Docket: IMM-2603-11
Citation: 2011 FC 1287
Ottawa, Ontario, November 9,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mandamin
BETWEEN:
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ANGELICA MARIA ALVARADO
DE ALVAREZ
GLADYS YULIETH ALVAREZ ALVARADO
ADOLFO GIOVANY ALVAREZ ALVARADO
YANELY MELISSA ALVAREZ ALVARADO
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
Ms.
Angelica Maria Alvarado de Alvarez applies for judicial review of the February
24, 2011decision of a Member of the Refugee Protection Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board. The Member refused the Applicants’ claims for
refugee protection made pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27.
[2]
Ms.
Alvarado de Alvarez is from Guatemala. Her husband became
involved in politics in 2002, advocating Mayan rights. Although she had
separated from him, she received telephone calls seeking his whereabouts and
threatening her. Her house was also broken into. She fled to Canada after
receiving a telephone call telling her that she and the children would be
killed if she did not admit where her husband’s whereabouts.
[3]
I
conclude that the Member’s reasons were not reasonable and that judicial review
ought to be granted.
Background
[4]
Ms.
Alvarado de Alvarez, the principal Applicant (the Applicant) and her three
children are all citizens of Guatemala.
[5]
The
Applicant’s ex-husband became involved in politics in Guatemala in 2002. She
was not supportive of her ex-husband’s involvement in politics and endeavoured
to convince him to give it up. The Applicant’s concerns centered on the
unsavoury characters her ex-husband was associating with. The Applicant
continued to plead with her ex-husband to give up politics and eventually left
him. They were allegedly divorced on September 13, 2006 with the children
remaining in the home of the ex-husband and his parents.
[6]
The
Applicant stated that she began receiving phone calls asking for her husband in
2006. These initial calls were non-threatening. In November 2008, during a
phone conversation with her eldest daughter, the Applicant was informed that
her ex-husband had disappeared. She was worried and collected the children and
brought them to live with her. In the process of collecting the children’s
things, the Applicant unknowingly collected several documents belonging to her
ex-husband.
[7]
The
Applicant then started receiving phone calls from callers who thought that she
and her ex-husband were still together. The callers would ask for her husband
and would threaten and insult her before hanging up. The Applicant also claimed
that strange men approached her children after school to question them about
her ex-husband.
[8]
On
January 8, 2009, her house was broken into while she was out. The Applicant did
not report the incident immediately. However, shortly thereafter, she claimed
to have received a threatening note addressed to her and her children that was
left under her door. The Applicant reported the note along with the break-in on
January 30, 2009. She requested that the authorities launch an investigation.
The Applicant returned to the police 3 days later to check on their progress,
but was told to wait and be patient.
[9]
In
late June of 2009, the Applicant’s house was broken into a second time. She
later received a phone call in which she was told that if she did not admit
where her husband was, she and her children would be killed. The caller also
said they were angry that she had complained to the police in January.
[10]
After
this phone call, the Applicants fled. The Applicants travelled through the United
States
before arriving in Canada. They sought refugee protection at the Canadian
border.
Decision Under Review
[11]
The
Member found that the Applicants did not have a well-founded fear of
persecution for a convention reason and their removal to Guatemala would not
subject them personally to a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture.
[12]
The
Member found that the Applicants’ identities had been established through
certified copies of their passports. The Member’s decision focused on its
analysis of the Applicants credibility and subjective fear as well as state
protection.
Credibility &
Subjective Fear
[13]
The
Member began his analysis by stating that testimony given under oath is
presumed to be true, unless there is a valid reason to doubt its truthfulness,
and that in testing the truth of a story of a witness, the Member cannot be
satisfied that the evidence is credible or trustworthy unless satisfied that it
is probably so, not just possibly so. The Member then went on to make a number
of blanket statements with regards to the evidence he assessed. For example, the
Member stated that he:
·
made an
assessment of all the evidence, both oral and documentary
·
assessed
the evidence as a whole so it could be treated in a consistent manner
·
would not
refer to every piece of evidence, only those relevant to his decision, and
·
even if
the evidence is not referred to, that he carefully considered it as part of the
evidence
The Member also stated that he was entitled
to make reasonable findings based on implausibility, common sense and
rationality, and may reject evidence if it was not consistent with the
probabilities affecting the case as a whole.
[14]
The
Member believed that the Applicant had wanted to move to Canada for a long
time but had not qualified. The Member cited a failed refugee claim in 1994 as
well as the fact that the Applicant has relatives living in Canada as evidence.
The Member found this is the reason for the Applicant’s allegations of a
well-founded fear.
[15]
The
Member also did not believe that the Applicant’s ex-husband was missing or in
hiding and that he was being sought for by dangerous individuals who wanted to
harm him, and had threatened to harm the Applicant and her children if she did
not tell them the whereabouts of her ex-husband. The Member believed that she
fabricated the story to bolster her claim for refugee status. The Member
rejected the story and found that it undermined the Applicant’s credibility.
[16]
The
Member stated that in arriving at his decision, he examined inconsistencies and
omissions in and between the Applicant’s written and oral testimony.
[17]
First,
the Member discussed how the Applicant came into possession of some of her
ex-husband’s documents. The Member stated that the Applicant had testified that
the documents were found buried among the children’s clothing. The Member found
that this was inconsistent with common sense and rationality which also
undermined her credibility. The Member used this finding as the base to further
find that the Applicant’s ex-husband was not missing and that she had fabricated
the story that he was missing to support her claim for refugee status.
[18]
Second,
the Member focused on the Applicant’s statement in her Personal Information
Form (PIF) narrative where she wrote that her house was broken into on January
8, 2009 and a few days later she found a threatening note placed under her
door. The Member noted the police denunciation stated she found the note on
January 28, 2009. The Applicant was questioned as to what she considered “a few
days”. The Applicant stated a few days meant 8-10 days. The Member stated the
Applicant was confronted with the fact that she was referring to as many as 20
days as “a few days” and stated that she dismissed the contradiction as simply
some days, but not months. The Member found her explanation to be unreasonable,
rejected it, and found that it undermined her credibility. The Member found
that the Applicant did not find a note under her door for if she had, the
Applicant would have not had the difficulty she had in explaining what she
meant by a few days.
[19]
The
Member also noted that the Applicant testified she gave the note to the police.
The Member stated he carefully reviewed the denunciation and that the wording
of the denunciation did not mention anything about a note being handed over to
the police. The Member found that if the Applicant had presented a note to the
police, they would, on a balance of probability, have quoted the note instead
of quoting what the Applicant told the police was in the note, which is how the
Member read the denunciation.
[20]
Third,
the Member noted a contradiction between the denunciation and the Applicant’s
testimony. In the denunciation, the Applicant claimed to have first received
phone calls asking her for the whereabouts of her ex-husband in May of 2006.
However, the Member found that when the Applicant was asked when she received
the first telephone calls, she replied it was after she went to get her
children from their grandparents’ house at the end of November 2008.
[21]
Next,
the Member found a discrepancy between the denunciation and the Applicant’s
PIF. The denunciation states that when the Applicant’s house was broken into on
January 8, 2008, nothing was taken. However, in the Applicant’s PIF, she wrote
that they took some personal documents. When asked to explain the discrepancy,
the Applicant replied that she did not realize the personal documents were
missing until after she had reported the incident to the police; she had not
required the documents until sometime after she had visited the police and
therefore did not know they were missing. The Member found it was unreasonable
that the Applicant did not return to the police after she had discovered the
missing documents. The Member noted that the she had returned to the police
three days after making the initial report, but had not returned to inform the
police of further developments such as the discovery that documents had be
taken and that the threatening phone calls had persisted. The Member found her
explanation to be confusing and inconsistent with common sense and rationality
and found that it also undermined the Applicant’s credibility.
[22]
The
Member noted that the Applicant claimed to have left her husband because of his
association with unsavoury characters that he was bringing to their home. The
Applicant claimed to have moved out as a result, but did not bring her children
with her. The Member did not believe that if the Applicant’s husband was living
so dangerously and bringing dangerous people to their home to the extent that
she felt the need to leave the home, her husband, and marriage that she would
not have taken the children with her. The Member found this undermined her
credibility.
[23]
Finally,
the Member noted the vague and confusing answers the Applicant provided to the
straightforward questions of where the Applicant had moved once she had left
her ex-husband. The Member found that if indeed the Applicant had changed her
address, she would have remembered the address, especially as she testified
that she lived there for 4 months.
[24]
In
conclusion, the Member found that based on an examination of the evidence
before him, the Member could find no persuasive evidence of a subjective fear
to base the refugee claim. Given the problems with respect to major issues, the
Member found the Applicant was generally lacking in credibility. The Member did
not believe that any of the significant events the Applicant claimed happened
to her actually happened and stated that the Applicant’s claim pursuant to s.
96 of the Act failed.
State Protection
[25]
While
the Member found that the Applicant did not have a subjective fear and was able
to base his decision on that finding, the Member nevertheless also considered
state protection.
[26]
The
Member started out by stating that he considered whether or not there is
adequate state protection in Guatemala, whether the Applicant
took all reasonable steps to avail herself of that protection, and whether she
has provided clear and convincing evidence of the state’s inability to protect.
[27]
The
Member set out a number of established principles relating to state protection
including the burden of proof. The Member then went on to find that the Applicant
had not provided clear and convincing evidence, that on a balance of
probabilities, state protection Guatemala was inadequate. In particular, the
Member found that the Applicant had not taken adequate efforts to seek
protection and set out examples from her testimony.
[28]
The
Member also found that the Applicant did not seek to report any of the examples
of threats to any other authorities. The Member found the Applicant’s responses
regarding the effectiveness of state protection to be not objectively
well-founded, since they were largely unsubstantiated and contradicted the
documentary evidence. The Member then referred to the National Documentation
Package finding Guatemala is a representative democracy and a member of
the Central America Free Trade Agreement. The Member referred to its governance
structure and stated that Guatemala was one of the countries that led the wave
of criminal procedure reforms that emerged in the mid-1980s in Latin
America.
[29]
The
Member went on to note Guatemala’s measures to fight
corruption among the police and cited the number of administrative disciplinary
measures in the national civil police and the numbers of police arrests in 2005
and 2006. The Member then listed a number of agencies that address criminality,
corruption and kidnapping to assist citizens access state protection.
[30]
The
Member concluded by stating that in view of the principles relating to state
protection, and when considering the documentary evidence weighted against the
Applicant’s evidence, the Member found that the Applicant had failed to rebut
the presumption of state protection with clear and convincing evidence and that
the Applicant did not take all reasonable steps to avail herself of that
protection before making a claim for refugee protections.
Relevant Legislation
[31]
The
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 provides:
96.
A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a)
is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason
of that
fear,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection
of
each of those countries; or
(b)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
…
97.
(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not
have
a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would
subject them Personally
(a)
to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b)
to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if
(i)
the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of
the
protection
of that country,
(ii)
the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is
not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii)
the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard
of
accepted international standards, and
(iv)
the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate
health or medical care.
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96.
A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a)
soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du
fait de cette
crainte,
ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa
résidence
habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
…
97.
(1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
a)
soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b)
soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans
le
cas suivant :
(i)
elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii)
elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes
originaires
de
ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées
au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
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Issues
[32]
The
issues for this application are:
1. Did
the Member make a reviewable error in coming to his conclusion that the
Applicant is not credible?
2. Did
the Member make a reviewable error in finding that the Applicant failed to
avail herself of the adequate state protection that was available?
Standard of Review
[33]
The
Supreme Court of Canada has held that there are only two standards of review:
correctness for questions of law and reasonableness involving questions of
mixed fact and law and fact: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008
SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paras 50 and 53.
[34]
Findings
of credibility are based on factual determinations and therefore attract a
reasonableness standard. Determinations of state protection are matters of
mixed fact and law and should also be reviewed on a reasonableness standard: Flores
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), 2010 FC 503 at para 21.
Analysis
[35]
The
Applicants submit that the Member erred in his finding based on a “balance of
probabilities” that the Applicant’s husband is not missing. The Applicants cite
the Federal Court of Appeal in Peng v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), (1993), 19 Imm LR (2d) 220 (FCA) and this Court in Sivamoorthy
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 408 to the
effect that where a critical aspect of a claimant’s testimony is disbelieved,
but the Member can be shown to have erred on that point, the entire decision
must be set aside, regardless of whether the Member made further findings on
credibility.
[36]
The
Applicants submit that the Member erred in law by failing to address or even
acknowledge the December 1, 2008 police report filed by the Applicant’s
father-in-law and the father-in-law’s letter. The Applicants argue that it is
an error of law for the Member to fail to address an official document
corroborating the Member’s testimony and that this is a reviewable error. The
Applicants then challenge some of the implausibility findings made by the
Member.
[37]
The
Respondent submits that this case deals with findings of fact and, therefore, a
great deal of deference is owed. The Respondent submits that this Court should
not interfere where the Member’s decision is rationally supported. The
Respondent does note that where there are issues concerning the fairness of the
hearing, no deference is owed to the decision-maker in this regard, and it is
up to this Court to form its own opinion as to the fairness of the hearing.
[38]
The
Respondent submits that the Member refused the Applicants’ claims because the
Applicant was not a credible witness. The Respondent argues that the
Applicant’s lack of credibility extended to key and central elements of the
claims. As a result, there was insufficient credible evidence upon which the
Member could conclude the claims were well founded. The Respondent submits that
the Member’s reasons are clear, cogent, and comprehensive, and the Applicants
have failed to provide persuasive arguments to suggest that the Member could
not have concluded as it did.
[39]
The
Respondent submits that reasons are not to be read microscopically and that
courts ought to be mindful against faulting a tribunal for not referring to
evidence that could have led it to decide differently. The Respondent submits
that reasons need not refer to every piece of evidence, but must simply provide
an adequate explanation of the basis upon which the decision was reached.
[40]
The
Respondent argues the Member specifically acknowledged its obligation to
consider the entirety of the evidence, and confirmed that it did so even if
every piece of evidence is not referred to. The Respondent points out that the
Member stated that those pieces of evidence that the Member finds relevant to
its decision will be referred to and that the presumption that the Member has
considered all of the evidence clearly applies in this case.
[41]
The
Respondent submits the Member did not believe the Applicant’s ex-husband was
missing and the Member provided examples of how it came to this determination.
This, the Respondent submits, satisfied its obligation to explain the basis
upon which the determination was based. The Respondent specifically submits
that the Member was not required to refer to the father-in-law’s letter or
police denunciation. The Respondent submits the letter was self-serving and
that the denunciation raised additional credibility concerns. The Respondent
argues that these documents were thus not material or probative of the Member’s
ultimate determination and the Member was not obliged to confront the Applicant
with this evidence.
[42]
The
Respondent submits that it is well established that the tribunal, as the
primary finder of fact, is entitled to draw its own reasonable inferences from
the evidence and to reject uncontradicted evidence if it is not consistent with
the probabilities affecting the case as a whole. The Respondent submits the
Member was entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities,
common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent
with the probabilities affecting the whole case.
[43]
In
response to the Applicants’ challenges to the Member’s individual credibility
findings, and having regard to the deferential standard of review of
reasonableness that allows for a range of possible reasonable outcomes, the
Respondent submits that it is not sufficient for the Applicants to present an
alternative line of reasoning. What is required is that the Applicants point to
a conclusion of the Member that is not supportable in any way on the evidence.
This, the Respondent submits, the Applicants have failed to do.
Did
the Member make a reviewable error in coming to its conclusion that the Applicant
is not credible?
[44]
To
begin, I find it useful to quote a portion of the Member’s decision at
paragraph 12:
The panel believes that for a long time
[the Applicants] had wanted to move to Canada but had not qualified; for
example, they had applied to the Canadian authorities in El Salvador for refugee status in 1994
which was denied. She has relatives living in Canada and the panel believes that the claimant
would like to live here too, hence her allegations of a well-founded fear. The
panel does not believe that her husband is missing or is in hiding and that he
is being sought for by dangerous individuals who want to harm him, and have
threatened to harm the claimant and her children if she does not tell them his
whereabouts. The panel believes that she has fabricated the story about her
husband being missing/in hiding and is being pursued by dangerous individuals
who threatened to harm her and her children if she does not tell them where her
ex-husband is, to bolster her claim for refugee status and the panel rejects it
and finds that it undermines her credibility.
[45]
Essentially,
the passage above makes two findings:
1. the Applicant has wanted
to move to Canada for some time and this is the
reason for her claim, and
2. the Applicant’s
ex-husband is not missing and she has simply fabricated the whole story to
bolster her claim for refugee status.
[46]
First,
I am unable to find any evidence that between 1994 and the Applicants’ claim in
2009, fifteen years later, that the Applicants had made any attempt to move to
Canada that would justify the Member’s finding that the Applicant have wanted
to move to Canada “for a long time” and that this was therefore the reason for
her allegations of a well-founded fear. The fact the Applicant has relatives in
Canada does not
constitute evidence one way or the other.
[47]
Second,
the Member made no reference to the letter and denunciation by the Applicant’s
father-in-law about his son’s disappearance. As the Member considered the
question of whether the Applicant’s ex-husband had in fact not disappeared and
was not missing, the father-in-law’s letter and denunciation ought to have been
specifically addressed. Blanket statements stating that the evidence, though
not mentioned, was carefully considered, is not enough: Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), (1998), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ no 1425
(FCTD) at paras 15-17. The letter and denunciation were evidence that the
ex-husband had disappeared and corroborated the Applicant’s story.
[48]
In
Melo Sanchez v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), 2011 FC 68 at paragraph 22, a letter
provided by the applicant’s father corroborating the applicant’s story was also
not mentioned in the board’s decision. Justice Mosley found that the board
erred in determining that there was no persuasive evidence in that case without
assigning any weight to the letter. Justice Mosley stated that while the letter
was self-serving, it had some corroborative value and ought to have been
considered.
[49]
I
do not consider the father-in-law’s denunciation to be self-serving. He was
reporting the disappearance of his son to the police, not merely buttressing
the Applicant’s claim for refugee status. The Member was obligated to address
that evidence.
[50]
In
addition, I consider the Member’s picking at discrepancies in the Applicant’s
story to find her not credible to be fatally flawed.
[51]
The
Member makes errors in his findings of fact and relies on those findings. The Member
states the Applicant found her ex-husband’s documents “buried among her
children’s clothing” while the transcript discloses the Applicant never made
any such statement.
[52]
Moreover
the Member invites the Applicant to speculate why her husband’s documents were
among her children’s “stuffs”:
PRESIDING MEMBER: Do you have any idea
why these documents that pertain to your husband would be in amongst your
children’s stuff?
PRINCIPAL CLAIMANT: I have no idea
because I was not there. I do not know when did he put them there. Maybe he
forgot them there, maybe they were misplaced and he was looking for them later
on.
The Member then finds:
While the panel believes that items
including documents can be misplaced, it does not believe that it is probable
that her husband’s membership card would be misplaced among his children’s
personal stuff; this is an item which would more likely be among adults’
stuffs, especially it is not something he would be hiding.
[53]
Questions
along the lines of why do you think someone else knew or did something are
fraught with danger as they invite speculation. Justice Harrington stated in Ukleina
it has long been established that findings of fact based on speculation are
inherently unreasonable: Ukleina v The Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, 2009 FC 1292 at para 8.
[54]
In
this case, the Member invited the Applicant to make a speculation, which she
did; the Applicant speculated that the documents were perhaps misplaced. The
Member then relied on the Applicant’s speculation to make further findings of
improbability that affected the Applicant’s credibility in the eyes of the
Member.
[55]
The
Member found a contradiction between the date the Applicant claimed to have
received the first call asking for her ex-husband in the denunciation (2006)
and the date she provided in her PIF narrative and oral testimony (December,
2008). The Member relies on this contradiction to further impugn the Member’s
credibility. The Member’s decision states:
The panel also notes that the
denunciation stated that in May 2006 the claimant received a call on her cell
phone asking her for the whereabouts of her ex-husband. At first, she thought
the calls were normal but when the calls continued she moved to Quetzaltenango
and changed her address and telephone number. However, when the claimant was
asked when she received the first telephone call; she replied after she went to
get her children from their grandfather’s home at the end of December 2008.
[56]
What
is troubling with the Member’s finding of a contradiction, besides not
providing the Applicant with an opportunity to explain the alleged
contradiction, is that when the transcript is consulted, no contradiction is to
be found. The Member is correct that the denunciation states that in May 2006
the Applicant was called on her cell asking her for the whereabouts of her
ex-husband and that she thought the calls were normal. However, it must be
noted that the Applicant was not asked in the hearing when she received the
first telephone call, but rather when she had received the first telephone threat
as the following exchange clearly shows:
PRESIDING MEMBER: Before he went missing
were you receiving telephone threats?
PRINCIPAL APPLICANT: No.
PRESIDING MEMBER: When did you receive
the first telephone threat?
PRINCIPAL APPLICANT: After I went
to get my children, by the end of December.
PRESIDING MEMBER: December what year?
PRINCIPAL APPLICANT: 2008.
[Emphasis added]
[57]
In
my opinion, the Member’s decision on credibility is based on erroneous findings
of fact that it made in a perverse of capricious manner without regard to the
material before it.
Did
the Member make a reviewable error in finding that the Applicant failed to
avail herself of the adequate state protection that was available?
[58]
The
Member referred to the National Documentation Package to discuss and highlight
steps, measures and options available for state protection in Guatemala. The Member
relies on this information to find that adequate state protection was available
in Guatemala and that the
Applicant had not availed herself to that protection.
[59]
The
contradictory documentary evidence is strikingly different from the Member’s
recitation. For example:
Guatemala Human Rights Watch – 2009
Guatemala’s weak and corrupt law enforcement
institutions have proved incapable of containing the powerful organized crime
groups and criminal gangs that contribute to Guatemala having one of the
highest criminal violence rates in the Americas.
Amnesty International - 2009
Officials involved in opening Guatemala’s police archives and members
of their families have been threatened and attacked in recent days.... The
police archives contain information on atrocities committed by the security
forces during Guatemala’s internal armed conflict....
Guatemala’s internal armed conflict
cost the lives of approximately 200,000, most of them members of Mayan
Indigenous groups, who were killed or subjected to enforced disappearance. The
conflict began in 1960 and ended in 1996...
[60]
In
Toriz Gilvaja v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2009 FC 598 at paragraph 38, the Court stated the RPD must
address contradictory evidence that state protection is not adequate.
[61]
I
came to the same conclusion in Flores Alcazar v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 173, notwithstanding the RPD in
that case acknowledged there was contradictory evidence but did not explain why
it chose to discount that evidence. Here the Member does not even acknowledge the
contradictory documentary evidence.
[62]
Given
the failure of the Member to address contradictory documentary evidence, I
conclude the Member’s finding on state protection was unreasonable.
Conclusion
[63]
The
application for judicial review is granted. The matter is to be remitted back
to a differently constituted panel for redetermination.
[64]
No
question of general importance is certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that:
- The application for
judicial review is granted. The matter is to be remitted back to a
differently constituted panel for redetermination.
- No question of
general importance is certified.
“Leonard
S. Mandamin”