Date: 20130130
Docket: T-91-12
Citation: 2013
FC 99
Ottawa, Ontario,
January 30, 2013
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Manson
BETWEEN:
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DETRA BERBERI
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
Ms.
Detra Berberi [the applicant] seeks judicial review of a decision made by the
Canadian Human Rights Commission [the Commission, or CHRC], delivered by
correspondence dated March 25, 2011. In that decision, pursuant to paragraph
41(1)(d) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 [the Act],
the Commission decided not to deal with the applicant’s complaint against her
employer, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada [HRSDC].
I. Background
[2]
The
applicant has been an employee of HRSDC, represented here by the Attorney
General of Canada [the respondent], since 1986. On November 22, 2005 she filed
a complaint with the Commission, alleging discrimination at her workplace on
the basis of her disability. In her complaint form, she claimed her manager had
harassed her by calling her at home on a Friday evening and directing her to
report to a new work location effective the following Monday. She also alleged
that her employer failed to accommodate her disability, which was the result of
two separate car accidents in 1998 and 1999, by directing her to report to the
new location, which added 2 ½ to 3 hours to her daily commute.
[3]
In
addition to her complaint under the Act, the applicant filed grievances through
her union pertaining to various work related matters, including the subject
matter of her complaint under the Act.
[4]
In
April 2006, pursuant to section 41(1)(a) of the Act, the Commission decided not
to deal with the applicant’s complaint, as her complaint could be dealt with
through the grievance procedure available to her.
[5]
In
December 2009, the applicant’s union withdrew her grievances from the Public
Service Labour Relations Board [the PSLRB, or the Board] on the basis that it
was non-adjudicable.
[6]
The
applicant returned to the Commission on April 26, 2010 and asked that her
complaint be re-activated. The Commission decided it would not deal with the
complaint. This decision, delivered by correspondence dated March 25, 2011, is
the subject of the present application for judicial review.
[7]
The
Commission advised the applicant that it had decided not to deal with her
complaint pursuant to section 41(1)(d) of the Act. The only reason the
Commission provided was that “[t]he allegations of discrimination in the
complaint were addressed through a review procedure otherwise reasonably
available to the applicant.”
[8]
By
letter dated July 25, 2011, the Commission advised the applicant that her
request for reconsideration of this decision was denied.
II. Issues
[9]
The
only issue raised by this application for judicial review is whether the
Commission’s decision was reasonable.
III. Standard of review
[10]
The
standard of review applicable to the Commission’s decision to dismiss the
complaint is reasonableness (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190
at paras 54-55 [Dunsmuir]; Chan v Canada (Attorney General of Canada), 2010 FC 1232 at para 15).
IV. Analysis
[11]
The
applicant submits there was insufficient evidence before the Commission to
support its decision, as contrary to the Commission’s assessment, the alleged
discrimination and failure to accommodate the applicant’s disability were not
addressed through the grievance procedure or elsewhere.
[12]
The
applicant asserts the Commission should have conducted an investigation and/or
assessment of the merits of her complaint rather than simply adopting the
respondent’s position that it had remedied the matter. Moreover, the Commission
does not provide reasons or an explanation to justify why it preferred the
respondent’s position over the applicant’s, or any indication that the
Commission even considered the applicant’s submissions that the allegations in
her complaint had not been addressed by the grievance procedure.
[13]
The
applicant maintains that the Commission’s failure to test the competing positions
advanced by herself and HRSDC in relation to the issue of whether her
discrimination claim was addressed by the grievance procedure renders the
decision unjustifiable.
[14]
The
respondent submits that where the Commission provides only brief reasons for its
decision, the Commission’s investigator’s report is treated as constituting the
Commission’s reasoning for the purpose of reviewing its decision (Sketchley
v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404 at paras 37 and 38 [Sketchley];
Exeter, above, at para 21). Accordingly, the decision under review in
this case includes the Section 40/41 Report prepared by the investigator and
considered by the Commission.
[15]
The
respondent asserts the Commission’s decision was reasonable and emphasizes the
following findings made by the investigator after she considered the parties’
positions:
-
The
investigator found that a "final decision" was made on the grievances
when they were denied at the third level because the union had withdrawn the
applicant’s grievances before they were considered by the PSLRB;
-
The
investigator also determined that the summary of the final decisions on the
grievances indicated that all of the applicant’s human rights allegations were
addressed by the grievance procedure, and although the applicant alleged bias
on the part of those investigating her grievances, she had provided no
additional facts to substantiate this allegation;
-
The
investigator therefore concluded that the Commission should not deal with the
complaint under paragraph 41(1)(d) of the Act because the applicant’s complaint
of alleged discrimination was addressed through a review procedure otherwise
reasonably available to her.
[16]
The
respondent submits that the Commission’s finding that the applicant’s complaint
had been dealt with through the grievance procedure, notwithstanding that it
was never adjudicated before the PSLRB, is consistent with Chan, above,
at paras 32 and 46.
[17]
In
Hérold v Canada (Revenue Agency), 2011 FC 544 at paragraphs 33 to 36,
Justice Donald J. Rennie set out the following four threshold points for any
analysis of the discretion vested in the Commission by paragraph 41(1)(d) of
the Act:
33 First, the Commission has a broad discretion
to dismiss complaints where it is satisfied that further inquiry is not warranted.
In Bell Canada v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, [1999] 1 FC 113 (CA) at para 38, the Federal Court of Appeal held that
"the Act grants the Commission a remarkable degree of latitude when it is
performing its screening function on receipt of an investigation report".
In consequence Parliament did not intend the Court to intervene lightly in the
decisions of the Commission.
34 Second, the Commission is not an adjudicative
body and does not draw any legal conclusions. It simply assesses the
sufficiency of the evidence before it and determines whether a full Tribunal
hearing is warranted. In Slattery v Canada (Canadian Human Rights
Commission), [1994] 2 FC 574 at para 56, Justice Nadon held that deference
was owed to decision makers assessing such evidence and judicial review is
warranted only when unreasonable omissions are made, such when an investigator
failed to investigate crucial evidence.
35 Third, the test for determining whether or
not a complaint is frivolous within the meaning of section 41(1)(d) of the Act
is whether, based upon the evidence, it appears to be plain and obvious that
the complaint cannot succeed.
36 Finally, the standard of review with respect
to the Commission's decision to dismiss a complaint, rather than refer it to
the Tribunal, is reasonableness: Wu v Royal Bank of Canada, 2010 FC 307
as it is for a decision to find a complaint trivial, frivolous, vexatious or
made in bad faith: Morin v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 1355 at
para 33.
[18]
I
agree with the respondent that in the case at bar, as the Commission provided
only brief reasons for its decision, the Commission’s investigator’s report
should be treated as constituting the Commission’s reasoning for the purpose of
reviewing its decision. As found by the Federal Court of Appeal in Sketchley,
above, at para 37:
…The investigator's Report is prepared for the
Commission, and hence for the purposes of the investigation, the investigator
is considered to be an extension of the Commission (SEPQA, supra at para 25).
When the Commission adopts an investigator's recommendations and provides no
reasons or only brief reasons, the Courts have rightly treated the
investigator's Report as constituting the Commission's reasoning for the
purpose of the screening decision under section 44(3) of the Act (SEPQA, supra
at para 35; Bell Canada v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of
Canada (1999) 167 DLR (4th) 432, [1999] 1 FC 113 at para 30 (CA) [Bell Canada];
Canadian Broadcasting Corp v Paul (2001), 274 NR 47, 2001 FCA 93 at para 43
(CA)).
[19]
Moreover,
reasons need not be exhaustive, or include all the details I may have
preferred, as the reviewing judge, as noncomprehensive reasons do not impugn
the validity of the decision’s reasons or its result (Newfoundland and
Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011
SCC 62 [Newfoundland]).
[20]
Respondent’s
counsel admitted the Commission’s decision is “thin”, but still within the
acceptable level of reasonable outcomes to sustain the Commission’s decision.
[21]
Notwithstanding
the clear path of deference to be given to the Commission’s decision, such
deference is not unfettered, and the Commission must be prudent in determining
whether a complaint warrants an inquiry by the Tribunal (Canada (Attorney
General) v Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte, 2012 FC 105 [Mohawks], Conroy
v Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2012 FC 887).
[22]
As
stated by Justice Marie-Josée Bédard in Mohawks, above, at paragraphs 39
and 42:
39 As stated above, the first decision that the
Commission must make upon receiving a complaint is whether it will deal with it
and investigate the allegations. Section 41 of the Act obliges the Commission
to deal with all complaints that are filed unless it appears to it that the
complaint falls within the exceptions set forth in section 41; one of those
exceptions being that the complaint is beyond its jurisdiction. The approach
that the Commission should adopt when deciding whether to deal with a
complaint, and the approach that the reviewing court should keep in mind, was
enunciated by Justice Rothstein in Canada Post Corp v Canada (Canadian Human
Rights Commission) (1997), 130 FTR 241, 71 ACWS (3d) 935 (TD); aff'd
(1999), 169 FTR 138, 245 NR 397 (FCA) [Canada Post], wherein he held
that the Commission should decline to deal with a complaint only where it is
plain and obvious that the matter is beyond its jurisdiction:
3 A decision by the Commission under section 41 is
normally made at an early stage before any investigation is carried out.
Because a decision not to deal with the complaint will summarily end a matter
before the complaint is investigated, the Commission should only decide not
to deal with a complaint at this stage in plain and obvious cases. The
timely processing of complaints also supports such an approach. A lengthy
analysis of a complaint at this stage is, at least to some extent, duplicative
of the investigation yet to be carried out. A time consuming analysis will,
where the Commission decides to deal with the complaint, delay the processing
of the complaint. If it is not plain and obvious to the Commission that the
complaint falls under one of the grounds for not dealing with it under section
41, the Commission should, with dispatch, proceed to deal with it.
[Emphasis
added]
…
42 As the respondents suggest, the "plain and
obvious" test proposed by Justice Rothstein is very similar to the test
for striking out a court pleading on the basis that it discloses no reasonable
cause of action. The approach proposed in the context of such a motion by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Hunt v Carey Canada Inc, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 at
para 33, 74 DLR (4th) 321, may be of assistance to the Commission when it
determines whether a complaint should be summarily dismissed without any
investigation:
Thus, the test in Canada ... is ... assuming that
the facts as stated can be proved, is it "plain and obvious" that
the plaintiff's statements of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action? As
in England, if there is a chance that the plaintiff might succeed, then the
plaintiff should not be "driven from the judgment seat". Neither
the length and complexity of the issues, the novelty of the cause of
action, nor the potential for the defendant to present strong defence
should prevent the plaintiff from proceeding with his or her cause. ...
[Emphasis added]
[23]
Thus,
while the Supreme Court of Canada in the Newfoundland case, above,
clearly decided that reasons given for a tribunal’s decision need not be
comprehensive, it does not translate into not giving meaningful reasons or
reasons supported by some evidence before the Tribunal. I am mindful that the
Supreme Court also stated in Newfoundland that in order for the Dunsmuir
criteria for reasonableness to be met, a reviewing court must be able to
understand why a tribunal made its decision and determine whether a tribunal’s
conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes given the evidence that
was before it (Newfoundland at paras 16 and 18).
[24]
Here,
there is very little in the section 40/41 Report of the Commission to support
any reasonable finding that the Commission turned its mind to any of the
underlying reasons for the complaint, or that the grievance process did in fact
even deal with the applicant’s complaints. The following facts demonstrate the
deficiencies and errors made by the Commission on this front:
a) With
respect to the grievance process initiated and undertaken by the PSLRB, it was
withdrawn at the third level due to the union acting on behalf of the applicant
deciding the grievances were “not adjudicable, for technical reasons, but not
based on the merits of her grievances”. Therefore, the union withdrew the
grievances and the applicant could not obtain adjudication on the merits;
b) The
Commission found a “final decision” was made in respect of the grievances at
the third level, but did not provide any analysis or reasons for this finding,
nor comment on the merits of the grievances;
c) The
Commission found that “the grievances were all denied. All the allegations were
found to be unfounded”. This is not the case. The grievances were withdrawn,
not concluded with any final decision on the merits of the grievances or the
veracity of the applicant’s allegations;
d) The
Commission admitted that “[n]o copies of the decisions with respect to the
grievances were provided” (paragraph 25 of the investigator’s report); and
e) While
the Commission in its report did state “the Respondent provided a summary of
the final decisions on the grievances, which indicate that all the human rights
allegations were addressed by the grievance procedure”, no reasons or analysis
were given in respect of that summary report. In fact in the February 11, 2011
letter from the respondent to the Commission’s Resolution Services Division, the
respondent states:
With respect to disclosure of the final report:
While it is true that the parties to the harassment complaint were informed
that the final report would not be released to the parties, this in no way
reflected an impingement of the Complainant’s procedural rights. The Respondent
firmly states that the investigator arrived at the conclusion that the
complaint was unfounded and management had no doubt as to that conclusion.
Rather, management was concerned with respect to the quality of the investigation
report and with respect to the fact that the investigator expressed personal
opinions that were inappropriate in such a report. Consequently, management
advised the parties that the report was being rejected and would therefore not
be disclosed to the parties.
[25]
I
find that the Court’s intervention in the present case is warranted, as the
reasons provided by the Commission through its investigator were not justified,
transparent or intelligible. While the Commission is certainly entitled to
consider the grievance process and a decision made by a third party, it cannot
abdicate its responsibility to independently consider any decision that
resulted from that process and the reasons for it.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1.)
The
decision of the CHRC not to deal with the applicant’s complaints dated March
25, 2011 is set aside;
2.)
This
matter is referred back to the Human Rights Commission to conduct an
investigation of the applicant’s complaint against HRSDC and render a decision
based on the full record concerning the applicant’s grievances and its own
consideration of the merits of those grievances;
3.)
Costs
to the applicant.
"Michael D.
Manson"
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