Date: 20070829
Docket: T-1846-06
Citation: 2007 FC 866
Ottawa, Ontario, August 29,
2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Harrington
BETWEEN:
PLAMEN
KOZAROV
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
Plamen
Kozarov is a Canadian citizen; not a very good one, but a citizen nevertheless.
He is a convicted drug dealer. He is currently serving a sentence in the United
States
for having distributed not less than 100 kilos of cocaine, 100 kilos of
marijuana and 97,000 units of Ecstasy.
[2]
In
accordance with the treaty between Canada and the United
States
and the International Transfer of Offenders Act, he applied to serve the
remainder of his sentence here. The American authorities have consented, but
our Minister, the Honourable Stockwell Day, did not. He denied the application
for the following reasons:
The offender has spent at least the past
ten years in the United
States.
File information suggests the offender
left Canada with no intention of
returning.
File information states that there do not
appear sufficient ties in Canada to warrant a transfer.
[3]
This
is a judicial review of his decision. In fact, he made the same decision twice.
He was asked to reconsider. He did so but maintained his position as quoted
above.
[4]
The
Minister based himself upon subsections 10(1)(b) and (c) of the Act which
provide:
10. (1)
In determining whether to consent to the transfer of a Canadian offender, the
Minister shall consider the following factors:
[…]
(b)
whether the offender left or remained outside Canada with the intention of
abandoning Canada as their place of permanent residence;
(c)
whether the offender has social or family ties in Canada; and
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10. (1) Le ministre tient compte des
facteurs ci-après pour décider s'il consent au transfèrement du délinquant
canadien :
[…]
b) le délinquant a quitté le Canada
ou est demeuré à l'étranger avec l'intention de ne plus considérer le Canada
comme le lieu de sa résidence permanente;
c) le délinquant a des liens
sociaux ou familiaux au Canada;
|
[5]
Mr.
Kozarov submits that in the circumstances of this case the Act did not
authorize the Minister to deny his return to Canada. However, if
they do, the relevant provisions of the Act violate his mobility rights as set
out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 6(1) thereof
confirms:
6.
(1) Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and
leave Canada.
|
6. (1) Tout citoyen canadien a le droit
de demeurer au Canada, d'y entrer ou d'en sortir.
|
BACKGROUND
[6]
Mr.
Kozarov is 52 years of age. He was born and raised in Bulgaria. After
spending a year in Italy, he came to Canada as a refugee in 1977.
While here, he became romantically involved with a Canadian citizen. In 1982,
he himself became a citizen. The same year they moved to Florida, apparently
because her parents had moved there and she wanted to be close to them. While
there, they had a daughter in 1983 and subsequently married in 1984. The
marriage broke up. His wife and daughter returned to Canada where they
remain. By 1996 they were divorced.
[7]
He
had no legal status in the United States but nevertheless spent most
of his time there, although at first, he did travel back and forth to Canada. In 1995,
however, he was arrested in Buffalo by the United States
Immigration Service and charged with a violation of American immigration laws.
He returned to Canada, but afterwards re-entered the United States allegedly to
be closer to his now former father-in-law and to look after his business
interests. Thereafter, he only returned here once. In the summer of 2001, he
made a road trip across Canada with his then current girlfriend whom he
married in Las
Vegas
in 2003. Her exact status in Canada is unclear.
[8]
In
September 2003, he was arrested in Florida and charged with
Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute detectable amounts of cocaine,
marijuana and Ecstasy. He subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 5
years and 10 months imprisonment and ordered deported from the United States to
Canada once his
sentence was served.
[9]
After
the conviction, but before filing the application under review, his wife
established a residence in Canada, but has shuttled back and forth to the United
States
visiting him in prison and looking after their business interests.
[10]
As
part of the application process the American authorities prepared a case
summary and the Canadian authorities conducted a community assessment on his
wife and attempted to conduct one on his daughter. She initially refused. The
Americans approved his transfer in January 2006. However the Act also requires Canada’s consent.
In May 2006, the Minister refused for the reasons given above.
[11]
Mr.
Kozarov asked that the matter be reconsidered, and his daughter then consented
to a community assessment. However, in October the Minister maintained his
earlier decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[12]
Leaving
the Charter aside, the courts should not readily interfere with a discretionary
decision of a Minister. It was held in Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Canada,
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, 44 N.R. 354 that the courts, wherever possible, avoid a
narrow technical construction and endeavour to make effective the intent of the
legislature. As stated by Mr. Justice McIntyre at pages 7 and 8:
Where the statutory discretion has been
exercised in good faith and, where required, in accordance with the principles
of natural justice, and where reliance has not been placed on considerations
irrelevant or extraneous to the statutory purpose, the courts should not
interfere.
[13]
Since
then, the concept of a pragmatic and functional approach to judicial review has
been fully developed.
[14]
Even
under this approach, decisions of Ministers of the Crown, in the exercise of
discretionary administrative powers, usually receive the highest standard of
deference, that is to say they are not disturbed unless patently unreasonable (Mount
Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001
SCC 41, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281), although in certain circumstances the standard of
reasonableness simplicitor applies (Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, [1999] S.C.J. No. 39). Relying on the
principles enumerated by the Supreme Court of Canada in such cases as Dr. Q
v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19, [2003]
1 S.C.R. 226, and Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, 2003 SCC
20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, I am of the opinion that the Minister’s
discretionary decision should be assessed against the standard of patent
unreasonableness.
[15]
However,
on legal interpretation the standard of review is correctness. The Minister is
owed no deference.
[16]
The
first step is to determine whether on the applicable standards of judicial
review Mr. Kozarov’s application should be granted. If so, there is no need to
consider the Charter. If not, the question arises whether the relevant sections
of the Act offend. As required, Mr. Kozarov filed and served a notice of
constitutional question.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER
OF OFFENDERS ACT
[17]
The
following provisions of the Act, the full title of which is “An Act to
implement treaties and administrative arrangements on the international
transfer of persons found guilty of criminal offences” are relevant:
2. […]"Canadian
offender"
«délinquant canadien »
"Canadian offender" means a Canadian citizen
within the meaning of the Citizenship […]
8. (1) The consent of the three parties to
a transfer — the offender, the foreign entity and Canada — is required.
[…]
10. (1) In determining whether to consent to the transfer
of a Canadian offender, the Minister shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the offender's return to Canada would
constitute a threat to the security of Canada;
(b) whether the offender left or remained outside Canada with the intention
of abandoning Canada as their place of permanent residence;
(c) whether the offender has social or family ties
in Canada; and
(d) whether the foreign entity or its prison
system presents a serious threat to the offender's security or human rights.
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2.
«délinquant canadien »
"Canadian offender"
«délinquant canadien » Citoyen canadien au sens de la Loi sur
la citoyenneté […]
8. (1) Le transfèrement nécessite le consentement des
trois parties en cause, soit le délinquant, l'entité étrangère et le Canada.
[…]
10. (1) Le
ministre tient compte des facteurs ci-après pour décider s'il consent au
transfèrement du délinquant canadien :
a) le
retour au Canada du délinquant peut constituer une menace pour la sécurité du
Canada;
b) le
délinquant a quitté le Canada ou est demeuré à l'étranger avec l'intention de
ne plus considérer le Canada comme le lieu de sa résidence permanente;
c) le
délinquant a des liens sociaux ou familiaux au Canada;
d)
l'entité étrangère ou son système carcéral constitue une menace sérieuse pour
la sécurité du délinquant ou ses droits de la personne.
|
[18]
Apart
from the Charter, Mr. Kozarov submits that the Minister erred in his
interpretation of section 8 and that his discretion was not exercised in good
faith, or was based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
[19]
It
was argued that once Mr. Kozarov applied for a transfer and the American
authorities agreed, the Minister’s consent under section 8 was limited to
determining whether or not he was a Canadian citizen. That cannot be so. That
is a fact-finding mission, not a discretionary decision. It is clear that
subsection 10(1) as opposed to subsection 10(2) only applies to “Canadian
offenders” i.e. Canadian citizens.
[20]
The
language is unambiguous. Section 10 cannot be internally read down within the
Statute. Indeed, I find no inconsistency between the stated purpose of the Act
as set out in section 3, and subsections 10(1)(b) and (c). Although Mr. Kozarov
is a citizen, it can hardly be said he is a member of the community. Only if
two interpretations are possible is it presumed that Parliament did not intend
to legislate contrary to international law and to Canada’s
international obligations. (See for example R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 26 at paragraph 39)
[21]
In
any event, the section 10 factors, taken into account by the international
community with respect to the transfer of prisoners from one jurisdiction to
another, are fairly new, and fairly fluid. The sections relied upon by the
Minister do not offend international law. By letter issued in November 1991,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations presented the Permanent
Representative of Canada to the United Nations (Vienna) with “a Model treaty on
the transfer of supervision of offenders conditionally sentenced or conditionally
released” The model requires the consent of the state to whom the prisoner
would be transferred. Article 7 goes on to provide, among other things, that
“acceptance may be refused where: a) the sentenced person is not an ordinary
resident in the administering state”.
[22]
Section
10 is neither all inclusive, nor does it require the Minister to either give or
refuse consent depending on whether the factors set out therein are met.
[23]
The
Minister had conflicting advice. The Director General of the Offender Programs
and Reintegration, Correctional Services of Canada, recommended he approve the
transfer. However, one “Sharif” came to the opposite conclusion. The security
classification of his or her memorandum was “confidential – not for
distribution”. Subsection 10(1) was considered in its entirety. Apart from the
factors on which the Minister based his decision, Sharif reported, quite
correctly, it would appear, that Mr. Kozarov’s return would not constitute a
threat to Canada’s security, that there was no basis to suppose he would commit
a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence, and that the United
States prison system did not present a serious threat to his security or human
rights.
[24]
The
Minister took advice, but he took the decision. He did not delegate. The
findings that Mr. Kozarov had spent at least the last ten years in the United
States, that he left Canada with no intention of returning, and that there did
not appear to be sufficient ties in Canada to warrant a transfer, were not unreasonable,
must less patently so.
[25]
Mr.
Kozarov would have it that as long as he had any tie to Canada, a transfer
would be warranted. I do not read section 10 that way, but, as aforesaid, it does
not exhaust the Minister’s discretion. Mr. Kozarov goes on to suggest that the
Minister acted in bad faith and had an agenda beyond that expressed by
Parliament in such acts as the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, which
would apply if he were to serve the remainder of his sentence here. Because of
our system of parole, it is quite possible that Mr. Kozarov could get out on
the street a lot sooner in Canada, than in the United States. However,
there is no evidence in the file to justify that allegation, and so it is not
entitled to consideration.
[26]
Mr.
Kozarov makes much of the fact that he is a naturalized Canadian, not
native-born. The suggestion is that he is being stripped of his citizenship.
There is no merit to that suggestion. Had he been born in Canada, but was
ordinarily resident somewhere else for the past 25 years, he would have been
treated the same way.
CHARTER MOBILITY RIGHTS
[27]
Mr.
Kozarov’s current restrictions on his mobility arise from his own actions, his
own criminal activities. A natural and foreseeable consequence of a criminal
conviction is that the state in which the offence is committed and in which the
offender may be found may incarcerate him. Once Mr. Kozarov serves his
sentence, he has the absolute right, as a citizen, to return here. The same
holds true if his current sentence were commuted, or if he were pardoned. All
citizens, unlike foreigners and permanent residents, have that constitutional
mobility right (see Catenacci v. Canada (Attorney
General),
2006 FC 539, 144 C.R.R. (2d) 128).
[28]
However
the American authorities have put a condition on his transfer. The condition is
that he serve his sentence here. Upon his transfer he could not immediately
invoke his constitutional right as a citizen to leave Canada. His freedom
would properly be restricted in accordance with the Corrections and Conditional
Release Act. I have come to the conclusion that neither section 8 of the International
Transfer of Offenders Act which requires the consent of the offender, the
foreign entity and Canada nor subsections 10(1) (b) and (c) which call upon the
Minister to consider whether Mr. Kozarov has social or family ties here or
whether he left or remained outside Canada with the intention of abandoning
Canada as his place of permanent residence offends his mobility rights under
the Charter.
[29]
Consequently,
it is not necessary to consider whether the challenged provisions can be saved
as “reasonable limits prescribed by law” that are “demonstratively justified in
a free and democratic society” under section 1 of the Charter as set out in the
four-step test enunciated in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R.
(4th) 200 and subsequent cases. In coming to the conclusion that
sections 8 and subsections 10(1)(b) and (c) do not offend against Charter
mobility rights. I have considered the case law relating to extradition, the
case particularly urged upon me by Mr. Kozarov (Van Vlymen v. Canada (Solicitor
General),
2004 FC 1054, [2005] 1 F.C.R. 617) and the recent Supreme Court case relied
upon by the Minister (R. v. Hape, above).
[30]
Extradition
affects a citizen’s right to remain in Canada, and so
brings section 6 of the Charter into play. The State is active in such cases,
not passive as in this. In United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1469, (1989) 48 CCC (3d) 193, the constitutional questions were whether
the surrender of a Canadian citizen to a foreign state constituted an
infringement of his right to remain in Canada, and if so, would a surrender in
the circumstances of that case constitute a reasonable limit under section 1.
The United
States
requested Mr. Cotroni’s extradition on a charge of conspiracy to possess and
distribute heroin. However, all his personal actions relating to the alleged
conspiracy took place while he was in Canada.
[31]
The
Court held that Mr. Cotroni’s mobility rights were affected, but the relevant
provisions of the Extradition Act were saved by section 1. To my way of
thinking, the key to that case is at page 1480 where Mr. Justice La Forest said:
The
right to remain in one's country is of such a character that if it is to be interfered
with, such interference must be justified as being required to meet a
reasonable state purpose.
However, he went on to say at page 1482:
An
accused may return to Canada following his trial and acquittal or, if
he has been convicted, after
he has served his sentence. The impact of extradition on the
rights of a citizen to remain in Canada appears to me to be of secondary
importance. In fact, so far as Canada and the United States are concerned, a
person convicted may, in some cases, be permitted to serve his sentence in Canada; see
Transfer of Offenders Act,
S.C. 1977-78, c. 9.
[Emphasis added]
That Act was replaced by the current International
Transfer of Offenders Act.
[32]
In
this case, it was Mr. Kozarov who chose to leave Canada and to
commit a crime in the United States. He has the absolute
mobility right, as a Canadian citizen, to return to Canada once his
sentence is served. At the present time, we are not really speaking of mobility
rights at all. We are rather speaking of the transfer of supervision of a
prison sentence. Had the Minister given his consent, Mr. Kozarov could not on
his arrival here have immediately asserted his mobility right to leave the
country.
[33]
The
Minister’s reliance upon R. v. Hape, above, is misplaced. That case
dealt with the extraterritorial application of the Charter as regards police
activity outside Canada. The activity in question in this case, the
decision of the Minister, was made in Canada. If one were to say the
Charter had no application to Mr. Kozarov while he was outside Canada, then his
constitutional right to return to Canada, once his sentence is
served, would be violated.
[34]
I
do not think that the decision of Mr. Justice Russell in Van Vlymen,
above, assists Mr. Kozarov. Although he held that Mr. Van Vlymen, as a Canadian
citizen, had the constitutional right by virtue of section 6 of the Charter to
enter Canada provided he remained incarcerated, subject only to his securing
the approval of the U.S. authorities, and such reasonable limits as Parliament
might prescribe by law, and can be demonstratively justified in a free and
democratic society as per section 1 of the Charter, the facts of that case have
to be carefully considered. The Minister was found to have neglected or to have
deliberately failed to consider Mr. Van Vlymen’s request for transfer for close
to ten years. In additional to breaching the Charter, it was held that the
Minister breached his common law duty to act fairly in processing Mr. Van
Vlymen’s application.
[35]
The
driving force of that decision was the failure to decide within a reasonable
time frame. That is not the case here.
[36]
The
section 10 provisions relied upon the Minister in this case were at that time
found in regulations under the now repealed Transfer of Offenders Act.
Mr. Justice Russell noted that the impugned regulations were not used to refuse
Mr. Van Vlymen’s transfer back to Canada (see paragraphs 106 and
109), and that the constitutionality of those regulations did not arise on the
facts of the case.
[37]
I
would dismiss the application for judicial review with costs, and answer the
constitutional questions as follows. Is the applicant entitled to:
a.
A
declaration that … [Mr. Kozarov] by virtue of his Canadian citizenship and s.
6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, has a
constitutional right to enter Canada, and that the Respondent Minister has no
lawful jurisdiction to deny, refuge or postpone such entry and return to
Canada;
b.
A
declaration that the Respondent Minister is obliged and is under a legal duty
to approve the Applicant’s application for transfer pursuant to the … [International
Transfer of Offenders Act] and s. 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, subject only to the Applicant being a Canadian citizen.
c.
A declaration
that the provisions of the …[International Transfer of Offenders Act],
namely, s. 8(1) and s. 10, and in particular s. 10(1)(b) and (c) are
unconstitutional as being inconsistent with s. 6(1) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and, as such, are of no force or effect by virtue of
s. 52 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
d.
A
declaration that the constitutional rights of the applicant, pursuant to s. 6
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, have been violated by
the Respondent Minister since approximately January 11, 2006, when the United
States of American approved his transfer back to Canada, and therefore that the
Applicant is entitled to an appropriate and just remedy, pursuant to s. 24(1)
of the Charter, including an order for his immediate transfer back to
Canada pursuant to the terms of the… [International Transfer of Offenders
Act], and the applicable treaty or convention between Canada and the United States of America.
The answer is: no.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the
application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister made 5 October
2006, maintaining his earlier decision made on 23 May 2006, denying the
applicant’s transfer to Canada, is dismissed, with costs.
“Sean Harrington”