Docket: IMM-608-11
Citation: 2011 FC 1503
Ottawa, Ontario, December 20, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
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RAED HADAD
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP,
IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act) for judicial review of a
decision of an immigration officer of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (the
officer), dated January 19, 2011, wherein the applicant’s application for
criminal rehabilitation was denied. This conclusion was based on the officer’s
finding that she was not satisfied that the applicant had been rehabilitated
under paragraph 36(3)(c) of the Act.
[2]
The applicant requests that his application for rehabilitation be
granted or in the alternative, that the matter be remitted for reconsideration.
Background
[3]
The
applicant, Raed Hadad, is an Israeli citizen. He was born in Jordan and moved to Israel with his family when he
was a child. In Israel, his family experienced
persecution and discrimination due to their Jordanian background and Christian
faith. This tension led to the separation of the applicant’s parents in 1974.
The applicant’s father subsequently moved to the United States.
[4]
In Israel, the applicant
continued to experience severe persecution, including abuse, beatings, stabbing
and even being shot at. To escape these attacks, the applicant fled Israel in
1986 and moved to Flint,
Michigan where his father owned
and operated a grocery store. Since leaving Israel, one of his brothers and his step-father
have been shot and killed.
[5]
In
the U.S., the applicant worked
at his father’s store. In 1990, the store was experiencing financial
difficulties. The applicant decided to move to California to seek better employment. However, before
he left, the applicant’s father decided to burn his own shop down. Due to his
poor English proficiency, the father asked the applicant to postpone his trip to
California for a few days. The
applicant complied with his father’s wishes. The applicant was not involved in
the negotiations or the actual burning of the store, but he did give the
arsonist a ride to purchase the gasoline. The applicant was therefore charged
and convicted of arson of real property and conspiracy to burn real property.
[6]
While
in the U.S., the applicant was also
convicted of attempted violation of the Cigarette Tax Act and
unauthorized acquisition of food stamps. The applicant had observed his father
purchasing food stamps at his store and using them for his own use. Due to his
own financial difficulties and his failure to understand the system, the
applicant also purchased food stamps for his own use.
[7]
As a
result of these convictions, the applicant was sentenced to a minimum of seven
years in prison. In prison, he obtained his GED and held jobs as a cook and
tutor. Due to his conviction, he was also charged with deportation under U.S. immigration laws whilst
in prison. On June 17, 1998, after serving the minimum sentence, the applicant
was released on parole and subsequently returned to Israel. However, upon
returning to Israel, the threats and
persecution he had previously experienced resumed. He unsuccessfully sought to
move to Canada in 1999. Then, in early
2000, the applicant returned to the U.S. where he remained for approximately five years.
[8]
In
2005, the applicant was detained at a traffic stop and a search of the National
Crime Information Centre revealed his status as a deported felon. U.S.
Immigration incarcerated him for approximately one year before again returning
him to Israel in February 2006. The
following month, the applicant came to Canada and was granted a six month temporary stay. On
arrival to Canada, he did not reveal his
criminal history.
[9]
In Canada, the applicant met Dana
Dabour, a Canadian citizen. Within a year, they were married and moved to Saskatoon. They have two children
(a daughter born in February 2008 and a son born in February 2010), and the
applicant’s wife was expecting her third child (due in November 2011). The
family also recently purchased a home in Saskatoon.
[10]
Since
obtaining a work permit, the applicant has been working in the construction
industry. In February 2010, he began operating his own general contracting
business (Amazon Construction Ltd.) and currently employs three full time
staff. The applicant is also involved in a local church and in the Knights of
Columbus service group.
[11]
The
applicant applied for criminal rehabilitation in 2008. In January 2011, his
application was denied.
The Decision
[12]
In a
letter dated January 19, 2011, the applicant was notified that the officer was
not satisfied that he had been rehabilitated. His application for criminal
rehabilitation was therefore denied. The basis for this letter was a report
prepared on January 6, 2011. Collectively, the January 19, 2011 letter and the
January 6, 2011 report are referred to herein as the decision.
[13]
The
decision first described the applicant’s past criminal history in the U.S., including the
corresponding provisions under the Canadian Criminal Code and the
circumstances surrounding the offences. Based on the dates of these offences,
the applicant was eligible to apply for rehabilitation on June 18, 2008.
[14]
The decision then
outlined the applicant’s immigration history in the U.S. and in Canada:
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1989: Applicant
obtains permanent resident status through application submitted by his father.
This status later revoked due to criminal convictions.
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1991 to 1998:
Applicant serves prison term.
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December 10, 1998:
Applicant ordered deported from U.S. to Israel.
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January 5, 1999:
Applicant deported to Israel.
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January 21, 1999:
Applicant arrived at Toronto’s Pearson
Airport and made a refugee claim (later
withdrawn).
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January 22, 1999:
Applicant issued an allowed to leave.
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June 1999: Applicant
goes to Mexico from Israel, sneaks into the U.S. and lives with his
mother and siblings in Las
Vegas.
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February 13, 2005:
Applicant recognized as deported felon by Las
Vegas police at traffic
stop.
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February 16, 2005:
Applicant released from Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody.
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March 8, 2005:
Applicant ordered removed from the U.S. and subsequently removed.
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March 17, 2006:
Applicant arrives at Toronto’s Pearson Airport and has Israeli passport stamped
with six month entry.
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August 31, 2006:
Applicant files refugee claim in Saskatoon.
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November 8, 2006:
Refugee claim hearing scheduled in Windsor. Hearing later cancelled as applicant
had moved back to Saskatoon.
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December 12, 2006:
Applicant marries his current wife and files a permanent residence application
under spousal category.
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November 6, 2008:
Refugee claim hearing held and applicant ordered deported.
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November 7, 2008:
Applicant’s application for permanent residence under spousal category refused.
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December 9, 2008: Refugee
claim found ineligible. Applicant applies for leave and judicial review of this
decision.
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February 5, 2009:
PRRA issued.
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June 19, 2009:
Applicant’s application for leave and judicial review of refugee claim decision
dismissed.
[15]
The decision
also described the applicant’s family. The applicant was previously married in
1988 and had a son the following year. The applicant separated from his first
wife in 2005 and they were divorced in 2006. He does not maintain contact with
his previous wife and first child. The applicant’s current wife was born in Qatar and obtained permanent
residence in Canada as a young child. She
became a Canadian citizen in 2004. The couple have two children together. The
applicant’s parents divorced in 1974 and both parents now live in the U.S. The applicant’s two
siblings also live in the U.S.
and he maintains contact with his family there. The parents of the applicant’s
wife live in Windsor and her three brothers
are Canadian citizens that work abroad. The applicant and his wife keep in
touch with her family.
[16]
The
applicant’s employment history was also described in the decision. It
acknowledged that while in prison in the U.S., the applicant had completed two years of a
four year course in restaurant association, had worked as a tutor and a cook
and had volunteered with Alcoholics Anonymous. From the time that he arrived in
Canada in 2006 through to when
he obtained a work permit in 2009, he was supported by family members and did
not receive social assistance. Upon receiving his work permit, he worked for a
construction company for nine months and later began his own construction
company. The applicant’s wife previously worked as a chemical lab technician and
since having her second child, has done paperwork for her husband’s company.
[17]
Following
this outline of the applicant’s background, the following factors were listed
in favour of the applicant’s rehabilitation:
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No criminal activity
since being paroled in 1998;
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Canadian wife and
children;
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Applicant’s statement
that prison changed his life and rehabilitated him;
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Active member in
church and community;
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Positive reference
letters from members of his community;
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Prompt application
for work permit to support his family; and
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Owner and operator of
growing construction business.
[18]
Factors
were also listed that operated against the applicant’s rehabilitation:
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Past convictions of
serious criminality;
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Failure to apply for
rehabilitation before entering Canada;
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Applicant was not
eligible for rehabilitation when he entered Canada;
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Applicant did not
abide to U.S. law and was therefore deported;
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Applicant showed lack
of respect to U.S. law by lying to police officer;
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Applicant’s
application for judicial review of decision denying his refugee claim was
dismissed;
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Deportation order
issued against applicant in 2008; and
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Applicant is
currently in non-compliance with Canadian immigration law.
[19]
The
final section of the decision provided a recommendation on the applicant’s
rehabilitation. It highlighted the applicant’s history of criminal behaviour
and failure to comply with Canadian and American immigration laws.
Concurrently, it acknowledged the applicant’s stable family life in Canada,
close family ties in Canada and the U.S., successful employment
and business operation, active community involvement and support and apparent
remorsefulness over past criminal activities. However, based on the applicant’s
failure to abide to immigration laws in Canada and the U.S., the decision concluded
that the officer was not satisfied that the applicant had demonstrated criminal
rehabilitation. The applicant’s application for criminal rehabilitation was
therefore denied.
Issues
[20]
The
applicant submits the following points at issue:
1. The decision to deny the
applicant’s application for rehabilitation is unreasonable and not supported by
the evidentiary record.
2. In coming to the
decision, the officer failed to consider all relevant information and/or
considered information which was not relevant.
3. In coming to the
decision, the officer failed to follow its own internal guidelines, processes
and/or manuals.
[21]
I
would rephrase the issues as follows:
1. What is the appropriate
standard of review?
2. Was the officer’s decision
that the applicant had not been criminally rehabilitated unreasonable, based on
the totality of the evidence?
Applicant’s Written Submissions
[22]
The
applicant submits that Thamber v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 177, [2001] FCJ No 332, established
that the standard of review applicable to criminal rehabilitation decisions is
reasonableness simpliciter.
[23]
The
applicant submits that the officer’s decision was unreasonable on three
grounds:
1. The decision was not
supported by the evidentiary record;
2. The officer inadequately
considered factors in favour of rehabilitation and gave undue weight to the
factors against; and
3. The officer failed to
follow its own internal guidelines, processes and/or manuals.
[24]
On
the first ground, the applicant refers to evidence that he is a committed
family man, productively employed, active in his church and community and has
not been in any criminal trouble since his release from U.S. prison in 1998. The
applicant submits that the officer erred by giving undue weight to his non-compliance
with immigration law and giving insufficient weight to the above factors in
favour of his rehabilitation.
[25]
On
the second ground, the applicant submits that the issue in considering an
application for criminal rehabilitation is limited to whether or not the
applicant is likely to re-offend on a provision of criminal law, not of
immigration law. Similarly, the applicant submits that his previous application
for leave and judicial review of a decision on his refugee application is not a
factor that should be negatively considered in his rehabilitation assessment.
[26]
The
applicant submits that there was insufficient analysis and reasons provided in
the decision as to why the overwhelming factors in his favour were insufficient
to overcome those not in his favour. In support, the applicant relies on the
similarities between the facts in the case at bar and those in Kok v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 77, [2005] FCJ No 78. The applicant
highlights the finding in Kok above, that the overwhelming evidence of
rehabilitation outweighed the immigration compliance concerns.
[27]
Similarly,
the applicant refers to Malicia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FCT 170, [2003] FCJ No 235 for the importance of
adequately considering evidence of compelling humanitarian and compassionate
factors that could overcome negative factors. The applicant points to the
section of the decision in which his response to the officer’s question on why
he should be considered rehabilitated is discussed:
I
asked Mr. Hadad, in his own words, to tell me why he should be considered
rehabilitated. He stated that he does not have a criminal mind, that he does
not think about anything criminal. He stated that he is a family man (at that
point looked at the child who had fallen asleep on his shoulders) and started
to cry. He stated that it was a hard lesson to learn and he does not wish
anyone to go through what he went through.
[28]
The
applicant submits that this excerpt is distinguishable from other jurisprudence
in which immigration officers have found applicants to be insincere and
misleading regarding their remorsefulness and likelihood to re-offend.
[29]
Finally,
the applicant has been unable to access Citizenship and Immigration Canada
(CIC)’s guidelines for criminal rehabilitation applications or similar guidance
manuals. In the absence of such objective guidance, the applicant submits that
he is entitled to judicial review on the basis that the decision was not made
in accordance with objective, established and known criteria. Nevertheless, the
applicant submits that CIC’s “Evaluating Inadmissibility” policy (ENF 2/OP18) limits
it to only considering the possibility of further criminal activities as having
an impact on an applicant’s rehabilitation. By failing to address the question
of whether the applicant would offend against criminal law in the future, the
applicant submits that the officer violated its own internal policy.
Respondent’s Written Submissions
[30]
The
respondent submits that the applicant has failed to demonstrate that any
reviewable error has been committed under subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal
Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7.
[31]
The
respondent agrees with the applicant’s reference to Thamber above, on
the standard of review. The respondent submits that post-2008, after the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC
9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, the standard of review of a decision on criminal
rehabilitation is reasonableness. In addition, the respondent submits that the
standard of review for whether the officer erred in its treatment of the
evidence is also reasonableness.
[32]
The
respondent submits that the recommendation in the decision was supported by the
record and was reasonable. The respondent refers to Aviles v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1369, [2005] FCJ No
1659, for its position that when applying paragraph 36(3)(c) of the Act, the
unique facts of each particular case must be considered along with whether the
overall situation warrants a finding that the individual has been
rehabilitated. Therefore, although CIC’s former Inland Processing Manual
included guidelines recommending that immigration officers be satisfied that it
was highly unlikely that the person would be involved in any further criminal
activities, the jurisprudence, which carries greater legal weight, requires
that the overall situation be considered and not merely the likelihood of
future criminal events.
[33]
In
the alternative, the respondent submits that it was reasonable to doubt that
the applicant was unlikely to commit further crimes based on his past conduct;
particularly as his violations of immigration laws could have subjected him to
criminal prosecution. In support, the respondent refers to available statutory
criminal provisions for the applicant’s acts in:
- Unlawful re-entry to the U.S. subsequent to his 1999
deportation;
- False representation of U.S. citizenship in 2005;
and
- Failure to declare his
criminality at the port of entry into Canada in 2006.
[34]
The
respondent submits the applicant’s willingness to violate these laws suggests
that he may engage in further criminal activity. Therefore, the officer’s
finding that these actions outweighed those in favour of the applicant’s rehabilitation
was reasonable. As deference is owed to the weight assigned to the evidence by
an immigration officer, the respondent submits that this finding should not be
overturned.
[35]
The
respondent also submits that contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the officer
did not consider irrelevant information and did not fail to consider all
relevant information in its decision. The fact that the applicant was not
criminally convicted of violating Canadian and American immigration laws did
not render those violations irrelevant. Rather, the applicant’s willingness to
comply with those laws was an important factor to consider. In support, the
respondent refers to Cheung v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FCT 710, [2003] FCJ No 935, where Mr. Justice James Russell,
at paragraph 20, deemed it reasonable for a delegated manager of CIC to draw a
negative inference from an applicant’s past disrespect of Canadian immigration
laws.
[36]
In
response to the applicant’s reliance on Kok above, the respondent
submits that it is distinguishable from the case at bar because the officer
went further than merely acknowledging the mitigating factors in a general way.
After a detailed discussion of the positive aspects of the applicant’s case,
the officer found them inadequate to offset the negative aspects, namely, the
violations of immigration laws. The respondent submits that this Court should
not reweigh these factors.
[37]
Finally,
the respondent submits that the decision cannot be reviewed by the Court on the
basis of it being contrary to CIC’s internal policy or guidelines. In addition,
although the excerpts of the guidelines referred to by the applicant speak of
further criminal activities, the respondent submits that Aviles above, requires that
all the facts of a particular case be considered.
Applicant’s Written Reply
[38]
The
applicant submits that the case at bar is distinguishable from Cheung
above. In Cheung, the applicant’s credibility was deemed questionable.
Conversely, in the case at bar, the applicant submits that all accounts suggest
that he is genuine in both his remorse and acceptance of responsibility.
Analysis and Decision
[39]
Issue
1
What is the appropriate standard
of review?
Where previous jurisprudence has
determined the standard of review applicable to a particular issue before the Court,
the reviewing court may adopt that standard (see Dunsmuir above, at
paragraph 57).
[40]
It
is established law that the standard of review of an immigration officer’s decision
on criminal rehabilitation is reasonableness (see
Thamber above, at paragraph 9; and Dunsmuir above, at paragraph
45).
[41]
In
reviewing the officer’s decision on the standard of reasonableness, the Court
should not intervene unless the officer came to a conclusion that is not
transparent, justifiable and intelligible and within the range of acceptable
outcomes based on the evidence before it (see Dunsmuir above, at
paragraph 47; and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009
SCC 12, [2009] SCJ No 12 at paragraph 59). As the Supreme Court held in Khosa
above, “it is not up to a reviewing court to substitute its own view of a
preferable outcome, nor is it the function of the reviewing court to reweigh
the evidence” (at paragraph 59).
[42]
Issue
2
Was the officer’s decision that
the applicant had not been criminally rehabilitated unreasonable, based on the
totality of the evidence?
In the case at bar, the applicant
was inadmissible to Canada on grounds of
criminality (paragraph 36(2)(b)) and serious criminality (paragraph 36(1)(b))
until June 18, 2008, ten years after the date of his release from U.S. prison. The applicant
could then attempt to satisfy CIC that he had been rehabilitated (paragraph
36(3)(c)). If successful, he would no longer be inadmissible to Canada.
[43]
In Aviles above, Mr. Justice Paul
Rouleau explained that the purpose of paragraph 36(3)(c) of the Act is “to
allow the Minister to take into consideration the unique facts of each
particular case and to consider whether the overall situation warrants a
finding that the individual has been rehabilitated”. Information significant to
this determination would include: the nature of the offence, the circumstances
under which it was committed, the length of time which has elapsed and whether
there have been previous or subsequent offences (at paragraph 18).
[44]
Implicit
in the concept of rehabilitation is the acknowledgement that the person has
already participated in some type of conduct from which he or she needs to be
rehabilitated. In the present case, for the applicant, that conduct was the
criminal convictions and the breach of immigration laws. Rehabilitation is
forward looking, that is, is he likely to continue in this or similar conduct?
[45]
CIC’s
“Evaluating Inadmissibility” policy (ENF 2/OP18), the matter to be considered
in an application for criminal rehabilitation is whether an applicant is likely
to commit another violation of the criminal law. It was put this way in section
13.6 of the same policy:
Whereas
criminal rehabilitation is specific and results in a decision that the person is
not likely to re-offend, the concept of national interest is much broader. The
consideration of national interest involves the assessment and balancing of all
factors pertaining to the applicant’s entry into Canada against the stated
objectives of the Immigration and Refugee Act as well as Canada’s domestic and international interests and obligations.
[46]
The
following factors were listed in the officer’s decision in favour of and
against the applicant’s rehabilitation:
In favour of rehabilitation:
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No criminal activity
since being paroled in 1998;
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Canadian wife and
children;
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Applicant’s statement
that prison changed his life and rehabilitated him;
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Active member in
church and community;
-
Positive reference
letters from members of his community;
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Prompt application
for work permit to support his family; and,
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Owner and operator of
growing construction business.
Against rehabilitation:
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Past convictions of
serious criminality;
-
Failure to apply for
rehabilitation before entering Canada;
-
Applicant was not
eligible for rehabilitation when he entered Canada;
-
Application did not
abide to US law and was therefore deported;
-
Applicant showed lack
of respect to US law by lying to police officer;
-
Applicant’s
application for judicial review of decision denying his refugee claim was
dismissed;
-
Deportation order
issued against applicant in 2008; and,
-
Applicant is
currently in non-compliance with Canadian immigration law.
[47]
I am
satisfied that the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the factors favouring
rehabilitation must be that the applicant has presented evidence, that when
properly considered, shows that he has been rehabilitated. I am of the view
that the officer attributed too much importance to the fact that the applicant
had past criminal activity as opposed to the likelihood that he would be
involved in future criminal or unlawful activity. For this reason, the
officer’s decision was unreasonable and must be set aside. The application for
judicial review is allowed and the matter is referred to a different officer
for redetermination in accordance with these reasons.
[48]
Neither
party wished to submit a proposed serious question of general importance for my
consideration for certification.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that
the application for judicial review is allowed and
the matter is referred to a different officer for redetermination.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant
Statutory Provisions
Federal
Courts Act, RSC 1985, c
F-7
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18.1 . . . (4) The
Federal Court may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that
the federal board, commission or other tribunal
(a) acted
without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise
its jurisdiction;
(b) failed
to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure
that it was required by law to observe;
(c) erred
in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears on
the face of the record;
(d) based
its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it;
(e) acted,
or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or
(f) acted
in any other way that was contrary to law.
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18.1
. . .(4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3) sont prises si la Cour
fédérale est convaincue que l’office fédéral, selon le cas :
a) a agi
sans compétence, outrepassé celle-ci ou refusé de l’exercer;
b) n’a
pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou d’équité procédurale ou toute
autre procédure qu’il était légalement tenu de respecter;
c) a
rendu une décision ou une ordonnance entachée d’une erreur de droit, que
celle-ci soit manifeste ou non au vu du dossier;
d) a
rendu une décision ou une ordonnance fondée sur une conclusion de fait
erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des
éléments dont il dispose;
e) a agi
ou omis d’agir en raison d’une fraude ou de faux témoignages;
f) a
agi de toute autre façon contraire à la loi.
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Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27
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36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign
national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for . . .
(b) having been convicted of an offence outside
Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act
of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10
years; or . . .
(2) A foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of
criminality for . . .
(b) having been convicted outside Canada of an
offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable offence
under an Act of Parliament, or of two offences not arising out of a single
occurrence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute offences under an
Act of Parliament;
(3) The following provisions govern subsections (1)
and (2):
. . .
(c) the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)(b) and
(c) and (2)(b) and (c) do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of a
permanent resident or foreign national who, after the prescribed period,
satisfies the Minister that they have been rehabilitated or who is a member
of a prescribed class that is deemed to have been rehabilitated; . . .
72. (1) Judicial review by the Federal Court
with respect to any matter — a decision, determination or order made, a
measure taken or a question raised — under this Act is commenced by making an
application for leave to the Court.
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36. (1) Emportent interdiction
de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants :
. . .
b) être déclaré coupable, à
l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait
une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au
moins dix ans;
(2) Emportent, sauf pour le résident
permanent, interdiction de territoire pour criminalité les faits suivants :
. . .
b) être déclaré coupable, à
l’extérieur du Canada, d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait
une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation ou de
deux infractions qui ne découlent pas des mêmes faits et qui, commises au
Canada, constitueraient des infractions à des lois fédérales;
(3) Les dispositions suivantes
régissent l’application des paragraphes (1) et (2) : . . .
c) les faits visés aux alinéas (1)b)
ou c) et (2)b) ou c) n’emportent pas interdiction de territoire pour le
résident permanent ou l’étranger qui, à l’expiration du délai réglementaire,
convainc le ministre de sa réadaptation ou qui appartient à une catégorie
réglementaire de personnes présumées réadaptées; . . .
72. (1) Le contrôle judiciaire
par la Cour fédérale de toute mesure — décision, ordonnance, question ou
affaire — prise dans le cadre de la présente loi est subordonné au dépôt
d’une demande d’autorisation.
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