Date: 20080605
Dockets: IMM-2342-07
IMM-2339-07
Citation: 2008 FC 710
Toronto, Ontario, June 5,
2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Maurice E. Lagacé
BETWEEN:
GURBHAGWANT SINGH KHAKH
PREETKIRAN KHAKH
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
case concerns two applications for judicial review heard together pursuant to
an Order of this Court. The first application, docket IMM-2342-07, concerns an
application for judicial review of a decision of the Program Manager at the
Canadian High Commission in New Delhi, India dated May 25, 2007, which refuses
the applicants’ request for authorization to return to Canada. The second
application, docket IMM-2339-07, concerns an application for judicial review of
a decision of visa officer Cinthia Roberge, dated May 25, 2007, which refuses
the applicants’ application for permanent residence in Canada. The decision in docket
IMM-2339-07 depends entirely on the fact that the applicants did not receive
authorization to return to Canada as required by subsection 52(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act).
I. Facts
[2]
Both
citizens of India, the principal applicant, Gurbhagwant Singh Khakh, and his
wife, Preetkiran Khakh, arrived in Canada illegally on December 10, 2003 after
three failed attempts to obtain Canadian visitors visas.
[3]
In
January 2004, the applicants filed a claim for refugee protection on the basis
that they were being extorted by local authorities in India. That claim
was dismissed on November 5, 2004 when the Refugee Protection Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board (the RPD) concluded that the applicants possessed
an internal flight alternative within India. An application for
leave and judicial review of that decision was dismissed by this Court on
February 22, 2005.
[4]
On
July 23, 2005, the applicants applied for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA)
pursuant to section 112 of the IRPA. On the advice of counsel, the applicants
withdrew their PRRA application on November 24, 2005. On March 12, 2006, the
applicants left Canada in compliance with a removal order.
[5]
Prior
to leaving Canada, the
applicants explored their immigration options and applied as provincial
nominees under the Provincial Nominee Program of Prince Edward Island. Having
been accepted as provincial nominees, the applicants applied for permanent
residence in Canada. Their
applications were received at the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi on September
27, 2005. However, due to the fact that they had previously been subject to an
enforced removal order, the applicants’ permanent residence application could
not be processed unless they first obtained authorization to return to Canada
pursuant to subsection 52(1) of the Act.
[6]
On
November 30, 2006, the principal applicant was convoked to an interview at the
Canadian High Commission in New Delhi to review his
eligibility as a provincial nominee. On April 19, 2007, the applicants were
convoked to a second interview at the Canadian High Commission, which was designed
to address their admissibility to Canada and whether they should
be granted authorization to return under subsection 52(1) of the Act. Both
interviews were conducted by the same visa officer (the VO).
[7]
On
May 17, 2007, the VO recommended that the Immigration Program Manager (the IPM)
refuse the applicants’ request for authorization to return to Canada. The recommendation
of the VO stated:
The Principal Applicant bears the onus of
satisfying me that the compelling reasons present in his individual
circumstances are sufficient to warrant an exemption, which I was not. As such,
I recommend refusal of [authorization to return to Canada] under the Immigration Program Managers
delegated authority.
[8]
On
May 25, 2007, the IPM in the exercise of his delegated authority concludes that
the applicants should not be granted authorization to return to Canada. This
decision is impugned by the applicants’ judicial review application in docket
IMM-2342-07.
[9]
Also
on May 25, 2007, relying on the fact that the applicants had not received
authorization to return to Canada, the VO refused their application for
permanent residence in Canada. The VO’s decision is impugned by the
applicants’ judicial review application in docket IMM-2339-07.
II. Issues
[10]
The
applicants raise three issues for consideration, which the Court rephrases as
follows:
1. Did the IPM breach
the rules of fairness or otherwise err in basing his decision on the visa
officer’s recommendation, which contains false credibility findings premised on
misconstrued evidence;
2. Did the IPM
breach the rules of fairness in relying on extrinsic evidence and failing to
advise the applicants of the case to be met; and
3. Was the visa
officer’s decision to refuse the applicants’ permanent residence application
unreasonable on the circumstances of this case?
[11]
Given
that the visa officer’s decision depends entirely of the IPM’s refusal to grant
the applicants authorization to return, the Court’s conclusion on the third
issue will necessarily depend upon its conclusion regarding the first two
issues.
III. Standard of Review
[12]
Issues
of natural justice and procedural fairness are not governed by the pragmatic
and functional approach to judicial review. Such matters are questions of law
subject to the standard of correctness. In such cases, the Court must “examine
the specific circumstances of the case and determine whether the [decision
maker] in question adhered to the rules of natural justice and procedural
fairness” (Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 16, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 168 at
paragraph 15). In the event that a breach is found, no deference is due and the
decision will be set aside (Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney
General),
2005 FCA 404, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 392).
[13]
The
majority of the Supreme Court held in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, that judicial reviews should be limited to two standards:
correctness for legal questions outside of the enabling statute of the tribunal
and reasonableness for all other questions. The Court also noted that the
analysis of the appropriate standard of review need not by undertaken where
courts have arrived at consensus in similar cases.
[14]
The
authority granted to the IPM is contained in subsection 52(1) of the Act,
which states:
|
52. (1) If a removal order has been enforced,
the foreign national shall not return to Canada,
unless authorized by an officer or in other prescribed circumstances.
|
52. (1) L’exécution de la mesure de renvoi
emporte interdiction de revenir au Canada, sauf autorisation de l’agent ou
dans les autres cas prévus par règlement.
|
This authority shall therefore be
reviewed on a standard of reasonableness (formally reasonableness simpliciter as
decided in Sahakyan
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, 2004 FC 1542, 267 F.T.R. 126, at paragraph 34).
IV. Relevant Legislation
[15]
Failed
refugee claimants such as the applicants are subject to removal from Canada once their
claim has been finally determined. Section 223 of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2002-227 (the Regulations) outlines
three types of removal orders, namely,
departure orders, exclusion orders and deportation orders.
[16]
Under
subsection 224(2) of the Regulations, a foreign national who is issued a
departure order must leave Canada within 30 days of the order becoming
enforceable. Failure to do so results in the departure order becoming a
deportation order.
[17]
This
transformation is significant. Under section 224 (1) of the Regulations, a
foreign national subject to an enforced departure does not need to obtain
authorization under subsection 52(1) of the Act in order to return to Canada. However,
once a departure order becomes an enforceable deportation order, removal from Canada carries
significant consequences. Section 226 of the Regulations, which governs
deportation orders, states that a foreign national subject to an enforced deportation
order cannot return to Canada at any point in the future without first
obtaining written authorization to do so.
[18]
In
the case at bar, the applicants became subject to an enforceable departure
order in February 2005 when their application for leave and judicial review of
their refugee claim was dismissed by this Court. By not leaving Canada within
the 30-day period mandated in subsection 224(2) of the Regulations, the
applicants became subject to a deportation order that was executed when they ultimately
left Canada on March 12,
2006. Accordingly, by operation of subsection 52(1) of the Act and section 226
of the Regulations, the applicants cannot return to Canada without
written authorization.
[19]
The
above-noted relevant provisions of both the Law and the Regulations are
attached at the end of this judgment as Appendix “A”.
V. Analysis
Issue No. 1: Did the
Program Manager breach the rules of fairness or otherwise err in basing his
decision on the visa officer’s recommendation, which contained false
credibility findings premised on misconstrued evidence?
[20]
The
applicants argue that the IPM breached the rules of fairness in failing to give
them an opportunity to respond to the credibility findings made by the VO who
interviewed the applicants regarding their request for authorization to return
to Canada.
[21]
Whether
or not the applicants were treated unfairly in their interview with VO depends
on the extent of the duty of fairness owed to the applicants in the
circumstances of this case. It is clear that the decision to grant an
authorization under subsection 52(1) of the Act is a discretionary administrative
decision. While the duty of procedural fairness applies to discretionary
administrative decisions, its content varies according to the circumstances of
each case (Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817). In Baker, the
Supreme Court outlined a number of factors that must be taken into account when
determining the appropriate level of fairness. These factors include, inter
alia, the importance of the decision to the individual, the nature of the
decision and the process followed, the legitimate expectations of the individual,
the public interest, and the factual context.
[22]
In
addition to those factors, it is important to also to keep in mind the values
underlying the concept of fairness and “that the individual or
individuals affected should have the opportunity to present their case fully
and fairly, and have decisions affecting their rights, interests, or privileges
made using a fair, impartial, and open process, appropriate to the statutory,
institutional, and social context of the decision” (Baker, above, at
paragraph 28).
[23]
In
Akbari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [2006] F.C.J. No.1773,
at Paragraphs 9-11, this Court commented as follows on the
considerations to be made when determining the extent of the duty of fairness as
it relates to decisions under subsection 52(1) of the Act:
¶ 9 The
public interest factor requires that attention be directed to our immigration
laws, to ensuring that non-citizens adhere to them and that officials enforce
them. As noted in [Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2001] 2 F.C.
297 (C.A.)] a decision adversely affecting an individual may engage a lower
content of procedural fairness where prejudice to national security or
international relations is engaged. There do not appear to be issues of that
nature or issues of criminality in this matter.
¶ 10 The factors must be balanced, not in the abstract, but in
the factual context of the particular case. Thus, the level of procedural
fairness required in one case may not be the same as that required in another.
It is not insignificant that some hardship has been imposed in this matter as a
result of the loss of Ms. Akbari’s passport.
¶ 11 In balancing the
factors in the situational context of this matter, I consider the content of
procedural fairness to be near the low end of the spectrum. I do not agree with
Ms. Akbari’s suggestion that an interview was required. Nor is there a
requirement that formal reasons be provided. As in Baker,
I conclude that the notes of the immigration officer may be taken as the
reasons for the decision. That said, I also agree with the respondent that an [authorization
to return to Canada] should not be construed as a mini humanitarian and compassionate
application. However, regard must be had to the various factors that I have
discussed. This requirement necessitates that consideration be given to the
totality of the factual circumstances that are presented to the immigration
officer.
[24]
In
the case at bar, the Court agrees with the respondent that the content of the
duty of fairness falls even lower on the spectrum than in Akbari, above. This is
mainly because of the fact that the IPM’s refusal in the case at bar did not
lead to, or maintain, the break up of the applicants’ immediate family as was
the case in Akbari.
[25]
However,
given that the applicants were granted an interview at the Canadian High
Commission in order to address whether authorization should be granted, the
Court must determine whether they were given an adequate opportunity to respond
to the concerns of the immigration officials before a final decision was
rendered. Accordingly, at a minimum, the applicants in the case at bar were
entitled to be given an opportunity to respond to the concerns of VO that
formed part of her recommendation to the IPM. For the following reasons, this
Court does not believe that such an opportunity was given in this case.
[26]
As
stated in Akbari, above, a decision on whether to grant authorization to
return to Canada should not
be construed as a “mini humanitarian and compassionate application.” Such a
decision should, however, be based on all the circumstances of the case,
including the underlying objectives of the Act. For example, paragraph 3(1)(h)
of the Act states that the legislation must be construed in a manner that
protects the health and safety of Canadians and maintains the security of
Canadian society. However, this objective must be balanced with the other
objectives of the Act, which include permitting Canada to pursue the social,
cultural, and economic benefits of immigration, enriching and strengthening our
social and cultural fabric, and promoting the successful integration of
permanent residents into Canada.
[27]
In
the case at bar, the recommendation of the VO focuses primarily on the
applicants’ immigration history, particularly on the fact that they entered Canada illegally in
2003 and failed to leave in a timely manner after a final decision was rendered
on their refugee claim. This focus is demonstrated in the notes of the VO who
refers to the applicants’ illegal entry into Canada and failure
to comply with Canadian immigration law as reasons for her negative
recommendation. Further, such rationale is then relied on by the IPM, who
states in his decision that the applicants “committed multiple violations of
Canadian Law, knowing that [their] behaviour was illegal.”
[28]
The
recommendation of VO is also premised on the nature of the applicants’ refugee
claim, which she finds to have “no credible basis” and amounting to an abuse of
Canada’s refugee
system. The applicants, however, argue that such findings were premised on the VO’s
misconstruction of the evidence before her and were, accordingly, unreasonable.
The applicants further argue that the VO failed to comply with the duty of
fairness in reaching such conclusions without first informing them of her concerns
and providing them with an opportunity to respond.
[29]
Having
reviewed the evidence, the Court finds that the conclusion of The VO that the
applicants’ refugee claim had “no credible basis” and was an abuse of Canada’s refugee
system was an unreasonable conclusion on the evidence. While the VO’s decision
seems to be premised on the fact that the applicants’ illegally entered Canada
in 2003, with an express intention of immigrating, her conclusion is in no way
supported by the reasons of the IPM, which does not base its decision on the
applicants’ credibility, but rather on the existence of an internal flight
alternative in India, as he states in his decision that :
The claimants have sought protection in
the country of Canada; however, I find that
protection was available to them in their own country of India. Assuming, without making a finding to
that effect, that the brutal mistreatment at the hands of the local Punjabi
police unfolded as alleged, instead of fleeing to Canada for protection, I am
of the view the claimants could have found respite within India. Delhi, Mumbai
and Calcutta, are, in my opinion, viable
[internal flight alternative] areas for the claimants.
[30]
Accordingly,
it was unreasonable for the VO to find that the applicants’ refugee claim had
no credible basis. The applicants arrived in Canada in 2003, and
forwarded what they believed was a well-founded claim for refugee protection on
account of extortion threats from local authorities in India. In
concluding that the applicants were not Convention refugees or persons in need
of protection, the Board based its decision not on the credibility of the
applicants, but on the issue of state protection in India, i.e.,
the applicants would have been able to receive adequate state protection by
relocating to another area within the country. On this basis, there was no
evidence before the visa officer on which to conclude that the applicants’
refugee claim was anything less than genuine. Accordingly, the applicants had
the right under the Law to seek refugee protection in Canada and it was
not open to the VO to comment on the genuineness of their claim. As Mr. Justice
Harrington stated in Sahakyan
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1542, 267 F.T.R. 126,, at
paragraph 22:
... No matter how [the applicant] got here,
no matter how he may have pitched his chance of success, no matter that he
wanted to join his brother, no matter his economic motives, he had the right
under Part 2 of the Act to seek refugee protection in Canada. As the
Regulations make clear, the fact that his application was not successful has no
bearing on his right to seek permanent residence as an immigrant. All he did
was run afoul of the timing requirements governing his departure from Canada, and yet he was not
asked the reasons for that delay. [Emphasis added]
[31]
The
respondent argues that any error alleged by the applicants regarding the
genuineness of their refugee claim is immaterial to the reasonableness of the IPM’s
decision since such findings did not form the basis of that decision. However,
the Court finds on the evidence that while the IPM’s decision was not directly
based on the view that the applicants abused Canada’s refugee
system, it was based largely on a finding that the applicants committed
“multiple violations” of Canadian immigration law, which, in turn, was informed
by the unreasonable conclusions of the VO.
[32]
In Sahakyan,
above, the Court considered a case quite analogous to the present issue. In
that case, the Court addressed the factors relevant to a decision under
subsection 52(1). In relation to an individual’s immigration history the Court
stated that while such history is not entirely irrelevant to a request for
authorization, it must be considered within the appropriate context – i.e.,
whether that immigration history was relevant to why the applicant remained in
Canada longer than authorized.
[33]
Based
on these considerations, the factors seized upon by the VO in her
recommendation, and by the IPM in his decision, were not relevant to the
applicants’ reasons for leaving Canada after the date in which
they were required to do so. For example, had the applicants left Canada within
the period prescribed in the Regulations, they would have been entitled to return
to Canada in the future notwithstanding the legality of their initial entry in
2003 or the well-fondness of their refugee claim.
[34]
Accordingly,
the IPM’s reliance on the applicants’ illegal entry into Canada in 2003, which along
with their late departure in March 2006 combined to form the “multiple
violations” referred to in the decision, was unreasonable in that no
consideration was given to the applicants’ purpose for illegally entering
Canada in 2003; namely file a claim for refugee protection, which, as stated in
Sahakyan, above, they were entitled to do under the law. While
respecting immigration laws is a legitimate policy consideration in the IPM’s
exercise of discretion, the evidence before this Court establishes that the
applicants’ only true violation was their failure to leave Canada within the
timeframe mandated.
[35]
Moreover,
the Court has trouble finding that the IPM’s decision was made with regard to all
the circumstances of the case and the underlying objectives of Canadian
immigration law. First, while the Program Manager attempted to balance the
economic benefit to Canada of granting the applicants’ request for
authorization, at no point did he consider the applicants’ reasons for not
leaving Canada until March
2006. The applicants state that their late departure is largely due to the fact
that they had trouble renewing their Indian passports. They explain that
despite paying extra fees to have their renewal applications expedited, they could
not secure renewed passports until March 2006, the very same month in which they
left Canada. While
correspondence concerning the applicants’ difficulty in renewing their
passports was recorded in the VO’s notes, at no point in either her
recommendation or the IPM’s decision are such reasons considered within the
context of whether authorization should be granted. Had they advised the
applicants of their concerns they could have obtained more precision on their
late departure.
[36]
Further,
at no time in the IPM’s decision or the VO’s recommendation is any consideration
given to the fact that deportation orders are often applied to those
individuals who have been found inadmissible to Canada on various
grounds including serious criminality, national security, or violations of
human and international rights. Unlike in those situations, the applicants in
the case at bar are not security risks, nor do they possess criminal records.
While they entered Canada illegally, they made a valid, albeit
unsuccessful claim for refugee protection. They now seek to return to Canada as
immigrants, having already been found eligible as provincial nominees. Accordingly,
in the words of Mr. Justice Harrington in Sahakyan, above, their only
violation was to “run afoul of the timing requirements” governing their
departure from Canada. It strikes the Court as unreasonable that the
applicants would be denied authorization to return under such circumstances,
especially considering that no consideration was given to their reasons for not
departing Canada before March
2006.
[37]
Accordingly,
in basing his rejection on factors not relevant to their delayed departure, and
then not further considering the applicants’ reasons for such tardiness, the IPM
erred in his decision. On this basis, the applicants’ application for judicial
review in docket IMM-2342-07 must be allowed.
Issue No. 2: Did the
Program Manager breach the rules of fairness in relying on extrinsic evidence
and failing to advise the applicants of the case to be met?
[38]
In
her recommendation to the IPM, the VO made reference to a document entitled RIL
06-017, which are draft guidelines of overarching principles that are used to
inform on the exercise of discretion under subsection 52(1) of the Act. In
reference to these guidelines, the VO notes:
As per RIL 06-017 guidelines, Section 52 of
the [IRPA] was written, and passed, in order to encourage individuals to comply
with enforceable departure orders. A permanent bar to return to Canada is a serious consequence of
non-compliance. An ARC should not be routinely granted as a way to overcome
this bar, but rather should only be granted in cases where an officer considers
the issuance to be justifiable based on the facts of the case. The onus is on
the applicant to provide reasons to consider the issuance of an ARC given the
circumstances that necessitated the issuance of a removal order. Aside from
meeting eligibility requirements for the issuance of a visa, there must also be
compelling reasons to grant an ARC.
[39]
The
applicants argue that the VO breached the rules of fairness in relying on the
draft guidelines as part of her recommendation without giving the applicants
any notice of their content or even their existence. Accordingly, the
applicants submit that had they known about the existence of the draft
guidelines, they would have made additional submissions explaining how the
considerations outlined therein “worked in the Applicants’ favour.”
[40]
Having
reviewed the draft guidelines, it is clear that they possess a number of
overarching principles that are intended to guide the IPM’s decision on how to
exercise his or her discretionary power under subsection 52(1) of the Act.
These principles are not intended to fetter that discretionary power, nor do
the applicants argue that such was the case here. However, the Court finds that
these principles provide substantial additions to the guidelines that were already
in force within Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s Overseas Processing Manual
OP1 – Procedures, which, at the time, did not address any overarching
principles to be taken into consideration by the IPM when making a decision.
Accordingly, had the draft guidelines been disclosed to the applicants prior to
their interview with the VO, the applicants would have been able to more fully
comprehend the factors being weighed by the IPM concerning whether an
authorization to return was warranted. By failing to disclose their existence
and then relying on them in reaching a negative recommendation, the VO did not
give the applicants adequate knowledge of the case to be met, which breached
their right to fair treatment. This is especially the case given that the draft
guidelines were not publicly available at the time that the applicants were
interviewed in April 2007.
[41]
Accordingly,
the decision of the IPM to deny the applicants’ request for authorization must
also be set aside on these grounds.
Issue No. 3: Was the
visa officer’s decision to refuse the applicant’s application for permanent
residence unreasonable on the circumstances of this case?
[42]
The
applicants argue that the decision of the VO was based solely on the fact that
they did not receive authorization to return to Canada as required
under subsection 52(1) of the Act. The Court agrees. Accordingly, because the
Court already found that the IPM’s decision to no grant the applicants’ request
for authorization was made in error, then the VO was not entitled to rely in
that decision in refusing their application for permanent residence.
[43]
For
these reasons, the Court will allow the applicants’ application for judicial
review in docket IMM-2339-07. A final determination of their permanent
residence application shall be made once a new decision is rendered regarding
whether they are authorized to return to Canada.
[44]
The
Court agrees with the party that there is no question of general interest to
certify.
JUDGMENT
FOR THE
FOREGOING REASONS THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. Allows the
application for judicial review in docket IMM-2342-07, sets aside the decision
of the Program Manager, and refers the matter back to a different individual
for redetermination in accordance with these Reasons; and
2. Allows the
application for judicial review in docket IMM-2339-07, sets aside the decision
of the visa officer denying the applicants’ permanent residence application,
and the matter is sent back to another visa officer for redetermination once a
decision has been rendered on whether the applicants are to be granted
authorization to return to Canada.
“Maurice E. Lagacé”
APPENDIX “A”
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
|
52. (1) If a removal order has been enforced, the foreign national shall not
return to Canada, unless authorized by an officer or in other prescribed circumstances.
|
52. (1)
L’exécution de la mesure de renvoi emporte interdiction de revenir au Canada,
sauf autorisation de l’agent ou dans les autres cas prévus par règlement.
|
Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, S.O.R./2002-227
|
223. There are three
types of removal orders, namely, departure orders, exclusion orders and
deportation orders.
224. (1) An enforced departure order is prescribed as a
circumstance that relieves a foreign national from having to obtain
authorization under subsection 52(1) of the Act in order to return to Canada.
(2) A foreign national
who is issued a departure order must meet the requirements set out in
paragraphs 240(1)(a) to (c) within 30 days after the order
becomes enforceable, failing which the departure order becomes a deportation
order.
(3) If the foreign national is detained
within the 30-day period or the removal order against them is stayed, the
30-day period is suspended until the foreign national’s release or the
removal order becomes enforceable.
[…]
226. (1) For the purposes of subsection 52(1) of the Act, and
subject to subsection (2), a deportation order obliges the foreign national
to obtain a written authorization in order to return to Canada at any time
after the deportation order was enforced.
(2) For the purposes of
subsection 52(1) of the Act, the making of a deportation order against a foreign
national on the basis of inadmissibility under paragraph 42(b) of the
Act is prescribed as a circumstance that relieves the foreign national from
having to obtain an authorization in order to return to Canada.
(3) For the purposes of subsection 52(1)
of the Act, a removal order referred to in paragraph 81(b) of the Act
obliges the foreign national to obtain a written authorization in order to
return to Canada at any time after the removal order was enforced.
|
223. Les
mesures de renvoi sont de trois types : interdiction de séjour,
exclusion, expulsion.
224. (1)
L’exécution d’une mesure d’interdiction de séjour à l’égard d’un étranger est
un cas prévu par règlement qui exonère celui-ci de l’obligation d’obtenir
l’autorisation prévue au paragraphe 52(1) de la Loi pour revenir au Canada.
(2)
L’étranger visé par une mesure d’interdiction de séjour doit satisfaire aux
exigences prévues aux alinéas 240(1)a) à c) au plus tard trente
jours après que la mesure devient exécutoire, à défaut de quoi la mesure
devient une mesure d’expulsion.
(3) Si
l’étranger est détenu au cours de la période de trente jours ou s’il est
sursis à la mesure de renvoi prise à son égard, la période de trente jours
est suspendue jusqu’à sa mise en liberté ou jusqu’au moment où la mesure
redevient exécutoire.
[…]
226. (1) Pour
l’application du paragraphe 52(1) de la Loi, mais sous réserve du paragraphe
(2), la mesure d’expulsion oblige l’étranger à obtenir une autorisation
écrite pour revenir au Canada à quelque moment que ce soit après l’exécution
de la mesure.
(2) Pour
l’application du paragraphe 52(1) de la Loi, le cas de l’étranger visé par
une mesure d’expulsion prise du fait de son interdiction de territoire au
titre de l’alinéa 42b) de la Loi est un cas prévu par règlement qui
dispense celui-ci de l’obligation d’obtenir une autorisation pour revenir au
Canada.
(3) Pour
l’application du paragraphe 52(1) de la Loi, la mesure de renvoi visée à
l’article 81 de la Loi oblige l’étranger à obtenir une autorisation écrite
pour revenir au Canada à quelque moment que ce soit après l’exécution de la
mesure.
|
Email this Content