Date: 20110329
Docket: IMM-4760-10
Citation: 2011 FC 380
Ottawa, Ontario,
March 29, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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MOHSIN ALI KAMRAN
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act) for judicial
review of the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the
Immigration and Refugee Board, dated 30 March 2010 (Decision), which refused
the Applicant’s application to be deemed a Convention refugee or a person in
need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Applicant is a citizen of Pakistan where he fears persecution based on his Ahmadi religious
background.
[3]
The
Applicant belongs to a well-known and devout Ahmadi family in the city of Rabwah. He claims that, ever
since the founding of the Ahmadi faith in the time of his great-grandparents, members
of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community have been subjected to religious persecution
by the state of Pakistan and by Pakistani society in general. The Applicant
claims that he, too, was threatened and attacked while preaching and
participating in faith-related activities in Rabwah and its environs.
[4]
The Applicant
claims that in 2004, while serving on the executive of a local Ahmadi
organization, he came to the attention of anti-Ahmadiyya religious groups,
particularly the Majlis Tahaffaz Khatm e Nabuwat (MTKN). He began to receive
threats from anonymous callers, warning him to stop his activities or face the
consequences.
[5]
He
was threatened again by unknown callers after being involved in Ahmadiyya
activities in 2006 and after organizing a free medical camp in March 2008, when
he was also threatened by fanatical students who warned him to abandon his
un-Islamic activities. In June 2008, he was ridiculed and punched by one of his
hostel mates, Tajdar Khan (Tajdar), after the Applicant asked him to return a
shirt to him. The Applicant reported the incident to a person in authority at
the hostel, who advised him to ignore it and keep a low profile. The next day,
Tajdar’s parents warned the Applicant against complaining about their son. More
than a week later, the Applicant’s father received a call on behalf of Mullah
Allah Yar Arshad (Mullah Arshad), ordering him to advise the Applicant not to
mess with his associates or he would be “taught a lesson.”
[6]
In
September 2008, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered against a
number of Ahmadis in Rabwah. The Applicant’s father attended court with some of
the accused. He was subsequently harassed by the authorities and warned by
unknown callers to keep away from the persons accused or his and his son’s
names would be added to the FIR. The callers also threatened to harm the
Applicant and his siblings. In consequence, the Applicant began to accompany
his father on all outings to protect him.
[7]
In
February and March of 2009, the Applicant invited non-Ahmadi friends and
relatives to some Ahmadi programs. Consequently, in April of that year,
anonymous phone callers threatened to take “severe action” and to charge him
with blasphemy; the Applicant believes that these calls were instigated by Mullah
Arshad, who had been monitoring his activities. In June 2009, the Applicant was
telephoned in Lahore by an anonymous caller
who wanted to know his whereabouts and who said that he would find the
Applicant sooner or later. The Applicant feared being located in Lahore, so he travelled to Rawalpindi.
[8]
On
13 June 2009, three masked men entered the Applicant’s hostel room. They did
not identify themselves, but they shouted and kicked and punched the Applicant
until other students intervened. That night, the Applicant’s father received an
anonymous phone call saying that the Applicant was lucky that his life had been
spared but that it may not be the next time. The Applicant believes that this
incident was connected to Mullah Arshad or the MTKN.
[9]
The
Applicant’s family decided that that he should leave the country. He left
Pakistan on 30 July 2009 and arrived in Calgary on 1 August 2009, at which time he made a claim
for refugee protection. The Applicant appeared before the RPD on 30 March 2010.
He was represented by counsel and an interpreter was present. In its Decision
dated 6 July 2010, the RPD found that the Applicant did not have a well-founded
fear of persecution because he would not face a serious possibility of
persecution if he were to return to Pakistan. This is the Decision under review.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[10]
The
RPD accepted that the Applicant was a member of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community
and found that his evidence demonstrated a nexus to a Convention ground, namely
religion.
Preliminary Observations
[11]
Although
the Applicant indicates in his PIF that, at times, he kept a low profile, a
review of the Applicant’s evidence reveals that he was often involved with
Ahmadi activities and organizations.
[12]
In
addition, the Applicant provided very little corroborating documentation in
relation to his alleged difficulties. He did not report the threats or
incidents to the police and therefore police reports were not available. He
provided no corroborating affidavits or letters from officials, instructors or
students at school or from other witnesses. He did, however, provide articles
and materials regarding discrimination against and persecution of Ahmadis
generally.
No Well-founded Fear of
Persecution
[13]
The RPD
cited four factors in support of its finding that the Applicant did not have a
well-founded fear of persecution.
[14]
First,
almost all of the incidents described by the Applicant constituted
discrimination (specifically, religious insults, arguments and difficulties at
school) or threats. The RPD found that the discrimination was neither serious
enough nor persistent enough “to raise the spectre of persecution as
contemplated in the Act.” Also, the threats were not demonstrably acted upon
between 2004 and 2008, despite the fact that the Applicant was easily
accessible while a student at the business school and a resident at a hostel.
[15]
Second,
the Applicant had been involved in only two physical altercations during 2008
and 2009. The 2008 incident began as a dispute over a shirt and degenerated
into physical violence and, only then, into religious insults. The 2009 attack
by the masked assailants was never shown to be related to the Applicant’s
religion.
[16]
Third,
the Applicant’s family was similarly situated to the Applicant, yet none fled Pakistan. Rather, the
Applicant’s father continued to operate two jewellery stores in Pakistan. During those times
when the Applicant accompanied his father to provide him with protection, there
was no evidence of anything untoward happening to either of them.
[17]
Finally,
during the period of the alleged persecution, between 2005 and 2007, the
Applicant travelled to the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, India, Belgium, France and Germany, sometimes on multiple
occasions. The Applicant never attempted to seek asylum in any of those
countries despite his evidence that his problems in Pakistan had begun in 2003. The
RPD inferred from the Applicant’s failure to use these available opportunities
to seek protection that his fear of persecution was not as grave as he claimed.
Country Conditions
Documentation Shows Limited Scope of Persecution
[18]
The
RPD observed that, while the country conditions documentation demonstrated that
discrimination against Ahmadis is a “serious problem” in Pakistan, it also shows that the
scope of persecution is limited, particularly considering the substantial number
of Ahmadis in the country. It noted that, in 2009, eleven Ahmadis were killed
for religious reasons.
[19]
For
the above reasons, the RPD concluded that, should he return to Pakistan, the Applicant would not
face a serious possibility of persecution based on a Convention ground, nor
would he, on a balance of probabilities, face a personalized risk to his life,
a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture.
Therefore, his application was rejected.
ISSUES
[20]
The
Applicant raises the following issues:
i.
Whether
the RPD based its Decision on erroneous findings of fact made in a perverse and
capricious manner and without regard to the material before it; and
ii. Whether the RPD erred in
its assessment of the cumulative effects of the incidents suffered by the
Applicant and in finding that these did not amount to persecution.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[21]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country
of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of
protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country
and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless
imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide
adequate health or medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of
protection.
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Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la
personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de
sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de
ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut
ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun
de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans
lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au
Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a
la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être
soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines
cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de
ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres
personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement
pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes —
sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à
celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de
fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve
au Canada et fait partie
d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin
de protection.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[22]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held that a standard
of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the
standard of review applicable to the particular question before the court is
well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that standard
of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing court
undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review
analysis.
[23]
The
first issue concerns the RPD’s findings of fact and its treatment of the
evidence. The appropriate standard of review is reasonableness. See Aguebor
v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration)
(1993), 160 NR 315, 42 ACWS (3d) 886 (FCA); Aguirre v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 571 at paragraphs 13-14; Dunsmuir,
above, at paragraphs 51 and 53; and Sittampalam v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 65 at paragraph 52.
[24]
With
respect to the second issue, Justice Yves de Montigny held in Tetik v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1240 at paragraph 25, that
“[t]he identification of persecution behind incidents of discrimination or
harassment is a question of mixed fact and law and, as such, is reviewable on a
standard of reasonableness.” I concur. See also Liang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration),
2008 FC 450, at paragraphs 12-15; and Mohacsi v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 429 at paragraph 35.
[25]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph
47; and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at
paragraph 59. Put another way, the Court should
intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls
outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
Credibility Findings
Support a Well-founded Fear
[26]
The
Applicant argues that, as the RPD made no express negative credibility finding,
his evidence must be believed. See Camargo v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1434 at paragraph 32.
[27]
The
Applicant states that the RPD accepted that: his family has been persecuted; he
has been heavily involved in Ahmadi activities; he has drawn the attention of
anti-Ahmadi groups, who have threatened him with serious harm; and, following
the 2009 attack by the masked assailants, the Applicant’s father was warned
that the Applicant would be killed the next time. Given the Applicant’s
evidence that, if returned to Pakistan, he will continue to proselytize, the Applicant contends
that it was not reasonably open to the RPD to conclude that he did not have a
well-founded fear of persecution. As the evidence demonstrates, the severity of
the incidents has escalated. The Applicant was assaulted and his life was
threatened. The only reasonable conclusion is that these incidents amount to
persecution.
The
Applicant Was Motivated By Family Loyalty Despite His Well-founded Fear
[28]
The
Applicant challenges the RPD’s finding that accompanying his father to protect
him while out in public undermined the Applicant’s claim of well-founded fear
of persecution. In Mohammadi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FC 1028 at paragraph 15, the Court recognized that the
bonds of family loyalty may lead a person to engage in dangerous conduct that
might otherwise be viewed as inconsistent with a subjective fear of
persecution. The Applicant contends that such was the case here and that the
RPD erred in concluding otherwise.
No Proper Assessment of
Cumulative Persecution
[29]
The
RPD has a duty to consider the issue of cumulative persecution. This involves
reviewing the discriminatory acts as a whole and appreciating the cumulative
effect of the applicant’s uncontradicted evidence about the treatment he has
endured. See Tetik v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1240 at
paragraph 27. The Applicant argues that the RPD failed to do this. Instead, it
compartmentalized the different incidents into those that were merely
discriminatory, those that had not resulted in physical harm and those that
were not motivated by the Applicant’s religion. If the Panel had conducted a
proper analysis, the increase in risk over time would have made it clear that the
Applicant had a reasonable apprehension of persecution. This is a reviewable
error.
[30]
The
Applicant further argues that the RPD erred in concluding that his failure to
claim asylum prior to 2009, despite having visited many countries, demonstrated
that he had no well-founded fear of persecution. In Ibrahimov v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1185 at paragraph 19, Justice
Elizabeth Heneghan held that “the issue of delay cannot be used as a
significant factor to doubt that person’s subjective fear of persecution”:
Cumulative
acts which may amount to persecution will take time to occur. If a person's
claim is actually based on several incidents which occur over time, the
cumulative effects of which may amount to persecution, then looking to the
beginning of such discriminatory or harassing treatment and comparing that to
the date on which a person leaves the country to justify rejection of the claim
on the basis of delay, undermines the very idea of cumulative persecution.
[31]
The
Applicant contends that only after being threatened with severe consequences
and with blasphemy in April 2009 did he begin to consider leaving Pakistan, and only after being
violently beaten in June 2009 did he formalize those plans. Therefore his claim
was clearly based on cumulative persecution. Accordingly, the Applicant submits
that the Panel erred in rejecting his claim based on his failure to claim
previously in other countries.
RPD Ignored Relevant
Objective Evidence
[32]
The
Applicant asserts that there is objective evidence that violence against Ahmadis
in Pakistan is escalating. He
enumerates laws prohibiting defilement of the Qur’an or the name of the Prophet
on pain of fine, imprisonment or death and restricting Ahmadis from preaching
and propagating their faith. He comments that the role of the MTKN is to act
against Ahmadis. He also informed the RPD, as stated above, that he intends to
continue proselytizing if he is returned to Pakistan. The RPD never referred to this evidence
in finding that the Applicant would not suffer persecution in Pakistan. The Applicant relies
on Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(1998), 157 FTR 35, [1998] FCJ No 1425 (QL) and Goksu v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 382, to argue that, since the RPD has
failed to refer to this evidence, which is central to the claim, it failed to
consider that evidence and thereby committed a reviewable error.
The Respondent
Treatment of
the Evidence Was Reasonable
[33]
The
Respondent submits that the RPD clearly has the discretion to weigh the
evidence before it. See Aguebor, above. Furthermore, the RPD “need not
mention every piece of evidence in its reasons and is assumed to have weighed
and considered all evidence before it, unless the contrary is shown.” See Akram
v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 629 at paragraph 15.
[34]
In
the instant case, the RPD acknowledged the Applicant’s claim that his family
was at risk in Pakistan; however, it also
observed that they had made no attempt to leave the country. Similarly, it
recognized that the life of the Applicant’s father had been threatened in 1995
due to his religious beliefs and that the Applicant, in later years, felt it
necessary to provide personal protection to his father to keep him from being
harmed due to his religious beliefs. However, it was reasonable for the RPD to
find that this action undermined the well-foundedness of the Applicant’s
alleged fear of persecution and the seriousness of the risks facing him. There
was no evidence that either man had been threatened or harmed at that time.
[35]
The
Applicant relies on Mohammadi, above. The Respondent submits, however,
that Mohammadi is distinguishable on its facts. The applicant in that
case had been physically abused by state authorities and threatened with
further harm should he return to a particular location. The Court held that the
RPD failed to rely on the evidence in determining that the applicant’s choice
to return to the location of harm undermined his claim of a well-founded fear
of persecution. The RPD in the instant case did not make a similar error. Each
claim turns on its own facts. In the instant case, the Applicant had not been
harmed by anyone prior to offering protection to his father in 2008. He had
been threatened over the phone on an irregular basis, and those threats had
never been fulfilled. Unlike the applicant in Mohammadi, the Applicant
was not returning to a particular location where he had been threatened with
harm. The RPD reviewed the submitted evidence in its entirety before
determining that the Applicant’s choice to remain in Pakistan undermined his alleged
well-founded fear of persecution and alleged risk.
[36]
Similarly,
Tetik, above, is distinguishable from the instant case. In Tetik,
the Court held that the RPD had committed a reviewable error in failing to
consider the most serious incidents of threats and assaults when assessing
whether the applicants’ experiences of harassment, insults and serious physical
violence constituted cumulative harm. In the instant case, the RPD did not
commit that error. It considered the entirety of the Applicant’s evidence
before determining that the majority of the incidents were discriminatory and
may not have been attributable to his religion. The RPD noted that these
threats had not been followed by attempts to harm or endanger the Applicant,
despite his accessibility while attending school.
[37]
The Respondent
contends that the RPD did not attempt to minimize the discrimination and
persecution to which Ahmadis are subjected in Pakistan. It was reasonable for the RPD to assess
the scope of persecution and to determine the outcome of the application based
on the evidence. The Respondent submits that the Decision falls within the
range set down in Dunsmuir, above, and therefore should not be
disturbed.
The Applicant’s Reply
[38]
The
Applicant challenges the Respondent’s comments regarding Mohammadi,
above, stating that he himself was threatened in March and July of 2008, which
was prior to engaging in “risky” behaviour by protecting his father in public.
Moreover, he was accompanying his father through the very locations where he
had been threatened and could have been targeted at any of them. The Applicant
asserts that the instant case falls squarely within the precedent set by Mohammadi.
ANALYSIS
[39]
The
RPD found that the Applicant’s account of his problems was credible and that
the evidence “demonstrates a nexus to a Convention ground, on the basis of the
claimant’s Ahmadi religion and background.”
[40]
Notwithstanding
these findings, the RPD found that “he would not face a serious possibility of
persecution if he were to return to Pakistan.” This conclusion is difficult to understand
given the range and severity of what the Applicant has endured over the years.
[41]
The
RPD’s rationale is as follows:
The
claimant’s evidence is that although his family and others in the Ahmadi
community have faced discrimination, and to some extent, persecution over a
number of years, almost all of the incidents alleged by the claimant were
either discriminatory, involving issues such as religious insults, arguments or
difficulties at school that may not be attributable to his religion, or threats
that were not demonstrably followed up on. Although some of the claimant’s
allegations involve discrimination, I find that they are neither serious enough
nor persistent enough to raise the spectre of persecution as contemplated in
the Act. The claimant also alleges receiving a number of threats over a
number of years, largely on his cellular phone, but there is no clear evidence
before me that these alleged threats were followed by attempts to harm or
endanger the claimant even though he was often readily accessible, particularly
while attending business school from 2004 to 2008, and while residing at the
hostel.
[42]
I
believe there are several reviewable errors inherent in the RPD’s reasons.
[43]
First
of all, the RPD dealt with the incidents sequentially and compartmentalized
them. Nowhere does the RPD show an awareness of the need to consider whether
persecution arises from the cumulative impact of all that has happened to the
Applicant. See Tetik, above.
[44]
Indeed,
if one simply summarizes the accepted sequence of incidents, threats and
mounting violence to which the Applicant has been subjected – which culminated
in a death threat that, even though he had escaped death from a beating, he
would not escape the next time – the chronology clearly indicates an escalation
of harassment and risk that, in my view, must cumulatively amount to
persecution. He has been told that, if returned, he will be targeted and
killed. Although the RPD does not question the veracity of this threat, it
unreasonably discounts it as not being connected to the history of religious-based
threats against the Applicant.
[45]
Second,
I also think the RPD is led astray by several unreasonable findings of fact.
[46]
For
example, the RPD accepted the Applicant’s evidence that if he was returned to Pakistan he would continue to
preach and work on behalf of the Ahmadi faith. As the Applicant points out, the
objective evidence before the RPD was that the Pakistani state has outlawed
proselytizing by Ahmadis and that such activity can be punished by death. The
objective evidence further indicated that prominent Ahmadi religious proponents,
such as the Applicant, are targeted by non-state actors such as the MKTN. It
was the Applicant’s own evidence (not questioned) that he had been targeted and
threatened as an Ahmadi. These extremely compelling indicators of risk were not
addressed or alluded to by the RPD in determining that the Applicant would not
suffer persecution if returned to Pakistan.
[47]
Also,
the RPD appears to have been of the view that the Applicant’s accompanying his
father to provide him with protection undermines the well-foundedness of the
Applicant’s fear and the seriousness of the risks that he says he faces. The
RPD fails to consider the jurisprudence of this Court which warns that bonds of
family loyalty may lead a claimant to engage in dangerous conduct that might
otherwise be viewed as conduct inconsistent with a subjective fear. See, for
example, Mohammadi, above.
[48]
The
RPD also appears to rely heavily upon its conclusion that threats made against
the Applicant were not followed up by attempts to harm him. However, the
Applicant was threatened on many occasions and, in June 2009, he was physically
assaulted. This was followed up by a telephone call to the Applicant’s father,
indicating that the Applicant would be killed next time. It was this
precipitating threat, after an accumulation of threats and incidents that
caused the Applicant to come to Canada to seek protection.
[49]
There
are other issues that arise from the Decision that concern me but I do not need
to go into them at this time. Based upon what I have already concluded, I feel that
this Decision must be returned for reconsideration.
[50]
All
of the Applicant’s evidence was accepted by the RPD. For the reasons given, I
have to conclude that the Decision is unreasonable. It lacks justification and
intelligibility, given the evidence that was provided and accepted by the RPD,
and it falls outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law. See Dunsmuir, above, at
paragraph 47.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is
that
1.
The
application is allowed, the decision is quashed and the matter is returned for
reconsideration by a differently constituted RPD.
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James Russell”