Date: 20080526
Docket: IMM-4682-07
Citation: 2008
FC 656
Ottawa, Ontario, May
26, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Martineau
BETWEEN:
AHMED ABDUL MUHAMMAD LAKHANI
KARIMA AHMED LAKHANI
AMIN AHMED LAKHANI
KAWISH AHMED LAKHANI
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The
applicants contest the legality of a decision rendered by Patricia Rousseau, a
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) officer, on October 30, 2007, which rejected
the applicants’ PRRA application on the grounds that they would not be subject
to risk of persecution, torture, risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if returned to their country of nationality or habitual
residence.
[2]
The
applicants, Ahmed Abdul Muhammad Lakhani, Karima Ahmed Lakhani, Amin Ahmed
Lakhani and Kawish Ahmed Lakhani, are citizens of Pakistan. They are Ismaili Shia, a minority
within a minority group in Pakistan.
[3]
In August
2001, Mr. and Mrs. Lakhani, together with their two sons, Kawish and Amin,
landed in Canada under a business immigration
category – entrepreneur category.
[4]
They have
been in Canada since that time and have not
returned to Pakistan, nor have they travelled
elsewhere.
[5]
Mr.
Lakhani is 43 years old, Mrs. Lakhani is 36 and their minor sons are 15 and 12,
respectively.
[6]
Not having
met the conditions of landing of entrepreneurs within the two year period
prescribed by the former Immigration Regulations (the current Regulations allow
three years to meet the prescribed conditions), departure orders were made
against them by the Immigration Division, on February 3, 2004.
[7]
The applicants
appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), pursuant to subsection 63(3)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 as
amended (the Act). Their appeal was heard on June 20, 2005.
[8]
The IAD
considered the applicant’s investment of $100,000 into Bensus International, a
company in which Mr. Lakhani was first an employee shortly after his arrival in
Canada. The IAD decided that he did
not make “a significant contribution to the Canadian economy”. Further, the IAD
was of the opinion that neither Mrs. Lakhani’s employment as an assistant
educator, nor the children’s interests warranted granting special relief to the
applicants. Their appeal was dismissed on September 22, 2005.
[9]
The
applicants sought to judicially review the IAD’s decision; however, their
application was dismissed on January 13, 2006.
[10]
In April
2006, the applicants filed an application for permanent residence from within Canada on humanitarian and
compassionate (H&C) grounds.
[11]
At that
time, the applicants also filed their initial PRRA application which was
refused on April 26, 2006.
[12]
Almost
exactly one year later, on April 25, 2007, Mr. and Mrs. Lakhani attended an
interview for their application on H&C grounds. This application was
refused a few days later, on April 30, 2007.
[13]
An
application for leave on the H&C refusal was filed, on September 21, 2007
(Court file: IMM-3872-07).
[14]
A few days
after filing the application for leave of the H&C refusal, the applicants
met with a Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officer, Martin Desmarrais,
to ask for a second PRRA application to be submitted for decision prior to
their departure. The CBSA officer gave the applicants the requisite PRRA forms
and also gave them a departure date of November 18, 2007.
[15]
The
applicants filed their second PRRA application in October 2007.
[16]
On October
31, 2007, the applicants served and filed a motion to stay their removal to Pakistan within the file IMM-3872-07 (the
application for review of the H&C refusal). Leave was denied by this Court
on January 10, 2008.
[17]
On
November 2, 2007, the refusal of the applicants’ second PRRA application was communicated
to the principal male applicant in person, together with reasons for decision,
dated October 30, 2007 (the impugned decision).
[18]
At the
same time, the PRRA officer accorded the applicants a postponement of departure
until January 25, 2008. Accordingly, the applicant postponed the hearing of
the motion to stay removal in the file IMM-3872-07.
[19]
On
November 12, 2007, the applicants filed the present application for leave of
the impugned decision.
[20]
On January
22, 2008, the Court stayed the applicants’ removal until a final decision is
rendered in the application for judicial review of the impugned decision (2008
FC 65).
[21]
Before considering
the merits of the arguments raised in this application, it is worthwhile to highlight,
in brief, the arguments made by the applicants in support of their second PRRA
application.
[22]
The
applicants submitted to the PRRA officer that, because of their religious
minority status, they would face persecution and risk to life and safety. They presented
evidence to prove their Ismaili faith, including letters of identification from
His Highness Prince Aga Khan Imami Ismaili Council; a certified copy of certificate of honour
for Mrs. Lakhani from his Highness Prince Aga Khan Imami Ismailia Association;
a certified copy of a certificate of honour for a teaching program for Mrs.
Lakhani; and, a certified copy of an Aga Khan Council certificate from the
Institute of Computer Studies for Mrs. Lakhani.
[23]
The applicants
indicated that even before coming to Canada,
they had faced the following forms of discrimination:
·
They were
called “Kaafir” by the Sunnis, a derogatory word that means “infidels” as they
do not follow the same customs as Sunnis or other sects of Islam; for instance,
both men and women pray together in the same mosque;
·
“They
(Sunni muslims) always treated me like I was inferior to them because I believe
in the Agakhan as our Ismaili spiritual leader, they would say that Ismailis
are committing … the greatest Sin, and they say Koran is for true Muslims not
for us. The situation… was such that if I/we argued to defend our religion they
could start a fight. So I/we had to keep quiet. I do not want for my children
to be treated like that.”;
·
The
principal male applicant was harassed for money at his business and threatened
that his sons would be kidnapped; and,
·
The female
applicant had to run from someone following her on a street of a neighbourhood
in Karachi where many Ismailis live as it is close to their mosque, when she
was eight months pregnant with her first son, which forced her to never go out alone
on a street again including been called derogatory words by the Sunni majority.
[24]
The
applicants stated that if they were to be returned to Pakistan today, they would face more than
derogatory name calling or extortion of money at their business. Indeed,
according to the country conditions documentation, the courts could not protect
Pakistan’s minorities. The applicants submitted
that this lack of protection is evidenced by the fact that in April 2007, four
armed men stormed into the house of Mr. Lakhani’s mother and forcibly confined
her and members of her family. The armed men threatened the family and stole
their valuable possessions.
[25]
Having examined
the arguments raised by the applicants in support of their second PRRA
application, the PRRA officer rendered the impugned decision.
[26]
In doing
so, she first reviews the immigration history of the applicants. She then identifies
the risks the applicants face stating:
La demanderesse craint, en tant que jeune
femme, d’être victime de viol.
Les demandeurs craignent d’être soumis à
des risques de persécution et à des menaces pour leur vie en raison de leur
appartenance à une minorité religieuse (Ismaili Shia), notamment en étant à
nouveau victimes de vols et de discrimination sociétale.
[27]
The PRRA
officer notes that the applicants had made a previous PRRA application in 2006;
however, she finds:
Les demandeurs expliquent qu’ils ont été
mal conseillés par leur premier représentant. Ils n’auraient donc pas présenté
d’allégations de risque. J’accepte ces explications. Tous les documents présentés
par les demandeurs seront donc considérés comme éléments de preuve au titre de
l’alinéa 113a) de la [Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés].
[28]
Under the
section “Considérations communes relatives à tous les motifs de protection”,
the PRRA officer concludes that the applicants failed to demonstrate that the
State was either unwilling or unable to provide protection. In particular, with
respect to the issue of the female applicant’s risk of rape, the PRRA Officer finds:
La demanderesse allègue qu’étant une
jeune femme elle risquerait le viol à son retour au Pakistan.
Selon la preuve documentaire consultée,
la situation des femmes, de façon générale, au Pakistan n’est pas facile. […]
Les viols et les autres formes de violences sont également fréquents,
spécialement pour celles qui sont détenus par les autorités policières (P-7 et
P-8).
Toutefois, le gouvernement prend des
mesures pour améliorer la situation des femmes […]
Il est vrai que la preuve documentaire
générale indique que le Pakistan est aux prises avec de nombreux problèmes
notamment avec le traitement des minorités et des femmes par les forces
policières. Toutefois, l’arrêt Ward, indique que, sauf dans le cas de
l’effondrement complet de l’appareil étatique, il y a lieu de présumer qu’un
État est capable de protéger ses citoyens. […]
Or, la demanderesse ne soumet aucune
preuve démontrant qu’elle a demandé la protection des autorités de son pays ou
qu’elle n’a pu le faire ou qu’elle ne pourrait recourir è cette protection dans
le futur. Je conclus donc que cette protection est effectivement disponible.
[…]
[29]
In terms of the risks
the applicants face because of
their religious minority status (as Ismaili Shia), the PRRA officer evaluates the evidence in
this manner:
[…] Je suis satisfaite que les demandeurs
appartiennent à cette communauté religieuse.
[…] Malgré une coexistence généralement
pacifique, certains évènements violents sont survenus entre les Chiites et les
Sunnites.
[…] La discrimination sociétale contre
les minorités religieuses est répandue et des incidents violents contre ces
minorités existent. Plusieurs morts sont liées à la violence sectaire. […] On
mentionne également que le gouvernement a pris certaines mesures pour améliorer
le traitement des minorités religieuses […].
Les demandeurs mentionnent certains faits
quant à la détérioration de la situation de leur communauté depuis leur départ.
[…] En avril dernier, quatre hommes armés ont fait irruption chez les membres
de leur famille et les ont volés en les menaçant de mort s’ils parlaient à la
police. […]
Je constate que [l’affidavit de la mère
du demandeur principal] ne fait pas le lien entre cet évènement et le fait que
la famille appartient à une minorité religieuse. Il s’agit d’un évènement
isolé. D’ailleurs, la représentante des demandeurs précise « no-one has ever
broken into the client’s or their family’s home before ». Cet évènement ne
démontre pas à ma satisfaction que les demandeurs sont ciblés comme membres
d’une minorité religieuse.
Les demandeurs ne soumettent aucun
document quant aux menaces et à la fermeture de leur mosquée, le fait que trois
autres familles Ismaili ont été ciblées et ont été victimes de vol ainsi
que la police soit corrompue. Conséquemment, la preuve quant à l’établissement
de ces faits ne me satisfait pas.
D’autre part, le guide du HCR distingue
la discrimination qui résulte en un simple traitement de faveur de celle qui
équivaut à une persécution. La persécution, par effet cumulatif ou à elle seule,
restreint gravement la jouissance par le demandeur de ses droits fondamentaux :
sérieuses restrictions au droit d’exercer un métier ou au droit d’avoir accès
aux établissements d’enseignement et/ou de santé normalement ouvert à tous ou
des mesures économiques imposées qui détruiraient les moyens d’existence d’un
groupe religieux donné. […]
En ce sens, je ne suis pas satisfaite que
la discrimination alléguée (la possibilité d’être volé ainsi que les paroles et
les gestes inappropriés de d’autres membres de communautés religieuses à leur
égard) atteigne le niveau de gravité qu’on attribut à la « persécution ».
[30]
The PRRA
officer rejects the applicants’ PRRA application on the grounds that they had
not shown : « de façon claire et convaincante que la demanderesse ne
pouvait bénéficier de la protection de l’État pakistanais en cas de viol. Ils
n’ont également pas démontré à ma satisfaction qu’ils feraient face à des
risques de persécution ou des menaces à leur vie en tant que membre d’une
minorité religieuse tel que décrits aux articles 96 et 97 de la [Loi sur
l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés] s’ils devaient retourner au
Pakistan. »
[31]
The applicants now
seek to judicially review the impugned decision. They submit that the PRRA
officer committed unreasonable errors in evaluating whether they would be
persecuted or subject to risk to life or safety based on their religion if
returned to Pakistan. The applicants allege that the situation
with respect to sectarian violence in Pakistan has deteriorated since 2004. In
particular, the applicants allege the PRRA officer erred in her analysis of
whether all of the incidents of violations described in the applicants’
evidence and the country conditions, as a whole, in addition to the evidence of
treatment of the specific minority in Pakistan, cumulatively, would constitute
a well-founded fear of persecution should the applicants be returned to
Pakistan. It is further argued that the PRRA officer placed exaggerated
emphasis on the need for repetition and persistence when she stated that “Il
s’agit d’un évènement isolé [...] Cet évènement ne démontre pas à ma satisfaction que les
demandeurs sont ciblés comme membres d’une minorité religieuse [...] ”. By placing too much emphasis on the
need for repetition, the PRRA officer failed to determine the gravity of the
events in question as a fundamental violation of human dignity. A single act of
discrimination or mistreatment may amount to persecution depending on the
circumstances, the severity of the act and the possibility of repetition. The
applicants also submit that the PRRA officer erred in asking for evidence to
corroborate the allegation that their neighbours in Pakistan had been targeted as Shia. Finally, the applicants state
they “filed a mountain of evidence from credible and trustworthy sources that
outlined the situation of the Shia and other minorities in Pakistan in today’s environment” and that the officer ignored this
evidence in her analysis, thereby committing a reviewable error. The applicants
submit that the PRRA officer erred with respect to the availability of state
protection. The applicants seek to have the impugned decision annulled and to
have their PRRA application remitted to a different officer for
redetermination.
[32]
For the following
reasons, this application for judicial review is dismissed.
[33]
Prior jurisprudence
emanating from this Court had established that the standard of review of a PRRA
officer's decision, when considered globally and as a whole, was reasonableness
simpliciter (Figurado v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FC 347, [2005] F.C.J. No. 458 (QL)).
Justice Mosley in Kim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2005 FC
437, [2005] F.C.J. No. 540 (QL) elaborated at para. 19 as follows: “the
appropriate standard of review for questions of fact should generally be patent
unreasonableness, for questions of mixed law and fact, reasonableness simpliciter,
and for questions of law, correctness.”
[34]
Since the parties
filed their submissions, the Supreme Court of Canada released the decision in Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL) (Dunsmuir).
The effect of Dunsmuir is to collapse the two reasonableness standards
into one. It further allows that, where the type of decision being reviewed has
been thoroughly assessed for the applicable standard, subsequent decisions may
rely on that standard. Accordingly, in applying these principles, I find that
the standard of review of a
PRRA officer's findings, except where they concern pure questions of law, are
reviewable on the reasonableness standard: See Erdogu v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 407, [2008] F.C.J. No. 546 (QL) and Aslani
c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de
l'Immigration), 2008 CF
324, [2008] A.C.F. no 390 (QL).
[35]
In Dunsmuir,
above, at para. 47, the Court gave useful instruction on applying the
reasonableness standard. Reasonableness is concerned with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making
process. It is also concerned with “whether the decision falls within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law.” Justification requires that a decision be made with regard to the
evidence before the decision-maker. A decision cannot be a reasonable one if it
is made without regard to the evidence submitted.
[36]
In this instance, I
am of the view that the PRRA officer’s decision was reasonable and based on the
evidence before her. Indeed, a thorough reading of the impugned decision in its
entirety demonstrates that the PRRA officer carefully considered the risks of
return as raised by the applicants. She neither ignored the evidence before
her, nor did she misapply the correct legal tests. While this Court may have
ultimately come to a different conclusion, I am unable to find that the PRRA
officer committed an error warranting this Court’s intervention. In this
regard, I note the applicants’ arguments appear, in essence, to be a general
objection to the PRRA officer’s weighing of the evidence on record.
[37]
With respect to the
issue of the risk of rape to the female applicant were she to be returned to
Pakistan, contrary to what was alleged by the applicants in their written
submissions and orally at the hearing, I am of the view that the impugned
decision took into consideration the seriousness and gravity of the incident
when the female applicant was 8 months pregnant as described above. However,
the PRRA officer emphasized that this incident occurred in 1992 (approximately
9 years before the applicant left Pakistan) finding as follows:
Elle n’aurait pas connu d’autres
évènements semblables. Elle travaillait comme professeur dans une école privée
à son départ du Pakistan en août 2001. La demanderesse n’indique pas avoir
jamais porté plainte à la police.
[38]
In this case, the
PRRA officer clearly considered the applicants’ submissions, as well as the
recent documentary evidence with respect to ongoing human rights abuses in Pakistan. It is well-established that where there is evidence before
a decision-maker which contradicts its conclusions, it must provide reasons why
it did not consider this evidence credible or trustworthy (Cepeda-Gutierrez
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425
(QL), at para. 15). A failure to do so will result in a reviewable error.
Nevertheless, in the case at bar, the PRRA officer carefully evaluated the
evidence that both supports and contradicts her ultimate conclusion. For
example, the impugned decision cites the Amnesty International Report 2007 and
the Pakistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices -2006 as follows: « Selon
la preuve documentaire consultée, la situation des femmes, de façon générale,
au Pakistan n’est pas facile. […] Les viols et les autres
formes de violences sont également fréquents, spécialement pour celles qui sont
détenus par les autorités policières. »
[39]
I am equally of the view
that the PRRA officer did not err in concluding that the risk the applicants
would face as Ismaili Shia did not amount to persecution. In this regard, the
applicants strongly argue the PRRA officer put an exaggerated emphasis on the
need for repetition and persistence of the discriminatory acts for them to
amount to persecution.
[40]
I disagree. Although the
PRRA officer describes the incident in which four armed men entered into Mr. Lakhani’s mother home;
forcibly confined her and members of her family; threatened the family; and,
stole their valuable possessions as isolated, I do not find that she places an
exaggerated (and erroneous) emphasis on the need for repetition or persistence.
To the contrary, she
states:
La persécution, par effet cumulatif ou à
elle seule, restreint gravement la jouissance par le demandeur de ses droits
fondamentaux : sérieuses restrictions au droit d’exercer un métier ou au droit
d’avoir accès aux établissements d’enseignement et/ou de santé normalement
ouvert à tous ou des mesures économiques imposées qui détruiraient les moyens
d’existence d’un groupe religieux donné. […]
[41]
As such, I am of the opinion that her analysis corresponds with
the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Rajudeen v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1984] F.C.J. No. 601 (QL) (Rajudeen),
the leading case dealing with the notion of persecution under the Act in terms
of refugee status under the Convention. In Rajudeen, above, the
applicant, a young Tamil male, described his experiences of persecution he
suffered in the space of eight months all at the hands of a group of Sinalese
individuals who constituted the majority in the place where he lived and where
the police offered no protection. These experiences amounted to four incidents
including two beatings with sticks and two instances of threats to his life
without physical violence being experienced. The Court had no hesitation in
holding these incidents were serious enough to constitute a fundamental
violation of the applicants’ human dignity. The Court also
noted that the focus of any refugee claim is not past persecution but is
forward looking, that is, a well-founded fear of persecution should an
applicant return to
their country of nationality or habitual residence.
[42]
Having correctly assessed
the law with respect to discrimination and persecution, the PRRA officer was of
the view, nevertheless, that the incidents in question were not serious enough
to constitute a fundamental violation of the applicants’ human dignity, nor did
they demonstrate that the applicants were targeted as members of a religious
minority. In short, the evidence before the PRRA officer was insufficient to
establish that the applicants face a well-founded fear of persecution should
they return to Pakistan.
[43]
This conclusion was
reasonable, supported by the evidence and open to the PRRA officer. It is also worthwhile
to reiterate at this point that the applicants are, in effect, asking this
Court to reweigh the evidence and come to the contrary conclusion. That is not
the role of the Court on judicial review. This Court does not see in what way
the PRRA officer's decision was unreasonable and therefore the decision will
not be vacated on this issue. In passing, there is no need to address the issue
of state protection in Pakistan, as it is not a determinative element of
the PRRA officer’s reasons to dismiss the PRRA application.
[44]
For these reasons,
this application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no question for
certification.
ORDER
THIS
COURT ORDERS that the
application for judicial review is dismissed.
“Luc Martineau”
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-4682-07
STYLE OF CAUSE: AHMED
ABDUL MUHAMMAD LAKHANI ET AL v. MCI
PLACE OF
HEARING: MONTREAL
DATE OF
HEARING: May
21, 2008
REASONS FOR
ORDER
AND ORDER: MARTINEAU J.
DATED: May
26, 2008
APPEARANCES:
Mrs. Nataliya
Dzera
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
Mr. Evan
Liosis
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|
SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
Waice Ferdoussi Attorney
Company
Montreal, Quebec
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
John H. Sims
Deputy
Attorney General of Canada
Montreal, Quebec
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|