Date: 20110512
Docket: T-1056-10
Citation: 2011 FC 544
Ottawa, Ontario, May 12,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Rennie
BETWEEN:
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NICOLE HÉROLD A.K.A. NORA
HÉROLD
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Applicant
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and
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CANADA REVENUE AGENCY (CRA)
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
The
applicant seeks judicial review of the decision of the Canadian Human Rights
Commission (the Commission), dated May 26, 2010, wherein the Commission decided
not to refer the applicant’s complaint under the Canadian Human Rights Act,
RSC 1985, c H-6 (the Act) to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal because
it was trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith.
[2]
The
applicant’s notice of application requests a number of different types of
relief, including: costs or no order of costs against her if the judicial
review is dismissed; damages for stress, lost wages, in the amount of $5
million; punitive/aggravated damages, in the amount of $10 million; an inquiry
into the conduct of various Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) employees, and an order
striking down section 9(2) of the Act. These remedies are largely
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court on judicial review. To the extent that the
constitutional issue has been raised, it has been done without notice or
evidentiary foundation and will not be considered.
[3]
In
my view, there is no reviewable error in the Commission’s decision to dismiss
the complaint. The Commission conducted a thorough and neutral investigation
as required by the case law. The Commission’s findings of fact were reasonably
open to it on the evidence, and its conclusion that the complaint was trivial,
frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith is a reasonable exercise of the
discretion accorded to it by Parliament.
The Facts
[4]
The
applicant was first hired at the CRA in Vancouver in 1999 and
transferred to the Toronto office in November, 2000.
[5]
The
applicant alleged that once she reached the age of 65 she experienced
discrimination at the CRA based on her age. Specifically, the applicant
alleged that she was denied promotions or transfers within the CRA, that her
tasks became more repetitive, and that she was refused opportunities to
participate in workplace committees. The applicant raised five different
issues in her complaint form;
i.
Alleged
harassment by Jean Kast;
ii.
Alleged
harassment by supervisor Claudia Deluy;
iii.
The
refusal of her union to represent her;
iv.
Alleged
discrimination based on age while applying for jobs; and
v.
The
CRA’s failure to destroy two documents, a Confidential Report and supporting
Chronology.
[6]
The
applicant viewed all five of these incidents as part of a broader conspiracy or
campaign to force her to leave the CRA.
[7]
A
Commission investigator wrote a report on the applicant’s complaint (the
section 40/41 Report), to assist the Commission in deciding whether to deal
with the complaint. The Report was provided to both parties, who then had the
opportunity to make submissions regarding the facts and issues addressed in the
Report. The applicant concedes that she was afforded this opportunity, but
before this Court maintained that the investigation Report was in error because
it included the viewpoint of other employees and her manager. I will summarize
the findings in the Report that was placed before the Commission.
Alleged harassment by
Jean Kast
[8]
Jean
Kast was a colleague of the applicant’s at the CRA. The applicant alleged that
Mr. Kast bullied her, spread lies and rumours about her and crumpled her
printouts at the printer.
[9]
The
applicant first complained about Mr. Kast in 2005. The applicant initiated
mediation and signed a resolution agreement with Mr. Kast in March, 2006. It
appears that prior to signing this agreement the applicant approached her
union, but refused union advice, and proceeded with the mediation without union
involvement. The applicant attempted to re-open the matter later in 2006,
saying she was dissatisfied with the results of the mediation, but was informed
that the matter was closed.
[10]
The
applicant’s complaint form also stated that she received a Notice of
Disciplinary Action, and that this put an end to her dreams of getting another
position. The applicant believed that Mr. Kast was somehow involved in the
Notice of Disciplinary Action.
[11]
As
the Commission noted, apart from this incident, the applicant did not provide
any evidence to support her allegation that Mr. Kast harassed her or that any
alleged harassment had a link to her age. As best I understand the applicant’s
argument, her view is that the age discrimination came from management, not Mr.
Kast, but management used the hostile climate created by Mr. Kast to further
its agenda of age discrimination.
Alleged Harassment by
Supervisor Claudia Deluy
[12]
In
her complaint form, the applicant alleged that her supervisor, Claudia Deluy, harassed
her by finding deficiencies in her work, particularly in 2006, by pointing out
a lack of knowledge of procedures and a bad attitude towards co-workers and
clients. The applicant asserted that all her other team leaders were satisfied
with her work, as indicated by her previous performance evaluations.
[13]
However,
the Report found that the applicant did have performance problems while under
the supervision of other team leaders. Between 2002-2005 four different team
leaders noted issues with the applicant’s work performance, including problems
with communication and relating to her co-workers.
[14]
Before
this Court, the applicant contended that Ms. Deluy intercepted and then altered
her e-mails before they were sent so as to compromise her position in the
workplace. She also contended that some of her managers were not competent to
make the assessment that they did about her workplace performance.
[15]
The
applicant also alleged that Ms. Deluy denied the applicant the opportunity to
participate in the Official Languages Committee in May 2006.
The Confidential Report
and the Chronology
[16]
In
June, 2006 the respondent directed that its Human Resources department prepare
a Confidential Report and supporting Chronology of the applicant’s workplace
performance related issues. The Confidential Report opens with a sentence
identifying the applicant as a “female francophone in her late 60’s [sic]”.
[17]
This
sentence, relating to the applicant’s age, forms the foundation of the
applicant’s complaint of age discrimination.
[18]
The
Confidential Report notes that during the applicant’s five and half years of
employment with the Toronto Centre she demonstrated a consistent inability or
unwillingness to foster positive and amicable relationships with peers and managers.
Managers complained that the applicant spent an “exorbitant” amount of time
using the email system, which impacted her work performance. The Confidential
Report also sets out examples of poor judgment, unacceptable conduct and
comments, inappropriate use of email, and security breaches. The Confidential
Report also contains suggestions to address the applicant’s performance and
professional behaviour.
[19]
The
Chronology is a 40 page document which reviews the applicant’s employment
history, with observations that are similar to the Confidential Report.
[20]
The
applicant relies heavily on the first sentence of the Confidential Report as
evidence of age discrimination. She disputes all of the conclusions in the
Confidential Report. In particular, she states that any problems with
interacting with others were part of “an engineered program” to make her leave
because of her age.
[21]
The
respondent agreed that the sentence referring to the applicant as a “female
francophone in her late 60’s [sic]” was not appropriate and agreed to destroy
the Confidential Report. The respondent also agreed to make some changes to
the Chronology. The applicant demanded further changes to the Chronology which
were not acceptable to the respondent. The respondent eventually offered to
destroy both documents, but says the applicant did not respond to this offer.
The Decision Under Review
[22]
The
Commission decided not to deal with the applicant’s complaint under subsection
41(1)(d) of the Act. It found the complaint to be trivial, frivolous,
vexatious or made in bad faith.
[23]
The
Commission’s reasons were largely derivative of the section 40/41 Report. The
Commission found that the reference to the applicant’s age in the Confidential
Report was information presented in a factual, non-discriminatory manner. The
Confidential Report simply described the applicant’s documented behaviours with
respect to workplace behaviour, and proposed a list of suggestions to be
followed to manage the applicant’s performance and her professional behaviour. There
was no indication in the Confidential Report that the applicant’s age was an
issue for her employer.
[24]
I
agree that the reference to the applicant’s age in the Confidential Report was
immaterial to the substantive content of that report, which was entirely
focused on performance related issues.
[25]
Moreover,
the Commission noted that all parties agreed that the Confidential Report would
be destroyed. The Commission therefore concluded that all of the issues raised
by the reference to the applicant’s age in the Confidential Report have been
resolved by the respondent.
[26]
The
Commission concluded that the statements in the Confidential Report to the
effect that there were issues with the applicant’s professional behaviour were
motivated by concern about performance and not age, and the respondent
exercised management prerogative to have the applicant focus on tasks within
her job description in order to deal with these issues. This was the sole
reason the applicant was denied any work opportunities. The Commission found
there was no evidence the applicant was discriminated against on the ground of
age.
The Issues
[27]
The
applicant has not specified any issues in her memorandum of fact and law. I
therefore characterize the issue as whether the Commission’s decision was
reasonable.
Relevant Legislation
[28]
The
Act contains several provisions which specifically prohibit
discrimination based on age in the employment context:
a.
Section 7
of the Act specifies that it is a discriminatory practice to refuse to
employ an individual based on a prohibited ground of discrimination, or to
differentiate adversely in relation to an employee in the course of employment.
b.
Section 10
states that it is a discriminatory practice for an employer to pursue a policy
or practice that tends to deprive an individual of any employment opportunities
on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
c.
Section 14
states that it is a discriminatory practice to harass an individual on a
prohibited ground of discrimination in matters related to employment.
[29]
Section
41 sets out circumstances where the Commission is not required to deal with a
complaint filed with it:
Commission to deal
with complaint
41. (1) Subject to section
40, the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed with it unless in
respect of that complaint it appears to the Commission that
(a) the alleged
victim of the discriminatory practice to which the complaint relates ought to
exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available;
(b) the
complaint is one that could more appropriately be dealt with, initially or
completely, according to a procedure provided for under an Act of Parliament
other than this Act;
(c) the
complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission;
(d) the
complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; or
(e) the
complaint is based on acts or omissions the last of which occurred more than
one year, or such longer period of time as the Commission considers
appropriate in the circumstances, before receipt of the complaint.
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Irrecevabilité
41. (1) Sous
réserve de l’article 40, la Commission statue sur toute plainte dont elle est
saisie à moins qu’elle estime celle-ci irrecevable pour un des motifs
suivants:
a) la victime
présumée de l’acte discriminatoire devrait épuiser d’abord les recours
internes ou les procédures d’appel ou de règlement des griefs qui lui sont
normalement ouverts;
b) la plainte
pourrait avantageusement être instruite, dans un premier temps ou à toutes
les étapes, selon des procédures prévues par une autre loi fédérale;
c) la plainte
n’est pas de sa compétence;
d) la plainte
est frivole, vexatoire ou entachée de mauvaise foi;
e) la plainte a
été déposée après l’expiration d’un délai d’un an après le dernier des faits
sur lesquels elle est fondée, ou de tout délai supérieur que la Commission
estime indiqué dans les circonstances.
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[30]
Section
44 sets out what action the Commission shall take once an investigator has
completed a report. The Commission can do one of three things: refer the
complainant to a more appropriate forum for dealing with the complaint, request
that the Chairperson of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal institute an inquiry
into the complaint, or dismiss the complaint:
44. (1) An investigator shall, as soon as
possible after the conclusion of an investigation, submit to the Commission a
report of the findings of the investigation.
Action on receipt of report
(2) If, on receipt of a report
referred to in subsection (1), the Commission is satisfied
(a) that the complainant ought
to exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available, or
(b) that the complaint could
more appropriately be dealt with, initially or completely, by means of a procedure
provided for under an Act of Parliament other than this Act,
it shall refer the complainant to the
appropriate authority.
(3) On receipt of a report
referred to in subsection (1), the Commission
(a) may request the Chairperson
of the Tribunal to institute an inquiry under section 49 into the complaint
to which the report relates if the Commission is satisfied
(i) that, having regard to all the
circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the complaint is warranted,
and
(ii) that the complaint to which the
report relates should not be referred pursuant to subsection (2) or dismissed
on any ground mentioned in paragraphs 41(c) to (e); or
(b) shall dismiss the complaint
to which the report relates if it is satisfied
(i) that, having regard to all the
circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the complaint is not
warranted, or
(ii) that the complaint should be
dismissed on any ground mentioned in paragraphs 41(c) to (e).
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44. (1) L’enquêteur présente son rapport à
la Commission le plus tôt possible après la fin de l’enquête.
Suite à donner au rapport
(2) La Commission renvoie
le plaignant à l’autorité compétente dans les cas où, sur réception du
rapport, elle est convaincue, selon le cas:
a) que le plaignant devrait épuiser les
recours internes ou les procédures d’appel ou de règlement des griefs qui lui
sont normalement ouverts;
b) que la plainte pourrait
avantageusement être instruite, dans un premier temps ou à toutes les étapes,
selon des procédures prévues par une autre loi fédérale.
(3) Sur réception du
rapport d’enquête prévu au paragraphe (1), la Commission:
a) peut demander au président du
Tribunal de désigner, en application de l’article 49, un membre pour
instruire la plainte visée par le rapport, si elle est convaincue:
(i) d’une part, que, compte
tenu des circonstances relatives à la plainte, l’examen de celle-ci est
justifié,
(ii) d’autre part, qu’il n’y a
pas lieu de renvoyer la plainte en application du paragraphe (2) ni de la
rejeter aux termes des alinéas 41c) à e);
b) rejette la plainte, si elle est
convaincue:
(i) soit que, compte tenu des
circonstances relatives à la plainte, l’examen de celle-ci n’est pas justifié,
(ii) soit que la plainte doit
être rejetée pour l’un des motifs énoncés aux alinéas 41c) à e).
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[31]
In this case, the Commission chose to dismiss the complaint
because it found the complaint to be trivial, frivolous, vexatious, or made in
bad faith, a ground mentioned at section 41(1)(d).
Analysis
[32]
Any
analysis of the discretion vested in the Commission by section 41(1)(d) is
framed by four threshold points.
[33]
First,
the Commission has a broad discretion to dismiss complaints where it is
satisfied that further inquiry is not warranted. In Bell Canada v Communications,
Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, [1999] 1 FC 113 (CA) at para 38, the Federal Court
of Appeal held that “the Act grants the Commission a remarkable degree of
latitude when it is performing its screening function on receipt of an
investigation report”. In consequence Parliament did not intend the Court to
intervene lightly in the decisions of the Commission.
[34]
Second,
the Commission is not an adjudicative body and does not draw any legal
conclusions. It simply assesses the sufficiency of the evidence before it and
determines whether a full Tribunal hearing is warranted. In Slattery v
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1994] 2 FC 574 at para 56, Justice
Nadon held that deference was owed to decision makers assessing such evidence
and judicial review is warranted only when unreasonable omissions are made,
such when an investigator failed to investigate crucial evidence.
[35]
Third,
the test for determining whether or not a complaint is frivolous within the
meaning of section 41(1)(d) of the Act is whether, based upon the
evidence, it appears to be plain and obvious that the complaint cannot succeed.
[36]
Finally,
the standard of review with respect to the Commission’s decision to dismiss a
complaint, rather than refer it to the Tribunal, is reasonableness: Wu v
Royal Bank of Canada, 2010 FC 307 as it is for a decision to find a
complaint trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith: Morin v Canada
(Attorney General), 2007 FC 1355 at para 33.
[37]
With
these threshold points in mind, I turn now to an analysis of the Commission’s
decision.
[38]
The
Commission had before it a record which revealed a history of performance
review issues and interpersonal conflicts between the applicant and her
co-workers and supervisors. In an otherwise positive performance review, a
supervisor found that the applicant “has had difficulties in dealing with some
colleagues and struggles with accepting the ideas and opinions of others”. The
report continued to note that improving the applicant’s communication skills
would help her in avoiding confrontations with colleagues, and that the
applicant has had difficulties with being respectful towards her colleagues. Similarly,
in a later review a different supervisor wrote that:
Issues with respect to her written
communication through email had to be discussed with her and addressed to
ensure the value of respect is upheld when communicating in writing. This is an
area requiring Nora’s immediate attention.
[39]
The
Confidential Report largely focuses on what appear to be legitimate performance
issues. Other than the opening sentence, the report does not refer to the
applicant’s age, nor does it indicate any preference to have the applicant
leave her job, or force the applicant to retire. On the contrary, the report
ends with a list of suggestions intended to manage any inappropriate behaviour,
and keep the applicant in the workplace.
[40]
The
Commission’s conclusion that the Confidential Report focused on the applicant’s
documented work behaviours, rather than her age, is thus a reasonable
assessment of the evidence. The Commission’s conclusion that the
recommendation to have the applicant focus on tasks within her job description
was to address issues with the applicant’s behaviour in the workplace is also
reasonable, and entirely within management’s prerogative.
[41]
The
applicant was simply unable to provide any probative evidence that actions
taken against her were done so because of her age or because of a campaign to
force the applicant out of the CRA. The only evidence the applicant put
forward regarding her age was the first sentence of the Confidential Report,
and the fact that in her view, criticism of her work increased after she reached
the age of 65. In the face of compelling evidence that actions taken against
her were related to documented workplace performance issues commencing well
before she turned 65, it was reasonably open to the Commission to find that it
was plain and obvious her complaint could not succeed.
[42]
Finally,
I note that the Commission has complied with its duty of fairness. The
Commission did not ignore an important piece of evidence or display bias
against the applicant. The Commission provided all parties with a copy of the
section 40/41 Report prior to making a decision, and gave both parties the
opportunity to respond to the Report. In sum, the Commission carried out its
statutory mandate according to legal principle and there are no grounds to
intervene.
[43]
The
application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that
the application for judicial review be and is hereby
dismissed.
"Donald J. Rennie"