC 280 (TD) [Canadian
Chicken], on the other hand, Justice Strayer refused to follow Williams
and questioned whether federal regulations could ever be challenged in
provincial superior courts. He wrote as follows (at para 23):
Even assuming, however, that the principle of the
Law Soc. of B.C. case applies so as to ensure the Supreme Court of Ontario the
power to make a declaration as to conflicts between regulations made by federal
boards and the Charter, it is doubtful that the principle can be carried beyond
that so as to authorize such judicial review of the acts of a federal agency in
the form of a declaration that its regulations, though within federal
jurisdiction, were not authorized by Parliament. I can see no reason for an
implied guaranteed right of the provincial superior Courts to issue such a
declaration, as the situation does not menace the federal system or
constitutional safeguards of individual rights and freedoms.
[22]
Justice
Strayer’s comments were followed by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] SJ No 436 at para
13, 107 DLR (4th) 63 (Sask CA) [Wheat Pool]:
In this action we are not asked to rule on the constitutional
validity of the Canadian Wheat Board Act, nor has any Charter
issue been raised. The issue here is purely and simply a request for a declaration
that the Governor in Council has acted in excess of the authority it was
granted by a federal statute when it issued the order in council in question.
In our view, this case comes as close as it can come to being a situation which
was intended to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. All
of the attributes of what might be termed a federal case are firmly in place
and the exception identified by Strayer J. has no application.
[23]
In
Messageries Publi-maison Ltée v Société canadienne des postes, [1996]
RJQ 547, EYB 1996-71771, JE 96-575 (Qc CA), Justice Fish, then of the Québec
Court of Appeal, noted the conflicting case law on whether a non-constitutional
challenge of the vires of federal regulation can be heard by superior
courts and that the Supreme Court had not yet decided the issue. Justice Fish
followed the decision in Wheat Pool.
[24]
The
bulk of the case law, therefore, recognizes that the provincial superior courts
do not possess jurisdiction to hear applications that seek to challenge the vires
of federal subordinate legislation on an administrative law basis, where the
challenge proceeds as a stand-alone claim for a declaration and is not an
integral part of another claim that is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the
court.
[25]
Where,
however, the challenge to the vires of the federal subordinate
legislation on an administrative law basis is an integral part of another claim
over which the superior courts possess jurisdiction, it is my view that the
superior courts do possess jurisdiction to hear the vires claim because
jurisdiction over a subject-matter must include every legal and factual element
necessary to deal with the subject matter.
[26]
In
Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc, 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3
SCR 585, the Supreme Court of Canada was faced with a somewhat similar
situation where TeleZone had commenced an action against the Crown in Right of
Canada for damages when TeleZone was not awarded a tender. As part of its
claim, TeleZone argued that the decision made by Industry Canada breached the policy statements the department had issued regarding the tendering process and
was therefore improper and in effect illegal. The Supreme Court dismissed the
respondent’s claim that the action was an attack on the decision made by Industry
Canada that needed to proceed before the Federal Court by way of judicial
review due to sections 18 and 18.1 of the FCA. Writing for the Court, Justice
Binnie stated at para 6:
In the present case, the Ontario Superior Court has
jurisdiction over the parties, the subject matter and the remedies sought by
TeleZone. That jurisdiction includes the authority to determine every legal and
factual element necessary for the granting or withholding of the remedies
sought unless such authority is taken away by statute. The Federal Courts
Act does not, by clear and direct statutory language, oust the jurisdiction
of the provincial superior courts to deal with these common law and equitable
claims, including the potential “unlawfulness” of government orders. That being
the case, the Superior Court has jurisdiction to proceed.
[27]
In
the companion judgments issued in Canada (Attorney General) v McArthur,
2010 SCC 63, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 626, Nu-Pharm v Canada (Attorney General),
2010 SCC 65, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 648, Canadian Food Inspection Agency v
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2010 SCC 66, [2010]
3 SCR 657 and Manuge v Canada, 2010 SCC 67, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 672, the
Supreme Court applied the same principles and held that plaintiffs could
challenge the legality of decisions made by federal decision-makers in the
context of actions in tort, contract or under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, in which the plaintiffs
sought relief from the decision-makers or against the federal Crown.
[28]
In
my view, the reasoning in these cases should be extended to situations where a
party seeks to challenge the vires of federal subordinate legislation in
the context of another claim over which the superior court has jurisdiction.
Support for this proposition is found in Denys C. Holland and John P. McGowan’s
Delegated Legislation in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 247:
In
the context of a collateral challenge to the validity of a particular
regulation, the provincial courts must retain jurisdiction to entertain
arguments and to rule upon the validity of the regulation in question. On our
reading of the Federal Court[s] Act, all that statute does is limit the
opportunities for direct challenge of the regulation. This is quite a different
thing from requiring a court to enforce a regulation without regard to its
legality.
[29]
In
addition, in Premi v Khodeir, [2009] OJ No 3365, 179 ACWS (3d) 880 (Sup
Ct) [Premi], a case involving a claim for child support, Justice
Turnbull ruled, albeit in obiter, on the vires of the Guidelines
in the context of a challenge similar to that which the applicants seek to make
in this application. In so doing, however, Justice Turnbull did not expressly
address the issue of the Ontario Superior Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the vires
argument, but, rather, merely exercised his jurisdiction and dealt with the
argument.
[30]
To
somewhat similar effect, in Authorson (Litigation Administrator of) v Canada
(Attorney General) (2004), 238 DLR (4th) 517, [2004] OJ
No 1201 (Ont CA), a class action involving benefits for veterans,
the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the vires of the Veterans
Treatment Regulations, CRC 1978, c 1585 in the context of a damages claim
and held that the regulations were consistent with the Pension Act, RSC
1985, c P-6. This case and Premi provide two examples of situations
where courts other than this one have taken jurisdiction over a vires
claim like that the applicants seek to make.
[31]
In
light of the foregoing, it is my view that the provincial superior courts do
possess jurisdiction over a claim that the Guidelines are ultra vires
due to their alleged conflict with section 26.1 of the Divorce Act, if
such claim is made in the context of a proceeding where the superior court is
called upon to apply the Guidelines. There is thus concurrent jurisdiction over
these issues between this Court and the provincial superior courts.
Standing
[32]
Turning,
next, to the issue of the applicants’ standing, as noted, the AGC argues that
all the applicants except Robert Auer lack standing because none of them is
party to an order in which the Guidelines were applied. The applicants, on the
other hand, argue that they are all impacted by the Guidelines as they
determine the amount of support payable, which has a detrimental effect on
them. Such effect, however, is insufficient to afford them standing.
[33]
Standing
may arise either directly due to a party’s interest in the subject matter of
the action or as a matter of public interest.
i) Private
standing
[34]
Insofar
as concerns private or direct standing, generally speaking, to possess such
standing an applicant or plaintiff must have a personal interest in the
proceeding such that there is some direct causal relationship between the alleged
wrongs set out in the pleadings and a prejudice suffered by the party or some
advantage the party will directly gain if the proceeding succeeds (Finlay v Canada
(Minister of Finance),
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 at 622-624).
[35]
The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has applied these principles in Zeyha v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SKCA 157 [Zeyha], a case identical to the
present. There, the Court of Appeal held that only a person who is subject to a
child support order made in the context of a divorce proceeding has private
standing to challenge the Guidelines. In other words, merely being impacted by
such an order – as in the case of a subsequent spouse or another child – does
not afford an individual standing to challenge the Guidelines as any order
quashing or upholding them will not directly impact such an individual.
[36]
In
light of the foregoing, it is clear that Vladimir Auer, Mark Auer, Iwona
Auer-Grzesiak and George Connon have no private standing. None of them is
engaged in divorce proceedings or pays child support pursuant to a court order.
In the case of George Connon, I agree with the AGC that the fact that he pays
child support on a voluntary basis in not sufficient to grant him private
standing as he is not impacted by an order applying the Guidelines.
[37]
It
is equally clear that Roland Auer does have private standing, as he is subject
to a child support court order. (Indeed, the AGC does not challenge his
standing.)
[38]
The
standing of Robert Strickland is more ambiguous. In his affidavit, he explains
that he is engaged in a divorce proceeding and pays child support pursuant to
an interim agreement reached in a court-mandated mediation session. He
intimates that the Guidelines were applied to arrive at the amount payable. I
am inclined to accept that he does have private standing, but this issue is not
determinative because, as is discussed below, his claim must be dismissed as an
impermissible collateral attack.
ii) Public
interest standing
[39]
Insofar
as concerns public interest standing, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the
requirements for being granted public interest standing in Canadian Council
of Churches v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 SCR
236 at 253-254. To be granted public standing, a party must demonstrate that:
1) a serious
justiciable issue is raised;
2) the party has a
real stake or genuine interest in the resolution of the legal issue; and
3) there is no
other reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.
[40]
The
first two prongs of the test are met by all applicants. However, I agree with
the AGC that the third prong is not met. The applicants’ argument that the
present application is the only possible way to bring the issue before a court
must fail, as superior courts may rule on the vires of the Guidelines in
family law proceedings, as discussed above. The applicants alternatively argue
that this application is a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue of
the vires of the Guidelines before the courts, as opposed to addressing
the issue in the context of family proceedings before a superior court. With
respect, this argument misses the point; the issue is not whether this
application is reasonable and effective. The issue is rather whether there is
no other reasonable and effective way to bring the challenge before the courts.
As noted, the vires claim can be made in the context of a divorce
proceeding before a superior court as occurred in Premi. Such a
proceeding is, in my view, “another effective and reasonable way to bring the
issue before the court”.
[41]
Thus,
none of the applicants possesses public interest standing in respect of this
application and only Robert Strickland and Roland Auer possess private standing
to make the vires challenge to the Guidelines.
Collateral
Attack and Abuse of Process
[42]
I
now turn to the issue of whether Robert Strickland and Roland Auer’s challenge
of the vires of the Guidelines amounts to an impermissible collateral
attack of a court order in the case of Mr. Auer and a court mandated agreement
in the case of Mr. Strickland or are otherwise an abuse of process.
[43]
Both
the applicants and the respondent refer to R v Wilson, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594,
[1983] SCJ No 88 [Wilson], as setting out the test for collateral
attack. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “a collateral attack may
be described as an attack made in proceedings other than those whose specific
object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of the order or judgment”
(at 599). The rule against collateral attack prevents parties from questioning
an order made by a court of competent jurisdiction in any other proceeding
except through the appeal process applicable to the order (Wilson at
599; Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies Inc, 2001 SCC 44 at para 20 [Danyluk];
British Colombia Workers’ Compensation Board v British Colombia (Human
Rights Tribunal), 2011 SCC 52 at para 28 [Figliola]).
[44]
The
doctrine of collateral attack has been applied to prevent parties from
challenging support orders or support agreements, arrived at through a
court-sponsored mediation process. In Cunningham v Moran, 2011 ONCA 476
[Cunningham], the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the motion judges’
decision, dismissing an action brought by the payor spouse against his former
spouse and her counsel, seeking damages for their allegedly having misrepresented
the former spouse’s ability to pay. The parties had reached a negotiated
agreement, providing for child support, following a mediation-arbitration. The
plaintiff and his ex-spouse had voluntarily agreed to participate in the
mediation-arbitration to resolve the ex-spouse’s family law action, in which
she sought child support, a division of property and spousal support. Their
agreements and settlement were incorporated into court orders and an order from
the mediator/arbitrator. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the
subsequent action for damages as being an impermissible collateral attack on
the agreements, arbitral awards and court orders issued in the earlier
proceedings. The Court of Appeal ruled that agreements made in family law actions
cannot be collaterally attacked in separate proceedings.
[45]
A
similar conclusion was reached in Zeyha. In addition to determining that
the appellants lacked standing to bring the challenge to the Guidelines as
discussed above, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal also indicated that if the
appellant had possessed standing to attack the Guidelines, their action would
be an impermissible collateral attack on the support orders applicable to them
(see also Premi; Grenon v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ABQB 403 [Grenon];
Khodeir v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CarswellOnt 4483 (Sup Ct)).
[46]
In
many of these cases, the doctrine of abuse of process was applied as an
additional basis for dismissal of the collateral action. The Courts reasoned
that it is an abuse of process for a party to seek to collaterally attack an
order rather than appealing it through the appropriate appeal route (see Cunningham
at para 36; Grenon at paras 32-33; Premi at paras 22-24; Figliola
at paras 31-33, considering Toronto (City) v CUPE, Local 79, 2003 SCC
63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77; Danyluk).
[47]
What
these various decisions teach is that the place and time to raise a challenge
to the vires of the Guidelines is before the provincial superior court
in the context of the claim for child support, where the court will be called
upon to apply the Guidelines or to explain why they should not apply. It is too
late and inappropriate to challenge the Guidelines in a collateral proceeding,
commenced after the support order is made (unless the order contemplates the
challenge).
[48]
Application
of the foregoing principles leads to the conclusion that Mr. Strickland’s
application is an impermissible collateral attack on the agreement reached in
the context of his family proceedings and an abuse of process. His claim is
indistinguishable from that dismissed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Cunningham.
[49]
The
same result, however, does not pertain in Mr. Auer’s case. There, as noted, the
most recent Order of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench specifically provides
that it may be varied, depending on the outcome of the present application. The
Order stipulates that it “is made on a without prejudice basis so
that if [Mr. Auer] is successful with his federal challenge to the Federal
Child Support Guidelines, then [the amount of the required support payment]
shall be reviewable back to the date of this Order”. Contrary to what
the AGC asserts, I do not believe that this possibility for amendment of the
Order depending on the outcome of the present application is negated by the
subsequent provision in that Order requiring that matters arising
from it are to be brought before one of the judges of the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench “for either interpretation or implementation”. The two are
different issues.
[50]
Thus,
the issue becomes whether in the face of such an express provision in the
Order, providing for variation depending on the outcome of the present
application, the doctrine of abuse of process and the rule against collateral
attack prevent Mr. Strickland from bringing this application. Such an issue
does not appear to have been previously squarely considered in the case law.
That said, it is my view that the policy objectives for both doctrines and the
case law on “without prejudice” orders leads to the conclusion that the
doctrine of abuse of process and the rule against collateral attack do not
prevent Mr. Auer from instituting this application.
[51]
The
Supreme Court of Canada has identified the policy objectives of the doctrine of
collateral attack as being to “[prevent] a party from undermining previous
orders issued by a court or administrative tribunal” (Garland v Consumer’ Gas
Co,
2004 SCC 25 at para 71) and to “protect the fairness and integrity of the
justice system by preventing duplicative proceedings” (Figliola at para
28). In Figliola (at para 31), Justice Abella noted that the same policy
objectives underlie the doctrine of abuse of process.
[52]
However,
neither collateral attack nor abuse of process is categorical in its
application. Where “the
interests underlying the rule are not served by
adherence to it” (R v Domm (1996), 31
OR (3d) 540 (CA))
or whether the fair administration of justice will not be harmed by the
arguably duplicative proceeding, an exception to the doctrines may be
appropriate (Shams v MacDonald (2008), 174 ACWS (3d)
1026, [2009] OJ No 226 at para 26 (Sup Ct)).
[53]
With
regard to “without prejudice orders”, judges often dismiss an action at a
preliminary stage “without prejudice” to further proceedings on the substance
of the issue. This prohibits defendants from relying on the defences of res
judicata, issue estoppel or collateral attack. Such indications are
generally respected by other judges and other courts (See e.g. Wilson (Re),
[1937] OJ No 314 at para 9 (CA); Jagtoo v 407 ETR Concession Co, [2001]
OJ No 2789 at para 5; 106 ACWS (3d) 450 (Sup Ct); Porter v Anytime Custom
Mechanical Ltd, 2007 ABCA 208 at para 13; Carleton University v Geonetix
Technologies Inc, [2001] OJ No 2780 at para 7, 106 ACWS (3d) 585 (Sp Ct); Mahmood
(Re), 2011 ONSC 625 at para 19; Logan v Harper, 72 OR (3d) 706, [2004] OJ
No 4132 (Sp Ct)).
[54]
In
Goulding v Ternoey, 35 OR (2d) 29 [1982] OJ
No 3109 at para 27 (CA), Justice Houlden elaborated on the meaning of “without
prejudice” in a court order and quoted the Supreme Court of Alabama’s decision
in Palmer et al v Rucker et al, 268 So 2d 773 (1972):
[7] The words “without
prejudice” in their general adaptation, when used in a decree, mean that there
is no decision of the controversy on its merits, and leaves the whole subject
in litigation as much open to another suit as if no suit had ever been brought.
[…] When the words “without prejudice” appear in an order or decree, it shows
that the judicial act done is not intended to be res judicata of the merits of the controversy. […]
[Citations omitted]
[55]
In
my view, the policy objectives of the doctrines of collateral attack and abuse
of process as stated by the Supreme Court are consistent with Mr. Auer’s
application proceeding. Because the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Order was
specifically “without prejudice to a federal challenge of the Guidelines”, it
cannot be said that Mr. Auer seeks to “undermine a previous order” through this
application.
[56]
Thus,
only Mr. Auer has the standing to advance the application and is not barred by
the doctrine of abuse of process or the rule against collateral attack from
doing so.
Deferral
to the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
[57]
The
final issue that I must determine involves consideration of whether I should
exercise my discretion to hear Mr. Auer’s application or should return it to
the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench for decision.
[58]
As
the AGC correctly notes, judicial review is a discretionary remedy. This Court
accordingly possesses jurisdiction to decline to hear a judicial review
application where the issues raised in it are more appropriately considered by
another court or tribunal or where an applicant has unduly delayed in bringing
the proceeding. I need not consider the AGC’s claim of undue delay as, in my
view, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench is the more appropriate forum to hear Mr.
Auer’s challenge to the vires of the Guidelines, given the fact that it
applies the Divorce Act and the Guidelines on a daily basis and this
Court is virtually never called upon to do so.
[59]
In
Reza v Canada, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394, 116 DLR (4th) 61 [Reza], cited
by the respondent, the applicant challenged the constitutionality of provisions
of the Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2 on Charter grounds before
the Ontario Court (General Division). Although the superior court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Court to hear constitutional
challenges of legislation, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Federal
Court was the proper forum because of its expertise in immigration law and
because Parliament granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court over the
Immigration Act.
[60]
Likewise,
in Action des nouvelles conjointes du Québec v Canada, 2004 FC 797,
this Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction to hear a constitutional
challenge to the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Divorce Act
and the Guidelines. Applying Reza, Justice Blais (as he then was) determined
that the proper forum for this challenge was the superior court, which has
expertise and near exclusive jurisdiction over the legislative and regulatory
scheme:
46 The
Federal Court is not the appropriate forum to challenge provisions of the Divorce
Act, for two main reasons: First, Parliament has granted jurisdiction on
divorce to provincial superior courts, which therefore have a great deal more
experience than the Federal Court in hearing cases under the Act and applying
the law. Secondly, according to Reza v. Canada, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394, even if there
is concurrent jurisdiction in a matter, it is preferable for the Court mandated
by the regulatory scheme of the Act to hear matters under that Act. It could be
argued that the “court of competent jurisdiction”, terminology used in both the
Charter section 24 and the Divorce Act section 16, is more likely the
superior court of a province rather than the Federal Court.
47 The
Federal Court is given a very narrow mandate by the Divorce Act. In the
unlikely event that a divorce action would be started on the same day in two
different provinces, and if after thirty days one or the other party has not
withdrawn his or her action, the Federal Court has jurisdiction to hear the
divorce case. This occurrence is extremely rare (one case found in Quick Law, Williamson
v. Williamson, [1977] 1 F.C. 38). The plaintiffs argue that the Federal Court has
jurisdiction to hear challenges of federal legislation. This is undoubtedly the
case, but a court challenge cannot be severed of its subject matter.
[61]
In
my view, identical reasoning should be applied in the present case. Parliament
granted exclusive jurisdiction over the Divorce Act, except in
exceptional circumstances, to the superior courts. Superior courts have
developed expertise in family law in general, and in child support matters in
particular. The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench is therefore better placed than
this Court to hear Mr. Auer’s application.
[62]
This
application will therefore be dismissed, without leave to amend.
Costs
[63]
The
AGC, as the successful party, is entitled to its costs of this application,
inclusive of the costs of this motion. If the parties are not able to settle the
quantum of costs, they shall file submissions of no more the 5 pages each,
outlining their positions on the quantum of costs to be awarded. Such
submissions shall be served and filed by June 28, 2013.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS
that:
1. This
motion is granted and the applicants’ application for judicial review is
dismissed with costs; and
2. In
the event the parties cannot agree as to the quantum of the costs, they may
file written submissions of no more than 5 pages in length by June 28, 2013.
"Mary J.L. Gleason"