Date: 20091013
Docket: T-1619-07
Citation: 2009 FC 1025
Ottawa, Ontario, October 13,
2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Boivin
BETWEEN:
MOKHTAR
ALLOU
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an appeal by the Applicant, Mokhtar Allou, pursuant to subsection 14(5) of
the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29 (the Act) challenging the
decision by Citizenship Judge George Springate (the citizenship judge) dated
August 24, 2007, denying the Applicant’s second application for citizenship
because he did not satisfy the residency requirement found at paragraph 5(1)(c)
of the Act.
[2]
For
the reasons that follow, the appeal will be dismissed.
Factual Background
[3]
The
Applicant came to Canada on January 13, 1997 as
a Convention refugee and was granted permanent resident status on December 7,
1999.
[4]
The
Applicant was also granted permanent residence in the United States on December 16, 1999
and this status is valid until July 26, 2010.
[5]
On
December 8, 2001, the Applicant filed his first application for citizenship for
which the relevant period for consideration of his residency was from December
8, 1997 until December 8, 2001.
[6]
On
June 5, 2003, the Applicant’s application was refused because he did not meet
the residency requirement set out in paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act. This
decision was not challenged before the Federal Court.
[7]
On
June 23, 2003, the Applicant filed a second application for citizenship for
which the relevant period for consideration of his residency was from June 23,
1999 until June 23, 2003. In this application, the Applicant declared three
brief periods of absence from Canada in 1999 and 2000, during which time he visited the United States for a total of 35 days.
[8]
The
Applicant appeared for an interview before the citizenship judge on June 12,
2007, where he produced numerous documents which had not been previously filed,
including income tax returns from 1999 to 2002.
[9]
The
Applicant’s second application for citizenship was denied on June 27, 2007.
Impugned Decision
[10]
The
Applicant has the burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that
he satisfies the residency requirement pursuant to paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act
(Maharatnam v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), (2000), 96 A.C.W.S. (3d) 198, [2000] F.C.J.
No. 405 (QL)).
In order to succeed in his application for citizenship, the Applicant had to
demonstrate that he resided in Canada during three years (1,095 days) of the relevant four year
period beginning on June 23, 1999 and ending on June 23, 2003.
[11]
The
citizenship judge denied the Applicant’s citizenship application on the grounds
that he failed to satisfy the residence requirement set out at paragraph 5(1)(c)
of the Act because there was evidence he resided in the United States from 1999
until 2001 and the Applicant failed to rebut that evidence. The information
provided by the Applicant did not accurately reflect the number of days he was
absent from Canada.
[12]
The Applicant’s
original application stated that he had been in the United States one day in
1999 and 34 days in 2000 and he insisted that he had not traveled to the United States since then. The
Applicant has 1,376 material days and admitted to being outside of Canada on 36 days, which
totals 1,340 days of physical presence in Canada. However, documentation in the Applicant’s file
shows that U.S. Border Patrol advised
their Canadian counterparts on May 12, 2005 that the Applicant “was a permanent
resident of the United States from 1999 to 2001”, but the Applicant denied
this.
[13]
The
citizenship judge found confusion and contradictions in the Applicant’s story
and insufficient documentation in support of his claim of residency to allow
the citizenship judge to conclude that the Applicant was not in Canada during
the periods of time he claims to have been and that he meets the residency
requirement under paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act. The Applicant thus failed to
meet the onus, on a balance of probabilities, that he was residing in Canada for the required 1,095
days during the relevant four year period.
Issues
[14]
The
Applicant submits the following questions to the Court:
1. Did
the citizenship judge err in finding that there was evidence that the Applicant
resided in the United
States
from 1999 until 2001, and that this evidence had not been rebutted?
2. Did
the citizenship judge violate the Applicant’s right to know the case to be met,
and thus his right to procedural fairness, by failing to disclose the
information from the U.S. Border Patrol and thus failing to provide him the
opportunity to respond to that information?
Relevant Legislation
[15]
The
residency requirements are set out in subsection 5(1) of the Citizenship Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29:
Grant of
citizenship
5. (1) The Minister shall grant citizenship
to any person who
[…]
(c) is a
permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, and has, within the four years immediately
preceding the date of his or her application, accumulated at least three
years of residence in Canada calculated in the following manner:
(i) for every
day during which the person was resident in Canada before his lawful
admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to
have accumulated one-half of a day of residence, and
(ii) for every
day during which the person was resident in Canada after his lawful admission
to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to have
accumulated one day of residence;
|
Attribution
de la citoyenneté
5. (1)
Le ministre attribue la citoyenneté à toute personne qui, à la fois :
[…]
c) est
un résident permanent au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l’immigration
et la protection des réfugiés et a, dans les quatre ans qui ont précédé la
date de sa demande, résidé au Canada pendant au moins trois ans en tout, la
durée de sa résidence étant calculée de la manière suivante :
(i) un
demi-jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada avant son admission à titre
de résident permanent,
(ii)
un jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada après son admission à titre
de résident permanent;
|
Analysis
Standard of Review
[16]
In
the case at bar, the citizenship judge adopted the test set forth in Re Pourghasemi,
(1993), 62 F.T.R. 122, 39 A.C.W.S. (3d) 251. This is evidenced by his analysis
and finding that the Applicant failed to meet the onus, on a balance of
probabilities, that he was residing in Canada for the required 1,095 days
during the relevant four year period.
[17]
With
respect to the first question, whether the Applicant established that he was
physically present in Canada for 1,095 days, this is
a question of fact. I am satisfied and the parties agree that this question is
reviewable on the standard of reasonableness, as recently articulated by the Supreme
Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190.
[18]
With
respect to the second question, I agree that questions of natural justice must
be decided on the correctness standard (Arrachch v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 999, 299 F.T.R. 1).
1. Did the citizenship judge err
in finding that there was evidence that the Applicant resided in the United
States from 1999 until 2001, and that this evidence had not been rebutted?
[19]
The
Applicant states that the citizenship judge failed to properly consider the
evidence which demonstrates he resided in Canada during the relevant period. In particular, while
the citizenship judge’s decision reveals that he had correspondence from the
U.S. Border Patrol which, in his view, indicates that the Applicant resided in
the United
States
from 1999 until 2001, the Applicant argues the citizenship judge never
confronted the Applicant with that information and did not disclose the
correspondence in question.
[20]
The
Applicant submits that there was ample evidence in the record demonstrating his
residence in Canada during the relevant
period and, given the absence of evidence to the contrary, the citizenship
judge erred in concluding that the Applicant had not met the residency requirement.
[21]
The
Respondent notes that the citizenship judge relied on multiple factual elements
in concluding that the Applicant was not only absent for 36 days during the
relevant period and it was reasonable for the citizenship judge to conclude
that too few documents were filed in support of the Applicant’s claim to allow
him to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that he meets the residency
requirement.
[22]
It
is the prerogative of the citizenship judge to adopt the approach he sees
appropriate in determining whether the Applicant has met the residency
requirement of the Act (Rizvi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2005 FC 1641, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d) 608 at paragraph 12; see also
Wang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 390 at
paragraph 18; 166 A.C.W.S. (3d) 220).
[23]
As
noted above, the citizenship judge in the case at bar used the physical
presence requirement set out in Re Pourghasemi. This Court has
recognized, as did the citizenship judge, that the jurisprudence has created a
strong inference that presence in Canada during three years out of the four
year period must be substantial (Rizvi, above at paragraph 12; Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Lu, 2001 FCT 640, 106 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 786 at paragraph 7; Zhang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), (2000), 197 F.T.R. 225 at paragraph 9; 101 A.C.W.S. (3d)
691). The onus was on the
Applicant to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he met the
residency requirement of the Act (Rizvi, above at paragraph 21).
[24]
The Applicant failed
to put forward sufficient evidence demonstrating his presence in Canada during the relevant period, as highlighted by the citizenship
judge in his reasons:
A
June 26, 2003 letter states the applicant has been a leasee at 3505 # 804 Ste.
Famille since February 1, 1997. However, the applicant failed to submit any
rent receipts or monthly utility statements.
A
Royal Bank letter dated June 11, 2003 states the applicant has been a client of
the bank since September 8, 1997. However, the applicant did not submit any
monthly bank (or credit card) statements.
The
applicant did not submit any documents to show he visited a doctor, dentist or
any medical person during his material time period. Nor did the applicant submit
any receipts showing he had made purchases at a pharmacy during the four-year
material time period.
The
applicant did not submit any letters of support from any friends, neighbours,
business associates or employers. Moreover, other than paying an annual
membership fee to Club La Cite, the applicant failed to present any letters or
memberships in any Canadian community, cultural, religious, social club, organization,
group or association.
[25]
These
facts are not challenged by the Applicant.
[26]
The citizenship judge is not
required to mention each and every piece of evidence before him and submitted
by the Applicant (Cheng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
(2000), 97 A.C.W.S. (3d) 393, [2000] F.C.J. No. 614 (QL); Kwan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 738, 107 A.C.W.S. (3d) 21; Bakht
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1193, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1510 (QL)). However,
there is one piece of evidence referred to by the citizenship judge that raises
questions in the case at bar, namely the evidence regarding the correspondence between
Canadian authorities at the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and U.S. authorities at the U.S.
Border Patrol on May 11 and May 12, 2005.
[27]
As
noted by the citizenship judge in his reasons, this evidence refers to the
correspondence between the U.S. Border Patrol and the CBSA which states that
the Applicant “was a permanent resident of the United States from 1999 to
2001”.
[28]
Counsel
for the Applicant has argued that the correspondence in question was about the
legal status of the Applicant in the United States from 1999 to 2001 as opposed to his
physical presence.
[29]
The
Applicant has further argued that the citizenship judge may have misread the
correspondence at issue and its true meaning and that it is at most “ambiguous”.
[30]
This
alleged misinterpretation of the correspondence at issue is, according to the
Applicant, further evidenced by the memorandum dated April 5, 2005 sent by a “citizenship
adviser” to the “citizenship judge” stating that the Applicant is “in the USA since Dec 1999. Still
living there in 2000.” (Emphasis is ours).
[31]
In
light of this evidence, it appears possible that the citizenship judge may have
misinterpreted the correspondence between the U.S. Border Patrol and the CBSA in
finding that the Applicant was a resident in the United States from 1999 to
2001, as it consists of correspondence regarding the Applicant’s legal status
in the United States, as opposed to his physical presence in the United States
or in Canada.
[32]
Indeed,
this could have led the citizenship judge to conclude that the correspondence
at issue demonstrated that the Applicant was not in Canada during the period in
question (1999 to 2001). This correspondence is the only evidence in the record
which could have indicated that the Applicant was absent from Canada during the relevant
period.
[33]
Notwithstanding
the above, upon its review of the record in full, the Court is of the view that the evidence as a whole – including
the 1999-2001 portion of the relevant period – remains insufficient, inadequate
and highly incomplete for purposes of demonstrating a substantial physical
presence in Canada during the relevant period.
[34]
By way of example, the
Applicant submitted training certificates in support of his application. Yet,
these certificates fail to indicate the period during which the training courses
were attended. A mere date confirming the completion of such courses in 2000 is
insufficient in this regard as it provides no information about the dates the
Applicant attended the courses. These courses could have been attended outside
the relevant period in question.
[35]
Further, during his interview
with the citizenship judge in June 2007, the
Applicant did
not provide any information about his income or other form of benefits received
in 2003.
[36]
The
jurisprudence of this Court has continued to emphasize the need for substantial
physical presence in Canada during the relevant time period (Re Pourghasemi;
Chen; Ghahremani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 411, [2009]
F.C.J. No. 524 (QL); Huan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 448, 147 A.C.W.S. (3d) 746; Rizvi v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1641, 144 A.C.W.S. (3d)
608). Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Lu, 2001 FCT 640, 106 A.C.W.S. (3d) 786 at
paragraphs 6-7). In this case, the Applicant has failed to meet his burden of
proof.
[37]
The Court therefore finds
that the alleged misinterpretation of correspondence between the U.S. Border Patrol
and the CBSA by the
citizenship judge could not have been and is not material to the end result (Patel
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 55, 288 N.R.
48; Goudimenko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2002 FCT
447, 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 766 at paragraphs 17-18). The Court is not convinced, on
the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant satisfied the residency
requirement pursuant to paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act. The citizenship judge’s
conclusion was reasonable and does not warrant this Court’s intervention.
2. Did the citizenship judge
violate the Applicant’s right to know the case to be met, and thus his right to
procedural fairness, by failing to disclose the information from the U.S. Border Patrol and thus failing to
provide him the opportunity to respond to that information?
[38]
The
Applicant alleges that this Court has held that the duty of fairness owed to an
applicant for citizenship is “fairly high” and the discretion of the
citizenship judge is quite broad (Sadykbaeva v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1018, 336 F.T.R. 51 at paragraphs
14-16).
[39]
In
the case at bar, the Applicant submits that it was a violation of procedural
fairness for the citizenship judge to fail to disclose the correspondence
between the CBSA and the U.S. Border Patrol authorities to the Applicant.
[40]
The
Respondent submits that the present case is one of those instances in which
even if there was an error, it would not affect the outcome of the case and
would not justify this Court’s intervention.
[41]
It
is a known fact that the Applicant’s permanent residence status in the United States is valid until July 26,
2010 and the Applicant has not denied this information. Therefore, the
information provided by the U.S. Border Patrol on May 12, 2005 stating that the
Applicant was a permanent resident of the United States from 1999 to 2001 does not constitute new
information.
[42]
This
information did not create a possibility of prejudice to the Applicant (Kane
v. University of British Columbia, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105, 31 N.R. 214; International
Woodworkers of America, Local 2-69 v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd.,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 282 at 339, 105 N.R. 161). As noted in Canadian Cable Television
Assn. v. American College Sports Collective of Canada, Inc., [1991] 3 F.C.
626, 129 N.R. 296 (F.C.A.): “It therefore appears that a board’s referring to
material from publicly known government sources, and entirely supplemental in
its nature and kind to the very material the parties themselves applied to the
board, will not of itself violate the principles of natural justice.” The
Applicant was aware of the government information concerning his permanent
resident status in the United
States and
he even admitted in his evidence that he obtained this status in 1999 and it is
valid until July 2010. On the facts of this particular case, the citizenship
judge acted fairly towards the Applicant.
[43]
The
information regarding the permanent residence of the Applicant does not amount
to third party information unknown to the Applicant. Therefore, the citizenship
judge was under no obligation to disclose a known fact to the Applicant (Yassine
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1994), 172 N.R. 308,
48 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1434 at 9-10 (F.C.A.); Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v.
Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202 at 228,
163 N.R. 27; Cartier v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 2 F.C. 317,
300 N.R. 362 at paragraphs 32-33 (F.C.A.)). The Court’s intervention is thus
not warranted.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that the appeal is dismissed.
“Richard
Boivin”
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1619-07
STYLE OF CAUSE: Mokhtar
ALLOU v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
PLACE OF
HEARING: Montreal, Quebec
DATE OF
HEARING: October
6, 2009
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT: Mr. Justice Boivin
DATED: October
13, 2009
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Jared Will
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FOR THE APPLICANT
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Ms. Thi My
Dung Tran
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
Jared Will
400 McGill
Street, 2nd Floor
Montreal, Qc
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
John H. Sims,
Q.C.
Deputy
Attorney General of Canada
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FOR THE RESPONDENT
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