Docket: IMM-1655-11
Citation: 2011 FC 1421
Ottawa, Ontario, December 6, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mandamin
BETWEEN:
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THANABALASINGAM SINNATHAMBY
AND
VASANTHADEVI THANABALASINGAM
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Applicants
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and
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MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
AND
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
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Respondents
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
The
Applicants apply for judicial review of the January 10, 2011 decision of Brian
Hudson, an Immigration Counsellor (the Officer), pursuant to subsection 72(1)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA).
[2]
The
Officer determined that the Applicants’ application for permanent residence
could not be approved because they are inadmissible to Canada pursuant to
section 40(1)(a) of IRPA for misrepresentation. The Officer found that
the information they initially provided and on two subsequent requests kept
changing with new details being added leaving the Officer uncertain he had been
provided a complete and accurate account of the Applicants circumstances.
[3]
The
Applicants submit they were denied procedural fairness in not being granted an
in-person interview, in that they did not properly understand what information
was requested of them and their misrepresentations were not materially
important.
[4]
For
reasons that follow, I am dismissing this application for judicial review.
Background
[5]
Thamilarasi
Sivanesan (the “Daughter”) and her parents Thanabalasingam Sinnathamby and
Vasanthadevi Thanabalasingam (the “Applicants”), are originally from Sri Lanka. The Daughter
immigrated to Canada in 2002 and
is now a Canadian Citizen. The Applicants are citizens of Sri Lanka and continue
to live there.
[6]
In
June 2006, the Daughter applied to sponsor the Applicants’ application for
permanent residence.
[7]
The
Officer’s initial review of the Applicants’ application revealed
inconsistencies and omissions with regards to information provided relating to
the Applicants’ employment, arrests and detention, residences, travel and
immigration history.
[8]
The
Officer sent a procedural fairness letter dated October 19, 2010 to the Applicants
providing them with an opportunity to respond to the Officer’s concerns. The Officer
set out four questions requesting further clarification regarding the Applicants’
travel history, arrests and detention, residences and immigration history.
[9]
The
Applicants responded in a letter dated November 11, 2010. However, the Applicants’
reply raised further concerns and questions for the Officer.
[10]
On
November 24, 2010, the Officer sent a second procedural fairness letter to the Applicants
specifically relaying his concerns regarding the Applicants’ residence history,
activity/employment history, history of arrests and detainments, and travel
history. The Officer stated he remained concerned that the Applicants had
either failed to declare key information or had provided information that is
contradictory. The Officer set out some of the contradictions in the
information provided up to that point and provided the Applicants 30 days to
respond to the discrepancies.
[11]
The
Applicants responded on December 20, 2010 to the second procedural fairness
letter. They attempted to allay the concerns expressed by the Officer and
clarify the contradictions in the information submitted to that point. Their
letter alleviated the concerns the Officer had about the Applicants’
residences. However, the Officer found that the information provided in the
December 20, 2010 letter raised additional contradictions in the Applicants’
information and added further to the confusion.
[12]
On
January 10, 2011, the Officer refused the Applicants’ application and found
that the Applicants were inadmissible to Canada for a period
of 2 years. A letter was sent to the Applicants informing them of the Officer’s
decision.
Decision Under Review
[13]
The
Officer’s reasons are found in the decision letter dated January 10, 2011 and
are supplemented by the CAIPS notes. The Officer, having reviewed all the facts
of the file, remained concerned regarding the Applicants’ admissibility;
specifically their arrest, detention and employment history. The Officer noted
that when these concerns were raised, the information subsequently provided
continued to present contradictions and provided details that should have been
provided within the Applicants’ original application.
[14]
The
Officer decided the Applicants had not discharged their statutory obligation to
satisfy the Officer that they were not inadmissible. The Officer concluded he
did not have a complete picture of the Applicants’ background and was not
satisfied that the Applicants were not inadmissible to Canada.
Relevant
Legislation
[15]
The
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 provides:
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11.
(1) A foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for
any other document required by the regulations. The visa or document may
be issued if,
following
an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not
inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
…
40.
(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for
misrepresentation
(a)
for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts
relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in
the administration of this Act;
[Emphasis
added]
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11.
(1) L’étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, demander à l’agent
les visa et autres documents requis par règlement. L’agent peut les délivrer
sur preuve, à la suite d’un contrôle, que l’étranger n’est pas interdit de
territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
…
40.
(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour fausses déclarations les faits
suivants :
a)
directement ou indirectement, faire une présentation erronée sur un fait
important quant à un objet pertinent, ou une réticence sur ce fait, ce qui
entraîne ou risque d’entraîner une erreur dans l’application de la présente
loi;
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Issues
[16]
In
my view, the issues arising in this application are:
1. Does the
Daughter have standing to bring this application?
2. Did the Officer
violate the duty of procedural fairness owed to the Applicants?
3.
Was the Officer’s decision reasonable?
Standard of Review
[17]
The
Supreme Court of Canada has held that there are only two standards of review:
correctness for questions of law, and reasonableness for questions involving
fact or mixed fact and law: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir] at paras 50 and 53.
[18]
The
appropriate standard of review to apply to a decision refusing an application
for permanent residence on the grounds of misrepresentation is reasonableness: Mahmood
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 433 [Mahmood] at para 11; Lu
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 625, 167 ACWS (3d) 978 at para
12.
[19]
Judicial
deference to the decision-maker is appropriate where the decision making
process demonstrates justification, transparency and intelligibility and the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible on
the facts and in law: Dunsmuir at para 47.
[20]
With
regards to questions of procedural fairness, the applicable standard of review
is correctness: Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA
404, 44 Admin LR (4th) 4 at para 46.
Analysis
Does the
Daughter have standing to bring this application?
[21]
The
Respondent submits that the Daughter should be struck as an applicant in these
proceedings as she, the sponsor, has no standing in this application. The
Respondent relies on Thangarajah v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 FC 754 where J. Near of this Court
stated:
[16] The Applicant submits that as
the sponsor he has an evident interest in the litigation and that in many cases
before the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) the sponsor is the appellant.
[17] The Respondent argues that this
is not an application for judicial review of a decision made by the IAD, in
which situation the sponsor would have had the right to appeal the decision
before the IAD and then come to the Court for a review of that decision.
Rather, in the present situation the Applicants had no appeal right before the
IAD and the Applicant has no standing to challenge the refusal of the
application since he is not “directly affected” by the decision. The jurisprudence
of this Court supports this position. The Respondent cites Carson v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
(1995), 95
FTR 137, 55 ACWS (3d) 389 at para 4:
[4] While Mrs. Carson has an
interest in this proceeding, in that she is Mr. Carson’s sponsor for landing in
Canada and she was interviewed as
part of the marriage interview involving the H&C determination, these
facts are insufficient to give her standing in this judicial review. Mrs.
Carson is a Canadian citizen and does not require any exemption whatsoever from
the Immigration Act or regulations. Moreover, whether she has standing or not
has no impact whatsoever on the ultimate issue in this matter. Accordingly,
with respect to this proceeding, the applicant, Tonya Carson, is struck as a party.
(see also Wu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
(2000), 183 FTR 309, 4 Imm LR (3d) 145 at para 15).
[18] Accordingly, the Applicant is
struck as a party. However, further to the request of both parties, the Court
will add the Applicant’s sponsored dependents as named Applicants.
[Emphasis added]
[22]
The
situation in this case is similar to that in Carson. In this
case, the Daughter is a Canadian citizen and does not require any exemption
from the IRPA or regulations. Also, whether the Daughter has standing or
not has no impact on the ultimate issue in this matter.
[23]
Following
the jurisprudence cited above, the Daughter, Thamilarasi Sivanesan, is struck
as a party. The parents Thanabalasingam Sinnathamby and Vasanthadevi
Thanabalasingam remain named as Applicants.
Did the Officer violate
the duty of procedural fairness owed to the Applicants?
[24]
An
allegation of a breach of procedural fairness is reviewed on a standard of
correctness. In most instances, a breach of procedural fairness will be
determinative of the application for judicial review: Ghasemzadeh v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 716 [Ghasemzadeh] at para
16.
[25]
The
Applicants submit they were denied procedural fairness because they were not
provided with an in-person interview to address the concerns of the Officer.
However, the jurisprudence is clear that an oral hearing is not always
necessary for a visa officer to fulfill his duty of procedural fairness: Ghasemzadeh
at para 27. As J. Lemieux stated in Ghasemzadeh:
What the duty [of procedural fairness]
requires is that the applicant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present
the various types of evidence to his or her case and have it fully and fairly
considered.
[26]
According
to the CAIPS notes, the Officer, upon review of the Applicants’ application,
had concerns about discrepancies discovered in their file. In an attempt to
have these concerns resolved, the Officer sent a procedural fairness letter to
the Applicants outlining his concerns. He requested answers from the Applicants
the following:
1. Please provide a list of your trips
back and forth from India when you visited your family.
Please provide copies of passport pages to confirm this travel.
2. What problems did you and your family
encounter with regard to the Sri Lankan armed forces, IPKF and LTTE? Were you
or any family member ever detained by any force? If yes, provide details. Were
you or any family member forced to do work for the LTTE?
3. Your son has given a different address
history from yours. Please outline where your son has lived and if apart from
his family, please provide an explanation.
4. Why did your wife not declare her
visitor visa application in 03/04 on her current application form? Why in that
application interview did she say she had no travel history when her
application address list shows she lived in Chennai from 07-97-05/03? Did she
attend your daughter’s wedding in Chennai?
[27]
This
letter set out the specific concerns held by the Officer and the information
requested to alleviate these concerns. This was the first opportunity the Applicants
had to respond and provide the necessary evidence.
[28]
The
Applicants responded by letter on November 11, 2010.
[29]
After
reviewing the Applicants’ November 11, 2010 letter, the Officer’s concerns
remained. In fact, the Officer’s CAIPS notes indicate that the November 11,
2010 letter created more uncertainty. For example:
a. The November
11, 2010 letter described three instances where the father was arrested or
detained. None of these arrests or detentions had been declared by the Applicants
in their application.
b. The November
11, 2010 letter also stated that the father sold produce after his boat was
destroyed in 1986 and that he mentioned leasing a boat and returning to his
passenger business about 2002. The produce business was also omitted from the
father’s personal history.
[30]
As
a result, the Officer sent a second procedural fairness letter on November 24,
2010 to the Applicants. The Officer specifically stated that he had concerns
that the Applicants had misrepresented their residence history,
activity/employment history, history of arrests and detainments, and travel
history. The letter set out examples of the contradictions found and provided a
final opportunity to the Applicants to respond and alleviate the Officer’s
concerns.
[31]
The
Applicants responded on December 20, 2010.
[32]
The
Officer’s CAIPS notes indicate the Applicants’ December 20, 2010 letter allayed
the concerns about discrepancies in their residence history. However, the Applicant’s
letter failed to satisfactorily address the remainder of the Officer’s concerns.
His CAIPS notes record:
On the topic of the employment history of
the PA, he now tells us his boat was indeed destroyed in 1986 and that he
commenced selling produce in 1989/90. He then goes on to describe his re-entry
into the boat provision business. That does not explain why, in his
application, he tells us he was engaged in [the] boat services from 1970 to
2008. He was not according to this most recent information. The pa again
confirms that he was “…detained several times”.
He tells us he did not declare the
detentions because “...they were not official”. Our application questions say
nothing about detentions or arrests being official. He says he didn’t intent to misrepresent
this information yet provides a rational as to why he deliberately omitted it
form his application. He rationalizes the failure of his wife to declare her
travel history as a matter of the travel being on a previous passport. He makes
no mention of the failure of his wife to declare her previous CCV application
in this most recent response. He tells us his wife failed to declare her
residences in India as “…it was only temporary”.
Again, there is nothing in our application that makes reference to the duration
of the residence.
In summary, my conclusion of Nov 22
stands and with the same rational. Every time we seek information we are
provided with further information that contradicts and provides details that
should have been provided upon application to us. Each new batch of
information neatly rationalizes the wanting nature of the previous information.
I am left to assume that if I simply continued to ask further detailed
questions, I would receive yet another version of the family history. The
Applicant’s [sic] have not met their statutory obligation to satisfy me they
are not inadmissible. In accordance with A11, the application is refused.
[Emphasis added]
[33]
As
a result of these continuing discrepancies and revealed omissions, the Officer concluded
that the Applicants were inadmissible to Canada due to
misrepresentation.
[34]
In
my view, the evidence demonstrates that the Officer met his duty of procedural
fairness. Twice the Officer set out his concerns to the Applicants and provided
the Applicants an opportunity to address and alleviate those concerns.
[35]
I
also consider it relevant that one of the reasons the Officer had for sending the
second procedural fairness letter was the possibility that the Applicants did
not fully understand what was being required of them. As the CAIPS notes state:
I note that the PA says he can speak
English and the preparation of the application was assisted by a family member
(the sponsor) who appears to have been living in Canada for many years and
thus, I think it reasonable to assume [the PA] has some sense of the need to
get it right or at least to understand our questions. Surely someone assisted
this PA to craft a lengthy and complicated response to our letter. However, it
is not clear to me that our request for information made it clear to the PA
that we have concerns and gave him a chance to response [sic] to our
concern. PF letter necessary.
[36]
The
Applicants have submitted they do not understand English and that as a result,
an in-person interview was required. However, as noted in the passage above,
the Officer was under the impression that the father could speak English. This
impression was supported by the fact that the father had indicated in his
permanent residence application that he could communicate in English.
Nonetheless, the Officer wanted to ensure that the Applicants fully understood
what was required of them and sent the second, more detailed procedural
fairness letter. I find this to be clear evidence that the Applicants were
provided with a meaningful opportunity to present evidence relevant to their
case.
[37]
While
the opportunity to present evidence is a significant part of the duty of
procedural fairness, that evidence submitted must be fully and fairly
considered.
[38]
The
CAIPS notes clearly show that the Officer fully considered the first letter
from the Applicants dated November 11, 2010. This is also evident in the
substance of the second procedural fairness letter sent to the Applicants dated
November 24, 2010. In this letter, the Officer refers specifically to
information provided by the Applicants in their November 11, 2010 letter.
[39]
It
is also evident that the Officer fully and fairly considered the Applicants’
second response letter. The Applicants’ December 20, 2010 letter allayed the
misrepresentation concerns held by the Officer regarding the discrepancies over
residences. This is clear evidence that the Officer considered the information
proved by the Applicants in their second letter.
[40]
The jurisprudence
requires a meaningful opportunity be afforded to the Applicants to present evidence
and to have that evidence fully and fairly considered. It was. I am satisfied
an oral interview was not required.
[41]
The
Applicants were provided with two opportunities to present evidence and all of
the information provided was fully and fairly considered by the Officer. I
conclude the Officer met his duty of procedural fairness. The Applicants’ submission
for judicial review on these grounds is rejected.
Was the Officer’s
decision reasonable?
[42]
The
appropriate standard of review to apply to a decision to refuse an application
for permanent residence on the grounds of misrepresentation is reasonableness: Mahmood
at para 11.
[43]
The
Officer decided that the Applicants were inadmissible to Canada under s.
40(1)(a). Two factors must be present for such a determination. First, there
must be misrepresentations made by the Applicants and second, the
misrepresentations must be material in that they could have induced an error in
the administration of the IRPA: Bellido v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), 2005 FC 452 at para 27.
[44]
With
regards to the presence of misrepresentations made by the Applicants, the
evidence is straightforward. The evidence before the Officer referred to
numerous contradictions and discrepancies in the Applicants’ file.
[45]
In
the Applicants’ application for permanent residence, the only employment listed
was that the father was self employed and engaged in “Boat services between
Nainativu & Kurikadduwan” from January 1970 to July 2008. However, in their
November 11, 2010 response letter it states:
After my boat had been destroyed [in
1986], I was involved in selling produce such as onions, chillies, and dried
fish to market in Colombo and was able to make a good living out of that. Since
there was no other way to market the produce, people that cultivated these
things would sell them to me at a lower price and I sold them at a higher price
in Colombo.
[46]
The
Applicants did not adequately explain the discrepancy regarding the father’s employment
history in the Applicants’ application and the subsequent letter.
[47]
The
Officer also found that the Applicants made a misrepresentation by omitting
significant information from their application. For example, when asked on the
application for permanent residence whether they had “been detained or put in
jail?”, the Applicants checked “No”. However, this contradicted what the Applicants’
son, Kartheebhan Thanabalasingam, had stated in his Personal Information Form
(PIF) narrative from his refugee application to Canada in 2003. The
son’s PIF narrative states:
On March 13, 1986 a Navy patrol boat was
destroyed in a bomb explosion when the boat arrived at Nainativu jetty. It was
believed that the Tamil Tigers had done this. In response to this, the Navy
personnel on the island went on a rampage against the local civilian
population. They set my father’s boat on fire and destroyed it. My paternal
aunt (father’s sister) also owned a boat which was burnt and destroyed that
same day by the Navy. She also owned a shop which was burnt by the Navy. There
were five local Tamil civilians, none of whom were Tamil Tigers, who were shot
and killed by the Navy. Very few people owned boats as large as my father’s.
The Navy assumed that he must have more money than the other local Tamils, and
that he must have some connections to the Tigers. They thought he must be
transporting Tigers from the mainland to the island. So the Navy arrested my
father, and interrogated him about this. He was detained for about two weeks.
He was beaten and tortured in detention. Later, he was released on payment
of a bribe to a high ranking officer.
[Emphasis added]
[48]
The
son’s PIF was provided by the Applicants pursuant to a request for the landing
papers and PIF of their son Kartheebhan. The son’s PIF clearly shows an
inconsistency with the information provided by the Applicants in their
application. The Officer found that the information regarding the father’s
detentions ought to have been included in the Applicants’ original application.
Because relevant information was omitted and only explained after that
information had been brought to their attention, the Officer found that the
Applicants had made a misrepresentation.
[49]
The
Applicants submit that the Officer’s findings of misrepresentation did not take
into account the Applicants’ understanding of the words in the application
forms. The Applicants submit that they reasonably understood the term ‘detentions’
in the permanent residence application for to only refer to “official”
detentions. The Applicants submit that the father was never officially detained
and therefore, the Applicants did not withhold information regarding those
detentions.
[50]
I
do not find this argument persuasive. The use of the word “official” is
argumentative and does not satisfactorily explain why such significant events
are excluded.
[51]
The
Officer is tasked with weighing the evidence submitted by the Applicants and
coming to a reasonable determination based on that evidence. So long as the Officer’s
determination shows justification, transparency and intelligibility and the
determination falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes, judicial
deference is appropriate: Dunsmuir at para 47.
[52]
The
Officer bases his finding of misrepresentation and omissions by identifying
specific contradictions found in the file as well as important facts that were
withheld from the original application. The Officer clearly and intelligibly
sets out his rationale for these findings. I find the Officer’s conclusion that
the Applicants made misrepresentations falls within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes.
[53]
However,
the Officer’s finding that the Applicants made misrepresentations or withheld
information is not enough, on its own, to determine that the Applicants were
inadmissible under s. 40(1)(a). It must be determined whether the
misrepresentations were material in that they could have induced an error in
the administration of the IRPA. In this case, the Officer found that the
misrepresentations were material.
[54]
In
his decision letter, the Officer stated that upon completing their application,
the Applicants misrepresented or withheld the following material facts: details
of their activities, residences and travel/immigration history. The seriousness
or materiality of these facts were noted by the Officer in the CAIPS notes:
Further, the PA and his spouse have
misrepresented information concerning their activities, residences
travel/immigration history. I cannot conclude that the rationales provided to
explain such misrepresentation are any more than an after the fact search for
excuses. Such information, especially for people residing for many years in
an active war zone, are key to determining admissibility so that the failure to
declare or declare with truthful care could lead to an error in the
determination of admissibility.
[Emphasis added]
[55]
The
above CAIPS notes make it obvious that the Officer regarded the
misrepresentations could have induced an error in his administration of the IRPA.
That the Officer is unclear about the background of the Applicants is evident
in the CAIPS notes. Any determination of admissibility where concerns remain
could be made in error.
[56]
The
Applicants claim that any misrepresentations made were not material, or in the
alternative, that they cannot be classified as misrepresentations under s.
40(1)(a) because they were corrected before it could have the effect of causing
an error in the administration of the IRPA.
[57]
I
find neither of these arguments persuasive.
[58]
First,
it appears clear that these misrepresentations are material. The Officer was
left with an unclear picture of the background and history of the Applicants.
As observed in the CAIPS notes, the Applicants lived in an active war zone for
many years and that raised security questions that remained unresolved.
[59]
Second,
this Court has previously considered the proper interpretation of s. 40(1)(a)
as it applies to misrepresentations. In Kahn v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 512, J. O’Keefe stated the
following at paragraphs 25-29:
[25] Paragraph 40(1)(a) is written
very broadly in that it applies to any misrepresentation, whether direct or
indirect, relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error
in the administration of the Act. I am of the opinion that this Court must
respect the wording of the Act and give it the broad interpretation its wording
demands. There is nothing in the wording of the paragraph indicating that it
should not apply to a situation where a misrepresentation is adopted, but clarified
prior to a decision being rendered.
[26] The applicant submitted that to
adopt the respondent’s interpretation would result in an absurdity as
individuals who made an innocent mistake in their application would be
inadmissible for two years on the basis of misrepresentation. I need not deal
with this argument as the applicant in this case continued the
misrepresentation in his interview with the officer until the officer was able
to get him to admit that he had not been employed as stated.
[27] I acknowledge that this case
presents a unique situation as the misrepresentation was clarified before the
decision was rendered. However, to adopt the applicant’s interpretation would
lead me to a situation whereby individuals could knowingly make a misrepresentation,
but not be found inadmissible under paragraph 40(1)(a) so long as they
clarified the misrepresentation right before a decision was rendered. I agree
with the respondent that such an interpretation could result in a situation
whereby only misrepresentations “caught” by the visa officer during an
interview would be clarified; therefore, leaving a high potential for abuse of
the Act.
[28] In Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
[2005] F.C.J. No. 1309 at paragraph 57, this Court noted Parliament’s intent
regarding misrepresentation as per the explanatory clause-by-clause analysis of
Bill C-11 (the Act) which reads:
This section is similar to provisions of
the current act concerning misrepresentation by either permanent or temporary
residents but modifies those provisions to enhance enforcement tools designed
to eliminate abuse.
[29] Moreover, to accept the
applicant’s interpretation would be to disregard the requirement to provide
truthful information under the Act. In light of these findings, I am of the
opinion that the visa officer correctly interpreted section 40.
[Emphasis added]
[60]
Justice
O’Keefe makes it clear that it is irrelevant whether the misrepresentation had
been corrected or not by the time the decision was made. Even if this were not
the case, it can not be said in this case that all the misrepresentations had
been corrected. While the Officer acknowledged that the Applicants corrected
the misrepresentation concerns the Officer had regarding the discrepancies over
the Applicants’ residences, the Officer’s concerns regarding other material
misrepresentations remained.
[61]
For
the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the Officer’s finding that the
Applicants made material misrepresentations was reasonable. Therefore, the
application for judicial review is dismissed.
[62]
Finally,
in the final two paragraphs of their reply, the Applicants proposed a question
to be certified. The Applicants do not set out a specific question but rather
appear to request that the proper definition of “residence” and “detention” be
clarified.
[63]
The
Respondent opposes certification of the Applicants’ proposed question. The
Respondent submits that it does not meet the test for certification.
[64]
I
agree with the Respondent and I decline to certify the question.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that:
1. The
Applicant, Thamilarasi Sivanesan, is struck as a party.
2. The
Application for judicial review is dismissed.
3. No question
of general importance is certified.
“Leonard
S. Mandamin”
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