Docket: T-514-11
Citation: 2011 FC 1120
Ottawa, Ontario, September 29,
2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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BELL CANADA
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND ROGERS
COMMUNICATIONS INC.
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Respondents
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application under the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c. F-7 for
judicial review to: (a) quash and set aside the publication in the Canada
Gazette on 19 March 2011 as Gazette Notice No. DGTP-002-11 (Notice) by the
Minister of Industry (Minister) of the 26 January 2011 petition (Petition) by
Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers) pursuant to subsections 12(1) and 12(4) of
the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38 (Act); and (b) prohibit the
Governor in Council (Cabinet) from considering the Petition.
BACKGROUND
[2]
In
2002, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)
issued Decision 2002-34, which permitted Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(ILECs), including Bell Canada (Bell), to charge more than a permitted maximum
tariff. Though these ILECs were permitted to charge above the tariff, the
excess amount was to be tracked in a separate account (Deferral Account) and
segregated from other funds. The CRTC retained the authority to determine the
use of these funds at a later date.
[3]
On
14 December 2006, by Order in Council P.C. 2006-1534 SOR/2006-355, the Cabinet
gave the Order Issuing a Direction to the CRTC on Implementing the Canadian
Telecommunication Policy Objectives (Policy Direction) under section 8 of
the Act. Among other things, the Policy Direction directed the CRTC to “rely on
market forces to the maximum extent feasible as the means of achieving the
telecommunications policy objectives, and when relying on regulation, use
measures that […] interfere with the operation of competitive market forces to
the minimum extent necessary to meet the policy objectives.”
[4]
Beginning
in 2006, the CRTC issued a series of decisions which established principles for
the distribution of the Deferral Account monies. The CRTC decided in Decision
2006-9 that the Deferral Account funds would be used for two purposes: (1) improving
access for people with disabilities; and (2) extending broadband internet
services into rural and remote locations. Any excess funds would be returned to
customers as rebates. Several parties appealed that decision to the Federal
Court of Appeal: Bell appealed the portion of the decision requiring
it to return a portion of the funds as rebates to customers, while other
parties appealed the requirement that the funds be used for broadband expansion.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Bell Canada v Bell Aliant
Regional Communications 2009 SCC 40, held that the CRTC’s allocation of
funds for broadband expansion, increasing access for people with disabilities,
and rebates to customers was valid, as the allocation of Deferral Account funds
is within the CRTC’s rate-setting authority.
[5]
In
Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15 the CRTC had rejected the proposal that the Deferral
Account funds should be available to all telecommunications companies and
awarded on the basis of a competitive bidding process. This competitive bidding
process, Rogers had
submitted, would fulfill the principle of competitive neutrality which the
Telecommunications Policy Review Panel had recommended the CRTC adopt in its
2006 Final Report. Rather than use a competitive bidding process which it felt
would “add a significant layer of complexity, delay the implementation of
broadband expansion, and result in substantial administrative and regulatory
burden,” the CRTC opted for the use of a proposal system. In the proposal
system, the CRTC would examine proposals submitted by the ILECs for the use of
the Deferral Account funds and approve or disapprove of them based on their
compliance with the conditions established in Decision 2006-9. In Decision
2007-15, the CRTC approved the use of Deferral Account funds for Broadband
expansion into 112 communities in Ontario. In Decision 2008-1,
the CRTC approved several proposals to expand accessibility to
telecommunications with Deferral Account funds and also set additional
principles for how additional communities would be selected for expansion, the
implementation of least-cost technology, and the recovery of uneconomic costs.
[6]
In
2009, Bell filed a proposal with the CRTC to use $303.6 million in Deferral
Account funds to expand broadband access to 112 communities in Ontario. Bell proposed
expanding broadband coverage using wireless high-speed packet access (HSPA+)
technology. Among others, Rogers opposed this proposal, in part because Rogers had already
implemented HSPA broadband technology in a number of these communities. Rogers
argued that, for the CRTC to permit Bell to expand its network using HSPA+
technology would not in fact expand broadband access, and so was contrary to
the principles established by the CRTC in Decisions 2006-9, 2007-15 and 2008-1
(the Deferral Account Decisions).
[7]
In
CRTC Decision 2010-637, the Commission rejected Bell’s proposal. In
that decision, the CRTC approved the use of $306.3 million of Deferral Account
funds for expanding broadband internet services to 112 communities. However,
rather than using the wireless HSPA+ technology, the CRTC required Bell to
complete the expansion using wireline Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) technology.
The remaining balance in the Deferral Account fund of $277 million would be
returned to consumers as a rebate. Bell proposed to roll out
this technology over a four-year period, beginning with 15 communities in 2011
and completing the expansion by 2015.
[8]
In
2010, given advances in technology, Bell filed an application with the CRTC to
vary Decision 2010-637, and to allow Bell to complete the
expansion into the approved communities using improved wireless technology (HSPA+).
Rogers opposed this
application to vary, saying Bell’s proposal did not comply with the
Guidelines established in the Deferral Account Decisions and violated the
Policy Direction. The CRTC in Decision 2010-805 approved Bell’s proposal
to complete the expansion using wireless HSPA+ technology and noted that
it had rejected this idea in both Telecom
Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-50 (sic), since it would add a significant
layer of complexity, delay the implementation of broadband expansion, and
result in substantial administrative and regulatory burden. The Commission
considers that these reasons continue to be valid.
[9]
In
response, on 26 January 2011, Rogers filed the Petition with the Clerk of the
Privy Council under subsection 12(1) of the Act. In the Petition, Rogers asks
the Cabinet to vary Decision 2010-805 to reduce the amount of deferral account
funds approved to only the amount necessary to cover the uneconomic portion of Bell’s expansion into
the first 15 communities in its proposal. Rogers also asks
the Cabinet to vary Decision 2010-805 to permit a competitive bidding process
for expansion into the remaining 97 approved communities.
[10]
Having
received the Petition from Rogers, the Minister published the Notice in the
19 March 2011 issue of the Canada Gazette. The Notice informs the public
that the Minister has received the Petition, that the Petition and the
supporting documents can be obtained electronically on Industry Canada’s Spectrum
Management and Telecommunications website, and that submissions regarding the Petition
must be made within thirty days of the publication of the Notice in the Gazette.
The publication of this Notice is what Bell seeks to
quash in this application for judicial review. Bell also seeks
to prohibit Cabinet from considering the Petition.
DECISION
UNDER REVIEW
[11]
Bell seeks
judicial review to quash the Notice published by the Minister in the Canada
Gazette. The Notice provides in relevant part as follows:
Notice is hereby given that a petition
from Rogers Communications Partnership (hereinafter referred to as Rogers), has
been received by the Governor in Council (GIC) under section 12 of the Telecommunications
Act with respect to a decision issued by the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), concerning the use of wireless technology
and deferral account funds for extending broadband service to approved
communities.
Subsection 12(1) of the Telecommunications
Act provides that, within one year after a decision by the CRTC, the GIC
may, on petition in writing presented to the GIC within 90 days after the
decision, or on the GIC’s own motion, by order, vary or rescind the decision or
refer it back to the CRTC for reconsideration of all or a portion of it.
In its petition, dated January 26, 2011, Rogers requests that the GIC vary
Telecom Decision CRTC 2010-805, Bell Canada – Applications to review and vary
certain determinations in Telecom Decision 2010-637 concerning the use of
high-speed packet access wireless technology and the deferral account balance. The reasons for this request
are included in Rogers’ petition.
Submissions regarding this petition
should be filed within 30 days of the publication of this notice in the Canada
Gazette. All comments received will be posed on Industry Canada’s Spectrum Management and
Telecommunications Web site at www.ic.gc.ca/spectrum.
[12]
Bell also seeks
an order of prohibition preventing the Cabinet from considering and determining
Rogers’s Petition.
ISSUES
[13]
Bell raises two
basic issues in this application:
1.
Whether
the Minister had jurisdiction to publish the Notice in the Canada Gazette;
2.
Whether
the Cabinet has jurisdiction to hear Rogers’s Petition.
STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
[14]
The
following statutory provisions of the Act are relevant to these proceedings:
2. (1) In this Act,
“decision” includes a determination made by
the Commission in any form;
…
CANADIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
7. It is hereby affirmed that telecommunications
performs an essential role in the maintenance of Canada’s identity and
sovereignty and that the Canadian telecommunications policy has as its
objectives:
…
(c) to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness, at the
national and international levels, of Canadian telecommunications
…
(f) to foster increased reliance on market forces for the
provision of telecommunications services and to ensure that regulation, where
required, is efficient and effective;
…
Variation, rescission or referral
12. (1) Within one year after a decision by
the Commission, the Cabinet may, on Petition in writing presented to the Cabinet
within ninety days after the decision, or on the Cabinet’s own motion, by
order, vary or rescind the decision or refer it back to the Commission for
reconsideration of all or a portion of it.
...
(4) On receipt of a Petition, the Minister shall publish
in the Canada Gazette a notice of its receipt indicating where the Petition
and any Petition or submission made in response to it may be inspected and
copies of them obtained.
…
Partial or additional relief
60. The Commission may grant the whole or any
portion of the relief applied for in any case, and may grant any other relief
in addition to or in substitution for the relief applied for as if the
application had been for that other relief.
…
Review of decisions
62. The Commission may, on application or
on its own motion, review and rescind or vary any decision made by it or
re-hear a matter before rendering a decision.
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2. (1) Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
« décision » Toute
mesure prise par le Conseil,
quelle qu’en soit la forme.
…
POLITIQUE CANADIENNE DE TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION
7. La présente loi affirme le caractère essentiel des
télécommunications pour l’identité et la souveraineté canadiennes; la
politique canadienne de télécommunication vise à
…
c) accroître l’efficacité et la compétitivité, sur les
plans national et international, des télécommunications canadiennes;
…
f) favoriser
le libre jeu du marché en ce qui concerne la fourniture de services de télécommunication
et assurer
l’efficacité de la réglementation, dans le cas où celle-ci est nécessaire;
…
Modification,
annulation ou réexamen
12. (1) Dans
l’année qui suit la prise d’une décision par le Conseil, le gouverneur en
conseil peut, par
décret, soit de sa propre initiative, soit sur demande écrite présentée dans
les quatre-vingt-dix jours de cette prise, modifier ou annuler la décision ou
la renvoyer au
Conseil pour réexamen de tout ou partie de celle-ci et
nouvelle audience.
…
(4) Dès réception de
la demande, le ministre publie un avis dans la Gazette du Canada faisant
état de la réception et indiquant où la demande, ou toute autre demande ou
observation
présentées en réponse à celle-ci peuvent être consultées
et où il peut en être obtenu copie.
…
Réparation
60. Le Conseil
peut soit faire droit à une demande de réparation, en tout ou en partie, soit
accorder, en plus ou à la place de celle qui est demandée, la réparation qui
lui semble justifiée, l’effet étant alors le même que si celle-ci
avait fait l’objet
de la demande.
…
Révision et
annulation
62. Le Conseil peut, sur demande ou de sa propre initiative,
réviser, annuler ou modifier ses décisions, ou entendre à nouveau une demande
avant d’en décider.
|
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[15]
The
Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held that
a standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance.
Instead, where the standard of review applicable to a particular question
before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may
adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must
the reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising
the standard of review analysis.
[16]
Both
of the issues raised involve true questions of vires. As the Supreme
Court of Canada held in Dunsmuir, true questions of vires attract
review on the standard of Correctness. Also in Dunsmuir, at paragraph 50,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that
When applying the correctness standard, a
reviewing court will not show deference to the decision maker’s reasoning
process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The
analysis will bring the court to decide whether it agrees with the
determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its own
view and provide the correct answer. From the outset, the court must ask
whether the tribunal’s decision was correct.
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
[17]
Bell argues that
the Cabinet should be prohibited from hearing the Petition because the Cabinet
lacks jurisdiction as the Petition does not relate to the subject matter of Decision
2010-805, the decision it purports to vary, and so is outside subsection 12(1)
of the Act. Bell also argues
that because the true subject matter of the Petition is the variance of
Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15, the Petition is out of time and so beyond the
jurisdiction of the Cabinet to hear.
[18]
With
respect to the Notice, Bell argues that it should be quashed by the Court
as it relates to a proceeding over which the Cabinet does not have
jurisdiction. Since Parliament intended the Minister to act in accordance with the
Cabinet’s jurisdiction, Parliament could not have intended subsection 12(4) of
the Act to require the Minister to publish notices over which the Cabinet had
no jurisdiction.
The Cabinet Should be Prohibited From Hearing
The Petition Because it Lacks Jurisdiction
[19]
Bell says that
when the Cabinet is exercising an authority delegated to it by statute, it must
do so within the bounds of the powers granted to it. Any exercise of the power
is reviewable by the Court and, where the Cabinet purports to exercise its
power outside of the bounds established for that power, the Court can intervene
to quash or, where necessary, prohibit the exercise of that power.
[20]
Bell also argues
that, as with the exercise of a delegated power by any body, the Cabinet only
has jurisdiction to act where the necessary conditions precedent have been
fulfilled. Where the Cabinet does not meet the statutory conditions precedent,
any exercise of that power is ultra vires. In this case, if the exercise
of the subsection 12(1) power to review Decision 2010-805 requires the Cabinet
to ignore a mandatory condition precedent, the Court ought to intervene. In
support of the use of prohibition to prevent the unlawful exercise of delegated
power, Bell refers to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Canadian Red
Cross Society v Canada (Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada –
Krever Commission), [1997] 2 FC 36, [1997] FCJ No 17 (CA) at paragraph 28:
In the instant case, if the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction
to make the findings in his report that he set out in the notices, then this is
a case in which want of jurisdiction is apparent, or at least one in which the
Commissioner “is undoubtedly about to step outside his jurisdiction”. It would
be intolerable to compel the appellants to wait until the report was made
before allowing them to object to it: the harm would then be greater, and
probably irreparable.
Since, by
hearing the Petition, the Cabinet will step outside its jurisdiction, Bell argues that
prohibition is an appropriate remedy in this case.
The Cabinet Lacks Jurisdiction Because it
Has Not Fulfilled the Mandatory Conditions Precedent
[21]
Bell also argues
that there are two mandatory (though not statutory) conditions precedent for
the exercise of the review power under subsection 12(1): (1) the existence of a
decision by the CRTC on the same subject matter as the Petition; and (2) variance
of the CRTC decision within one year of its making. Since neither of these conditions
has been fulfilled in this case, hearing the Petition under subsection 12(1) is
outside the jurisdiction of the Cabinet and should be prohibited.
Existence of
a Decision on the Same Subject Matter
[22]
Bell
relies on British Colombia (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney
General),
[1994] SCJ No 35; [1994] 2 S.C.R. 41 for the proposition that a petition to the Cabinet
under subsection 12(1) must concern the same subject matter as the decision
which is sought to be varied. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in that case
at paragraph 139,
While the Cabinet can vary an order “at any
time” pursuant to s. 64 of the National Transportation Act, 1987, and
while the s. 64 jurisdiction has been recognized as vast in Inuit Tapirisat[,]
the s. 64 power can only be exercised if a CTC or NTA “order” exists.
[23]
Bell
also relies on the following from Jasper Park Chamber of
Commerce v Canada (Attorney General), [1983] 2 FC
98; [1982] FCJ No 193, at paragraph 9:
I agree with counsel for the appellants that the Governor in
Council under the authority given to it by subsection 64(1) is not entitled,
under the guise of “variation” to do something of an entirely different nature.
I agree that the Cabinet is constrained under subsection 64(1), when varying a
Commission order, to deal with the same type or kind of order as the Commission
was dealing with. I do not agree that subsection 64(1) authorizes the Governor
in Council to vary any and all Commission orders no matter when they are issued
or regardless of their subject-matter. In my view, Order R-22346 is not a
relevant Order for the purposes of the discontinuance Order contained in section
2 of Schedule XV because as detailed supra, the passenger-train service which
was the subject-matter of Order R-22346 was not the same passenger-train
service as that ordered to be discontinued in section 2 of Schedule XV.
[24]
Taken
together, Bell says that these
cases demonstrate that in order for the Cabinet to review a decision under subsection
12(1), the Petition must concern the same subject matter as the decision to be
varied.
[25]
In
this case, Bell argues that
the subject matter of the Petition is sufficiently different from that of the
decision in question to remove it from the Cabinet’s jurisdiction. Bell argues that Decision
2010-805 was solely about what kind of technology should be used in the
implementation of the broadband expansion. Since the issue of competitive
bidding, which Rogers seeks to have included by its Petition was not
before the CRTC in its deliberations for Decision 2010-805, the subject matter
of the Petition and the decision it purports to vary are different. Bell notes
that competitive bidding had been considered and rejected by the CRTC in Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-15 and, as such, was not before the CRTC in the hearings
related to Decision 2010-805.
Improperly Raised at
Hearings
[26]
Bell also argues
that competitive bidding was improperly raised by Rogers at the
hearings related to Decision 2010-805. As a mere intervener in the hearings on
Bell’s application to vary Decision 2010-637, which resulted in Decision
2010-805, Rogers could not raise new issues for the CRTC to consider that were
not in Bell’s original application. Bell relies on the Supreme
Court of Canada’s statement in Reference re: Goods and Services Tax,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 445; [1992] SCJ No 62 at paragraph 76:
Intervener status is granted when this
Court feels that the intervener may be of assistance to the Court in resolving
the principal issues before us. Intervener status is not granted to allow the intervener
to raise an entirely new set of issues which are not addressed by other
principal parties.
Bell says this means that an
intervener in an administrative proceeding cannot raise new issues before the decision-maker.
[27]
Bell also asserts
that there is nothing in Decision 2010-805 to suggest that the CRTC intended to
deal with competitive bidding. Bell points to paragraph 23 of that decision,
which reads
With respect to the proposals to allow
for competitive bidding in order to ensure the use of least-cost technology,
the Commission notes that it rejected this idea both in Telecom Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-50 (sic), since it would add a significant layer of
complexity, delay the implementation of broadband expansion, and result in
substantial administrative and regulatory burden. The Commission considers that
these reasons continue to be valid.
Bell says this statement is
merely a reiteration of an earlier decision and is akin to a courtesy letter
advising a party of a decision previously taken. This demonstrates that the
issue of competitive bidding was not before the CRTC in Decision 2010-805. Since
the issue of competitive bidding was not before the CRTC in Decision 2010-805,
then the Petition which purports to vary that decision to include competitive
bidding does not concern the same subject matter. As they do not concern the
same subject matter, the Petition does not fulfil a mandatory condition
precedent for the exercise of Cabinet’s power under subsection 12(1).
Variance
of the Decision Within Year
[28]
Bell further argues
that the Petition is in substance about Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15 because
the subject matter of the Petition is competitive bidding which was also the
subject matter of those decisions. This means that the Petition should be
subject to the same limitation periods as those decisions. The limitation
period for a petition to the Cabinet to vary Decision 2007-15 expired 12 June
2007, and for Decision 2006-9, it expired on 17 May 2006, so the Petition in
the current case is well out of time. The expiry of a limitation period results
in a loss of jurisdiction.
[29]
Bell also argues
that there is no discretion for Cabinet to extend the limitation period. This
is shown by the legislative history of subsection 12(1). Where the predecessor
section, subsection 64(1) of the National Transportation Act, RSC 1985,
c. N-20, allowed Cabinet to vary a decision of the CRTC at any time, the
current subsection 12(1) limits the application period to ninety days from the
decision date, with an ultimate limitation period of one year. As there is a
presumption that Parliament intends legislative changes to be meaningful, the
change from an unlimited time to vary to a one year period to vary must have
been intended to limit Cabinet’s jurisdiction to vary CRTC decisions.
[30]
Bell
also argues that Ontario Hydro v Cuddy International Corp., [1990] OJ No
676, establishes the principle that, where a later decision of a board
clarifies an earlier decision with the same subject matter, while not being an
entirely new decision, the limitation period for appeal runs from the date of
the earlier decision. Since the true focus of the Petition is Decisions 2006-9
and 2007-15, the limitation period must run from the earlier dates.
[31]
Because
the Petition to vary the CRTC decision is out of time, the Cabinet lacks
jurisdiction to consider it and must be prohibited from doing so by the Court.
The Gazette Notice
Should be Quashed
[32]
In
addition to prohibiting the Cabinet from hearing and deciding the Petition, Bell also argues
that the Court should quash the Notice published in the Canada Gazette. Since
the Cabinet does not have the jurisdiction to hear the Petition, the Notice
should be quashed. Bell notes that courts have regularly and properly
quashed notices of hearings which are held to be ultra vires the entity
making the decision. Further, though subsection 12(4) of the Act, under which
the Minister published the Notice in the Gazette, is mandatory, Bell argues that
Parliament intended the Minister to act in accord with the Cabinet’s
jurisdiction as the Minister is part of the Cabinet. It cannot be, Bell argues, that
Parliament intended the Minister to publish notices for hearings that are ultra
vires the Cabinet. As such, the Notice should be quashed.
The
Respondent – Rogers
[33]
Rogers
says that the Court should reject Bell’s argument that the Petition
is really seeking a Cabinet review of subject matter that was dealt with in
Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15. Relying on subsection 12(1) of the Act, Rogers
argues that the only statutory conditions precedent for the Cabinet to have
jurisdiction are that there be a decision by the CRTC and that relief be sought
within the ninety-day limitation period established by the statute.
[34]
Rogers
asserts that its Petition seeks to vary Decision 2010-805 as it relates to the
determination of the availability of wireless broadband, the effect of HSPA+
technology on competition, the impact of competitive bidding in the use of deferral
account funds, and the CRTC’s refusal to institute a competitive bidding
process for the allocation of those funds. All of these issues, Rogers argues, were
raised by the interested parties in the hearings leading up to Decision
2010-805 and the CRTC made determinations on each of them. As such, the Petition
to vary is proper and within the jurisdiction of the Cabinet.
[35]
Rogers argues that
simply because parties other than Bell raised the issue of
competitive bidding at the hearings, does not mean that this was not part of
the subject matter of Decision 2010-805. Further, although the CRTC considered
and rejected the implementation of a competitive bidding arrangement in Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-15, those decisions do not prevent the consideration of
competitive bidding in Decision 2010-805. The fact that the CRTC could have
instituted competitive bidding in Decision 2010-805, but did not is within the Cabinet’s
jurisdiction to review. Rogers further argues that the CRTC is not bound
by its own precedents and cannot fetter its discretion to decide each matter
before it based on a full assessment of the facts and the law in each case. Though
the CRTC decided not to implement a competitive bidding process in Decisions 2006-9
and 2007-15, this does not mean that the CRTC could not have implemented competitive
bidding in Decision 2010-805.
[36]
Rogers
also notes that Bell characterised its own application in Decision
2010-805 as a new application or, in the alternative, an application to review
and vary Decision 2010-637. Further, in the hearings, several companies,
including Rogers, opposed the
Decision 2010-805 application on several grounds, including that Bell’s proposal
was inconsistent with the 2006 Policy Direction made by Cabinet. As the
question before the CRTC in Decision 2010-805 was whether Bell’s application
met the guidelines set for the allocation of the Deferral Account funds in
accordance with telecommunications policy objectives, it is within the Cabinet’s
jurisdiction to hear and determine a Petition on those grounds. This is what Rogers’s Petition
is truly about and the Cabinet has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the
matter.
The
CRTC Did Not Fully Consider Competitive Bidding
[37]
Rogers
takes issue with Bell’s argument that the CRTC fully considered
competitive bidding in Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15. Rogers quotes from
Macauley and Sprague’s Practice and Procedure Before Administrative
Tribunals:
…the notion of stare decisis is
not applicable in the administrative sphere. Agencies are not only at liberty
not to treat their earlier decisions as precedent, they are positively
obligated not to do so.
Rogers argues that, although
the CRTC had considered and rejected a competitive bidding process in earlier
contexts and decisions, it was not bound to follow those decisions in Decision
2010-805. The CRTC was empowered to, and did, consider whether competitive
bidding should be implemented in Decision 2010-805.
[38]
Rogers notes that,
following Hopedale Developments v Oakville (Town) (1965), 47
DLR (2d) 482 (ONCA), it is permissible for administrative tribunals to consider
the principles established in their previous decisions in subsequent matters that
come before them. They must, however, give each new matter full consideration. Thus,
although the CRTC had previously considered and rejected competitive bidding,
it was not foreclosed from considering this in Decision 2010-805.
[39]
Rogers further
argues that administrative tribunals such as the CRTC must have the flexibility
to consider each decision in light of new developments. In Decision 2010-637,
the CRTC did not have all the facts before it that were relevant to the
determination of whether HSPA+ wireless technology would satisfy the established
criteria, including its affect on competition. Even had the CRTC intended to
determine for all time in Decision 2010-637 that competitive bidding would not
be employed, it could not have done so as it could not possibly have had all
the facts before it necessary to make such a determination.
Competitive
Bidding Was Properly Before the CRTC
[40]
Although
Bell has argued that it is not proper for interveners to raise new issues in
proceedings, Rogers says that
the jurisprudence cited by Bell in support of this proposition is not
applicable to administrative proceedings. Rogers further
argues that, even if it were applicable, it and the other telecommunications
companies were interested parties in the proceedings related to Decision
2010-805 and could properly raise issues for the CRTC to consider.
[41]
Rogers
asserts that there is nothing in the CRTC rules, past or present, that would
prevent Rogers or any other intervener from raising issues in be considered by
the CRTC. Contrary to Bell’s argument that Rules 13 and 27 of the former CRTC
Telecommunications Rules of Practice would require an amendment to the
pleadings to raise a new issue, Rogers argues that these Rules simply give the
CRTC the discretion to require an amendment to the pleadings where it is
necessary for an issue to be fully determined. Since these Rules are
discretionary, it cannot be said that the CRTC did not intend to consider
competitive bidding simply because it did not require pleadings to be amended. Further,
the parties other than Bell raised the issues of competitive
neutrality and competitive bidding in their submissions.
[42]
Rogers also notes
that, under section 60 of the Act, the powers of the CRTC to vary an order are
broad. Because the CRTC could have ordered competitive bidding as a variance to
Decision 2010-637, yet did not do so, this is a decision that is properly
reviewable on petition to the Cabinet.
The CRTC Intended to Render a New Decision
on Competitive Bidding
[43]
Rogers argues that
the phrase in paragraph 23 of Decision 2010-805 that “these reasons continue to
be valid” constitutes a fresh determination on the issue of competitive bidding
which is reviewable by the Cabinet. Rogers relies on the decision of Justice Simon
Noël in Dumbrava v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) [1995] FCJ No 1238; (1995) 101 FTR 230, in
which he wrote at paragraph 15 that
Whenever a decision-maker who is empowered to do so agrees to
reconsider a decision on the basis of new facts, a fresh decision will result
whether or not the original decision is changed, varied or maintained. What is
relevant is that there be a fresh exercise of discretion, and such will always
be the case when a decision-maker agrees to reconsider his or her decision by
reference to facts and submissions which were not on the record when the
original decision was reached.
Since in this case the CRTC was considering
whether to vary Decision 2010-637 based on the availability of the new HSPA+ technology
and its impact on competition, Decision 2010-805 was a fresh exercise of discretion
which is reviewable by the Cabinet.
[44]
Rogers also argues
that the words “reasons” and “continue” in paragraph 23 of Decision 2010-805
demonstrate that this is a fresh exercise of discretion. “Continue” refers to
the fact that the CRTC is making a new decision in the present. “Reasons” shows
that the CRTC is not simply re-stating its earlier decisions, but is adopting
the rationale of previous decision in its current Decision 2010-805.
The
Respondents – The Minister and the Attorney General of Canada (AGC)
[45]
The
Minister and the AGC (Canada) have made joint submissions which support
and complement those of Rogers. In brief, Canada says first
that the publication of a notice of petition under subsection 12(4) of the Act
is mandatory and does not impact rights or deal with substantive issues. Second,
the proper course is for the court to decline to exercise its prerogative to
prohibit the Cabinet from considering the Petition because the Cabinet has
authority to determine questions of jurisdiction and it would be premature for
the Court to intervene at this stage. Also, because prohibition is an
exceptional remedy which should only be exercised where a want of jurisdiction
is apparent, and since it is not apparent in this case, prohibition should not
be granted.
[46]
Canada
says that there are three routes of review available from decisions of the
CRTC: (i) the CRTC has the authority, within the scheme of the Act, to
reconsider any of it is decisions, either by application of a party or on its
own motion; (ii) a decision of the CRTC may also be appealed directly to the
Federal Court of Appeal; or (iii) a Petition may be filed asking the Cabinet to
vary, rescind, or remit for re-determination the decision. Further, the
Minister may, on consultation with the Provinces, make a recommendation to the
CRTC on how it ought to exercise its discretion.
Publication
of a Gazette Notice is Mandatory
[47]
Based
on the plain language of subsection 12(4), the Minister has no discretion
whether or not to publish a notice of petition once the statutory conditions
have been met. Since the decision to publish is mandatory and involves no
exercise of discretion, certiorari is not available to quash this
decision.
[48]
Canada notes that certiorari
is available to quash decisions where a public decision-maker has acted in
excess of its authority. In
Martineau v Matsqui Institution [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 at page 628, Justice
Dickson wrote that
Certiorari is available as a general remedy for supervision of the machinery
of government decision-making. The order may go to any public body with power
to decide any matter affecting the rights, interests, property, privileges, or
liberty of any person. The basis for the broad reach of this remedy is the
general duty of fairness resting on all public decision-makers.
Since, in
this case, the decision to publish the notice has no effect on the rights of Bell or any other
person, certiorari is not available to quash the Notice. The publishing
of the Notice does not bind the Minister or the Cabinet to make a recommendation
or to consider and decide the Petition; the only functions of the Notice are to
give notice that the Minister has received the Petition and to provide an
opportunity for interested parties to make submissions on the Petition. As
there is no determination made at this stage, it is inappropriate to quash the Notice.
The
Notice Does Not Bind the Minister or the Cabinet
[49]
Canada argues that,
because simply publishing the Notice in the Gazette does not bind either
the Minister or the Cabinet to any action that is outside either of their
jurisdiction, a want of jurisdiction that would ground prohibition is not
apparent. Canada notes that
the publication of the Notice simply informs the public that the Minister has received
the Petition, gives notice as to where the Petition may be inspected, and gives
interested parties the opportunity to make submissions on the Petition to the Cabinet.
Publishing the Notice does not bind the Cabinet to consider or determine the Petition;
the Cabinet is still able at this stage to reject the Petition as being outside
its jurisdiction, to hear the Petition and not vary Decision 2010-805, or to
hear the Petition and vary Decision 2010-805.
[50]
Canada also notes
that the roles of the Minister and the Cabinet are distinct. Though the
Minister is a member of the Cabinet and as such will take part in the consideration
of the Petition, the roles of these two entities are separate under subsection 12(1).
The Minister’s role in publishing the Notice is purely administrative, while the
role of the Cabinet is deliberative. As such, the Minister’s jurisdiction to
publish the Notice is separate from the jurisdiction of the Cabinet to hear and
decide the Petition. Since the Minister is required to publish the notice under
subsection 12(4) regardless of the Cabinet’s jurisdiction to hear the Petition,
the Notice must stand.
Certiorari is Premature When the Action
to be Quashed is Interlocutory or Has no Effect on Rights
[51]
Canada argues that
for an action to be reviewable by the Court it must have some actual effect on
the rights of the parties concerned; where there is no effect to exercising certiorari,
the remedy should not be granted. In the instant case, publication of the Notice
does not affect Bell’s rights; Bell can make submissions regarding the Petition
to the Cabinet, including submissions on jurisdiction. Further, there is a
basic presumption that the courts should not fragment ongoing administrative
processes through the granting of prerogative writs, particularly where the
granting of the writ may be unnecessary. In the current case, the Cabinet could
decline to hear the Petition, based on its determination that it has no
jurisdiction to hear it. To seek certiorari at this stage is premature
and adds an unnecessary element of complexity to the process.
[52]
Canada relies on
the comments of the Federal Court of Appeal in Krever, above, at
paragraphs 29 and 30, in this regard:
In
principle, therefore, I believe that it is possible to apply to quash a notice
that a commissioner decides to give under section 13. In practice, however, I
believe that the courts must show extreme restraint before intervening at this
stage. The notices in no way state the commissioner's opinion; they merely
state the possibility that the commissioner may state the opinion that there
has been misconduct. The allegations are not (or should not be) stated in legal
language and must not be held under a magnifying glass. When a commissioner
decides to include a number of allegations in a single notice, the notice may seem
more overwhelming than the final report, in which the findings of misconduct,
if such there be, will probably be spread out. Since a notice, by definition,
states possible allegations of misconduct, it is inevitable that it will depict
the conduct of its recipient unfavourably, and that the recipient will believe
that its reputation is tarnished solely because a notice has been sent to it.
Thus there are many reasons why the Court should view the notice in context,
and not dramatize its implications.
The courts should intervene only when the content of the notice
implies an obvious excess of jurisdiction, or discloses a flagrant breach of
the rules of natural justice. […]
The publication of a notice serves an
important public purpose in allowing interested parties to file submissions
with the Cabinet while, at the same time, it has very little practical effect
on the rights of Bell and therefore the Notice should not be quashed.
Further, since quashing the Notice would not prevent the Minister from making a
recommendation to the Cabinet under section 13, and would not prevent the Cabinet
from hearing and determining the Petition, certiorari should not be
granted as it would be a meaningless exercise of the Court’s discretion.
There is no Compelling Reason for the
Court to Intervene to Prohibit the Cabinet From Considering the Petition
[53]
Canada argues that Bell has not met
the requirements to ground an order of prohibition, as it is not clear that, by
hearing and determining the Petition, the Cabinet will step outside its
jurisdiction. Because it is clear that the Petition relates to issues
determined in Decision 2010-805, that the Cabinet can hear and determine
submissions on jurisdictional issues, and that the statutory preconditions for
hearing a petition are met, there is no compelling reason for the Court to
prohibit the Cabinet from hearing the Petition.
No Obvious Want of Jurisdiction
[54]
Canada also notes
that subsection 12(1) of the Act vests a broad power to vary decisions of the
CRTC in the Cabinet. Further, the only limits on this power are the statutory
preconditions of a valid, subsisting decision of the CRTC and compliance with
the limitation period. These statutory conditions have been met and so the Cabinet
has jurisdiction to consider and determine the Petition. Canada also notes
that prohibition is a drastic remedy and should be used with caution; while it
is intended and useful for preventing administrative bodies from stepping
outside the bounds of their jurisdiction, it should only be used where the lack
of jurisdiction is obvious. The Federal Court of Appeal in Krever, above,
at paragraph 27, quoted de Smith, Woolf and Jowell in Judicial review of
administrative action, to the effect that “if want of jurisdiction is not
apparent, the application must wait until the tribunal has actually stepped
outside its jurisdiction.”
The
Petition Relates to Determination in CRTC Decision 2010-805
[55]
Canada argues that
the only thing that matters in determining if a petition relates to a
determination of the CRTC is whether the relief sought in the petition relates
to a valid, subsisting, and relevant order of the CRTC. In this case the relief
sought in the Petition, the implementation of a competitive bidding process,
relates to an explicit rejection of the same process in Decision 2010-805. When
the CRTC wrote in relation to its earlier rejection of the competitive bidding
process that “these reasons continue to be valid,” it was making a fresh
determination on that issue.
[56]
Canada
also argues that Bell casts Decision 2010-805 too narrowly. Bell has argued
that this decision was only about the kind of technology to be used in the
expansion of broadband into rural and remote communities. However, in addition
to the technology to be used, Decision 2010-805 was also about the allocation
of the Deferral Account funds; as the Petition seeks to reduce the amount of
the Deferral Account funds that Bell is permitted to use and to implement a
competitive bidding process for the allocation of Deferral Account funds, the Petition
relates to the same subject matter as Decision 2010-805. As the Petition
relates to the subject matter as the Decision 2010-805, it is within the
jurisdiction of the Cabinet to consider it.
The Commission Had Authority to Consider Competitive
Bidding in Decision 2010-805
[57]
In
Decision 2010-805, it was open to the CRTC to institute a competitive bidding
process to allocate Deferral Account funds. As sections 60 and 62 of the Act
indicate, the power of the CRTC to decide and vary its decisions is broad. Further,
there are few constraints on the CRTC’s Rate Setting Authority under sections
24, 25 and 32 of the Act which, after the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision in Bell Aliant, above, includes the power to allocate Deferral
Account funds. As such, it was not necessary for Rogers to make a
separate application to vary Decision 2010-637 to include a competitive bidding
process. Further, the CRTC was not bound to require an amendment to the parties
pleadings in the application to vary Decision 2010-637 in order to make a
determination on competitive bidding.
[58]
Canada
argues that where the CRTC’s guidelines for review show that to vary a decision
an interested party must “demonstrate that there is substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the original decision,” the fact that the CRTC did not vary Decision
2010-637 in Decision 2010-805 demonstrates that the CRTC did not believe the
threshold to vary its earlier decision had been met.
No Grounds to Believe the
Cabinet Will Act Outside Its Jurisdiction
[59]
Canada notes that
the Notice published in the Gazette does not indicate that the Cabinet
will consider or determine the Petition and, as discussed above, the Cabinet is
not bound to consider or determine the Petition. Although the Cabinet might
step outside its jurisdiction in hearing the Petition, it is not certain to do
so. As the Federal Court of Appeal held in Singh (Re), [1989] 1
FC 430 (FCA); [1988] FCJ No 414 at page 438,
What is important is that the Court
should not intervene to prevent a body such as the Commission from carrying out
its statutorily mandated duty to enquire into matters which may arguably be
within its jurisdiction unless the Court can say with confidence that those
matters are not within the Commission’s jurisdiction.
In the current case, the Court cannot say
with confidence that the matters to be heard by Cabinet are not within its
jurisdiction, so the Court should not intervene. Further, as the Cabinet is
equipped and capable of hearing and deciding submissions with respect to jurisdiction,
the Court should not intervene at this stage.
The Cabinet Should be Permitted to Adjudicate
the Sufficiency of the Petition Before Judicial Review is Taken
[60]
Because
Bell has not
exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to it, it is premature
for Bell to seek
judicial review at this stage. Canada notes that Bell is capable
of making submissions to Cabinet with respect to the Petition. As such, Canada argues that
the current application for judicial review is a collateral attack on a remedy
available under the Act. Canada relies on C.B. Powell Ltd. v Canada (Border
Services Agency) 2010 FCA 61 at paragraphs 30 and 31 in support of the
proposition that all administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial
review may be sought:
The
normal rule is that parties can proceed to the court system only after all
adequate remedial recourses in the administrative process have been exhausted.
The importance of this rule in Canadian administrative law is well-demonstrated
by the large number of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada on point [… .]
Administrative law judgments and textbooks describe this rule in
many ways: the doctrine of exhaustion, the doctrine of adequate alternative
remedies, the doctrine against fragmentation or bifurcation of administrative
proceedings, the rule against interlocutory judicial reviews and the objection
against premature judicial reviews. All of these express the same concept:
absent exceptional circumstances, parties cannot proceed to the court system
until the administrative process has run its course. This means that, absent
exceptional circumstances, those who are dissatisfied with some matter arising
in the ongoing administrative process must pursue all effective remedies that
are available within that process; only when the administrative process has
finished or when the administrative process affords no effective remedy can
they proceed to court. Put another way, absent exceptional circumstances,
courts should not interfere with ongoing administrative processes until after
they are completed, or until the available, effective remedies are exhausted.
Because it is within the jurisdiction of
the Cabinet to hear submissions on jurisdiction and to decide not to hear the Petition
if there is no jurisdiction, there is an administrative remedy available to Bell. Since there
remains an adequate administrative remedy, there is no compelling reason for
the Court to intervene at this stage.
ANALYSIS
[61]
The
parties have presented the Court with two antithetical interpretations, or
characterizations, of Decision 2010-805. The correct interpretation is
important because Bell takes the position that the Petition is invalid
because it seeks to vary Decision 2010-805, which involved an entirely
different subject-matter, and is in substance an attempt to vary two earlier
decisions (Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15) outside the one-year limitation period
in subsection 12(1) of the Act.
[62]
Bell
says that Decision 2010-805, which is the alleged subject of the Petition,
arose from an application by Bell to vary an earlier CRTC decision ordering
it to use its Deferral Account funds to expand wireline broadband services in
rural communities. Bell says it applied to the CRTC to vary that
decision because it wanted to use wireless rather than wireline technology for
the broadband expansion.
[63]
Bell complains
that Rogers intervened and raised an entirely new issue over Bell’s objection:
whether the CRTC should hold a competitive bidding process to determine if
Rogers could perform the broadband expansion rather than Bell. Rogers had
unsuccessfully raised this very issue years earlier in Decisions 2006-9 and
2007-15, when it was rejected by both Cabinet and the CRTC. Bell points out
that while Rogers could have
appealed, petitioned or applied for review of Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15 at the
appropriate time, it never did.
[64]
Bell asserts that
the true focus of the Petition is the variation of Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15
and says that the only relief sought in the Petition is that there be
competitive bidding, which the CRTC summarily dismissed in a single paragraph
of Decision 2010-805 on the ground that it was already answered by Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-15.
[65]
On
the basis of this characterization, Bell asks the Court to find that the Petition
lies outside Cabinet’s jurisdiction because it deals with a different
subject-matter (competitive bidding) than the subject-matter of Decision 2010-805
(Bell’s use of its
Deferral Account funds for wireless technology). Instead, Bell says it is
an attempt by Rogers to evade the
one-year ultimate limitation period in subsection 12(1) of the Act for varying
Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15.
[66]
On
the other hand, Canada and Rogers say that the Petition is clearly related
to the subject matter of Decision 2010-805 and is not an attempt to boot-strap
the competitive bidding issue that should have been dealt with by other means.
Hence, the Cabinet has jurisdiction to deal with the Petition, including the
competitive bidding issue.
[67]
Bell has directed
the Court’s attention in particular to paragraph 23 of Decision 2010-805:
With respect to the proposals to allow
for competitive bidding in order to ensure the use of least-cost technology,
the Commission notes that it rejected this idea both in Telecom Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-50, since it would add a significant layer of complexity, delay
the implementation of broadband expansion, and result in substantial
administrative and regulatory burden. The Commission considers that these
reasons continue to be valid.
[68]
Bell
says that the CRTC is not here making a fresh decision about competitive
bidding; the CRTC is, rather, simply directing the attention of the parties to
the fact that the competitive bidding issue has already been dealt with in Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-15. Hence, Bell says that Decision 2010-805 does not deal with
competitive bidding and, in asking the Cabinet to address competitive bidding
in the Petition, Rogers is again attempting to raise an issue that has already
been dealt with in previous decisions and that is not within Cabinet’s
jurisdiction because it involves different subject matter from Decision
2010-805.
[69]
Rogers and Canada, on the
other hand, say that the CRTC is making a decision about competitive
bidding in Decision 2010-805. The fact that the issue may have been raised and
dealt with on previous occasions is irrelevant because the CRTC is not bound by
its previous decisions and, in any event, the CRTC has not dealt with the issue
in the context of Bell’s proposal for HSPA+ wireless services.
[70]
Both
sides have indicated that paragraph 23 of Decision 2010-805 must be viewed and
interpreted in the full context of a series of decisions and debate that goes
back to Decision 2002-34 when the CRTC created price regulation frameworks
applicable to telecommunications services offered by ILECs, including Bell.
[71]
The
Court has now reviewed the competing interpretations of Decision 2010-805
offered by the parties. In particular, the Court has been particularly mindful
of Decision 2010-805 itself, and what it reveals about the CRTC’s intention in
referring to competitive bidding in that decision, as well as what the record
reveals about the full context and the series of decisions that led up to Decision
2010-805, and what this tells us about whether the CRTC was making a new
decision about competitive bidding, or simply directing the parties attention
to the fact that the issue had already been dealt with in previous decisions.
Decision
2010-805
[72]
To
begin with, paragraph 23 of Decision 2010-805 acknowledges that the CRTC has
received, as part of the discussion surrounding this decision, “proposals to
allow for competitive bidding in order to ensure the use of least-cost
technology….” These proposals are summarized in paragraph 17 of Decision
2010-805:
Barrett, RCI, and Videotron submitted
that the revised proposal does not adhere to the principles in the deferral account
decisions, as it does not represent the use of least-cost technology to deploy
broadband services. These parties argued that alternative broadband service
providers could provide a comparable service at significantly less cost than
Bell Canada, and submitted that if the
Commission approves the revised proposal, it should allow for competitive
bidding to see whether other companies could provide the HSPA+ service at less
cost.
[73]
Paragraph
17 appears in that section of Decision 2010-805 which deals with the following
question:
Is Bell Canada’s HSPA+ wireless broadband proposal
consistent with the Commission’s criteria for use of funds to expand broadband
services in rural and remote areas?
[74]
It
is apparent from paragraph 17 of Decision 2010-805, in the context of Bell’s
application (which was an application to vary Decision 2010-637 by, inter
alia, allowing the Bell companies to use HSPA+ wireless broadband
technology rather than wireline DSL technology in order to provide broadband
services to communities previously approved by the commission), that the
parties who resisted Bell’s application to vary Decision 2010-637 felt that any
such variation would not accord with the CRTC’s established criteria for the
use of Deferral Account funds and that, because of this, if the CRTC were to
accept the application to vary, it would need to consider competitive bidding
“to see whether other companies could provide the HSPA+ service at less cost.”
[75]
In
other words, on its face, and when the whole of Decision 2010-805 is taken into
account, it looks to me as though the CRTC is dealing with an application from
Bell to vary a previous decision (and hence is making a new decision about the
use of Deferral Account funds) as part of which the CRTC was asked to consider
whether the variations were consistent with its own previously established
criteria and whether, if it was disposed to grant Bell its new or revised
proposal, it should not also allow for competitive bidding to see whether other
companies could provide the HSPA+ service at less cost.
[76]
The
CRTC points out in Decision 2010-805 that it had previously addressed the issue
of competitive bidding in Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15 and rejected the idea.
But Decisions 2006-9 2007-15 were not made in a context where the CRTC was
being asked to consider a Bell application for the use of HSPA+ wireless
technology.
[77]
Hence,
in the context of Decision 2010-805, I cannot read the CRTC’s comment in
paragraph 23 that “it rejected [competitive bidding] both in Telecom Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-50 [sic]…” as an indication that it does not need to,
and has not, considered the proposals for competitive bidding as put forward by
Barrett, RCI, and Videotron, in the context of Bell’s application to vary
involving a shift to HSPA+ wireless technology. In my view, all that paragraph
17 says is that competitive bidding was rejected in Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15
because the CRTC thought “it would add a significant layer of complexity, delay
the implementation of broadband expansion, and result in substantial
administrative and regulatory burden.” The CRTC also considers the same reasons
to be valid in the context of Decision 2010-805 even though, as the opposers
had pointed out, Bell’s application to vary was not consistent with the CRTC’s
own criteria and, if the CRTC was willing to proceed with the variations, it
should allow for competitive bidding as a way of remaining consistent with the Policy
Direction and its own previously stated objectives and criteria.
[78]
Hence,
I think that the issue of competitive bidding was very much a part of a new
decision that the CRTC made in Decision 2010-805 with regards to the
application that Bell was making at that time and which involved the
use of HSPA+ wireless technology. I do not see how the CRTC could be saying
that, for purposes of the application before it, the issue of competitive
bidding had already been dealt with in Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15 and so
required no further consideration in the context of an application that now
proposed using HSPA+ technology. The HSPA+ decision is one the CRTC had not
made before, so the CRTC was required to consider the impact on competition in
this context. In my view, the CRTC is simply saying that the justifications it
offered earlier in Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15 to reject competitive bidding
are equally persuasive in the decision it is now making. Bell is, in
effect, saying to the Court that the CRTC rejected the idea of competitive
bidding in previous decisions that did not involve HSPA+ wireless technology
and so did not need to, and did not, consider the idea of competitive bidding
in an application that does involve HSPA+ wireless technology. I cannot accept
this logic, and I do not think this is what the CRTC did in Decision 2010-805.
Just because the CRTC references previous decisions for reasons why competitive
bidding is not appropriate in the context of a new application involving a new
technology, does not mean it has not considered the idea of competitive bidding
as part of that new application which involves an assembly of elements that had
not previously been before the CRTC.
The Wider Context
[79]
I
believe that this interpretation is also borne out by the wider context in
which Decision 2010-805 was made. By and large, my review of the record before me
confirms the rationale and sequencing recited by Rogers and endorsed by Canada.
[80]
By
the time of Bell’s new application, or application to vary (either of them
requiring a new exercise of discretion and a new decision from the CRTC) that
resulted in Decision 2010-805, Rogers and the other challengers to Bell’s
application had made it clear to the CRTC that, in their view, an acceptance of
Bell’s proposal would result in inconsistency with the CRTC’s own criteria and
principles as forged and articulated in previous applications and decisions.
This would require rejection of Bell’s application, or a
reconsideration of issues such as competitive bidding, in order to maintain
competitive neutrality (a CRTC principal) in this market. The CRTC, as Decision
2010-805 shows, disagreed and, inter alia, rejected the proposal that
competitive bidding was a necessary or desirable approach.
[81]
Following
Decision 2010-805, Rogers still felt that the CRTC had violated its own
principles and that, if Bell’s HSPA+ application were to be endorsed,
then a reconsideration of competitive bidding was required. In my view, this is
what the Petition, in essence, says, and as such it is directly and obviously
related to Decision 2010-805. Among other things, the Cabinet needs to consider
whether it was appropriate for the CRTC to reject competitive bidding in a
context that involved a new technology, a service that is already available in
most of the communities involved, and the change of conditions that has
occurred since the CRTC rejected competitive bidding in Decisions 2006-9 and
2007-15. The request to the Cabinet in the Petition to consider competitive
bidding as a way of achieving competitively neutral regulation is, in my view,
directly related to Decision 2010-805 and, in particular, paragraphs 17 and 23
of that decision.
[82]
On
26 January 2011, Rogers submitted the Petition to the Cabinet seeking a
variance of the decision. The Petition challenges the CRTC’s determination in
the decision that Bell’s new wireless HSPA+ technology proposal satisfies the CRTC’s
criteria for Deferral Account funding, including the CRTC’s underlying
determinations in the decision on the availability of HSPA+ services in the
approved locations and the distortion of the wireless market caused by approval
of Bell’s new proposal, as well as the CRTC’s rejection in the decision of a
competitive bidding process.
[83]
The
Petition requests the Cabinet to vary Decision 2010-805 and to affirm that
approval of Bell’s new wireless HSPA+ technology proposal would give rise to
competitive inequities and market distortions that are not consistent with the
principles established by the CRTC in earlier decisions and the Cabinet’s Policy
Direction, and that use of a competitive auction is necessary to satisfy the
requirements of competitive neutrality and least-cost provision of service.
Recognizing, however, the importance of ensuring that there is no further delay
in broadband expansion, the Petition proposes that Decision 2010-805 be varied
so as to approve Bell’s use of Deferral Account funds to extend service to the
locations Bell has proposed to serve in 2011 using HSPA+ technology and to
state that a competitive auction will be convened to establish the appropriate Deferral
Account subsidy for the extension of broadband service to the remaining
approved communities that Bell has proposed to serve.
[84]
I
agree with Rogers and Canada that the decision speaks for itself on its
subject matter. In the decision and in response to the record before it, the CRTC
addressed whether Bell’s new wireless HSPA+ technology proposal was consistent
with its criteria for use of Deferral Account funds for broadband expansion to
rural and remote communities in light of a number of factors, including the
competitive impact of Bell’s proposal and the costs of using a competitive
bidding process. The CRTC’s approval of Bell’s new
wireless HSPA+ proposal was integrally related to and based on the CRTC’s
“determinations” on these factors. This is plainly set out in the “Commission’s
analysis and determinations” in paragraph 21 to 24 of the Decision:
With regard to the parties’submission
that HSPA services are already available in some of the approved communities,
the Commission notes that, in order to ensure a fair, predictable, and
transparent process, it established 19 February 2007 as the cut-off date for
alternative broadband service providers to verify that they were offering, or
were planning to offer, broadband service in the communities. The Commission
notes that broadband service was not available in the communities in question
as of this cut-off date. Furthermore, the Commission notes that none of the
carriers providing HSPA service in the approved communities demonstrated that
their current offerings are comparable to Bell Canada’s revised proposal.
Regarding the parties’ concerns that the
revised proposal would distort the mobile voice market, the Commission notes
that mobile voice services are already available in the vast majority of the
112 approved communities. Furthermore, the Commission considers that there are
many economic and social benefits associated with access to broadband services
in these communities, and that any associated market distortion would be
minimal.
With respect to the proposals to allow
for competitive bidding in order to ensure the use of least-cost technology,
the Commission notes that it rejected this idea in both Telecom Decisions
2006-9 and 2007-50, since it would add a significant layer of complexity, delay
the implementation of broadband expansion, and result in substantial
administrative and regulatory burden. The Commission considers that these
reasons continue to be valid.
In light of all of the above, the Commission finds that
Bell Canada’s HSPA+ wireless broadband proposal is consistent with its
determinations in the Deferral Account decisions. The Commission therefore approves
the revised proposal. [Some emphasis added.]
[85]
As
Bell and Canada point out, the Petition challenges and seeks a variance of the CRTC’s
determinations in Decision 2010-805on the impact of approving Bell’s new
proposal on wireless competition, the costs and benefits of implementing a
competitive bidding process and the consequent approval of Bell’s new wireless
HSPA+ technology proposal.
[86]
Simply
put, paragraphs 21 to 24 of the Decision are the subject matter of the Petition.
Bell’s Arguments
[87]
Bell has sought
to persuade the Court that the above interpretation of the Petition, Decision
2010-805, and the background decisions is not correct for various reasons. In
my view, none of the objections put forward by Bell can
withstand scrutiny.
[88]
First,
Bell maintains
that the “the CRTC had already fully considered the competitive bidding issue
in Decisions 2006-9 and 2007-15.” As a matter of law, however, it is my view
that while the CRTC may refer to and take guidance from its earlier decisions,
those decisions cannot dictate its subsequent decisions. The CRTC is not bound
by precedent and has a legal obligation not to fetter its discretion. As stated
in Macauley and Sprague’s Practice and Procedure Before Administrative
Tribunals:
… the notion of stare decisis is
not applicable in the administrative sphere. Agencies are not only at
liberty not to treat their earlier decisions as precedent, they are positively
obligated not to do so. [emphasis added]
[89]
The
principle that an administrative tribunal cannot use its previous decisions to
fetter its discretion was established in Hopedale Developments Ltd. v
Oakville (Town) (1965), 47 DLR (2d) 482 (ONCA) at 486. The Ontario Court of
Appeal held in that case that it would have been an error of law for the
Ontario Municipal Board to use precedent to limit the number of issues that it
needed to address. Administrative tribunals are permitted to rely on principles
articulated in previous decisions as long as the tribunal gives “the fullest
hearing and consideration to the whole problem before it.”
[90]
The
prohibition on exclusive reliance by an administrative tribunal on previous
decisions includes not only factual and policy decisions but also legal
determinations and is essential to ensure that administrative tribunals have
the flexibility to respond to new circumstances on a case-by-case basis. The
need for flexibility is particularly acute in the case of policy and factual
determinations, such as those at issue in Decision 2010-805 and the Petition.
[91]
The
CRTC also did not have before it in its previous decisions Bell’s new wireless
HSPA+ technology proposal, which Bell characterized as establishing new facts,
resulting in a new application. In my view, the CRTC could not have considered
competitive bidding in light of these new facts in its previous decisions
anymore than the CRTC could have considered Bell’s new
wireless HSPA+ technology in its previous decisions. The relevant facts, quite
simply, were not previously before the CRTC.
[92]
Therefore,
in my view, the CRTC cannot, as a matter of law, have “fully considered” in
previous decisions whether competitive bidding should be used to allocate Deferral
Account funds in light of Bell’s new wireless HSPA+ technology proposal.
[93]
Second,
Bell argues that consideration of a competitive bidding process was not
“properly before the CRTC in the Decision” because Rogers “intervened”
and raised this issue “over Bell’s objection.” In support of this
proposition, Bell cites
jurisprudence on the ability of the interveners to raise new issues at trial
and on appeal in the courts. In my view, this jurisprudence has no application
to administrative proceedings. Even if it did, Rogers, Barrett and Videotron –
all of whom requested a competitive bidding process should Bell’s application
be granted – were not interveners; they were interested parties to Decisions
2010-637 and 2010-805, entitled to respond to Bell’s application based on
factual, policy, and legal grounds relevant to the CRTC’s assessment of whether
Bell’s new wireless HSPA+ technology proposal satisfied the CRTC’s criteria for
Deferral Account funding. Opposing parties’ submissions focused specifically on
these criteria, including in particular the objectives of extending service to
underserved communities, competitive neutrality and least-cost service
provision, and it is in this context that the CRTC’s addressed these arguments.
[94]
I
agree with Rogers and Canada that there was also no prohibition under
the former CRTC Telecommunications Rules of Procedure (and there is no
prohibition under the new CRTC Rules of Procedure) on an interested
party to a CRTC proceeding to raise policy, factual or legal arguments that
have not been expressly identified by an applicant in the application. Rules 13
and 27 of the former CRTC Telecommunications Rules of Procedure, cited
by Bell, simply
provide the CRTC with the discretion to require parties to clarify issues in
dispute or to order amendments necessary for determining the real question in
issue. No such steps were taken by the CRTC in the Decision 2010-805
proceeding.
[95]
Nor
was there any requirement, in my view, for Rogers or other
interested parties to “formally request” a variance of Decisions 2006-9 and
2007-15 in their submissions in the Decision 2010-805 proceeding or by separate
application. The submissions of opposing parties identify competitive
neutrality and competitive bidding as factors that the CRTC needed to consider
in its assessment of whether Bell’s new wireless HSPA+ technology proposal
was consistent with its criteria for Deferral Account funding.
[96]
There
is also no question, in my view, that the CRTC had the authority to order the
implementation of a competitive bidding process in the Decision had it
determined that this was necessary to ensure competitive neutrality and/or
least-cost provision of service. In this regard, section 60 of the Act
especially authorizes the CRTC to “grant the whole or any portion of the relief
applied for in any case, and may grant any of the relief in addition to or in
substitution for the relief apply for as if the application had been for that
relief.”
[97]
Bell’s third
proposition is that “the text of Decision 2010-805 does not suggest that the
CRTC intended to render any new decision on competitive bidding.” As I have
said previously, it is my view that the Decision clearly and unequivocally
makes a decision on this issue. In the Decision, the CRTC analyzed and
determined the appropriateness of implementing a competitive bidding process,
as it was required by law to do, referencing its earlier determinations that
such a process would result in complexity, delay and substantial administrative
and regulatory burden and concluding that “these reasons continue to be valid.”
[98]
I
do not think this can be characterized as a “courtesy response” in
correspondence to a request for a review or clarification of its earlier
decisions. The Decision is identified as “Telecom Decision CRTC Decision
2010-805” and is plainly a decision of the CRTC in all respects. In this
regard, the following statement of Justice Noël in Dumbrava, above, is
instructive:
Whenever a decision-maker who is empowered to do so agrees to
reconsider a decision on the basis of new facts, a fresh decision will result
whether or not the original decision is changed, varied or maintained. What
is relevant is that there be a fresh exercise of discretion, and such will
always be the case when a decision-maker agrees to reconsider his or her
decision by reference to facts and submissions which were not on the record
when the original decision was reached. [emphasis added]
[99]
The
CRTC was empowered to and did expressly reconsider its previous decisions on
competitive bidding in Decision 2010-805 as it was legally obligated to do in
light of the new facts and arguments before it. These facts and arguments,
including Bell’s new
wireless HSPA+ technology proposal and the submissions of interested parties,
were not before the CRTC in Decisions 2006-9 or 2007-15. The CRTC’s
determination that its reasons for declining to use a competitive bidding
process in earlier decisions “continue to be valid” does not make Decision 2010-805
any less a decision of the CRTC. What matters is whether CRTC made a fresh
exercise of discretion, which, in my view, it did.
[100] I also agree
with Rogers and Canada that, as a purely practical matter, the CRTC could not
have decided in earlier decisions that its analysis in those decisions would
“continue” to be valid in a future proceeding, conducted 3-4 years later to
assess a fundamentally different technology proposal for expanding broadband
service to rural and remote communities. As discussed above, Bell itself
characterized its application as a new application, on the grounds that its new
wireless HSPA+ technology proposal involved new facts not previously before the
CRTC. The CRTC could not have previously assessed the appropriateness of using
a competitive bidding process in light of these new facts.
[101] Bell also says
that, in essence, the Petition is nothing more than a collateral attack on
earlier decisions that has been brought out of time. It is true that the record
shows that Rogers did threaten
to attack and petition Cabinet on similar grounds and using wording that can
also be found in the Petition. In my view, however, the fact that Rogers may have
threatened to attack earlier decisions but did not follow through on those
threats does not make the present Petition a time-barred collateral attack upon
those earlier decisions. It is hardly surprising that similar wording is used,
or that previous decisions are cited, when the concerns raised are the same.
But the fact is that those earlier decisions did not involve the HSPA+ wireless
technology and in Decision 2010-805 the CRTC was asked to exercise its
discretion anew by addressing that new technology and whether allowing its
deployment now gave rise to a need for competitive billing in order to ensure
neutrality and compliance with the CRTC’s own policies and principles.
Conclusions
[102] I think that
the conclusions I have reached at this point effectively deal with the
application, and that there is no need to consider additional points raised by Bell or Canada. The heart
of Bell’s application is that Decision 2010-805 does not contain a fresh
exercise of the CRTC’s discretion to consider, or reconsider, competitive
billing. In my view, it does involve a fresh exercise of that discretion.
Hence, the Petition does not deal with subject matter that is unrelated to the Decision
and is not out of time. Consequently, in my view, there are no jurisdictional
issues that would justify quashing and setting aside the Notice and/or
prohibiting the Cabinet from considering the Petition in accordance with the
Act.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that
1.
The
application is dismissed.
2.
Rogers
and the Minister shall have their costs in this matter.
“James
Russell”