Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247,
2003 SCC 20
Law Society of New Brunswick Appellant
v.
Michael A. A. Ryan Respondent
and
Federation of Law Societies of Canada Intervener
Indexed as: Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan
Neutral citation: 2003 SCC 20.
File No.: 28639.
2002: October 1; 2003: April 3.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Iacobucci, Major, Binnie,
Arbour, LeBel and Deschamps JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for new brunswick
Administrative law — Judicial review — Standard of
review — Professional disciplinary bodies — Barristers and solicitors —
Professional misconduct — Discipline Committee of Law Society finding lawyer’s
conduct to be serious breach of professional standards warranting disbarment — Court of Appeal substituting own sanction of indefinite
suspension with conditions for reinstatement — Whether level of
deference involved in standard of reasonableness simpliciter varies according
to particular circumstances — Whether Court of Appeal erred in setting aside
disbarment — Whether Court of Appeal properly applied reasonableness
simpliciter standard.
The respondent lawyer was admitted to the New
Brunswick Bar in 1984 and carried on a private law practice. In 1999, a
complaint was filed against him by two of his clients. In 1993, the clients
had sought the respondent’s legal advice with respect to their dismissal by
their employer and gave him a small cash retainer to represent them for
wrongful dismissal. For five and a half years, the respondent did nothing to
advance the claims. To disguise his inattention to his clients’ interests, the
respondent spun an elaborate web of deceit. He lied to his clients making it
seem as if he was taking action on their behalf and placing the blame for
delays on others. In response to persistent requests for information, the
respondent gave his clients a forged decision of the New Brunswick Court of
Appeal dealing with their case. Moreover, the respondent falsely told his
clients that a contempt motion against the defendants was granted and that they
had been awarded $19,000 and $18,000 respectively. He then invented
significant delays and appeal periods that prevented his clients from
collecting these sums. Finally, he admitted to his clients that the “whole
thing was a lie”, at which time the clients filed a complaint with the Law
Society. The complaint was referred to the Law Society’s Discipline Committee,
which decided that the respondent should be disbarred. The respondent appealed
this decision and made a motion to adduce medical evidence to show that he was
under a mental disability contributing to his misconduct. The Court of Appeal
ordered that the case be reopened before the Discipline Committee for the
purpose of hearing and deciding on this medical evidence. After considering
the medical and psychiatric evidence, the Discipline Committee confirmed its
earlier decision that disbarment was the appropriate sanction. The Court of
Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal and substituted its own sanction of
indefinite suspension with conditions for reinstatement.
Held: The
appeal should be allowed and the order of the Discipline Committee restored.
There are only three standards for judicial review of
administrative decisions: correctness, reasonableness simpliciter and
patent unreasonableness. Additional standards should not be developed unless
there are questions of judicial review to which the three existing standards
are obviously unsuited. The pragmatic and functional approach will determine,
in each case, which of these three standards is appropriate. Although there is
a statutory appeal from decisions of the Discipline Committee, the expertise of
the Committee, the purpose of its enabling statute, and the nature of the
question in dispute all suggest a more deferential standard of review than
correctness. A consideration of these four contextual factors leads to the
conclusion that the appropriate standard is reasonableness simpliciter.
The reasonableness standard does not float along a
spectrum of deference such that it is sometimes quite close to correctness and
sometimes quite close to patent unreasonableness. The question that must be
asked every time the pragmatic and functional approach directs reasonableness
as the standard is whether the reasons, taken as a whole, are tenable as
support for the decision. The suggestion that reasonableness allows for more
or less deferential articulations would require that the court ask different
questions of the decision depending on the circumstances. This would be
incompatible with the idea of a meaningful standard which imposes deferential
self‑discipline on reviewing courts. Where the appropriate standard is
reasonableness simpliciter, a court must not interfere unless the party
seeking review has positively shown that the decision, taken as a whole, was
unreasonable.
A decision will be unreasonable only if there is no
line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the
tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived. If
any of the reasons that are sufficient to support the conclusion are tenable in
the sense that they can stand up to a somewhat probing examination, then the
decision will not be unreasonable and a reviewing court must not interfere.
This means that a decision may satisfy the standard if it is supported by a
tenable explanation even if this explanation is not one that the reviewing
court finds compelling. It also means that a reviewing court should not seize
on one or more mistakes which do not affect the decision as a whole. It is
important to remember that there will not often be only one “right answer” to
an issue reviewed against the reasonableness standard.
There is nothing unreasonable about the Discipline
Committee’s decision to ban a member from practising law when his repeated
conduct involved an egregious departure from the rules of professional ethics
and had the effect of undermining public confidence in basic legal
institutions. The Discipline Committee considered and weighed conflicting
medical evidence and then concluded that the reasons that it originally gave
for disbarring the respondent suggested disbarment even in light of this fresh
evidence. Since the Discipline Committee provided reasons in support of its
choice of sanction that were tenable and grounded in the evidence, its decision
was not unreasonable and the Court of Appeal should not have interfered.
Cases Cited
Applied: Pushpanathan
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; referred to: Law Society of
the Northwest Territories v. Jakubowski, [1995] L.S.D.D. No. 48 (QL); Markus
v. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (1989), 90 N.S.R. (2d) 156; U.E.S.,
Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048; Dr. Q v. College of
Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003
SCC 19; Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002]
4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; Pezim v. British Columbia
(Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; Canada (Director of
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748; Canada
(Deputy Minister of National Revenue) v. Mattel Canada Inc., [2001] 2
S.C.R. 100, 2001 SCC 36; Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio‑Television
and Telecommunications Commission), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722; Committee for
the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities
Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, 2001 SCC 37; United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd.,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 316; Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 869; Re Law Society of Manitoba and Savino (1983), 1
D.L.R. (4th) 285; Moreau‑Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council),
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11; Canada (Attorney General) v. Public
Service Alliance of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941; Centre communautaire
juridique de l’Estrie v. Sherbrooke (City), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 84.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Law Society Act, 1996, S.N.B. 1996, c. 89, preamble, ss. 5, 55(1), 55(4), 60(1),
66(1), 68.
Authors Cited
Dyzenhaus, David. “The Politics
of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed., The
Province of Administrative Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997, 279.
Stager, David A. A., and Harry W.
Arthurs. Lawyers in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1990.
APPEAL from a judgment of New Brunswick Court of
Appeal (2001), 236 N.B.R. (2d) 243, [2001] N.B.J. No. 117 (QL), 2001 NBCA 37,
allowing the respondent’s appeal from a decision of the Law Society of New
Brunswick Discipline Committee. Appeal allowed.
J. C. Marc Richard and Chantal
A. Thibodeau, for the appellant.
D. Leslie Smith, Q.C.,
for the respondent.
Gavin MacKenzie and Adam
M. Dodek, for the intervener.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Iacobucci J. —
I. Introduction
1
According to the governing jurisprudence, a court reviewing the decision
of an administrative tribunal should employ the pragmatic and functional
approach to determine the level of deference to be accorded to the decision in
question. The appropriate level of deference will, in turn, determine which of
the three standards of review the court should apply to the decision:
correctness, reasonableness simpliciter, or patent unreasonableness.
2
The controversy in this case concerns a statutory appeal from the
decision of a professional disciplinary body to disbar a lawyer whose conduct,
all parties admit, amounted to an egregious departure from professional
standards of practice. As will be discussed in these reasons, the appropriate
standard of review is reasonableness. Viewed as a whole, the decision of the
disciplinary body is supported by tenable reasons which are grounded in the
evidentiary record; therefore, it was not an unreasonable decision.
Accordingly, I would allow the appeal.
II. Facts
3
Michael A. A. Ryan was admitted to what is now the New Brunswick Law
Society in 1984. He carried on a private law practice. In 1999, a complaint was
filed against him by Grant Trider and Ronald Stewart. Six years earlier,
Trider and Stewart had approached Mr. Ryan, seeking his legal advice with
respect to their dismissal by their employer Unipress. After receiving a copy
of the collective agreement that governed their employment relationships, Mr.
Ryan told Stewart and Trider that they had a “strong civil case”. Stewart and
Trider gave Ryan a small cash retainer and instructed him to represent them for
wrongful dismissal.
4
For five and a half years, Mr. Ryan did nothing to advance the claims of
his clients. However, it would be false to say that this was a period of total
inactivity. To disguise his inattention to his clients’ interests, Mr. Ryan
spun an elaborate web of deceit. He lied to Stewart and Trider, making it seem
as if he was taking action on their behalf and placing the blame for delays on
others, including other members of the New Brunswick Bar. Mr. Ryan told his
clients that discoveries were taking place when none had been scheduled. On
one occasion, he called his clients to a hotel for the purpose of discovery. At
the meeting, he falsely told them that the discovery was cancelled because the
other side had failed to attend. Mr. Ryan told his clients that another lawyer
was representing the defendant when in fact no other lawyer was involved. Mr.
Ryan told his clients that he had succeeded in having the defence struck which
was untrue. He told them that the defendant appealed this decision; this was
also a lie. Some 16 to 18 months later, Mr. Ryan told his clients that, as a
result of a decision of the Court of Appeal, he would have to “start the case
from scratch”; again, this was untrue. Then Mr. Ryan did something even
worse.
5
In response to their persistent requests for information, Mr. Ryan gave
his clients what appeared to be a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
dealing with their case. The seven-page judgment was in fact forged by Mr.
Ryan.
6
Mr. Ryan falsely told his clients that he had filed a contempt motion
against the defendants for failing to appear for discovery. He later falsely
told them that the motion was granted and that they had been awarded $19,000
and $18,000 respectively at a subsequent “damages hearing”. Mr. Ryan
invented significant delays and appeal periods that prevented his clients from
collecting these sums. Finally, on March 24, 1999, Mr. Ryan admitted to his
clients over the telephone that the “whole thing was a lie”. The clients filed
the complaint that initiated this action.
7
The complaint was referred to the Discipline Committee of the Law
Society of New Brunswick pursuant to the Law Society Act, 1996, S.N.B.
1996, c. 89 (the “Act”). Mr. Ryan testified before the Discipline Committee.
He was apologetic and contrite and admitted his fault. Mr. Ryan had been
disciplined by the Law Society twice before. On both previous occasions, Mr.
Ryan had been reprimanded for failing to carry out services for his clients.
The only issue before the Discipline Committee on this third occasion was the
sanction that should be applied to Mr. Ryan.
8
Mr. Ryan testified that he had suffered emotional and physical health
problems following a separation from his wife in 1992. He told the Committee
that he abused alcohol during this period and had panic attacks for which he
took medication. He said that he began to feel better but then had a bout of
mononucleosis in 1994. When he finally recovered from that illness, he
believed that the limitation period for his clients’ action had expired.
Instead of confronting his clients, he “buried the file”. Mr. Ryan testified
that he had plans to commit suicide in 1997. He also planned to admit himself
into a psychiatric ward, but Mr. Ryan said that he changed his mind because
there were too many people at the hospital who might have recognized him.
9
Mr. Ryan met once with a psychiatrist who gave him a prescription for a
pharmaceutical product. Mr. Ryan never filled the prescription. Except for
this one meeting and the continuing treatment for his anxiety attacks, Mr. Ryan
did not seek any medical or therapeutic intervention during the relevant
period.
10
The Discipline Committee decided that Mr. Ryan should be disbarred. Mr.
Ryan appealed this decision and at the same time made a motion to adduce
medical evidence to show that he was under a mental disability contributing to
his misconduct. The Court of Appeal ordered that the case be reopened before
the Discipline Committee for the limited purpose of hearing and deciding on
this medical evidence. The Law Society was allowed to adduce contrary medical
evidence. After considering this medical and psychiatric evidence at a second
hearing, the Discipline Committee confirmed its earlier decision that
disbarment was the appropriate sanction in the circumstances.
11
The Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Ryan’s appeal from the second decision
of the Discipline Committee and substituted its own sanction of indefinite
suspension with conditions for reinstatement. The Law Society is now appealing
to this Court to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and to restore
the decision of the Discipline Committee.
III. Judgments in Appeal
A. Discipline Committee of the Law Society of New Brunswick
(1) First Decision of the Discipline
Committee (November 26, 1999)
12
The only issue before the Discipline Committee was the appropriate
sanction given Mr. Ryan’s admitted misconduct. After reviewing the evidence,
the Committee concluded that the circumstances warranted Mr. Ryan’s
disbarment. In reaching this conclusion, the Committee considered the facts of
the case, as well as the holdings in two decisions where, in the face of
similar misconduct, disciplinary committees outside New Brunswick decided to
disbar lawyers: Law Society of the Northwest Territories v. Jakubowski,
[1995] L.S.D.D. No. 48 (QL), and Markus v. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society
(1989), 90 N.S.R. (2d) 156 (S.C., App. Div.). The Discipline Committee noted
that the regime of professional self‑government obliged it to consider
each case on its own facts in light of prevailing professional standards, the
reasonable expectations of the public, and the public interest in the
administration of justice. The respondent’s conduct was an egregious breach of
professional standards. In the circumstances, only significant and compelling
factors could mitigate the seriousness of the breach. The mitigating factors
did not meet this standard. Against the backdrop of Mr. Ryan’s previous
disciplinary record, the nature and duration of his misconduct irreparably
undermined his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer. The Committee
ordered that the respondent be disbarred.
(2) Second Decision of the Discipline Committee (November 9,
2000)
13
The medical evidence introduced at the second hearing of the Discipline
Committee established that Mr. Ryan had suffered from a long-term substance
abuse problem. On the basis of expert testimony, the Discipline Committee
found that Mr. Ryan did not suffer from any other psychiatric illness that
could be diagnosed as long as he continued to use alcohol. The Committee found
that Mr. Ryan had not dedicated himself to the course of treatment recommended
by his doctor despite what Mr. Ryan knew to be the extremely serious
consequences of misconduct that he claimed was connected to his alcohol abuse.
In the Committee’s view, Mr. Ryan’s “tentative and sporadic pursuit of any
course of action designed to treat his illness and the consequences of his
illness highlighted . . . the futility of attempting to prescribe
meaningful conditions to any period of suspension”. The Committee did not say
that suspension would have been the appropriate sanction but for Mr. Ryan’s
failure to dedicate himself to treatment. The Discipline Committee confirmed
that disbarment was the appropriate sanction in the circumstances.
B. New Brunswick
Court of Appeal, Second Decision (2001), 236 N.B.R. (2d) 243, 2001 NBCA 37
(1) Selection of the Standard of Review
14
To determine the standard against which it should review the decision of
the Discipline Committee, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal relied on some of
its earlier decisions and the decisions of other appellate courts concerning
professional discipline bodies. On the basis of these cases, the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal concluded that “[i]t would appear that the more recent
decisions have moved the standard, on the spectrum between correctness and
patently unreasonable, closer to correctness” (para. 18).
15
Although the Court of Appeal settled on the standard of
“reasonableness”, it said this about the meaning of that standard: “on the
spectrum this standard is closer to correctness than patently unreasonable.
This is particularly so, as here, when you have the most serious of sanctions
being considered” (para. 21).
(2) Application of the Reasonableness
Standard
16
The Court of Appeal noted that a comparison of penalties assessed in
similar cases is an essential component in selecting a penalty in a
professional discipline matter (para. 22). While acknowledging that the
Discipline Committee’s initial decision relied heavily on comparisons with two
discipline decisions taken outside the province of New Brunswick (paras. 25‑27),
the Court of Appeal set out a series of New Brunswick discipline decisions that
Mr. Ryan referred to the court as being more analogous (para. 29). It appears
that the Court of Appeal accepted his submissions on this matter, concluding
that “the sanction imposed in this case was not similar to sanctions imposed by
the Respondent for similar offenses committed in similar circumstances” (para.
33). It appears that the Court of Appeal was not prepared to accept that
professional discipline decisions from outside New Brunswick could be
appropriate sources of comparison (para. 30). The Court of Appeal suggested
that the penalty of disbarment was so anomalous, when compared to penalties
assessed in similar cases, that the Discipline Committee was under an
obligation to explain the disparity (para. 33).
17
The substance of this analysis can be found in para. 33 of the Court of
Appeal’s judgment:
In addition, it is well accepted that disbarment
carries with it a stigma far greater than that of suspension. Consequently, it
is a more severe penalty than an indefinite suspension with conditions for
reinstatement. In our view, it is incumbent upon the Discipline Committee to
make comparisons with other cases and to indicate why this case is such an
anomalous case as to warrant such a clear disparity in sanction. We are of the
opinion that the sanction imposed in this case was not similar to sanctions
imposed by the Respondent for similar offenses committed in similar
circumstances. We are also of the view that insufficient weight was given to
the Appellant’s medical problems. Applying the standard of reasonableness to
this case, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Discipline Committee
was unreasonable and therefore requiring modification by this Court pursuant to
section 68 of the Law Society Act, supra.
18
The Court of Appeal therefore allowed the appeal and ordered that Mr.
Ryan be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law and that he could only
be reinstated after satisfying the Competence Committee of the Law Society,
through approved medical experts, that he was mentally and medically fit to
resume practice and then only on such terms and conditions as the Competence
Committee determined.
IV. Issues
19
This appeal raises the following issues:
(1) What is the appropriate standard of review of the disciplinary
sanction imposed by the Committee in this case?
(2) If reasonableness simpliciter is the appropriate standard
of review, does the level of deference involved in that standard vary according
to the particular circumstances?
(3) Should the respondent’s disbarment have been set aside by the
Court of Appeal on a proper application of the appropriate standard of review?
V. Analysis
20
In these reasons, I first address the question of how many standards
exist for judicial review of administrative decisions. I conclude that there
are only three standards: correctness, reasonableness, and patent
unreasonableness. Applying the pragmatic and functional approach to judicial
review of administrative action, I further conclude that the decision at issue
in this case must be reviewed against the standard of reasonableness. Next, I
set out the content of that standard. The standard of reasonableness simpliciter
does not “float” according to the circumstances but always basically involves
asking the same question about the challenged decision. Finally, I discuss the
application of the standard of reasonableness to the decision of the Discipline
Committee.
A. The Pragmatic and Functional Approach
21
The pragmatic and functional approach to review decisions of
administrative tribunals adopted in U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, will determine which standard is appropriate in the
judicial review of the choice of sanction by the Discipline Committee. As the
Chief Justice confirms in Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of
British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226, 2003 SCC 19, at para. 21, the
pragmatic and functional approach applies to judicial review, whether that
review is by way of application to the court or statutory right of appeal.
This means that courts must always select and employ the proper level of
deference. There is no shortcut past the components of the pragmatic and
functional approach as recently set out in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982.
22
At the outset, I will address a question that arises from the Court of
Appeal’s holding that: “on the spectrum this standard [of reasonableness] is
closer to correctness than patently unreasonable. This is particularly so, as
here, when you have the most serious of sanctions being considered” (para. 21).
This statement can be understood in two different ways: (1) that the pragmatic
and functional approach involves a choice among more than the three established
standards of review; or (2), that the level of deference involved in these
standards may shift according to the circumstances.
23
I will first address the suggestion that there are more than three
standards of review to which the pragmatic and functional approach may lead.
After doing so, I will apply the pragmatic and functional approach to this
case. Since I conclude that the reasonableness simpliciter standard is
appropriate, I will discuss whether the level of deference shifts within this
standard. Finally, I will elaborate the content of the reasonableness standard.
(1) How Many Standards Are Available in
Review of Administrative Decisions?
24
In the Court’s jurisprudence, only three standards of review have been
defined for judicial review of administrative action (Chamberlain v. Surrey
School District No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, 2002 SCC 86, at para. 5, per
McLachlin C.J.; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at para. 55; see also Pezim v. British Columbia
(Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557, at pp. 589‑90;
Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1
S.C.R. 748, at para. 30; Pushpanathan, supra, at para. 27). The
pragmatic and functional approach set out in Bibeault, supra, and
more recently in Pushpanathan, will determine, in each case, which of
these three standards is appropriate. I find it difficult, if not
impracticable to conceive more than three standards of review. In any case,
additional standards should not be developed unless there are questions of
judicial review to which the three existing standards are obviously unsuited.
25
To elaborate on this point, in Southam, supra, the Court
held that an unreasonable decision was one that did not stand up to a somewhat
probing analysis. It is not clear that there is helpful language to describe a
conceptually distinct fourth standard that would be less deferential than
reasonableness simpliciter but more deferential than correctness. At
this point, the multiplication of standards past the three already identified
would force reviewing courts and the parties that appear before them into
complex and technical debates at the outset. I am not convinced that the
increase in complexity generated by adding a fourth standard would lead to
greater precision in achieving the objectives of judicial review of
administrative action.
26
A pragmatic and functional approach should not be unworkable or highly
technical. Therefore I emphasize that, as presently developed, there are only
three standards. Thus a reviewing court must not interfere unless it can
explain how the administrative action is incorrect, unreasonable, or patently
unreasonable, depending on the appropriate standard.
(2) The Pragmatic and
Functional Approach Applied to the Disputed Decision
27
The pragmatic and functional approach determines the standard of review
in relation to four contextual factors: (1) the presence or absence of a
privative clause or statutory right of appeal; (2) the expertise of the
tribunal relative to that of the reviewing court on the issue in question; (3)
the purposes of the legislation and the provision in particular; and (4) the
nature of the question — law, fact, or mixed law and fact (Pushpanathan,
supra, at paras. 29-38; Dr. Q, supra, at para. 26).
(a) Presence or Absence of a Privative Clause
or Statutory Right of Appeal
28
There is no privative clause in the Act. Rather, there is a broad right
of appeal on questions of law or fact pursuant to s. 66(1):
66(1) Any respondent who is affected by a decision,
determination or order of the Competence or Discipline Committee may appeal to
the Court of Appeal on a question of law or fact.
The Court of
Appeal has a broad choice of remedies on appeal:
68 The Court of Appeal may make such order as may be just,
including referral to the Competence or Discipline Committee to act in
accordance with its directions.
29
The existence of a broad statutory right of appeal indicates that less
deference may be due to decisions of the Discipline Committee. However, as
Bastarache J. noted in Pushpanathan, supra, at para. 30: “The
absence of a privative clause does not imply a high standard of scrutiny, where
other factors bespeak a low standard.” The specialization of duties intended
by the legislature may warrant deference notwithstanding the absence of a
privative clause (Canada (Deputy Minister of National Revenue) v. Mattel
Canada Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2001 SCC 36, at para. 27; Bell Canada
v. Canada (Canadian Radio‑Television and Telecommunications Commission),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722, at pp. 1746‑47; Committee for the Equal
Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities Commission),
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 132, 2001 SCC 37, at para. 49; United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd.,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 316, at p. 335; Pezim, supra, at p. 591).
(b) The Expertise of the Discipline Committee
30
As the Chief Justice notes in Dr. Q, supra, at para. 28,
the question at this stage of the pragmatic and functional analysis is whether
the decision-making body has greater expertise than the reviewing court with
respect to the question under review. This expertise may be derived from
specialized knowledge about a topic or from experience and skill in the
determination of particular issues. At first glance, it may appear that the
discipline committee of a law society has no relative expertise since it is
composed of lawyers and lay appointees. Generally, judges will have been
members of a provincial law society and will know about the ethical and other
standards of practice to which those societies hold lawyers. That said, there
is nevertheless reason to expect that the Discipline Committee has superior
expertise relative to courts.
31
First, the Discipline Committee has greater expertise than courts in the
choice of sanction for breaches of professional standards. By s. 55(1)(a)
of the Act, the Discipline Committee is composed of a majority of members of
the Law Society who are subject to the same standards of professional practice
as the lawyers who come before them. Current members of the Law Society may be
more intimately acquainted with the ways that these standards play out in the
everyday practice of law than judges who no longer take part in the
solicitor-client relationship. Practising lawyers are uniquely positioned to
identify professional misconduct and to appreciate its severity (see Pearlman
v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 869, at p. 890;
Re Law Society of Manitoba and Savino (1983), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 285 (Man.
C.A.), at pp. 292-93); on the matter of expertise, see also Moreau‑Bérubé
v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11, at
paras. 43-53.
32
Second, members of the public are appointed to the Discipline Committee
pursuant to s. 55(1)(b) of the Act. There will always be one lay person
on a panel of the Committee by operation of s. 55(4). Although they will
presumably have less knowledge of legal practice than judges or the members of
the Law Society, lay persons may be in a better position to understand how
particular forms of conduct and choice of sanctions would affect the general
public’s perception of the profession and confidence in the administration of
justice. Since these are central concerns in the Act, the lay member of a
Discipline Committee provides an important perspective for the tribunal in
carrying out its duties.
33
Third, the Discipline Committee has relative expertise generated by
repeated application of the objectives of professional regulation set out in
the Act to specific cases in which misconduct is alleged. In each case, the Committee
will be called on to interpret those objectives in the factual context. This,
we can assume, will tend to generate a relatively superior capacity to draw
inferences from facts related to professional practice and also to assess the
frequency and level of threat to the public and to the legal profession posed
by certain forms of behaviour.
34
The Discipline Committee’s expertise is not in a specialized area
outside the general knowledge of most judges (such as securities regulation in Pezim,
supra, or competition regulation in Southam, supra).
However, owing to its composition and its familiarity with the particular issue
of imposing a sanction for professional misconduct in a variety of settings,
the Discipline Committee arguably has more expertise than courts on the
sanction to apply to the misconduct.
(c) Purpose of the Law
Society Act and the Disciplinary Process
35
The preamble of the Act suggests its purpose:
AND WHEREAS it is desirable, in the interests of
the public and the members of the legal profession, to continue the Law Society
of New Brunswick as a body corporate for the purposes of advancing and
maintaining the standard of legal practice in the Province, and of governing
and regulating the legal profession;
36
Clearly, a major objective of the Act is to create a self-regulating
professional body with the authority to set and maintain professional standards
of practice. This, in turn, requires that the Law Society perform its
paramount role of protecting the interests of the public. As D. A. A. Stager
writes in Lawyers in Canada (1990), at p. 31: “The privilege of
self-government is granted to professional organizations only in exchange for,
and to assist in, protecting the public interest with respect to the services
concerned” (see also Pearlman, supra, at pp. 887-88).
37
More specifically, the disciplinary process is meant to advance the
duties and objectives set out in s. 5 of the Act.
5 It is the object and duty of the Society
(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the
administration of justice,
(b) to preserve and protect the rights and freedoms of all
persons,
(c) to ensure the independence, integrity and honor of its
members,
(d) to establish standards for the education, professional
responsibility and competence of its members and applicants for membership,
(e) to regulate the legal profession, and
(f) subject to paragraphs (a) to (d), to uphold
and protect the interests of its members.
38
In any particular disciplinary proceeding, the Discipline Committee has
a broad discretion in respect of the sanctions it may apply to meet the
objectives of the Act:
60(1) If a panel of the Discipline Committee finds that a
respondent, other than a student-at-law, is guilty of conduct deserving
sanction, it may do one or a combination of the following:
(a) reprimand the respondent;
(b) order that the respondent, within a fixed time, pay to the
Society a fine not exceeding an amount set by the rules;
(c) suspend the respondent from practising law for a fixed
period or indefinitely, on such terms as in its opinion are necessary in the
circumstances;
(d) disbar the respondent;
(e) order that the respondent pay to the Society within a fixed
time in an amount decided by the panel, costs of the inquiry, including the
costs of an investigation by the Registrar, the Complaints Committee, or of an
audit or investigation under Part 11; or
(f) make such other order as in its opinion is necessary and
appropriate in the circumstances, including any order that could be made by the
Competence Committee under section 46.
39
In the case of Dr. Q, at para. 31, the Chief Justice confirms
earlier jurisprudence holding that “[a] statutory purpose that requires a
tribunal to select from a range of remedial choices or administrative
responses, is concerned with the protection of the public, engages policy
issues, or involves the balancing of multiple sets of interests or
considerations will demand greater deference from a reviewing court”. Sections
5 and 60(1) of the Act set out above clearly direct the Law Society to
undertake a balancing exercise and require the Discipline Committee to choose
among a range of remedial choices.
40
Taken as a whole, the legislative purpose of the Act suggests a higher
degree of deference to decisions of the Discipline Committee. This deference
gives effect to the legislature’s intention to protect the public interest by
allowing the legal profession to be self-regulating. The Law Society is
clearly intended to be the primary body that articulates and enforces
professional standards among its members.
(d) Nature of the Question in Dispute: Law, Fact or Mixed Law and
Fact?
41
This element of the pragmatic and functional approach is helpfully
discussed by the Chief Justice in Dr. Q, supra, at paras. 33-34.
The question of what sanction Mr. Ryan should face as a result of his
misconduct is a question of mixed fact and law since it involves the
application of general principles of the Act to specific circumstances. The
Court of Appeal impugned the weight that the Committee assigned to particular
mitigating evidence and also disapproved of the Committee’s selection of
factually similar cases. These are fact-intensive elements within the question
of mixed fact and law. They do not involve easily extracted and discretely
framed questions of law. The Committee’s decision on sanction is not one that
will determine future cases except insofar as it is a useful case for
comparison. The decision is intricately bound to many factual findings and
inferences about the misconduct of Mr. Ryan and the interests of the public and
the profession. The Committee clearly benefited from the opportunity to hear
the testimony and cross-examination of Mr. Ryan and of the expert witnesses.
All this suggests that a higher degree of deference should be afforded to the
Disciplinary Committee.
(e) Conclusion on the Pragmatic and Functional Approach
42
Although there is a statutory appeal from decisions of the Discipline
Committee, the expertise of the Committee, the purpose of its enabling statute,
and the nature of the question in dispute all suggest a more deferential
standard of review than correctness. These factors suggest that the legislator
intended that the Discipline Committee of the self-regulating Law Society
should be a specialized body with the primary responsibility to promote the
objectives of the Act by overseeing professional discipline and, where
necessary, selecting appropriate sanctions. In looking at all the factors as
discussed in the foregoing analysis, I conclude that the appropriate standard
is reasonableness simpliciter. Thus, on the question of the appropriate
sanction for professional misconduct, the Court of Appeal should not substitute
its own view of the “correct” answer but may intervene only if the decision is
shown to be unreasonable.
B. The Standard of Reasonableness Simpliciter
(1) Does the Standard Float Along a Spectrum
According to the Case?
43
The respondent asserts that the standard of reasonableness is an “area
on the spectrum or continuum” between patent unreasonableness and correctness.
This argument is meant to support the low deference that the Court of Appeal
afforded to the decision of the Discipline Committee despite having decided
that a pragmatic and functional examination led to the conclusion that the
standard of reasonableness applied. The thrust of the respondent’s submissions
is that it is sometimes appropriate to apply the reasonableness standard more
deferentially and sometimes less deferentially depending on the circumstances.
To deny this flexibility, the respondent argues, would signal a return to a
formalist approach to judicial review.
44
This argument must be rejected. If it is inappropriate to add a fourth
standard to the three already identified, it would be even more problematic to
create an infinite number of standards in practice by imagining that
reasonableness can float along a spectrum of deference such that it is
sometimes quite close to correctness and sometimes quite close to patent
unreasonableness. This argument rests on a mistaken extension of the metaphor
of a spectrum.
45
It is true that the Court has resorted to the metaphor of a
spectrum in order to explain the relative ordering of the three recognized
standards of review. The idea is that the standards could be arranged from
least deferential to most deferential with reasonableness as the intermediate
standard of review. The metaphor suggests standards arranged along a gradient
of deference but it was never meant to suggest an infinite number of possible
standards. That the metaphor relates to a spectrum of deference and not a
spectrum of standards has become increasingly clear since the use of the term
“spectrum” in Pezim, supra, at p. 590 (see Baker, supra,
at para. 55, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Pushpanathan, supra, at para. 27,
per Bastarache J.). As Major J. recently wrote: “The various standards
of review are properly viewed as points occurring on a spectrum of curial
deference. They range from patent unreasonableness at the more deferential end
of the spectrum, through reasonableness simpliciter, to correctness at
the more exacting end of the spectrum” (Mattel, supra, at para.
24).
46
Judicial review of administrative action on a standard of reasonableness
involves deferential self-discipline. A court will often be forced to accept
that a decision is reasonable even if it is unlikely that the court would have
reasoned or decided as the tribunal did (see Southam, supra, at
paras. 78-80). If the standard of reasonableness could “float” this would
remove the discipline involved in judicial review: courts could hold that
decisions were unreasonable by adjusting the standard towards correctness
instead of explaining why the decision was not supported by any reasons that
can bear a somewhat probing examination.
47
The content of a standard of review is essentially the question that a
court must ask when reviewing an administrative decision. The standard of
reasonableness basically involves asking “After a somewhat probing examination,
can the reasons given, when taken as a whole, support the decision?” This is
the question that must be asked every time the pragmatic and functional
approach in Pushpanathan, supra, directs reasonableness as the
standard. Deference is built into the question since it requires that the
reviewing court assess whether a decision is basically supported by the
reasoning of the tribunal or decision-maker, rather than inviting the court to
engage de novo in its own reasoning on the matter. Of course, the answer
to the question must bear careful relation to the context of the decision, but
the question itself remains constant. The suggestion that reasonableness is an
“area” allowing for more or less deferential articulations would require that the
court ask different questions of the decision depending on the circumstances
and would be incompatible with the idea of a meaningful standard. I now turn
to a closer examination of what a reviewing court should do when engaging in
its somewhat probing examination of an administrative decision.
(2) What Does the Reasonableness Standard
Require of a Reviewing Court?
48
Where the pragmatic and functional approach leads to the conclusion that
the appropriate standard is reasonableness simpliciter, a court must not
interfere unless the party seeking review has positively shown that the
decision was unreasonable (see Southam, supra, at para. 61). In Southam,
at para. 56, the Court described the standard of reasonableness simpliciter:
An unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported
by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination.
Accordingly, a court reviewing a conclusion on the reasonableness standard must
look to see whether any reasons support it. [Emphasis added.]
49
This signals that the reasonableness standard requires a reviewing court
to stay close to the reasons given by the tribunal and "look to see"
whether any of those reasons adequately support the decision. Curial deference
involves respectful attention, though not submission, to those reasons (Baker,
supra, at para. 65, per L’Heureux-Dubé J. citing D. Dyzenhaus,
“The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M. Taggart, ed.,
The Province of Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286).
50
At the outset it is helpful to contrast judicial review according to the
standard of reasonableness with the fundamentally different process of
reviewing a decision for correctness. When undertaking a correctness review,
the court may undertake its own reasoning process to arrive at the result it
judges correct. In contrast, when deciding whether an administrative action
was unreasonable, a court should not at any point ask itself what the correct
decision would have been. Applying the standard of reasonableness gives effect
to the legislative intention that a specialized body will have the primary
responsibility of deciding the issue according to its own process and for its
own reasons. The standard of reasonableness does not imply that a
decision-maker is merely afforded a “margin of error” around what the court
believes is the correct result.
51
There is a further reason that courts testing for unreasonableness must
avoid asking the question of whether the decision is correct. Unlike a review
for correctness, there will often be no single right answer to the questions
that are under review against the standard of reasonableness. For example,
when a decision must be taken according to a set of objectives that exist in
tension with each other, there may be no particular trade-off that is superior
to all others. Even if there could be, notionally, a single best answer, it is
not the court’s role to seek this out when deciding if the decision was
unreasonable.
52
The standard of reasonableness simpliciter is also very different
from the more deferential standard of patent unreasonableness. In Southam,
supra, at para. 57, the Court described the difference between an
unreasonable decision and a patently unreasonable one as rooted “in the
immediacy or obviousness of the defect”. Another way to say this is that a
patently unreasonable defect, once identified, can be explained simply and
easily, leaving no real possibility of doubting that the decision is defective.
A patently unreasonable decision has been described as “clearly irrational” or
“evidently not in accordance with reason” (Canada (Attorney General) v.
Public Service Alliance of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941, at pp. 963‑64,
per Cory J.; Centre communautaire juridique de l’Estrie v. Sherbrooke
(City), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 84, at paras. 9-12, per Gonthier J.). A
decision that is patently unreasonable is so flawed that no amount of curial
deference can justify letting it stand.
53
A decision may be unreasonable without being patently unreasonable when
the defect in the decision is less obvious and might only be discovered after
“significant searching or testing” (Southam, supra, at para.
57). Explaining the defect may require a detailed exposition to show that
there are no lines of reasoning supporting the decision which could reasonably
lead that tribunal to reach the decision it did.
54
How will a reviewing court know whether a decision is reasonable given
that it may not first inquire into its correctness? The answer is that a
reviewing court must look to the reasons given by the tribunal.
55
A decision will be unreasonable only if there is no line of analysis
within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the
evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived. If any of the
reasons that are sufficient to support the conclusion are tenable in the sense
that they can stand up to a somewhat probing examination, then the decision
will not be unreasonable and a reviewing court must not interfere (see Southam,
at para. 56). This means that a decision may satisfy the reasonableness
standard if it is supported by a tenable explanation even if this explanation
is not one that the reviewing court finds compelling (see Southam, at
para. 79).
56
This does not mean that every element of the reasoning given must
independently pass a test for reasonableness. The question is rather whether
the reasons, taken as a whole, are tenable as support for the decision. At all
times, a court applying a standard of reasonableness must assess the basic
adequacy of a reasoned decision remembering that the issue under review does
not compel one specific result. Moreover, a reviewing court should not seize
on one or more mistakes or elements of the decision which do not affect the
decision as a whole.
(3) Applying the Standard of Reasonableness
to the Committee’s Decision
(a) What Reasons Did the Committee Give for
its Decision?
57
Mr. Ryan appealed the second decision of the Discipline Committee. That
decision followed hearings to consider new evidence and submissions as ordered
by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal. In its second set of reasons, the
Committee found that Mr. Ryan did not suffer from any illness other than
“alcohol abuse” that could be diagnosed as long as he continued to drink. For
the Committee, the “tentative and sporadic” character of Mr. Ryan’s dedication
to treatment for alcoholism showed that it would be futile to attach conditions
to a suspension. However, this does not exhaust the reasoning in the second
decision. The Committee wrote:
After considering the new evidence and the submissions made by counsel,
the panel has concluded that the sanction previously imposed was the
appropriate one in the circumstances. For the reasons expressed in our
previous decision of November 26, 1999, we confirm the sanction. [Emphasis
added.]
58
Taken as a whole, the reasoning supporting the second decision is that
the evidence adduced at the hearings did not disclose facts which mitigated the
violation of professional ethics or change the context to such an extent as to
make the original sanction of disbarment inappropriate. The underlined words
of the second decision quoted above show that the second decision incorporates
the reasons given in the first decision of November 26, 1999. The reasons for
confirming the penalty of disbarment therefore included the following findings
and premises:
(1) even though the professional self‑government regime requires
that each case must be decided on its own facts, it is nonetheless relevant
that Mr. Ryan’s breaches of professional ethics were similar to ones for which
professional disciplinary bodies have previously imposed a sanction of
disbarment;
(2) Mr. Ryan’s conduct amounted to a “serious and egregious breach of
his professional conduct and responsibilities”;
(3) forging court documents undermines public confidence in the legal
system and is so improper that only significant and compelling factors would
mitigate the seriousness of such unethical behaviour;
(4) the evidence presented in mitigation was not compelling;
(5) when the duration of Mr. Ryan’s deceit was considered against the
backdrop of his previous disciplinary record, it was clear that his honesty,
trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer were irreparably compromised.
(b) Do These Reasons Support the Decision and
Do they Withstand Examination?
59
Applying a somewhat probing examination of the Discipline Committee’s
analysis and decision, I find that the reasons given by the Committee, taken as
a whole, are tenable, grounded in the evidence, and supporting of disbarment as
the choice of sanction. There is nothing unreasonable about the Discipline
Committee choosing to ban a member from practising law when his conduct
involved an egregious departure from the rules of professional ethics and had
the effect of undermining public confidence in basic legal institutions.
60
The Court of Appeal found fault with the Committee’s choice of analogous
cases on the issue of penalty. The Court of Appeal appears to agree with Mr.
Ryan that the cases considered by the Committee involved more serious
misconduct with less mitigation. However, the Committee did compare the
misconduct with two cases and also noted that it considered other cases that
were brought to its attention. The Court of Appeal’s objection is essentially
that the Committee was mistaken when it decided which cases were factually
similar and therefore appropriate for comparison. In particular, the Court of
Appeal appears to accept as a mitigating factor that “[n]o one would be acting
on the [fictitious] judgment [of the Court of Appeal] to their prejudice”
(para. 28). This was not a finding made by the Committee. Instead of showing
that the decision was unreasonable, this only shows that the selection of
comparable cases was not correct in the view of the Court of Appeal.
61
The Court of Appeal also held that “insufficient weight was given to the
Appellant’s medical problems” (para. 33). This is ambiguous. It may flow from
a disagreement with the Committee’s finding of fact that Mr. Ryan had not shown
any illnesses independent of his alcohol addiction. Alternatively, the Court
of Appeal might have viewed Mr. Ryan’s alcoholism as an illness that should
have been assigned enough mitigating weight to make disbarment inappropriate.
Since there was evidently no failure of the Committee to consider the evidence
of illness, this amounts to a finding that the Committee made an incorrect
finding of fact or incorrectly weighed its mitigating effect. If the standard
were correctness, the Court of Appeal might have weighed the evidence differently
and imposed a different penalty. However, neither the respondent’s arguments
nor the reasons of the Court of Appeal show how the Discipline Committee’s
weighing of conflicting expert testimony could make the decision unreasonable.
The conclusions of the Committee are supported by tenable reasons which are
grounded in the evidentiary foundation. Therefore the decision of the
Discipline Committee is not unreasonable and the Court of Appeal should not
have interfered.
VI. Disposition
62
For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs
throughout, set aside the judgment of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, and
restore the order of the Discipline Committee of the Law Society of New
Brunswick.
Appeal allowed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellant: Barry Spalding Richard, Saint John.
Solicitors for the respondent: Allen Dixon Smith Townsend,
Fredericton.
Solicitors for the intervener: Heenan Blaikie, Toronto; Borden,
Ladner, Gervais, Toronto.