Date: 20081218
Docket: T-75-08
Citation: 2008
FC 1395
Ottawa, Ontario,
December
18, 2008
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Mactavish
BETWEEN:
KATHERINE
SPENCER
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
Katherine Spencer’s employer refused to provide her with benefits
under the “Work Force Adjustment” provisions of her collective agreement on the
grounds that she was not an indeterminate government employee when her
employment ended.
[2]
An adjudicator with the Public Service Labour Relations Board
concluded that the “pith and substance” of the grievance related to Ms.
Spencer’s status under the Treasury Board’s Term Employment Policy,
rather than a question as to the interpretation or application of the relevant
collective agreement. As such, the grievance was outside the scope of the
jurisdiction conferred on adjudicators by subsection 209(1) of the Public
Service Labour Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 (PSLRA).
[3]
Ms. Spencer now seeks judicial review of the adjudicator’s
decision, asserting that the adjudicator erred in declining jurisdiction in
relation to this matter. According to Ms. Spencer, the Term Employment
Policy was legally binding on her employer, and had the force of law. As a
consequence, Ms. Spencer says that the adjudicator was required to consider the
Policy in determining the proper interpretation and application of the
collective agreement.
[4]
For the reasons that follow, I find that the adjudicator was
correct in concluding that the grievance was beyond her jurisdiction. As a
consequence, the application for judicial review will be dismissed.
Background
[5]
Ms. Spencer worked for the federal Public Service for several
years on a succession of term contracts. At the time that her employment
ended, she was a member of the bargaining unit governed by the Applied Sciences
and Patent Examination (SP) collective agreement between the Treasury Board and
The Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada.
[6]
After Ms. Spencer was advised that her employment would cease
with the expiration of her most recent contract, she filed a grievance alleging
that the termination of her employment was “an improper lay-off and in
violation of the WFA [Work Force Adjustment] provisions of [her] collective
agreement”. By way of corrective action, she sought the benefits stipulated in
the “Work Force Adjustment Directive”.
[7]
The Work Force Adjustment Directive is included as an
appendix to the collective agreement. It provides certain benefits to employees
affected by work force adjustment situations, but applies only to employees
within the bargaining unit who have “indeterminate” status.
[8]
After her grievance was denied through the internal grievance
process, Ms. Spencer’s grievance was then referred to adjudication in
accordance with subsection 209(1) of the PSLRA.
[9]
In assessing the merits of Ms. Spencer’s grievance, the
adjudicator would have had to determine whether she was an indeterminate
employee within the meaning of the Work Force Adjustment provisions of the
collective agreement.
[10]
Ms. Spencer argued that because she had been continuously
employed as a term employee for more than three years at the time of the
purported termination of her employment, the combination of subsection 59(1) of
the Public Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, ss. 12 & 13 (PSEA),
and section 7 of the Treasury Board’s Term Employment Policy resulted in
her automatically becoming an indeterminate employee within the meaning of the
collective agreement.
[11]
Subsection 59(1) of the PSEA provides that:
59. (1) Unless the employee requests otherwise of the deputy
head, the period of employment of an employee who is employed for a specified
term as a result of an appointment or deployment is converted to
indeterminate in the employee’s substantive position, at the end of the
cumulative period of employment specified by the employer in circumstances
prescribed by the employer.
|
59.
(1) La durée des fonctions du fonctionnaire qui est employé pour une durée
déterminée par voie de nomination ou de mutation devient indéterminée dans
son poste d’attache lorsqu’il a occupé un emploi dans les circonstances
déterminées par l’employeur pendant une période cumulative fixée par
celui-ci, sauf si le fonctionnaire demande à l’administrateur général que la
durée continue d’être determine.
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[12]
The “cumulative
period of employment specified by the employer” referred to in subsection
59(1) of the PSEA has been identified in
section 7.1 of the Treasury Board’s Term Employment Policy, which
provides that:
7. 1. Subject to section
7.2, where a person who has been employed in the same department/agency as a
term employee for a cumulative working period … of three (3) years without a break in
service longer than sixty (60) consecutive calendar days, the department/agency
must appoint the employee indeterminately at the level of his/her substantive
position. This appointment must be made in accordance with merit as
provided for in the Public Service Employment
Regulations established by the Public Service Commission. The
"same department" includes functions that have been transferred
from another department/agency by an act of Parliament or order-in-council. [Emphasis
added.]
|
7.1. En vertu
du paragraphe 7.2, lorsqu'une personne travaille dans le même ministère ou
organisme en tant qu'employé nommé pour une période déterminée … pendant une
période cumulative de trois (3)
années sans interruption de service de plus de soixante (60)
jours civils consécutifs, le ministère ou organisme doit nommer l'employé
pour une période indéterminée au niveau égal à celui de son poste d'attache. Cette
nomination doit être effectuée selon le principe du mérite comme prévu dans
le Règlement sur l'emploi dans la
fonction publique, établi par la Commission de la fonction
publique. Le « même ministère » comprend les fonctions qui ont été
transférées d'un autre ministère ou organisme aux termes d'une loi du
Parlement ou d'un décret en conseil. [Je souligne.]
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[13]
Before Ms. Spencer’s grievance could be heard on its merits,
counsel for the employer raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the
adjudicator to entertain the grievance. According to the employer, in order to
determine Ms. Spencer’s entitlement to Work Force Adjustment benefits, the
adjudicator would have had to interpret the Treasury Board’s Term Employment
Policy, rather than deal with a question as to the interpretation or
application of the collective agreement. As a result, the grievance was
outside the jurisdiction of an adjudicator appointed under the provisions of
the PSLRA.
[14]
The employer conceded that if Ms. Spencer was an
indeterminate employee, she would have undoubtedly been entitled to take
advantage of the Work Force Adjustment provisions of the collective agreement.
What was in dispute, from the employer’s perspective, was whether Ms. Spencer
was in fact an indeterminate employee.
The Adjudicator’s Decision
[15]
The adjudicator noted that in accordance with the provisions of
section 208 of the PSLRA, individuals may grieve many matters that touch
on the conditions of their employment through the internal grievance process.
However, the classes of grievances that can be referred to third-party
adjudication are considerably narrower.
[16]
Observing that adjudicators do not have plenary or inherent
jurisdiction, the adjudicator found that her jurisdiction was confined to the
matters identified in subsection 209(1) of the PSLRA, which states that:
209. (1) An employee may refer to adjudication an individual
grievance that has been presented up to and including the final level in the
grievance process and that has not been dealt with to the employee’s
satisfaction if the grievance is related to
(a) the interpretation or application in respect of the
employee of a provision of a collective agreement or an arbitral award;
(b) a disciplinary action resulting in termination,
demotion, suspension or financial penalty;
(c) in the case of an employee in the core public
administration,
(i) demotion or termination under paragraph 12(1)(d)
of the Financial Administration Act for unsatisfactory performance or
under paragraph 12(1)(e) of that Act for any other reason that does
not relate to a breach of discipline or misconduct, or
(ii) deployment under the Public Service Employment
Act without the employee’s consent where consent is required; or
(d) in the case of an employee
of a separate agency designated under subsection (3), demotion or termination
for any reason that does not relate to a breach of discipline or misconduct.
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209. (1) Après l’avoir porté jusqu’au dernier
palier de la procédure applicable sans avoir obtenu satisfaction, le
fonctionnaire peut renvoyer à l’arbitrage tout grief individuel portant
sur :
a) soit
l’interprétation ou l’application, à son égard, de toute disposition d’une
convention collective ou d’une décision arbitrale;
b) soit une
mesure disciplinaire entraînant le licenciement, la rétrogradation, la
suspension ou une sanction pécuniaire;
c) soit, s’il
est un fonctionnaire de l’administration publique centrale :
(i) la rétrogradation ou le licenciement
imposé sous le régime soit de l’alinéa 12(1)d) de la Loi sur la
gestion des finances publiques pour rendement insuffisant, soit de
l’alinéa 12(1)e) de cette loi pour toute raison autre que
l’insuffisance du rendement, un manquement à la discipline ou une inconduite,
(ii) la mutation sous le régime de la Loi
sur l’emploi dans la fonction publique sans son consentement alors que
celui-ci était nécessaire;
d) soit la
rétrogradation ou le licenciement imposé pour toute raison autre qu’un
manquement à la discipline ou une inconduite, s’il est un fonctionnaire d’un
organisme distinct désigné au titre du paragraphe (3).
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[17]
The adjudicator found that Ms. Spencer’s grievance did not involve
a question as to the interpretation or application of the collective agreement
as contemplated by paragraph 209(1)(a), and there was no suggestion that it
fell within any of the situations outlined in paragraph 209(1)(b) through (d).
[18]
According to the adjudicator, the “pith and substance” of Ms.
Spencer’s grievance was “whether or not, by operation of the Term Employment
Policy, Ms. Spencer is eligible to take advantage of the lay-off
protections outlined in the collective agreement”: see Spencer v. Deputy
Head (Department of the Environment), 2007 PSLRG 12, at para. 21.
[19]
The adjudicator acknowledged that it was conceivable that once
the threshold question as to whether Ms. Spencer was an indeterminate employee
was answered, a question might still remain regarding her status, which could
fall under the collective agreement. However, the adjudicator was of the view
that she could not answer the threshold question, with the result that the
employer’s jurisdictional objection was allowed and Ms. Spencer’s grievance was
dismissed.
Issue
[20]
The only issue in this case is whether the adjudicator erred in
finding that it was beyond her jurisdiction to consider the provisions of the
Treasury Board’s Term Employment Policy in determining whether the Work
Force Adjustment provisions of the collective agreement applied to Ms. Spencer.
Standard of Review
[21]
Ms. Spencer submits that the issue in this case is a true
question of jurisdiction, with the result that the standard of review should be
that of correctness. She acknowledges that the adjudicator undoubtedly had
expertise in interpreting and applying the provisions of the collective
agreement. However, Ms. Spencer argues that this expertise does not extend to
deciding the legal question of whether the Treasury Board’s Term Employment
Policy is legally binding on the employer, an issue that must be determined
in order to answer the jurisdictional question.
[22]
In contrast, the employer submits that the standard of review
should be that of reasonableness. In support of this contention, the employer
points to the strong preclusive clause contained in subsection 233(1) of the PSLRA,
and to the significant expertise of members of the Public Service Labour
Relations Board in relation to labour relations issues.
[23]
The employer also argues that the question of whether Ms. Spencer
could benefit from the Work Force Adjustment provisions of the collective
agreement required an appreciation of both legal and factual matters. As such,
it was not a pure question of law that was “of central importance to the legal
system”, nor was it one that was “outside the specialized area of expertise of
the adjudicator” (quoting from Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, at
paras. 60 and 70).
[24]
It is not necessary to resolve the dispute as to
the applicable standard of review in this case, as, for the reasons that will
be explained below, I am of the view that the adjudicator was correct in her
conclusion that Ms. Spencer’s grievance was beyond her jurisdiction.
The Content of the Record
[25]
Before turning to address the substantive issue raised by this
application, however, it is first necessary to address an issue that arose in
the course of the hearing with respect to the content of the record.
[26]
That is, Ms. Spencer objects to the inclusion in the respondent’s
record of two letters sent by her union to the Public Service Labour Relations
Tribunal, which letters are dated November 23, 2006, and May 28, 2007,
respectively. Ms. Spencer asserts that the letters were not before the
adjudicator, and thus are not properly part of the record on this application
for judicial review.
[27]
While the letters do appear to have been sent to the PSLRB, the
Court has not been provided with a copy of the Certified Tribunal Record in
this case. As a result, it has not been possible to verify by means of
reference to the Tribunal record whether the letters in question were actually
put in front of the adjudicator herself. Moreover, no affidavit was filed on
behalf of the respondent in relation to this application, and thus there is no
evidentiary support for the respondent’s submission that the letters were
indeed in front of the adjudicator when she made her decision.
[28]
While extraneous material may be admissible on judicial review in
certain situations (see, for example, Pathak v. Canada (Canadian Human
Rights Commission), [1995] 2 F.C. 455 (F.C.A.)), no basis
has been advanced for admitting the letters in question here. As a
consequence, the letters are not properly part of the record, and will be
struck. That said, there is nothing in either letter that would have affected
the outcome of this case.
Analysis
[29]
It is clear that adjudicators are not confined in their
deliberations to the four corners of the relevant collective agreement.
[30]
For example, adjudicators must consider and apply
employment-related statutes in determining the substantive rights and
obligations of the parties to the collective agreement in question: see, for
example, McLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517; Parry Sound (District)
Social Services Administration Board v. OPSEU, Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, at
para. 24.
[31]
Indeed, the power and duty of adjudicators to apply the law
extends to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c.11: see Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 at paras. 56, 60
and 61.
[32]
According to Ms. Spencer, there is no meaningful distinction
between employment rights provided for by statute or regulation, and those
provided for through a legally enforceable government policy. As a
consequence, adjudicators have not only the jurisdiction, but the positive duty
to interpret and apply all enforceable rights in determining the interpretation
of a collective agreement.
[33]
In support of her contention that the Treasury Board’s Term
Employment Policy is a legally binding policy, Ms. Spencer submits that if subsection
59(1) of the PSEA provided for automatic conversion to indeterminate
status after a specified period of service under term contracts, there would be
no doubt that she would be able to grieve the denial of work force adjustment
benefits under the collective agreement.
[34]
Ms. Spencer argues that there should be no difference in
principle whether the necessary period of service is identified in subsection
59(1) of the PSEA itself, or in a Treasury Board policy enacted under
the authority of that statutory provision. In either case, Ms. Spencer says
that the Term Employment Policy was legally binding on the adjudicator,
and should have been applied by the adjudicator in the context of her
grievance.
[35]
In support of this contention, Ms. Spencer relies on decisions
such as those in Endicott v. Canada (Treasury Board), 2005 FC 253, Glowinski
v. Canada (Treasury Board), 2006 FC 78, Gingras v. Canada, [1994] 2
F.C. 734 (C.A.) and in Myers v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 947.
[36]
In Endicott, the grievance in issue was based upon the
failure of a final level grievance officer to treat two predecessor versions of
the Treasury Board Term Employment Policy as legally binding. The Court
noted at paragraph 11 of its decision that whether the policies in question
created legal rights that a court could define or enforce depended upon the
intent behind, and context in which the policies were issued.
[37]
The Court noted that the policies in issue in Endicott
were not delegated legislation. Considering the content of the term employment
policies in effect at the relevant times, as well as the context surrounding
their development, the Court found no indication that the policies were
intended to be treated as a law conferring a term appointment on the applicant.
[38]
Ms. Spencer says that the rationale in Endicott suggests
that the opposite conclusion should be drawn in her case in light of the new
statutory basis for the current Term Employment Policy.
[39]
In Gingras, the Federal Court of Appeal gave effect
to the Treasury Board “Bilingualism Bonus Plan”, where the policy in question
was precise, conferred a specific benefit, and left no discretion to government
departments. Ms. Spencer argues that in Gingras, there was no
requirement that the government enact a bilingual bonus policy, but that having
done so, it was bound to follow it. In this case, the PSEA specifically
required the enactment of a term employment policy, which is all the more
reason why the policy should be binding on the employer.
[40]
In contrast, in Glowinski, the question was whether an
individual was a public service “employee”. The applicant sought judicial
review of the decision of the Treasury Board and Industry Canada that he was
indeed a public service employee. There were a number of different Treasury
Board policies defining “employee” in inconsistent ways.
[41]
The Court in Glowinski noted that, as a rule, such
policies are not legally binding unless the enabling statute requires a
department to issue the policy. The Court then refused to interpret or
reconcile the inconsistent Treasury Board policies, or to give them legal
effect, holding that if the Treasury Board had intended the policies to have
legal effect, the Treasury Board would have exercised its right to enact the
policies by way of regulation. Ms. Spencer submits that where, as here, the
policy is required by statute, the Court should be more ready to give the
policy the force of law.
[42]
The respondent submits that conversion to indeterminate status
under the provisions of the Treasury Board’s Term Employment Policy is
not automatic after three years of term employment, and that, unlike the
situation before the Federal Court of Appeal in Gingras, there is a
discretionary component to the policy.
[43]
In this regard, the respondent points to section 7.1 of the
policy, which states that appointments to
indeterminate positions must be made in accordance with the merit principle, as
provided for in the Public Service
Employment Regulations, S.O.R./2005-334, established by the Public
Service Commission.
[44]
Moreover, while the Court gave
legal effect to a “Government Security Policy” in the Myers case, the
evidence before the Court in that case was that the relevant agency had entered
into a memorandum of understanding with the Treasury Board, whereby the agency
agreed to be subject to the provisions of the Policy. There is no similar
evidence before the Court on this application, and the Myers decision is
thus distinguishable on that basis.
[45]
In deciding whether the adjudicator was legally bound to follow
the provisions of the Treasury Board’s Term Employment Policy, and
whether the policy should have been applied by the adjudicator in the context
of Ms. Spencer’s grievance, it bears repeating that there was no question as to
the interpretation of the collective agreement before the adjudicator. Indeed,
the employer had conceded that if Ms. Spencer was in fact an indeterminate
employee, she was entitled to the Work Force Adjustment benefits provided for
in her collective agreement. The only issue in dispute was whether or not she
was in fact an indeterminate employee.
[46]
Ms. Spencer has herself conceded on this application that the “core
of the dispute” before the adjudicator was whether or not she was an indeterminate
government employee, such that the Work Force Adjustment provisions applied to
her. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the essential nature of the
dispute was the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Term
Employment Policy, as opposed to the collective agreement.
[47]
Moreover, I am not persuaded that the Treasury Board’s Term
Employment Policy was legally binding on the adjudicator. A review of the
wording of the Policy confirms that there is a discretionary component
to the policy, in that appointments to indeterminate positions
must be made in accordance with the merit principle. If the adjudicator was
bound to find that an employee automatically became indeterminate after three
years of contract employment, no determination of merit would ever be made.
[48]
Ms. Spencer argues that there is no
discretion contemplated under the provisions of subsection 59(1) of the PSEA.
She submits that subsection 7.1 of the Term
Employment Policy must have been enacted under predecessor legislation that
may have contemplated a consideration of merit in the conversion of term
employees to indeterminate status. Given that such conversions no longer
amount to “appointments” under the new legislation, merit is no longer a
relevant consideration: see s. 59(2) of the PSEA.
[49]
Ms. Spencer cannot have it both ways. On the one hand, she
argues that the Term Employment Policy was legally binding on the
adjudicator, and ought to have been applied to find that she was indeed an
indeterminate employee. On the other hand, she is submitting that the express
wording of the Policy should not be followed, as it has been superseded by
intervening legislation.
[50]
As explained above, I am satisfied that there is a discretionary
component to the Term Employment Policy, as it currently stands. In the
circumstances, I am not persuaded that the adjudicator was legally bound to
apply the Policy.
[51]
I note that my conclusion that the Term Employment Policy
was not intended to be legally binding on the adjudicator is consistent with the
wording of Article 36 of the collective agreement, which identifies all of the
Treasury Board directives, policies and regulations that form part of the
collective agreement itself. Included amongst these is the Work Force
Adjustment Directive. The Treasury Board’s Term Employment Policy
is not included on the list.
[52]
As a consequence, I am of the view that the adjudicator was
correct in concluding that she was without jurisdiction to deal with Ms.
Spencer’s grievance. As a result, the application for judicial review is
dismissed. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to make any order as to
costs.
[53]
This finding does not necessarily leave employees such as Ms.
Spencer completely without recourse. It is open to the Union to seek to have
the Term Employment Policy incorporated into the collective agreement.
Moreover, as discussed below, it may also be open to Ms. Spencer to seek
judicial review of the final level grievance decision denying her claim for Work
Force Adjustment benefits.
Extension of Time
[54]
In the event that the Court were to find that the grievance was
indeed beyond the jurisdiction of the adjudicator, Ms. Spencer seeks an
extension of time in which to file an application for judicial review of the
final level grievance decision denying her grievance alleging that the
termination of her employment was an improper lay-off, in violation of the Work
Force Adjustment provisions of her collective agreement.
[55]
At the hearing of this application, counsel for the respondent
conceded that Ms. Spencer has clearly demonstrated a continuing intention to
pursue this matter, that there would arguably be some merit to the application,
and that there is a reasonable explanation for Ms. Spencer’s failure to
commence an application for judicial review of the final level grievance
decision in a timely manner.
[56]
Insofar as the issue of prejudice to the employer is concerned,
the respondent has now also conceded that it has not been prejudiced in any way
by Ms. Spencer’s delay in seeking judicial review of the final level grievance
decision. The result of this is that there is no dispute but that Ms. Spencer
has satisfied all four of the components of the Hennelly test: see Canada (Attorney General) v. Hennelly (1999), 244 N.R.
399 (F.C.A.).
[57]
I am also satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that
the extension of time be granted.
[58]
As a result, Ms. Spencer shall have 30 days from the date of this
order in which to commence an application for judicial review of the final
level grievance decision denying her grievance with respect to the termination
of her employment.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that this application for judicial review is dismissed,
without costs. Ms. Spencer shall have 30 days from the date of this judgment in
which to commence an application for judicial review of the final level
grievance decision denying her grievance with respect to the termination of her
employment.
“Anne
Mactavish”