Date:
20130319
Docket:
T-1001-12
Citation:
2013 FC 285
Ottawa, Ontario,
March 19, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
|
|
INTERNATIONAL CLOTHIERS INC.
|
|
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
|
DORNA SPORTS, S.L.
|
|
|
|
Respondent
|
|
|
|
|
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an appeal from a decision of the Trade-marks Opposition Board (the Board)
dated March 6, 2012, rejecting International Clothiers Inc.’s (the applicant)
opposition to the trade-mark “MOTOGP” and its design (the mark).
[2]
The
applicant seeks an order granting the appeal, setting aside the decision of the
Board and refusing trade-mark application serial no. 1,328,691. The applicant
seeks costs.
Background
[3]
The
applicant holds and uses the trade-marks MOTO, MOTO JEANS, MOTO SPORT, MOTO
GEAR, and MOTO TECHGEAR in association with clothing.
[4]
On
December 18, 2006, the respondent filed an application to register the mark on
the basis of proposed use in Canada in association with clothing and other
wares.
The Decision
[5]
The
Board’s reasons, cited as 2012 TMOB 43, begin by describing the application and
summarizing the applicant’s grounds of opposition, which dealt with conflicts
between the applicant’s and respondent’s marks. Each side submitted written
arguments supported by affidavits and presented oral arguments at a hearing.
[6]
The
Board identified the onus as resting on the respondent to establish on a
balance of probabilities that its registration complies with the Trade-marks
Act, RSC 1985, c T-13 (the Act) but that the applicant had an initial
evidentiary burden to support its grounds of opposition.
[7]
On
the paragraph 12(1)(d) opposition, confusion between the proposed mark and the applicant’s
trade-marks, the Board found the applicant had met its initial evidentiary
burden, but dismissed the ground summarily as it related to non-clothing wares
since the applicant had made no submissions on that point.
[8]
On
the point of clothing wares, the Board, in considering paragraph 6(5)(a) of the
Act, noted the parties’ marks shared the word “MOTO” and the evidence that the
term was associated with motorcycles. The Board found that the suffix “gp”,
along with design and colour features, made the mark distinctive from the applicant’s
marks. In evaluating whether the mark had become known in Canada through
promotion or use, the Board noted the evidence from the respondent’s affiant
she was able to purchase a t-shirt displaying the mark from a Canadian website,
but that this evidence did not reflect association between the respondent and
the mark. The Board concluded the mark had not become known to any extent in Canada.
[9]
The
applicant’s evidence was that it had been using various marks with the word
MOTO in association with clothing since 1997. The Board accepted that the applicant
had been selling such clothing in association with its marks, but was unable to
further determine the extent to which the applicant’s marks became known due to
the lack of sales figures or invoices to end consumers in Canada. The Board applied the same analysis to its consideration under paragraph 6(5)(b) of
the Act.
[10]
Under
paragraphs 6(5)(c) and 6(5)(d) of the Act, the Board found that it was
conceivable the parties’ clothing would travel through the same channels of
trade.
[11]
Under
paragraph 6(5)(e), the Board found the design elements, colour and the suffix
“gp” to be the most striking and unique elements of the mark. Although he
agreed with the applicant that the parties’ marks share similarities in sound,
appearance and idea, he found there were significant differences based on the
design and colour elements and the suffix.
[12]
On
additional surrounding circumstances, the Board considered evidence from the
register of trade-marks. The Board found that the 17 relevant marks including
the word MOTO in association with clothing, headwear and footwear were
sufficient for him to draw an inference that at least some of those marks were
in use in the Canadian marketplace. Although the respondent’s evidence relating
to online purchases was not strong evidence of marketplace use in Canada, it was sufficient when combined with the register evidence to establish that the
word MOTO is common to the clothing trade, a factor supporting the respondent’s
position. The Board was satisfied the respondent had discharged its burden to
establish on a balance of probabilities that there was no reasonable likelihood
of confusion between the marks and therefore dismissed the paragraph 12(1)(d)
ground.
[13]
The
Board next turned to the ground of opposition under paragraph 16(3)(a) of the
Act, non-entitlement due to lack of previous use in Canada. The Board held that
the applicant had met its initial burden to support a finding that one or more
of its marks had been used in Canada as of the material date and had not been
abandoned as of the advertisement date. The Board, however, dismissed this
ground on the basis of its findings under the paragraph 12(1)(d) ground, since
none of the marks claimed under paragraph 16(3)(a) were any more similar than
the applicant’s own marks discussed above.
[14]
Finally,
the Board considered the ground of opposition under paragraph 38(2)(d),
non-distinctiveness. The Board was unable to establish the extent to which the applicant’s
marks had become known in Canada due to the lack of sales figures. As a result,
the Board held the applicant had not satisfied its burden of establishing that
one or more of its marks had developed a substantial, significant or sufficient
reputation in Canada to negate the distinctiveness of the respondent’s mark.
[15]
The
Board rejected the opposition to the proposed mark.
Issues
[16]
The
applicant’s memorandum raises the following issues:
1. What standard of
review should be applied?
2. Did the Board err
in rejecting the applicant’s non-entitlement ground of opposition based on
section 16 of the Act?
3. Did the Board err
in rejecting the applicant’s non-registrability ground of opposition based on
paragraph 12(1)(d) of the Act?
4. Did the Board err
in rejecting the applicant’s non-distinctiveness ground of opposition based on
section 2 of the Act?
[17]
I
would rephrase the issues as follows:
1. What is the
appropriate standard of review?
2. Did the Board err
in rejecting the applicant’s non-entitlement ground of opposition?
3. Did the Board err
in rejecting the applicant’s non-registrability ground of opposition?
4. Did the Board err
in rejecting the applicant’s non-distinctiveness ground of opposition?
Applicant’s Written Submissions
[18]
The
applicant argues its new evidence filed on appeal makes the standard of review
correctness for all three grounds of opposition. The new evidence would have
affected the Board’s decision and therefore this Court should come to its own
conclusion based on the evidence before it.
[19]
The
test of confusion to be applied is a matter of first impression in the mind of
a casual consumer somewhat in a hurry who does not pause to give the matter any
detailed consideration or scrutiny, nor to examine closely the similarities and
differences between the marks.
[20]
The
material dates are December 18, 2006 (the date of the filing of the
application) with respect to section 16 non-entitlement and March 6, 2012 with
respect to section 12 non-registrability.
[21]
The
Board erred in making the finding that there was no reasonable likelihood of confusion.
It relied on undated online dictionary references suggesting the word MOTO has
motorcycle related meanings, but there was no evidence these dictionary
definitions were known to Canadians at any point in time and certainly not at
the time of the material date. The Board failed to recognize the applicant’s
clothing is not motorcycle-related, so the word MOTO is simply arbitrary with
no relation to the character or quality of the applicant’s clothing. Acronyms
have been held to be inherently weak, so the Board’s finding that the suffix
increased distinctiveness was incorrect and as some of the respondent’s
clothing products are motorcycle related, the word MOTO is suggestive of those
wares and therefore less distinctive.
[22]
The
Board found that the respondent’s mark had not become known to any extent in Canada as there was no evidence of use and this has not changed on appeal. The Board was
satisfied the applicant had displayed its marks in 2005 print advertisements,
displayed its marks on clothing tags and that the applicant sells its wares in
retail stores to end consumers in Canada.
[23]
The
Board was not satisfied as to the extent of the use of the marks in the absence
of sales figures. The applicant’s new evidence establishes that it sold over
$30 million of its MOTO-branded clothing from 2006 to 2012. Paragraph 6(5)(a)
therefore strongly favours the applicant.
[24]
Paragraph
6(5)(b) strongly favours the applicant since the Board found that the
respondent had not established use of the mark, while the applicant’s MOTO marks
had been used since 1997 and no new evidence has been filed in this appeal by
the respondent.
[25]
Regarding
paragraphs 6(5)(c) and 6(5)(d), the applicant argues little care or scrutiny is
given to the purchasing process. The Board found that the parties’ clothing
wares could travel through the same channels of trade. These factors also
strongly favour the applicant.
[26]
Regarding
paragraph 6(5)(e), the applicant argues the Board’s finding was neither
reasonable nor correct. The most distinctive element of the applicant’s marks
is MOTO and the respondent has taken that essential feature. A suffix is
generally insufficient to avoid confusion and acronyms are inherently weak.
When the marks are properly considered as a matter of first and imperfect
recollection and in their entirety, the mark MOTOGP & DESIGN is likely to
be seen as a new MOTO product launched by the applicant with the identifier GP.
[27]
The
applicant argues the Board misunderstood the state of the register evidence in
considering the surrounding circumstances. The Board incorrectly found that 17
related marks were in the register. As of the December 18, 2006 filing date,
there was only one trade-mark registration in force and registered in
connection with clothing, TOPMOTO. This is insufficient to establish that MOTO
was commonly used by companies in connection with clothing.
[28]
The
respondent’s affidavit evidence was not relevant because it did not establish
MOTO was a commonly used word in Canada for clothing. There was no evidence
that any such clothing was sold in Canada at the relevant date. The applicant’s
new evidence establishes that almost all the vendors identified in the
respondent’s affidavit are based in the United States. Foreign activities do
not impair distinctiveness of marks in Canada.
[29]
Therefore,
the respondent is not the person entitled to register MOTOGP & DESIGN and
the mark is not registrable. The respondent’s application should be refused.
[30]
The
Board dismissed the applicant’s third ground of opposition due to lack of sales
figures. The applicant’s new evidence establishes that by the material date for
non-distinctiveness, January 27, 2009, $14.5 million of MOTO-branded clothing
was sold by the applicant during the preceding three years. Therefore, the applicant
has met its initial burden, while the respondent has failed to provide any
evidence of actual use in Canada of any MOTO trade-mark in Canada by a third party by the material date. The applicant’s extensive sales counter the
impact of any third party use. Accordingly, the mark is not distinctive of the
respondent, is not adapted to distinguish the wares of the respondent and the
application should be refused.
Respondent’s Written Submissions
[31]
The
respondent filed no written submissions.
Analysis and Decision
[32]
Issue
1
What is
the appropriate standard of review?
Where previous
jurisprudence has determined the standard of review applicable to a particular
issue before the court, the reviewing court may adopt that standard (see Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paragraph 57).
[33]
Where
the new evidence filed would have materially affected the Board’s finding of
fact, the standard is correctness (see Hawke & Company Outfitters LLC v
Retail Royalty Company and American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 2012 FC 1539 at
paragraph 30, [2012] FCJ No 1622, citing Molson Breweries v John Labatt Ltd.,
[2000] 3 FC 145, 5 CPR (4th) 180).
[34]
In
this case, the sales figures provided in the new evidence would certainly have
affected the Board’s decision on the non-distinctiveness ground, as the Board’s
own reasons note the absence of such evidence.
[35]
On
the ground of non-registrability and non-entitlement, the new evidence relating
to the national origins of the website selling third party MOTO clothing would
have materially affected the Board’s decision, as it contradicted the
respondent’s evidence regarding such sales.
[36]
On
all three grounds, therefore, the standard of review is correctness.
[37]
Issue
2
Did the Board err in
rejecting the applicant’s non-entitlement ground of opposition?
The Board found in
considering paragraph 6(5)(a), that it could not establish the extent of the
use of the applicant’s MOTO trade-marks due to lack of sales figures. The applicant’s
new evidence establishes $30 million in sales from 2006 to 2012. Combined with
the evidence filed at the Board related to print advertisements and use of
clothing tags, this factor now favours the applicant.
[38]
Given
the lack of new evidence, there is no reason to disturb the Board’s findings on
paragraph 6(5)(b) (length of time) and paragraphs 6(5)(c)(d) (nature of wares
and trade).
[39]
On
paragraph 6(5)(e), resemblance between the marks, the applicant filed no new
evidence but urged me to find the Board’s decision unreasonable. Given the
weight of the other factors, as discussed below, I need not address this point.
[40]
I
accept the applicant’s evidence that the online sales introduced into evidence
by the respondent do not establish use in Canada and therefore reject the Board’s
finding that the word MOTO was common to the clothing trade in Canada.
[41]
Taking
all this evidence together, it is difficult to find that the respondent met its
burden to establish on a balance of probabilities that it was entitled to
register the mark. The applicant’s marks have become well known through their
sales. The applicant has used them since at least 1997. The marks do have some
similarities, even if the Board is correct that the suffix adds
distinctiveness.
[42]
I
therefore find that the respondent has not established that a consumer would
not be confused as a matter of first impression in the mind of a casual
consumer somewhat in a hurry who does not pause to give the matter any detailed
consideration or scrutiny, nor to examine closely the similarities and
differences between the marks (Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v Boutique Cliquot
Ltée, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 824). The respondent is therefore not
entitled to register the mark.
[43]
Issue
3
Did the
Board err in rejecting the applicant’s non-registrability ground of opposition?
For the
same reasons as described above, the mark is not registrable on the basis that it
is confusing with the applicant’s registered marks.
[44]
Issue
4
Did the Board err in
rejecting the applicant’s non-distinctiveness ground of opposition?
The Board found
that the applicant had not met its initial burden to show that its marks had
become known in Canada. The new evidence certainly satisfies that burden. With
that burden established, the onus shifts to the respondent; while the
respondent did not appear in this proceeding, its claim can still be evaluated
based on its evidence before the Board. Given the applicant’s new evidence
showing the online sales originated in the United States, there is no remaining
evidence showing third party use in Canada. The respondent has therefore failed
to meet its burden on this point. The mark is therefore not distinctive of the
respondent.
[45]
The
appeal is therefore granted, the Board’s decision is set aside and the
registration of trade-mark application serial no. 1,328,691 is refused.
[46]
The
applicant has requested costs on a solicitor and client basis. The request is
based on the respondent’s failure to appear at the hearing, its failure to
consent to the appeal and its failure to notify the Court of its decision not
to attend the hearing of the appeal. I am not prepared to make an award of
costs on a solicitor and client basis as the jurisprudence has established that
solicitor and client costs are awarded on rare occasions. They may be awarded
when a party has displayed reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous conduct (see
Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance; Rice v New Brunswick,
2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405 at paragraph 86).
[47]
I
would award costs to the applicant to be assessed at the high end of Column III
of Tariff B.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1. The appeal
is allowed, the Board’s decision is set aside and the registration of
trade-mark application serial no. 1,328,691 is refused.
2. The
applicant shall have its costs of the application to be assessed at the high end
of Column III of Tariff B.
“John A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant
Statutory Provisions
Trade-marks
Act, RSC
1985, c T-13
|
6. (1)
For the purposes of this Act, a trade-mark or trade-name is confusing with
another trade-mark or trade-name if the use of the first mentioned trade-mark
or trade-name would cause confusion with the last mentioned trade-mark or
trade-name in the manner and circumstances described in this section.
(2)
The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another trade-mark if the use
of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to lead to the inference
that the wares or services associated with those trade-marks are
manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or
not the wares or services are of the same general class.
(3)
The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with a trade-name if the use of both
the trade-mark and trade-name in the same area would be likely to lead to the
inference that the wares or services associated with the trade-mark and those
associated with the business carried on under the trade-name are
manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or
not the wares or services are of the same general class.
(4)
The use of a trade-name causes confusion with a trade-mark if the use of both
the trade-name and trade-mark in the same area would be likely to lead to the
inference that the wares or services associated with the business carried on
under the trade-name and those associated with the trade-mark are
manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same person, whether or
not the wares or services are of the same general class.
(5) In
determining whether trade-marks or trade-names are confusing, the court or
the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard to all the surrounding
circumstances including
(a)
the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent
to which they have become known;
(b)
the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been in use;
(c)
the nature of the wares, services or business;
(d)
the nature of the trade; and
(e)
the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in
appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.
12.
(1) Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is not
(a) a
word that is primarily merely the name or the surname of an individual who is
living or has died within the preceding thirty years;
(b)
whether depicted, written or sounded, either clearly descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive in the English or French language of the character
or quality of the wares or services in association with which it is used or
proposed to be used or of the conditions of or the persons employed in their
production or of their place of origin;
(c)
the name in any language of any of the wares or services in connection with
which it is used or proposed to be used;
(d)
confusing with a registered trade-mark;
(e) a
mark of which the adoption is prohibited by section 9 or 10;
(f) a
denomination the adoption of which is prohibited by section 10.1;
(g) in
whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the trade-mark is
to be registered in association with a wine not originating in a territory
indicated by the geographical indication;
(h) in
whole or in part a protected geographical indication, where the trade-mark is
to be registered in association with a spirit not originating in a territory
indicated by the geographical indication; and
(i)
subject to subsection 3(3) and paragraph 3(4)(a) of the Olympic and
Paralympic Marks Act, a mark the adoption of which is prohibited by
subsection 3(1) of that Act.
16.
(1) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30
for registration of a trade-mark that is registrable and that he or his
predecessor in title has used in Canada or made known in Canada in
association with wares or services is entitled, subject to section 38, to
secure its registration in respect of those wares or services, unless at the
date on which he or his predecessor in title first so used it or made it
known it was confusing with
(a) a
trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person;
(b) a
trade-mark in respect of which an application for registration had been
previously filed in Canada by any other person; or
(c) a
trade-name that had been previously used in Canada by any other person.
. . .
(3) Any
applicant who has filed an application in accordance with section 30 for registration
of a proposed trade-mark that is registrable is entitled, subject to sections
38 and 40, to secure its registration in respect of the wares or services
specified in the application, unless at the date of filing of the application
it was confusing with
(a) a
trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made known in Canada by any other person; . . .
38. (2) A
statement of opposition may be based on any of the following grounds:
. . .
(d) that
the trade-mark is not distinctive.
|
6.
(1) Pour l’application de la présente loi, une marque de commerce ou un nom
commercial crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de commerce ou un autre
nom commercial si l’emploi de la marque de commerce ou du nom commercial en
premier lieu mentionnés cause de la confusion avec la marque de commerce ou
le nom commercial en dernier lieu mentionnés, de la manière et dans les
circonstances décrites au présent article.
(2)
L’emploi d’une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec une autre marque
de commerce lorsque l’emploi des deux marques de commerce dans la même région
serait susceptible de faire conclure que les marchandises liées à ces marques
de commerce sont fabriquées, vendues, données à bail ou louées, ou que les
services liés à ces marques sont loués ou exécutés, par la même personne, que
ces marchandises ou ces services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale.
(3)
L’emploi d’une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec un nom
commercial, lorsque l’emploi des deux dans la même région serait susceptible
de faire conclure que les marchandises liées à cette marque et les
marchandises liées à l’entreprise poursuivie sous ce nom sont fabriquées,
vendues, données à bail ou louées, ou que les services liés à cette marque et
les services liés à l’entreprise poursuivie sous ce nom sont loués ou
exécutés, par la même personne, que ces marchandises ou services soient ou
non de la même catégorie générale.
(4)
L’emploi d’un nom commercial crée de la confusion avec une marque de
commerce, lorsque l’emploi des deux dans la même région serait susceptible de
faire conclure que les marchandises liées à l’entreprise poursuivie sous ce
nom et les marchandises liées à cette marque sont fabriquées, vendues,
données à bail ou louées, ou que les services liés à l’entreprise poursuivie
sous ce nom et les services liés à cette marque sont loués ou exécutés, par
la même personne, que ces marchandises ou services soient ou non de la même
catégorie générale.
(5)
En décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la
confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de
toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, y compris :
a)
le caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux,
et la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus;
b)
la période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont
été en usage;
c)
le genre de marchandises, services ou entreprises;
d)
la nature du commerce;
e)
le degré de ressemblance entre les marques de commerce ou les noms
commerciaux dans la présentation ou le son, ou dans les idées qu’ils
suggèrent.
12.
(1) Sous réserve de l’article 13, une marque de commerce est enregistrable
sauf dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants :
a)
elle est constituée d’un mot n’étant principalement que le nom ou le nom de
famille d’un particulier vivant ou qui est décédé dans les trente années
précédentes;
b)
qu’elle soit sous forme graphique, écrite ou sonore, elle donne une
description claire ou donne une description fausse et trompeuse, en langue
française ou anglaise, de la nature ou de la qualité des marchandises ou
services en liaison avec lesquels elle est employée, ou à l’égard desquels on
projette de l’employer, ou des conditions de leur production, ou des
personnes qui les produisent, ou du lieu d’origine de ces marchandises ou
services;
c)
elle est constituée du nom, dans une langue, de l’une des marchandises ou de
l’un des services à l’égard desquels elle est employée, ou à l’égard desquels
on projette de l’employer;
d)
elle crée de la confusion avec une marque de commerce déposée;
e)
elle est une marque dont l’article 9 ou 10 interdit l’adoption;
f)
elle est une dénomination dont l’article 10.1 interdit l’adoption;
g)
elle est constituée, en tout ou en partie, d’une indication géographique
protégée et elle doit être enregistrée en liaison avec un vin dont le lieu
d’origine ne se trouve pas sur le territoire visé par l’indication;
h)
elle est constituée, en tout ou en partie, d’une indication géographique
protégée et elle doit être enregistrée en liaison avec un spiritueux dont le
lieu d’origine ne se trouve pas sur le territoire visé par l’indication;
i)
elle est une marque dont l’adoption est interdite par le paragraphe 3(1) de
la Loi sur les marques olympiques et paralympiques, sous réserve du
paragraphe 3(3) et de l’alinéa 3(4)a) de cette loi.
16.
(1) Tout requérant qui a produit une demande selon l’article 30 en vue de
l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce qui est enregistrable et que le
requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre a employée ou fait connaître au Canada
en liaison avec des marchandises ou services, a droit, sous réserve de
l’article 38, d’en obtenir l’enregistrement à l’égard de ces marchandises ou
services, à moins que, à la date où le requérant ou son prédécesseur en titre
l’a en premier lieu ainsi employée ou révélée, elle n’ait créé de la
confusion :
a)
soit avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada
par une autre personne;
b)
soit avec une marque de commerce à l’égard de laquelle une demande
d’enregistrement avait été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre
personne;
c)
soit avec un nom commercial qui avait été antérieurement employé au Canada
par une autre personne.
.
. .
(3) Tout
requérant qui a produit une demande selon l’article 30 en vue de
l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce projetée et enregistrable, a droit,
sous réserve des articles 38 et 40, d’en obtenir l’enregistrement à l’égard
des marchandises ou services spécifiés dans la demande, à moins que, à la
date de production de la demande, elle n’ait créé de la confusion :
a) soit
avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par
une autre personne; . . .
38. (2) Cette
opposition peut être fondée sur l’un des motifs suivants :
. . .
d) la
marque de commerce n’est pas distinctive.
|
Email this Content