Docket:
IMM-1690-13
Citation: 2013 FC 1135
[UNREVISED
CERTIFIED ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, November 7, 2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
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BETWEEN:
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LINA MALHA RAHAL
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and
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HANANE ANISSA RAHAL
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
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AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent.
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
Lina Malha Rahal (Lina Rahal) and Hanane Anissa
Rahal (Hanane Rahal) (collectively "the applicants") are submitting
this application for judicial review of the decision by a visa officer at the
Canadian Embassy in Paris, France, rendered on January 4, 2013, excluding them
as dependent children in their parents' permanent residence application
pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
[2]
The court dismisses the application for judicial
review submitted by the applicants for the following reasons:
II. The
facts
[3]
The applicants were included
in their parents' permanent residence application as dependent children. They
state that they were continuous full-time students since they turned 22. Applicant
Lina turned 22 on June 2, 2000, and applicant Hanane turned
22 on October 17, 2003.
[4]
The visa officer excluded
the applicants from their parents' permanent resident application after finding
that they did not meet the definition of "dependent child" under
section 2 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227
[IRPR].
III. Legislation
[5]
Section 2 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR] states the
following:
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. . .
“dependent child”, in respect of a
parent, means a child who
(a) has
one of the following relationships with the parent, namely,
(i) is the
biological child of the parent, if the child has not been adopted by a person
other than the spouse or common-law partner of the parent, or
(ii) is the
adopted child of the parent; and
(b) is
in one of the following situations of dependency, namely,
(i) is less than
22 years of age and not a spouse or common-law partner,
(ii) has
depended substantially on the financial support of the parent since before
the age of 22 — or if the child became a spouse or common-law partner before
the age of 22, since becoming a spouse or common-law partner — and, since
before the age of 22 or since becoming a spouse or common-law partner, as the
case may be, has been a student
(A)
continuously enrolled in and attending a post-secondary institution that is
accredited by the relevant government authority, and
(B) actively
pursuing a course of academic, professional or vocational training on a
full-time basis, or
(iii) is 22
years of age or older and has depended substantially on the financial support
of the parent since before the age of 22 and is unable to be financially
self-supporting due to a physical or mental condition.
. . .
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[…]
« enfant à charge » L’enfant qui:
a) d’une part, par rapport à l’un ou l’autre de ses parents:
(i) soit en
est l’enfant biologique et n’a pas été adopté par une personne autre que son
époux ou conjoint de fait,
(ii) soit en
est l’enfant adoptif;
b) d’autre part, remplit l’une des conditions suivantes :
(i) il est
âgé de moins de vingt-deux ans et n’est pas un époux ou conjoint de fait,
(ii) il est
un étudiant âgé qui n’a pas cessé de dépendre, pour l’essentiel, du soutien
financier de l’un ou l’autre de ses parents à compter du moment où il a
atteint l’âge de vingt-deux ans ou est devenu, avant cet âge, un époux ou
conjoint de fait et qui, à la fois :
(A) n’a pas
cessé d’être inscrit à un établissement d’enseignement postsecondaire
accrédité par les autorités gouvernementales compétentes et de fréquenter
celui-ci,
(B) y suit
activement à temps plein des cours de formation générale, théorique ou
professionnelle,
(iii) il est
âgé de vingt-deux ans ou plus, n’a pas cessé de dépendre, pour l’essentiel,
du soutien financier de l’un ou l’autre de ses parents à compter du moment où
il a atteint l’âge de vingt-deux ans et ne peut subvenir à ses besoins du
fait de son état physique ou mental.
[…]
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IV. Issues
and standard of review
A. Issues
[6]
This application for
judicial review raises the following two questions:
•
Did the visa officer
err by finding that the applicants were not dependent children within the
meaning of section 2 of the IRPR?
•
Did the visa officer
breach procedural fairness by failing to give adequate reasons for his decision
and failing to provide the applicants with the opportunity to respond to his
concerns?
B. Standard
of Review
[7]
The applicable standard of
review for the first question is that of reasonableness (see Nawfal v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 464 at paras 13-15 and
Miao v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1288 at
para 12 [Miao]). The applicable standard of review for the question of
the adequacy of reasons is reasonableness (see Sithamparanathan v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 679 at para 15). Lastly,
the applicable standard of review for the issue of whether the visa officer
should have given Lina and Hanane Rahal the opportunity to respond to his
concerns is a question of procedural fairness and the is reviewable on the
standard of correctness (Miao, supra, at para 13).
V. Analysis
•
Did the visa officer
err by finding that the applicants were not dependent children within the
meaning of section 2 of the IRPR?
[8]
In light of the reasonableness
review, the Court must determine whether the officer's decision to exclude the
applicants from their parents' permanent residence application, finding that
they were not dependent children, falls within the "range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the
law" (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9 at para 47).
[9]
In a letter dated January 4,
2013, the officer notified Lina and Hanane Rahal's
parents that their children would be excluded from their application for
permanent residence since they did not meet the definition of "dependent
child". According to the notes in the Computer Assisted Immigration
Processing System [CAIPS], the officer found that the evidence submitted was
insufficient to show that the applicants continuously pursued their studies
after they turned 22.
[10]
On January 22, 2013, through their counsel, the
applicants wrote to the visa officer asking him to reconsider his January 4,
2013, decision. They also returned academic transcripts that they claim had
been sent on November 30, 2012. According to the note in the CAIPS, the documents
were the same ones the officer had analyzed before making his decision.
[11]
On March 8, 2013, a CAIPS note indicates that
new documents were received but the decision to exclude the applicants was
maintained, because they had not been full-time students since they turned 22.
This note certifies that the new documents did not change the officer's finding
that the evidence submitted was insufficient to prove that the applicants had
continued their studies on a continuous full-time basis after they turned 22.
[12]
That same day, an email was sent to the
applicants' parents to explain that their children did not meet the definition
of dependent children and the evidence submitted in support of their
application was insufficient. The email stated:
[translation]
Dear Sir, Madam, you
included Lina and Hanane as dependent children in your permanent residence
application. In accordance with section 2 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Regulations, a dependent child is a child who...
The documents
submitted on February 7, 2013, do not allow for the finding that Lina and
Hanane were continuous full-time students after they turned 22.
[13]
The applicants claim that the documents produced
establish that they were continuous full-time students after they turned 22.
[14]
The respondent objects to the production of
Exhibits A-12 and A-17 on the ground that they were produced after the visa
officer's decision, even though they could have been obtained before. The
respondent relies on Sidhu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 260 at para 22 in support of his claim that these documents are
inadmissible and cannot be used to support their application for judicial
review.
[15]
The documents in question are emails the
applicants sent to their university asking whether it is possible to be
registered as part-time students in their respective faculties. These emails
were sent after the application for judicial review was submitted on March 4,
2013. They were not before the decision maker and therefore are inadmissible
under the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106.
Applicant Lina Rahal
[16]
Many certificates were produced by the applicant
Lina Rahal in support of her claim that she was a continuous full-time student
after she turned 22. A first certificate indicated that Lina was registered in
medicine and surgery classes during the 2000-2009 academic years (page 25 of
the applicants' record). However, this certificate alone does not establish
that Lina Rahal was "actively pursuing" courses during each of those
years "on a full-time basis" pursuant to section 2 of the IRPR. Moreover,
upon reading her academic transcripts for this period (pages 35 to 37 of the
applicants' record), no grades appear to have been attributed to her in 2003,
2004 or 2007.
[17]
Moreover, the Court finds that during certain
years, Lina Rahal was registered in 9 courses (as in 2006) whereas in 2005 she
was only taking 3 courses. Because of this, it is uncertain whether her studies
were "active" and "full time".
[18]
There also seem to be issues in 2012 because Lina
Rahal was only registered for one course during this year.
[19]
The applicants note that courses taken but
failed do not appear in the certificates or academic transcripts. However, they
have the burden of proving they met the criteria at section 2 of the IRPR (see Pan
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 838 at paras 27
and 28 [Pan] and Dehar v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 FC 558 at para 30). The evidence submitted by Lina Rahal
does not clearly establish her status as a full-time student during each of the
years, namely 2003, 2004, 2007 and more particularly 2012.
[20]
The evidence produced by the applicant Lina are
not sufficient to show that she indeed studied actively and full time from 2001
to 2012. It is therefore not unreasonable for the officer to find that she did
not submit sufficient evidence to establish that she met the definition of "dependent
child" under the IRPR.
Applicant Hanane Rahal
[21]
Many certificates were produced by the applicant
Hanane Rahal in support of her claim that she was a full-time continuous
student after she turned 22. A first certificate indicates she was registered
from 2000 to 2004 (see page 70 of the applicants' file). This certificate also
indicates that from 2004 to 2005, the registration could not be completed
because the student did not present a copy of her residency permit.
[22]
A second certificate was produced indicating
that the applicant Hanane was registered from 2006 to 2010 (see page 72 of the
applicants' file). According to her first academic transcript she passed one
course in 2001 and 2 in 2002 (see page 84 of the applicants' file). Her second
academic transcript indicates courses taken in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011, but
does not indicate any courses in 2009 (page 86 of the applicants' file).
[23]
The academic transcripts of applicant Hanane
Rahal do not clearly establish her status as a full-time student during 2003,
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009. There are no grades attributed to her for these
years. Moreover, her registration for 2004 to 2005 was not completed because
there was no residency permit.
[24]
The totality of the evidence before the officer
was therefore insufficient to find that the applicant Hanane was studying
actively on a full-time continuous basis during the period of 2003 to 2012. It
is therefore not unreasonable for the office to have found that she did not
meet the definition of dependent child under the IRPR.
[25]
The applicants did not submit any evidence to
establish that the officer assessed their situation incorrectly or
inappropriately. They claim that their certificates and academic transcripts confirm
their full-time continuous studies, whereas the documents have no entries for
certain years. Considering the gaps in the evidence submitted by the
applicants, the Court must find that the officer did not err and his finding
that they did not meet the definition of "dependent child" under the
IRPR seems reasonable to us.
•
Did the visa officer
breach procedural fairness by failing to give adequate reasons for his decision
and failing to provide the applicants with the opportunity to respond to his
concerns?
Adequacy of reasons
[26]
The applicants allege that the officer did not
provide adequate explanations to justify the refusal and he neglected or
refused to answer their requests for explanations. They claim that [translation]: "even after a joint
reading of the refusal letter and the CAIPS notes, we are unable to determine
which evidence the visa officer considered nor could we determine which burden
of proof he applied."
[27]
They also claim they sent a new document that
was allegedly received on March 8, 2013, but they do not know whether the
officer considered it because the CAIPS note only indicates that the officer
maintains the decision to exclude them because the documents do not allow for
them to be considered full-time students after they turned 22.
[28]
The respondent claims that the visa officer's
decision is adequately justified and the obligation for fairness is minimal in
visa matters. He claims that the reasons in the January 4, 2013, letter,
completed by CAIPS notes, explain why the applicants do not meet the definition
of "dependent child". Indeed, these notes indicate that the evidence
was insufficient to determine they were full-time students after they turned 22.
[29]
The Court must restate that the burden of
establishing full-time student status is on the applicants. They had to produce
all the evidence required to do this. It was therefore their responsibility to
bring probative evidence for each year of study. Their academic transcripts do
not cover each of the years in question in order to meet the definition of
"dependent child" under the IRPR.
[30]
In his reasons, the officer claims that the
evidence submitted does not establish their status as full-time continuous
students. They essentially sent the same incomplete documents while noting that
their university does not mention failed courses in the academic transcripts.
In these circumstances, the officer's decision is within the range of possible
outcomes. The Supreme Court of Canada teaches us, at paragraph 18 of Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador, 2011 SCC 62, that
the reviewing court must ask whether "when read in light of the evidence
before it and the nature of its statutory task, the Tribunal's reasons
adequately explain the bases of its decision." This is true in the present
case.
Opportunity to respond to officer's concerns
[31]
The applicants claim that the officer did not
give them the opportunity to respond to his concerns. They note that if he had
doubts, he was obligated to provide them the opportunity to address his
concerns and answer his questions. The applicants claim that in such
circumstances, the officer should have met with them in an interview. The case
law has clearly addressed the issue of whether a visa applicant may rely on the
right to have an interview in similar circumstances:
... there is no entitlement to a personal interview if the application
is ambiguous or supporting material is not included (Silva v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007
FC 733, at paragraph 20) (see Pan supra
at para 27).
[32]
The applicants also claim that the officer did
not tell them what documents to submit.
[33]
The respondent refutes these claims, stating
that procedural fairness does not create such an obligation (Zeeshan v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 248 at para 46 and
Kamchibekov v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC
1411 at para 26). The Court notes, however, that the officer wrote to express
his reservations and specify that he was looking for original complete
transcripts and not mere attestations of studies, and indicated the relevant
years (see officer's November 2, 2012, letter).
[34]
This Court agrees with the respondent's
position. The CAIPS notes show that the applicants had the opportunity to
submit additional evidence after the officer informed them of the deficiencies
in the file.
[35]
Pan, supra,
reminds us that it is not the officer's responsibility to clarify a deficient application
(see para 28). In this case, the applicants failed to meet their obligation and
submit a complete, convincing application that is unambiguous (Obeta v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1542 at paras
25-26).
[36]
For these reasons, the applicants' application
for judicial review is dismissed.