Date: 20080619
Docket: IMM-2182-07
Citation: 2008 FC 761
Ottawa, Ontario, June 19,
2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
BETWEEN:
RAHIMEEN
FARIDI
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of the decision of a Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (CIC) Officer, dated May 29, 2007 wherein Mr. Rahimeen Faridi, (the
Applicant) was found to be inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1) (f)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27 (the “Act”),
for being a member of a terrorist organization, the Mohajir Quami Movement
(Altaf faction) (MQM-A or MQM).
1 Facts
[2]
The
Applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who came to Canada on April 23,
1996 and made a refugee claim based upon his membership and activities in MQM-A.
He was found to be a Convention refugee on December 18, 1996.
[3]
On
March 10, 1997, he applied for permanent residence in Canada. The
application was approved in principle on March 24, 1997 and referred to the
office of CIC, where it was assigned to a CIC Officer on December 8, 2006.
[4]
The
Applicant declared having joined the MQM-A in September 1991 and remained an
active member until he left Pakistan in 1996. In Canada, he continued
to support the organization providing $5 to $10 contributions on an occasional
basis. He also declared having participated in the Montreal and Calgary chapters of
the MQM-A in Canada. However, he
has two jobs driving a taxi and running a Pizza place, which prevent him from
being more involved in the MQM-A activities in Canada.
[5]
In
a one page letter dated February 27, 2007, the CIC Officer informed Mr. Faridi
that information available suggests that his application for permanent residence
may have to be refused as it appears that he may be a member of an inadmissible
class under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act, on the basis of his
membership in the MQM between 1990-2000. Before rendering a final decision, the
CIC Officer invited the Applicant to make representations and address CIC’s
concerns.
[6]
On
March 20, 2007, Counsel for the Applicant replied to the correspondence of
February 27, 2007 and objected to the cursory nature of the letter, which did
not provide an adequate basis or any analysis for the conclusion that the MQM
is a terrorist organization. It is the reply to Counsel’s letter, dated May
29, 2007, which forms the final decision and the object this application for
judicial review.
II Impugned
decision
[7]
Unlike
the cursory notice of February 27, 2007, the CIC Officer’s final decision is a
9-page document providing detailed reasons for its analysis and conclusions. Of
note, the CIC Officer finds as follows:
i.
With
respect to MQM-A activities, the CIC Officer relied on the definition of
terrorism provided in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at paragraphs 93 to 98 where paragraph 98 states as follows:
[. . .] "terrorism" .
. . includes any "act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to
a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities
in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature
or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act".
ii. The
documentary evidence indicates that the MQM-A committed acts of violence
against civilian population, including other political groups, police
constables and army officers, during the period the Applicant was its member
i.e., between 1991 and 1996.
iii.The
MQM-A is described in several reliable sources as a group that resorts to
violence, torture and murder. Its violent activities are well documented in a
variety of national, regional and international publications, including
UNHCR/US Department of Homeland Security, Amnesty International, Asiaweek
magazine and the South Asia Terrorist Portal. To cite but some of the many
examples highlighted in the CIC Officer’s decision:
·
In the mid
1990s, the MQM-A was heavily involved in the widespread violence that wracked
Pakistan’s southern Sindh province, particularly Karachi, the port city that is the country’s
commercial capital. … In 1994, fighting among MQM factions and between the MQM
and Sindhi nationalist groups brought almost daily killings in Karachi. By July 1995, the rate of
political killings in the port city reached an average of ten per day, and by
the end of that year more than 1, 800 had been killed . …The MQM-A allegedly
raises funds through extortion, narcotics smuggling, and other criminal
activities. In addition, Mohajirs in Pakistan
and overseas provide funds to the MQM-A through charitable foundations.
[Source: UNHCR/US Department of Homeland Security, “Pakistan: Information on Mohajir/Muttahida Qaumi
Movement – Altaf (MQM-A). February 9, 2004.]
·
It was the
events of May 18, 1995 that pushed Karachi
over the edge. Shortly after dawn in District Central’s Nazimabad quarter, a
group of MQM gunmen ambushed a patrol of paramilitary Rangers, killing two and
wounding six… Repeated strikes – and the violence that inevitably attended them
– were to become the MQM’s weapon of choice. [Source: Asiaweek magazine, May
31, 1996.]
·
The mid nineties
in urban Sindh was marked by consistent strike calls from the MQM which
included in announcement in July 1995 that weekly strikes on Fridays and
Saturdays would be observed. Most MQM strikes were accompanied by violence
leaving scores dead in their wake. [Source: Muttahida Quomi Mahaz, Terrorist
Group of Pakistan, South Asian Terrorist
Portal.]
·
Despite
protestation by MQM leader Altaf Hussain that the MQM does not subscribe to
violence, there is overwhelming evidence and a consensus among observers in Karachi that some MQM party members
have used violent means to further their political ends. During the period
when the MQM held office, Amnesty International obtained testimonies from
members of the PPP and smaller Sindh parties that their members had been
tortured and killed in the custody of MQM-A. …Torture cells allegedly
maintained by the MQM-A were discovered in which party members were alleged to
have tortured and sometimes killed dissidents and members of other parties. [Source:
Amnesty International, “Pakistan: Human rights crisis in Karachi,” February 1996.]
iv.
Documentary
evidence also speaks of the MQM intent to intimidate reporters and journalists
through threatening statements and killings. For instance:
·
[. . .] On
4 December 1994, Muhammad Slahudding, editor of the Urdu weekly Takbeer
was shot dead in his car outside his office in Karachi. He was highly critical of the policies
of the MGM which reportedly led to his office being ransacked and his house
being set on fire in late 1991, allegedly by MQM-A activists. [Source: Amnesty
International, “Pakistan: Human rights crisis in Karachi,” February 1996.]
v.
The IRB
Issue Paper on the MQM activities in 1995 and 1996 provides numerous example of
human rights abuse by the MQM, which involved violence against security forces,
party dissidents, political opponents and the press, violence against other
ethnic groups and abuses of ordinary citizens, even mohajirs. It also describes
in detail the MQM’s involvement in extortion, citing among its sources the
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
[8]
The
final decision was made on the basis of these documented reliable sources and
the Applicant’s self declaration that he joined the organization voluntarily
and was residing in Karachi during the period of the documented atrocities
perpetrated by the MQM-A. He not only followed the goals of the organization
but was also an active member who was appointed a Vice-Officer in charge of a
35-member unit No. 184. While there is no evidence to show that the Applicant
participated personally in any of the violent activities, his engagement was
limited to office work because he could not walk properly due to childhood
polio, which affected his right leg. He thus provided liaison to the members.
Moreover, the CIC Officer found that he did not quit his membership after he left
Pakistan and was
associated with the MQM following his arrival in Canada.
[9]
Finally,
based on the totality of this trustworthy and conclusive evidence, the CIC
Officer concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the MQM-A
is an organization that has engaged in terrorism when the applicant was its
member. As a result, he was inadmissible to Canada. Consequently,
his application for permanent residence was refused pursuant to paragraph 34
(1)(f) of the Act.
III Relevant
legislation
[10]
The
legal framework for determining the inadmissibility of permanent residents or
foreign nationals on security grounds is set out in section 34 of the Act. One
of these factors is membership in a terrorist organization as stipulated in
paragraph 34(1)(f) below:
Security
34.
(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security
grounds for
(a)
engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada;
(b)
engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government;
(c)
engaging in terrorism;
[.
. .]
(f)
being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to
believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph
(a), (b) or (c).
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Sécurité
34.
(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour raison de sécurité les faits
suivants :
a)
être l’auteur d’actes d’espionnage ou se livrer à la subversion contre toute
institution démocratique, au sens où cette expression s’entend au Canada;
b)
être l’instigateur ou l’auteur d’actes visant au renversement d’un
gouvernement par la force;
c)
se livrer au terrorisme;
[.
. .]
f)
être membre d’une organisation dont il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire
qu’elle est, a été ou sera l’auteur d’un acte visé aux alinéas a), b) ou c).
|
IV Issue
[11]
The
single issue to be determined is whether the CIC Officer erred in fact or in
law in concluding that the Applicant was inadmissible to Canada on security grounds.
[12]
For the
reasons set out below, I have concluded that the CIC Officer did not err in
fact or in law; as a result, the application will be dismissed.
V. Procedural Matter
[13]
Prior
to the hearing of this matter on June 18, 2008, the Minister brought a motion
for an order pursuant to section 87 of the Act, seeking a declaration
that he was not required to disclose secret information considered by the CIC
Officer in arriving at the decision of May 29, 2007. Following an in camera
ex parte hearing on April 2, 2008, and in light of the Applicant’s decision
not to make representations, this Court ordered on April 3, 2008 the disclosure
of paragraph 5 of page 204 of the certified tribunal record, as this
information will not be injurious to national security or endanger the safety
of any person, within the meaning of subsection 83(1). However, the remainder
of the section 87 application was granted, permitting thereby that the secret
information considered by the CIC Officer shall not be disclosed to the Applicant
because to do so would be injurious to the national security of Canada or endanger the safety
of any person.
[14]
Having
reviewed the public Tribunal’s Record and submissions of Counsel, the Court
renders the present decision solely on the public information.
VI. Standard of Review
[15]
At
the outset, the Supreme Court of Canada in its recent decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9,
observes that the court reviewing administrative decisions must first determine
whether there is prior jurisprudence that has addressed the applicable standard
of review and if so, it is to rely on such findings; keeping in mind the
changes it has set out by collapsing the two reasonableness standards into one
standard of reasonableness. [See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraphs 45, 47,
51, 53 and 62.]
[16]
In
my view, there is prior jurisprudence from the Federal Court of Appeal amply
followed by this Court that establishes the applicable standard of review.
Where it is to be determined whether an organization is one described in paragraph
34(1)(a), (b), or (c) of the Act, and whether one is a member of such an
organization (paragraph 34(1)(f)), the applicable standard of review is reasonableness.
See the analysis of Mr. Justice Rothstein, then of the Federal Court of Appeal
in Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 3
F.C.R. 511, and the subsequent analyses by me and my colleagues in Kanendra
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 1156 at paragraph 12; Jalil
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. No. 320,
at paragraph 19; Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2004] F.C.J. No. 1430 at 13; and Naeem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2007 FC 123, at paragraph 40.
[17]
To
succeed when applying the standard of reasonableness in this case, the
Applicant must satisfy the Court that the process of articulating the reasons
and the CIC Officer’s conclusions were not justifiable or transparent given the
evidence before it. In other words, as Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph 47
observes, the decision must fall “within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
VII Analysis
[18]
Counsel
for the Applicant submits that the CIC Officer failed to properly consider the
law and the facts. Notably, it is submitted that the CIC Officer failed to
follow the two step process set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugesera
v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2005 SCC 40. First, the CIC
Officer failed to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the
MQM-A committed the acts of violence attributed to it. Second, the CIC Officer
failed to determine whether these alleged acts constitute terrorist acts. As a
result, the Applicant asks that the decision be set aside and the status of
permanent resident be conferred upon him.
[19]
In
support of this view, Counsel for the Applicant states that the MQM-A is not a
terrorist organization. Rather, it is a legal political party in Pakistan, which had never
engaged in acts of terrorism, although individual members may have engaged in
acts of terrorism. At the hearing, Counsel for the Applicant argued that the
MQM-A committed political acts of violence in response to the political situation
existing in Pakistan. These political acts
were not acts of terrorism, it is submitted.
[20]
In
addition, the Applicant was in hiding most of the time during the violent
activities and was unable to participate in them because of his medical
condition. Moreover, the evidence shows that there was general political
violence in Pakistan and thus it cannot be
concluded that the MQM-A engaged in violence as it was also not part of its
objectives.
[21]
Finally,
the Applicant alleges that the CIC Officer relied on evidence by Amnesty
International but ignored evidence that supported the Applicant’s position. In
particular, Counsel for the Applicant makes reference to testimonial given at
an Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) hearing by Dr. Gowher Rizvi, Director,
Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation of Harvard University,
an expert on South Asian politics, security and the economy. The CIC Officer
also ignored the evidence by Dr. Lisa Given, Associate in the school of library
and information studies, University of Alberta.
[22]
After
a careful review of the certified tribunal record, the submissions of the
parties and the decision, I cannot find that the decision of the CIC Officer
was unreasonable or based on evidence that was not before it. In particular,
the decision is clear, outlining in detail the definition of terrorism as
stipulated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s national security jurisprudence.
The CIC Officer was meticulous to explain the definition of terrorism, adopting
the two-step process in Mugesera, above, before going on to determine
whether the documented violent activities imputed to the MQM-A fit this
definition. Moreover, the applicable standard of proof was clearly enunciated
before the rationale for the decision was spelled out in detail.
[23]
In
my view, the submissions of Counsel for the Applicant are without foundation.
The decision is not vague nor does it overlook the evidence that supports the
Applicant’s position. What is more, Counsel for the Applicant makes reference to
testimonials made by experts at an IRB hearing “a few months before” without
providing exact citation or copies of said testimonials for the consideration
of the CIC Officer. The Applicant’s affidavit makes no mention whether these
testimonials were transcribed and presented to the CIC Officer before rendering
the final decision and these are not included in the list of documents before
the CIC Officer. While it is trite law that a CIC Officer is not required to refer
to every document considered before reaching a final decision, such an officer certainly
cannot be faulted for ignoring testimonials that were not properly before it.
[24]
The
evidence shows that the Applicant had consistently indicated that he had joined
the MQM voluntarily in 1991, that he was aware of its policies and political
ideology, which he actively supported. The CIC Officer carefully reviewed his
membership, examined the documented activities of the organization and applied
these to the relevant definitions of the Act and the jurisprudence. As
such, I can find no element in the decision that would put it outside the range
of reasonable options based both on the facts before the officer and the law,
including both the Act and the applicable jurisprudence. For these
reason the application shall be dismissed; rendering the remedy sought moot.
[25]
In
response to the argument that the political climate in Pakistan and the use of
political acts of violence not being part of their objectives or acts of
terrorism or, I agree with my colleague Tremblay-Lamer J in Daud v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 701, when she wrote at
paragraphs 15 and 19:
[15]
The applicant submits that the officer could not conclude that MQM-A engaged in
violence because it did not form part of the organization’s objectives. I
disagree. This determination is a factual one, based on the documentary
evidence which involves not only the statements of the leadership or an
organization’s members but also their actions. The analysis does not lend
itself well to a simple tally of members who openly support violent acts;
however, at some point, the magnitude and frequency of violent tactics employed
by the organization in question will make it difficult to classify the
perpetrators as merely rogue members acting outside the will of the group.
[.
. .]
[19]
According to the applicant, the officer misconstrued the evidence which showed
general political violence in Pakistan by all political parties. However, in
my view, the existence of general violence does not preclude a determination
that an organization engages in terrorism. The existence of generalized
violence is part of the context within which the officer conducts his analysis,
but is not dispositive of the end determination. Indeed, terrorist acts are
committed during an array of country conditions ranging from periods of
relative peace to those of widespread strife and conflict.
[26]
Although
invited to do so, the parties declined to submit questions for certification.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES THAT:
-
The
application for judicial review is dismissed;
- No questions
will be certified.
“Simon
Noël”
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-2182-07
STYLE OF CAUSE: RAHIMEEN
FARIDI
v.
THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF
HEARING,
BY VIDEO
CONFERENCE: OTTAWA, ONTARIO
CALGARY, ALBERTA
DATE OF
HEARING: JUNE
18, 2008
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S. NOËL
DATED:
APPEARANCES:
MR. BIRJINDER
P.S. MANGAT
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
MS. CAMILLE N.
AUDAIN
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
MANGAT LAW OFFICE
CALGARY, ALBERTA
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
MR. JOHN H.
SIMS
DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA
EDMONTON, ALBERTA
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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