Date: 20110728
Docket: IMM-5917-10
Citation: 2011 FC 958
Ottawa, Ontario,
July 28, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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CHONG LI SHU
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act) for judicial
review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the
Immigration and Refugee Board, dated 9 September 2010 (Decision), which refused
the Applicant’s application to be deemed a Convention refugee or a person in
need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The Applicant
is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. He began attending a 23-member unregistered
house church in June 2007. In October 2007 and, again on 13 December 2007, he
joined other church members in distributing to residential mailboxes flyers promoting
the Christian faith. The members divided themselves into groups of three or
four, and each group was deployed to a particular location.
[3]
The
October distribution was without incident but, during the December distribution,
two members of a three-member group were arrested by the Public Security Bureau
(PSB) and subsequently disclosed the identities of everyone belonging to their
church. The Applicant went into hiding.
[4]
PSB
officers allegedly came to his house on approximately ten different occasions
to arrest him. They searched the home where he lived with his parents. The PSB informed
the Applicant’s father of the allegations against his son: that he had joined
an illegal religious group and that he had distributed illegal religious flyers
to poison people’s minds.
[5]
The
Applicant fled to Canada, arriving here on 14
February 2008. He claims that the PSB continues to make inquiries about him,
that officers have visited his home three times since he fled to Canada and that the two captured
church members remain in detention.
[6]
He
appeared before the RPD on 4 August 2010. He was represented by counsel and an
interpreter was present. In a written Decision, the RPD rejected the
Applicant’s claim, having found that he was neither a Convention refugee nor a
person in need of protection. This is the Decision under review.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
Credibility Concerns
[7]
The
RPD identified two aspects of the Applicant’s evidence that gave rise to credibility
concerns. The first related to the issuance of an arrest warrant and the second
related to the PSB’s questioning of the Applicant’s father.
[8]
The
Applicant stated that his father did not tell him that an arrest warrant or
summons had been issued in the Applicant’s name. The RPD did not find this
evidence believable. It noted that, according to the Applicant, the PSB
maintained a continuing interest in him. Were this true, in the RPD’s view, the
PSB would likely have left a warrant for his arrest in the care of his parents
during one of their thirteen visits to the home. According to the documentary
evidence, it is “very common in China for the police authorities to leave a summons
or subpoena with family members … instructing them to pass it along to the
person named on the summons.” Although this is not proper procedure, it
“happens all the time, especially in cases when the person on the summons is
not easily locatable ….”
[9]
The
Applicant also stated that his father never told him that the PSB ever inquired
about the father’s participation in the unregistered church. The RPD found this
to be unlikely. Given that the PSB had allegedly caught two members
distributing Christian flyers and had accused the Applicant of distributing
such flyers and poisoning people’s minds, it was reasonable to expect the PSB
to inquire about the Applicant’s family and whether they, too, were members of
the Christian faith. In the RPD’s view, it was also reasonable to expect the
Applicant to know if the PSB had made such an inquiry, given that he and his
father have exchanged information about the PSB’s visits to their home and the
fate of the arrested church members.
[10]
The
RPD weighed the Applicant’s evidence against the documentary evidence and found
the former lacking. According to the documentary evidence, while Christian
groups have no legal protection, they continue to increase in both number and
notoriety. In fact, most groups no longer operate in strict secrecy but,
rather, carry out public activities and social service work.
Documentary Evidence
[11]
The
RPD examined the documentary evidence regarding religious persecution in China. It found that,
although religious persecution of house churches does occur in China, “it is not general in
nature.”
[12]
The
RPD noted that, in China, Protestant Christians
number between 50 and 70 million in churches other than those sanctioned by the
state. There is a significant discrepancy in the treatment of house churches
throughout the country. In some areas, unregistered house churches with
hundreds of members meet openly with the full knowledge of local authorities,
particularly in small cities and rural areas. Elsewhere, those who participate
in house church meetings of more than a handful of family members and friends face
detention and abuse.
[13]
There
were “many” reports that authorities routinely disrupted home worship meetings,
claiming that participants had disturbed their neighbours or the social order
or belonged to an “evil cult.” One source stated, however, that family and
friends could hold religious meetings and did not need to register with
authorities. This was confirmed by another source, which observed that
gatherings of more than 40 are required by law to register with the government.
[14]
The
RPD also examined the documentary evidence regarding religious persecution in
the Applicant’s home province
of Guangdong. It found “no
persuasive information suggesting that religious persecution is occurring for
groups that are similar to the [Applicant’s].” It acknowledged the China Aid
Association (CAA) as a “significant source of up-to-date reporting and detailed
accounts of harassment and repression of Protestant house churches in China.” CAA reported that the
main targets of persecution include house church leaders, house churches in
urban areas, Christian publications and foreign Christians and missionaries
living and working in China. The RPD recognized
that, according to the President of CAA, “[s]ome forms of repression fall below
our radar such as warnings, fines, and harassment.”
[15]
The
RPD concluded that, had the arrests occurred in Guangdong (as the Applicant
alleges), they would be considered so egregious that one could reasonably
expect to see them reported not only by CAA but by “the multitude of different
resources which strive to inform the world of religious repression in China.” The one reported
incident for Guangdong province occurred in
2008; it was a raid on Liangren church in Guangdong. The pastor of that church has since filed an
administrative lawsuit, and the court accepted the filing. Aside from this
incident, there are no other reports for Guangdong. Consequently, the RPD concluded that there was
“[n]o other persuasive evidence … that Protestant unregistered church members
are facing persecution in Guangdong province.”
[16]
The
RPD stated that it was “mindful of the caveat that the number of persecution
incidents is likely to be much higher because of censorship” and that “not all
information is available to commentators.” However, as there is available a
significant number of detailed examples of religious persecution of varying degrees
of seriousness in areas much more remote than Guangdong, it was reasonable to
expect the Applicant to present persuasive evidence that individuals in
circumstances similar to his are being jailed or facing other forms of
persecution in Guangdong province. As such evidence was not presented and, as
the documentary evidence suggests otherwise, the RPD found, on a balance of
probabilities, that the Applicant was not arrested for distributing flyers and
that the authorities are not seeking him.
[17]
The
RPD found the Applicant to be a Christian, who would be able to practise his
Christian faith in Guangdong if he were to return
there. Consequently, it rejected his refugee claim.
ISSUES
[18]
The
Applicant raises a number of issues, which can be summarized in the following
manner:
i.
Whether
the RPD erred in its credibility findings; and
ii. Whether the RPD erred by
ignoring relevant evidence, relying on irrelevant evidence, misinterpreting the
evidence and making erroneous findings of fact.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[19]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country
of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of
protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country
and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless
imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide
adequate health or medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of
protection.
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Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le
réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de
sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe
social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors
du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays
dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le
croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la
Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements
ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de
l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la
personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes
auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[20]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held that a standard
of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the
standard of review applicable to the particular question before the court is
well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that standard
of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing court
undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review
analysis.
[21]
Both
credibility assessment and treatment of the evidence are within the RPD’s areas
of expertise and, therefore, deserving of deference. They are reviewable on a
standard of reasonableness. See Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration)
(1993), 160 NR 315, 42 ACWS (3d) 886 (FCA); Aguirre v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 571 at paragraph 14; Dunsmuir,
above, at paragraphs 51 and 53; and Ched v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1338 at paragraph 11.
[22]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph
47; and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at
paragraph 59. Put another way, the Court should
intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls
outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
Credibility
Concerns Related to the PSB’s Failure to Issue an Arrest Warrant Are Unjustified
[23]
The
Applicant notes that, in Response to Information Request (RIR) CHN42444.E, a
senior fellow of the Open Society Institute stated that Chinese authorities
would almost always issue an arrest warrant to the named individual (as opposed
to a family member). This opinion was corroborated by a law professor from the University of Washington. However, a
representative of Human Rights in China (HRIC) stated that it is “very common”
for the authorities to leave an arrest warrant with a family member with instructions
to pass it on to the person named in the warrant, even though this is “not
actually the proper procedure.”
[24]
The
Applicant argues that the RPD should have based its Decision on the corroborated
evidence and not on the unconfirmed alternative evidence. In ignoring the corroborated
evidence and preferring the evidence that went against the Applicant, the RPD
erred. There cannot be “selective reliance on evidence presented to the
detriment of the person concerned.” See Mui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration),
2003 FC 1020 at paragraph 28. While there is a presumption that the RPD
considered all of the evidence, as Justice Yves de Montigny observed in Saraci
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 175 at paragraphs 33-34:
… the more important the evidence which
is not specifically mentioned and analysed, the more likely it is that a
reviewing court may infer from the failure to mention the evidence that it was
overlooked.
A
careful reading of the tribunal's decision shows that many aspects of the
applicant's evidence were overlooked, or ignored. It is equally disturbing to
see that the Board failed to comment on important, or relevant, material
evidence.
[25]
The
Applicant’s sworn evidence is presumed to be true unless there is reason to
doubt his truthfulness. See Maldonado v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration)
(1979), [1980] 2 FC 302, [1979] FCJ No 248 (QL) (FCA).
Credibility
Concerns Related to the PSB’s Failure to Question the Applicant’s Father
Regarding His Involvement in Christian Activity Are Unjustified
[26]
The
Applicant argues that it is unreasonable for the RPD to expect the PSB to question
the Applicant’s father about their family’s involvement in Christian
activities. According to the Applicant’s evidence, the members who had been
arrested in December disclosed to the PSB the names of the other members of the
underground church. Therefore, the Applicant argues, the PSB had no reason to
question the father because they already knew the identities of all other
members.
[27]
Where
the RPD finds a lack of credibility based on inferences, there must be a basis
in the evidence to support the inferences. See Frimpong v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration),
(1989), 8 Imm LR (2d) 183, [1989] FCJ No 441 (QL) (FCA).
The RPD Erred in Its
Treatment of the Documentary Evidence
[28]
The
Applicant contends that the RPD’s treatment of the documentary evidence was in
error for the following reasons.
[29]
Since
1999, the U.S. Secretary of State has continued to identify China as a “Country of
Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act for “particularly
severe violations of religious freedom.”
[30]
The
RPD’s comments regarding the increased public freedom enjoyed by Chinese
Christians fail to appreciate the ongoing power struggle between the house
church movement and the government. In 2010, CAA published a report indicating
that, although members of Christian house churches may evangelize and otherwise
operate in public, this in no way means that they are not being persecuted when
they do so. To suggest otherwise is perverse. Moreover, as indicated above, among
the four most-targeted groups are Christian publications. The Applicant has
been accused of distributing Christian publications, which makes him particularly
vulnerable.
[31]
Also,
with respect to the level of persecution in the Applicant’s home province of Guangdong, the RPD’s
understanding of the facts is “completely in error,” as the documentation from
CAA demonstrates. The Applicant argues:
[I]t
is clear there are 8 instances involving over 300 persons for the most recent
statistics of Guangdong. Further, Guangdong
is the only area targeted in all of Southern China. All instances of
persecution for southern China occurred in Guangdong. This makes it a lightning rod of persecution. Guangdong
has the third or fourth highest incidences of persecution in all of China…. The [RPD] acknowledges that the Applicant is a Christian,
but suggests because he lives in Guangdong, he has nothing to fear, because Protestants
are being treated well there. The documentary evidence was misinterpreted. Guangdong is one of the worst places for persecution of Christians in
all of China…. As the panel itself notes, this could
well be only the tip of the ice berg [sic] in terms of persecution given
the tight grip the State has over media.
[32]
The
Applicant further notes that in December 2008, authorities raided the Liangren Church, a house church, in Guangdong province and charged
the members with organizing an illegal gathering. Clearly, contrary to the
RPD’s findings, Christians such as the Applicant are facing severe persecution
not simply in China generally but in Guangdong particularly.
The Respondent
The RPD’s
Credibility Findings Were Reasonable
[33]
The
Respondent notes the Court’s jurisprudence supporting the proposition that
decision-makers such as the RPD are in the best position to gauge issues of
credibility and plausibility, based on the evidence and on common sense, and to
draw the necessary inferences. See Aguebor, above at 316.
[34]
The
Respondent contends that the RPD’s credibility findings are firmly rooted in
the evidence. The RPD reviewed the documentary evidence as well as the evidence
of the Applicant that the authorities visited his family house thirteen times. Based
on that evidence, it concluded that it would be reasonable to expect the PSB to
leave an arrest warrant or summons with the Applicant’s family. The RPD did not
say that it expected the PSB to issue and serve arrest warrants for the
Applicant’s family members. The RPD’s observations in this regard are entirely
consistent with the documentary evidence referenced by the Applicant, which
states that it is “very common” for the PSB to leave a warrant with family
members.
[35]
Moreover,
the RPD reasonably expected that, in the course of inquiries, the PSB would
have asked whether other family members were participants in the Christian
faith and that the Applicant would then speak of this with his father. The
Applicant’s argument that the PSB knew exactly who the members were and
therefore did not need to ask these questions does not accord with common sense
and rationality.
The RPD’s
Treatment of the Evidence Was Reasonable
[36]
There
is nothing in the record to show that the RPD failed to consider the totality
of the evidence before it. An administrative decision-maker, such as the RPD,
is empowered to decide how to weigh the evidence, and it is assumed to have
weighed and considered all of the evidence unless that presumption is rebutted.
See Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 598 (FCA) (QL). The Respondent contends that the
Applicant has not rebutted the presumption in this case. Moreover, the RPD is
entitled to prefer documentary evidence to that of the Applicant. See Zhou v
Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration)
(1994), 49 ACWS (3d) 558, [1994] FCJ No 1087 (FCA) (QL).
The Applicant Has
Misunderstood the Statistics Provided by CAA
[37]
The
Respondent argues that the RPD acted reasonably in finding that there is no
persuasive information suggesting that underground churches similar to the one
attended by the Applicant are suffering religious persecution. The Applicant
has misunderstood the statistics on the incidence of religious persecution in Guangdong, as reported by CAA for
2010 and cited by the Applicant.
[38]
These
statistics do not contradict the RPD’s findings. The statistics clearly list 0
arrests for, presumably, the year of publication (that is, 2010) and 0 arrests
for the previous year. Moreover, the “Total incidents of persecution” is
reported as 8 for 2010 and 1 for the previous year. The “Total number of people
persecuted” is reportedly less than 300, presumably meaning 300 throughout the
entire reportable history.
[39]
Overall,
the Applicant’s position amounts to a disagreement with the RPD’s conclusion,
one that was clearly open to it based on the evidence before it. As such, it
does not afford a basis for this Court’s intervention.
ANALYSIS
[40]
The
RPD finds that the Applicant has not satisfied the burden of establishing
persecution or that he would personally be subjected to a risk to his life, or
a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a risk of torture, if
he returns to the People’s Republic of China.
[41]
The Decision
is based upon “a number of credibility concerns” and the Applicant says that
the RPD’s reasons and conclusions are unreasonable.
No Arrest Warrant or
Summons
[42]
The
RPD concluded that
Given
that the authorities have allegedly arrested two members and continue to
inquire about the claimants (sic), it is reasonable to expect, given the
documentary evidence, that an arrest warrant or summons would have been left
with the claimant’s family.
The Applicant says that the RPD is being
selective in the evidence it chooses to rely upon for this conclusion and that
the RPD “should have based its decision on the predominant, corroborated
evidence, not the unconfirmed alternative stand.” Alternatively, the Applicant
says that the RPD “was required at the very least to consider the more
authoritative first position, and explain why it preferred the second
alternative position over the primary corroborated evidence.”
[43]
The Response
to Information Request relied upon by the RPD had the following to say on
point:
Whether
Summonses are Given to Individuals or Households
According
to information provided to the Research Directorate on 10 December 1998 by a
senior Open Society Institute, a summons would almost always be issued to the
individual, rather than to a registration or family member (10 Dec. 1998). The University of Washington law professor corroborated information
in correspondence to the Research Directorate, saying that he was not aware of
any change in practice, as of April 2004 (22 Apr. 2004).
[44]
It
is clear, then, that the RPD does select and rely upon that portion of the
information request that supports a particular conclusion, rather than
providing the full context of the evidence on point and explaining why it
should rely upon the evidence of the HRIC representative in New York.
Religious Activities of
the Applicant’s Family
[45]
A
further credibility concern is addressed by the RPD at paragraph 6 of the
Decision:
The
panel questioned the claimant if the authorities had asked his father whether
he participated in the unregistered church. His response was that his father
didn't say anything about that in conversations that the claimant had with his
father. Given that the authorities had allegedly caught two members
distributing fliers promoting the Christian faith and the claimant was being
accused of distributing illegal religious fliers and poisoning people’s minds,
it is reasonable to expect them to make inquiries about the claimant’s family
and whether they were participants in the Christian faith. It is also
reasonable for the claimant to know if inquiries were made given that his
father had provided him with information about visits and the current
information regarding the detained fellow practitioners.
[46]
The
Applicant says that this is unreasonable because his PIF had made it clear that
the “PSB officers also said that two of the group members had been caught and
confessed about the involvement of the other group members.” This means that
“the PSB know exactly who all the members are” and that “the father is not a
member, and there is no need to ask the father if he is involved.”
[47]
In
my view, the RPD’s finding on this point is unreasonable. It is based upon
speculation and conjecture and has no real basis in evidence. In any event, the
Applicant’s evidence was not that his father had not been questioned but that,
as the RPD itself concludes in the Decision, “that his father didn’t say
anything about that in conversations that the claimant had with his father.”
There may have been many reasons why the father did not discuss this issue over
the phone with his son who had fled to Canada. However, the RPD did not explore this matter
and relied upon speculation and conjecture. See Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v Hamdar, 2006 FC 290 at paragraph 41.
[48]
Given
the context, any negative inference based upon the father’s failure to mention
something is, in my view, unreasonable.
Documentary Evidence
[49]
The
third basis for the RPD’s “credibility concerns” is documentary evidence to the
effect that unregistered religious groups continue to expand and no longer
operate in strict secrecy.
[50]
The
fact that unregistered groups continue to expand and no longer operate in
strict secrecy does not mean that persecution does not occur. Hence, as a basis
for questioning the Applicant’s credibility as to what happened to him and his
church, this is an extremely tenuous ground.
[51]
The
RPD also fails to address the fact that the Applicant did not say that he was
being sought by the PSB because he had practised his religion in a house church.
The Applicant’s narrative was that he had been handing out flyers that were
highly critical of the government church. The RPD fails to address how the
documentary evidence relied upon relates to the specifics of the Applicant’s
conduct in China that caused him to flee to Canada.
[52]
The
RPD’s conclusion is based upon all of the above factors:
Given
all of the above, the panel determines, based on a balance of probabilities,
that the claimant was not being sought for joining an illegal religious group
and distributing illegal religious fliers and that the authorities are not
interested in the claimant.
[53]
Because
this conclusion is based upon a selective use of the evidence, speculation and
conjecture, and faulty reasoning with respect to the present persecutory
treatment of unregistered churches, it is unreasonable and cannot stand.
[54]
In
its handling of the general documentation package, the RPD again appears to
leave out of account the specifics of the Applicant’s claim: i.e. that he was
being sought by the PSB because he had gone beyond attending a small house church
and had been identified as someone who was distributing fliers that were highly
critical of the Chinese government’s approach to religion. There was evidence
before the RPD that the Chinese government uses various forms of persecution to
“block controversial writings” (U.S. DOS Human Rights Report, 2009, page 11)
and that local officials in China
appear to be increasingly using “forcible psychiatric treatment to silence
critics ….” (U.K. Border Agency Report, January 2010 at paragraph 12.10).
The Applicant presented himself as someone who was distributing writings highly
critical of the government’s approach to religion. When the RPD examines the
general documentary package on religious persecution, it does not assess the Applicant’s
claims to persecution and section 97 risks with the specifics in mind. Rather
it looks at the treatment of house church meetings.
[55]
In
my view, these errors in the Decision render it unreasonable and it should be
referred back for reconsideration.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that
1.
The
application is allowed. The Decision is quashed and the matter is returned for
reconsideration by a differently constituted RPD.
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James Russell”