Date: 20090727
Docket: IMM-4338-08
Citation: 2009 FC 749
Ottawa, Ontario, July 27, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Frederick E. Gibson
BETWEEN:
Y. Z.
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
Introduction
[1]
These
reasons follow the hearing of an Application for Judicial Review of a decision
of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment Officer (the “Officer”) whereby the Officer
concluded:
Based on the totality of evidence, I find
the applicant devoid of any credibility. It is my finding that the applicant’s
story is a fabrication concocted for providing a basis for [his or her] refugee
claim and an attempt to circumvent Canada’s
refugee determination system. For the same reasons that I find the applicant
not credible for my negative finding I also find that the applicant does not
face more than a mere possibility of persecution in [the applicant’s state of
nationality] nor is [he or she] more likely than not to face a danger of
torture, or a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment.
...
After careful review of all the evidence,
this application for protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act is rejected.
[heading
omitted; portions in brackets modified]
The decision under review is dated the 22nd
of April, 2008, and was communicated to the Applicant on the 1st of
October, 2008.
Preliminary Matter
[2]
At
the close of the hearing of this Application for Judicial Review, the Court and
counsel for the Applicant engaged in a discussion of whether it would be
appropriate and in the best interests of justice to delete from these reasons
and the Court’s order flowing from these reasons all personal identifiers with
respect to the Applicant, and all identifiers of his or her state of
nationality (hereinafter the Applicant’s “home state”), formally a component of
the Soviet Union, given the role that the Applicant alleges that he or she played
as a member of the Soviet Union, and later Russian, military between 1980 and
1996, and the impact that that role had, and may again have, if he or she is
required to leave Canada and his or her “story” turns out to be true and not
the “fabrication” that the Officer determined it to be.
[3]
Counsel
for the Applicant urged that these reasons and order be “sanitized”. The basis
of his concern on behalf of the Applicant will become apparent from a review of
later paragraphs of these reasons. Counsel for the Respondent, after
consultation with his client, advised the Court that the Respondent does not
oppose suppression of the Applicant’s identity in the published reasons and
order.
[4]
In
Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of
Finance) Justice Iacobucci, for
the Supreme Court of Canada, wrote at paragraph 53 of his reasons:
Applying the rights and interests engaged
in this case to the analytical framework in Dagenais and subsequent
cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be
granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:
A confidentiality order under Rule 151
should only be granted when:
a) such an order is
necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest,
including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because
reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
b) the salutary effects
of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil
litigants to a fair trial outweigh its deleterious effects, including the
effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the
public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.
[5]
Applying
the foregoing test to the facts or allegations in this matter, particularly in
light of the position taken by counsel for the Respondent, I am satisfied that
the salutary effects of modifying these reasons to delete personal identifiers
and identifiers of the Applicant’s home state outweigh its deleterious effects,
including the public interest in open and accessible Court proceedings. In the
result, without formal motion before the Court, the Applicant is identified in
the style of cause of these reasons and in the related order simply as “Y. Z.”,
the identity of his or her home state has been suppressed and other
consequential changes have been made throughout the reasons.
[6]
Masculine
pronouns will be used throughout the balance of these reasons. That use is for
convenience and readability only, and is not intended to reflect the gender of
the Applicant.
Background
[7]
The
Applicant alleges that he was born and apparently raised in one of the
Republics that comprised the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He is 47
years of age, having been born in early 1962. He alleges that, in 1980, he
joined the military forces of the former Soviet Union and trained and served as
a military security officer, first in the Soviet Union military, and later in
the Russian military, until his medical discharge in 1996. He alleges that, at
the time of his discharge, he was bound to the Russian military not to move
beyond the geographical limits of the former Soviet Union for a period
of 10 years.
[8]
Upon
his discharge, the Applicant alleges that he returned to his home and to his
wife in his home state where he became known to the Security Service of that
state. He alleges that he was repeatedly summoned for questioning by that
Service, given his background in the Soviet and later Russian military. He
also alleges that, as an entrepreneur in his home state, he was targeted for
violent extortion by members of the criminal underworld. He alleges fear of
the same threats to his safety and well being if he is required to return to
his home state.
[9]
The
Applicant obtained a visitor’s visa to come to Canada and arrived in Canada on the 12th
of September, 1998. His visitor’s visa was valid to the 13th of
March, 1999. He overstayed and, at that point if not earlier, found himself in
breach of his obligation to the Russian military not to move beyond the
geographical limits of the former Soviet Union. By reason of this, he
alleges a fear at the hands of Russian authorities.
[10]
The
Applicant filed a claim for refugee protection on the 26th of
September, 2000. For whatever reason, the Applicant alleges that it was by
reason of misconduct on the part of the representative who filed his refugee
claim, the claim was not pursued. It was declared abandoned on the 5th
of June, 2002. The fact of the declared abandonment did not come to the
Applicant’s attention until late in 2004.
[11]
The
Applicant’s application for the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, the decision on
which gives rise to this Application for Judicial Review, was filed on the 7th
of November, 2007. It was later supplemented by, among other things, an
“expert statement” and a psychological assessment.
[12]
The
“expert statement”,
dated the 17th of December, 2007, was provided by Peter H. Solomon,
Jr., who described his expertise in the following paragraphs:
a.
I am a
Professor in the Department of Political Science, cross-appointed to the
Faculty of Law and the Centre of Criminology, and a member of the Centre for
European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, all at the University of Toronto. I am specialized in Soviet
and post-Soviet government and law for forty years. My experience includes a
year at the Law Faculty of Moscow State University as well as many research
trips to Russia as a guest of the Institute of State and Law in Moscow, and
participation in judicial reform projects, in both Russia and [the Applicant’s
home state], which I have visited a number of times in the past two years. My
research has focused upon courts, criminal justice and law enforcement in the USSR and its successor states, including [the
Applicant’s home state].
b.
As further
evidence of my qualifications to offer an expert opinion on this matter,
attached hereto is my curriculum vitae. Note that I am fluent in Russian and
follow closely both the popular press and legal journals of Russia and of [the Applicant’s home
state] in the Russian language, in hard and internet versions. I am familiar
with the application of [the Applicant] to remain in Canada on the basis of a preremoval risk
assessment.
...
[13]
The
psychological assessment
was provided by Gerald M. Devins, Ph.D., C. Psych., who describes himself as a consulting
and clinical psychologist.
[14]
Dr.
Devins wrote:
I hold the Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology
and am a Registered Psychologist in Ontario.
I have been in independent practice since 1982. In addition, I am Professor of
Psychiatry and Psychology at the University of Toronto, Head of Psychosocial
Oncology and Palliative Care Research at the University Health Network, a
Senior Scientist in the Ontario Cancer Institute, and Senior Scientist and
Deputy Head in the division of Behavioural Sciences and Health for the Toronto
General Research Institute. I am Associate Editor of two scholarly journals, Assessment
and the Journal of Psychosomatic Research, and am appointed to the
editorial boards for several others. My scholarly work focuses on stress,
coping and cultural factors as they shape the psychosocial impact of disease.
Honors include recognition as a Fellow of the Canadian and American
Psychological Associations and career awards from the National Health Research
and Development Program (Health Canada, 1985-1995), Medical Research Council of
Canada (1986-2001), and Canadian Institutes of Health Research (2001-2006).
...
[15]
Under
the heading “TEST BEHAVIOUR AND VALIDITY OF THE INTERVIEW DATA”, Dr. Devins
writes:
[The Applicant] cooperated fully. [He or
she] established eye contact with the interviewer and responded directly to the
questions. Bags appeared beneath [his or her] eyes. The interview was
stressful for [the Applicant]. [His or her] face was flushed and [he or she]
wiped it with the palm of [his or her] left hand. [He or she] sat quietly and
very still. [He or she] sighed repeatedly and throughout the interview. [He
or she] experienced flashbacks and emotional despair (“and it’s accompanied
with that sense of helplessness”). [He or she] developed a headache.
Concentration problems rendered it difficult to focus. [The Applicant’s]
responses were credible and internally consistent. Nonverbal behaviour and
emotional display were congruent with the themes presented in response to the
questions. I believe the information [he or she] provided was valid and
reliable. [The Applicant’s] experiences in [his or her home state] were
traumatic. Deleterious after-effects persist. [His or her] distress
intensified after [he or she] learned that [his or her] application for Refugee
status had been abandoned.
[portions in brackets modified]
[16]
Finally,
Dr. Devins concluded under the heading “CLINICAL IMPRESSION”:
[The Applicant] satisfies diagnostic
criteria for major depressive episode of moderate severity (296.22) in the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th ed., DSM-IV). [He or she] presents
significant stress-response symptoms (e.g., hyperarousal, intrusive ideation).
[He or she] requires treatment by a mental health professional. [His or her]
condition can improve with appropriate care guaranteed freedom from the threat
of deportation. Should [he or she] be refused, [his or her] symptoms will
intensify and [his or her] suffering will increase.
[portions in brackets modified]
The Decision Under Review
[17]
On
the 17th of April, 2008, the Officer interviewed the Applicant for
two hours. The Applicant was accompanied at the interview by counsel. An
interpreter was also present throughout the interview. At the opening of the
interview, counsel for the Applicant reminded the Officer of the existence of the
psychological report that was before the Officer and highlighted the
Applicant’s difficulties with dates and details.
[18]
In
the Officer’s “Notes to file” leading to his or her conclusion quoted earlier
in these reasons, the Officer wrote:
An oral hearing was held on 17 April
2008. At the outset of the hearing credibility was recognized as the
determinative issue. The applicant’s involvement in the Russian military was
an issue closely linked to credibility and formed part of the assessment of the
truthfulness of [his or her] assertion that because [he or she] was in the
Russian military [he or she] was privy to sensitive and classified information
that would place [him or her] at risk upon return to [his or her home state].
I made a general finding of a lack of
credibility. Accordingly, I determined that, on a balance or probabilities,
the applicant did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution in [his or
her home state]. I have valid reasons to arrive at a finding due to
inconsistencies, contradictions, embellishments and implausibilities that arose
in the applicant’s evidence, for which the applicant could not offer
satisfactory explanations.
...
I had the opportunity to observe the
claimant’s demeanour and the manner in which [he or she] responded to questions
for two hours. [His or her] testimony was markedly evasive with unrelated
responses even to simple questions. [He or she] was often repeating the same
responses to different questions. The applicant’s testimony was wavering and
ambiguous. I recognized that the demeanour of an applicant should not be the
sole criterion on which to assess credibility. Nonetheless, in conjunction
with determinative credibility findings, the demeanour can be of help to sense
the lack of truth to the story that is being narrated. I am guided by the
Federal Court, which has ruled that demeanour can be one of the factors that a
fact finder can consider while assessing the credibility of a witness. The
Federal Court of Appeal in Wen, said, in part, the following:
... we also observe that the adverse
finding was based as well on the appellant’s answers being “confusing” and
“evasive.” This assessment of personal demeanour ought to [not] to be
interfered with [by] the Court which lacks the advantages available to the
triers of fact.
I do not find the applicant’s story that [he
or she] is sought by [security] authorities in [the Applicant’s home state] or
criminal elements to be credible. I find that the applicant fabricated certain
elements of [his or her] declaration to bolster [his or her] refugee protection
claim.
[some text
omitted, portions in brackets modified]
The reference to “Wen” in the foregoing quotation is
to Wen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration).
[19]
After
detailing his or her credibility concerns, the Officer went on to note the
“expert statement” and psychological assessment that were before him or her.
The Officer wrote:
In support of the PRRA application,
counsel submitted a comprehensive package of documentation that included
submissions authored by Peter H. Solomon Jr., ... and Gerald N. Devins ... . I
accept the expertise of Professor Solomon and Dr. Devins. However, I find they
are not experts on the applicant’s personal circumstances. Moreover, they have
relied on the testimony of the applicant which I have determined, as outlined
above, to not be credible. Furthermore, I find that their submissions do not
overcome my findings with respect to the applicant’s credibility. Counsel also
submitted a package of media documentation relating to the country conditions
in both Russia and [the Applicant’s home
state]. While very insightful, I find that the information does not identify
the personal circumstances of the applicant. Furthermore, I find that the
documentation is general in nature and does not relate to the applicant
specifically and no comment has been made on the value of this material in
relation to the personal circumstances of the applicant. Both the applicant
and Counsel do not provide sufficient evidence of a personalized risk. In this
regard, I am guided by the recent decision in Kaba v. Canada:
Contrary to what was alleged by the
applicant, documentary evidence on a country is insufficient to warrant a
positive risk assessment since the risk must be personal:
[...] That said, the assessment of the
applicant’s potential risk of being persecuted if he were sent back to his
country must be individualized. The fact that the documentary evidence shows
that the human rights situation in a country is problematic does not
necessarily mean there is a risk to a given individual.
Following the hearing, Counsel submitted
post-hearing, additional documentation in an attempt to address the
discrepancies between the applicant’s written declaration and the information
revealed in [his or her] oral hearing. I have conscientiously reviewed
Counsel’s submissions. I do not find counsel’s submissions to overcome my
findings with respect to credibility. The applicant was provided many
opportunities, in the two-hour hearing, to relay and elaborate on all details
of [his or her] refugee claim.
[footnote
omitted, portions in brackets modified]
The reference to Kaba
v. Canada is to a matter before this Court, the citation for which appears
below.
[20]
At
the close of the hearing before the Officer, counsel for the Applicant
requested an opportunity to pose questions to his client in “redirect”
examination to clarify aspects of the interview in which counsel believed there
had been some confusion or misunderstanding. The request was denied. That
being said, counsel was provided a brief opportunity to provide post-hearing
documentation in support of the Applicant’s claim. As noted by the Officer in
the foregoing quotation, counsel availed of the opportunity provided and
post-hearing materials were taken into account by the Officer.
The Issues
[21]
In
a Further Memorandum of Argument filed on behalf of the Applicant, counsel
described the issues on this Application for Judicial Review, in addition to
the issue of standard of review, in the following
terms:
a)
Whether the Officer erred in law by
misunderstanding the nature and relevance of the psychological report, and
failing to take it into account when assessing the applicant’s testimony.
b)
Whether the Officer erred in law by making
credibility and plausibility findings without regard to the evidence and/or on
the basis of no evidence.
c)
Whether the Officer based his or her decision on
erroneous findings of fact that he or she made in an unreasonable, perverse or
capricious manner or in bad faith or without regard to the evidence before him
or her.
d)
Whether the Officer made an unreasonable
decision.
I am satisfied
that the second and third issues quoted from the Applicant’s Further Memorandum
can be subsumed within the fourth of such issues.
Analysis
a) Standard
of Review
[22]
Except
with respect to questions of pure law and issues of
fairness, it is now well settled, and it was not in dispute between counsel on
this Application for Judicial Review, that the standard of review of a decision
such as this, reflecting as it does a conclusion on a pre-removal risk
assessment application that the applicant is simply not credible, is
“reasonableness” with substantial deference being owed to the decision-maker in
respect of his or her weighing of the evidence that is before him or her. It
is further well settled that, for a decision to be reasonable, there must be
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making
process and the decision must fall within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law. The Supreme
Court of Canada has recently clarified in Khosa that it
is possible that there may be more than one reasonable outcome and what is
important is that the process and the outcome demonstrate justification,
transparency and intelligibility and that, if the foregoing test is satisfied,
a reviewing court should not substitute its own view of a preferable outcome.
[23]
On
a thorough and sensitive review of the totality of the
material before the Court on this Application for Judicial Review, I am
satisfied that no pure question of law or issue of procedural fairness arises.
b) Misunderstanding
the nature and relevance of the psychological report and failure to take it
into account when assessing the Applicant’s testimony.
[24]
On
this issue, counsel for the Applicant relied heavily on
Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) where Justice Evans,
then of this Court, wrote at paragraphs 19 to 22 of his reasons:
In this case, as
I have indicated, the credibility of the applicant’s testimony was fundamental
to the panel’s decision. The panel explained its finding by reference to the
contradictions in the applicant’s evidence and to the slow and confused answers
that he gave to questions. Indeed, on reading the transcript I can confirm
that the applicant’s evidence was on occasion quite incoherent.
However, in
making its finding the panel did not come to grips in its reasons with the
content of the medical report that had been submitted to it. In my opinion this
report was both cogent and relevant to the finding of credibility. The
deficiencies in the applicant’s testimony that lead the panel to find that it
was not credible are also consistent with the psychiatric and other problems
from which the report states that Mr. Hassan suffers, the treatment that he is
receiving for them and the results of the tests administered to Mr. Hassan by
the psychologist.
I do not wish to
be understood to be saying that the panel’s finding of non-credibility was
unreasonable in light of the medical report. Not at all. What I do say is
that the reasons for decision ought to have indicated clearly that, in assessing
the applicant’s credibility, the panel explicitly addressed the content of that
report.
To be sure, the
panel did state in the introductory portion of its reasons that it had
considered the various items of evidence before it, including the medical report
submitted on behalf of the applicant. However, given the cogency of that
report, its relevance to the panel’s finding of non-credibility and the central
importance of credibility to the outcome, the Refugee Division ought to have
gone
further than this.
It was obliged to explain how it dealt with it in the context of making its
non-credibility finding: ...
[emphasis added, citation omitted]
[25]
I am satisfied that, on the face of the
Officer’s reasons, the Officer “... explicitly addressed the content of ...
[the report of Dr. Devins that was before him or her]”. That report made no
reference to treatment that the Applicant was receiving or to the results of
tests administered to the Applicant by the psychologist. Rather, it appears to
be nothing more than a report of a single interview with the Applicant and a
review of a “narrative” provided by counsel. The report was specifically
addressed, not at the opening of the reasons of the Officer, but well into the
body of those reasons. I am satisfied that the decision in Hassan, is
entirely distinguishable.
[26]
Counsel
for the Applicant further relied on the decision of my colleague, Justice
Russell, in
Yilmaz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
where he wrote at paragraphs 79 and 80 of his reasons:
Yet,
nevertheless, Dr. Devins in his August 22, 2002, assessment does not make it
clear that the Applicant shows symptoms that “corroborate that [his]
experiences in Turkey were
traumatic and that the after-effects continue to exert a deleterious impact.”
Perhaps most convincing is Dr. Devins’ reference to various cognitive of
difficulties that he says “are common consequences of the disorganizing effects
of traumatic stress.” He is clear that these cognitive difficulties “reflect
the severity of [the Applicant’s] chronic stress-response symptoms. They do
not indicate an attempt to evade or obfuscate.”
In the Decision
the Member: “does not accept the resultant diagnosis” because the Member “does
not accept that the incidents actually took place ... .” In my opinion,
bearing in mind the reservations already expressed about Dr. Devins’ final
diagnosis and the way it was arrived at, the Member could have rejected it for
valid reasons. But the only reason the Member gives for rejecting it that she
did not accept that the events actually took place. In my opinion, this does miss
the whole point of what the Applicant was trying to show by submitting a
post-hearing psychological assessment. The Member clearly closed her mind to
the “cognitive difficulties” referred to in the assessment and whether they
could account for the obvious problems that the Applicant had had in
constructing a convincing persecution narrative.
Once again, I am satisfied that the
foregoing is distinguishable.
[27]
Further,
here, the Officer did not “...clearly close[ed] her mind to the ‘cognitive
difficulties’ referred to in the assessment ...”. With the assessment before
him or her, the Officer indicates in her reasons for decision that she had the
assessment in mind, took it into account and chose to exercise his or her own
judgment based, not only on the Applicant’s demeanour in the interview before
him or her, but also on the inconsistencies, contradictions, embellishments and
implausibilities that arose from the Applicant’s evidence for which the
Applicant offered no satisfactory explanation and for which the Officer found
no satisfactory explanation in Dr. Devins’ report.
[28]
Finally,
on this issue, counsel referred the Court to C.A. v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) where my
colleague, Justice Teitelbaum, wrote at paragraph 12 of his reasons:
The Board’s assessment of credibility in
this instance is linked to its consideration of the psychological and medical
evidence. Certainly, this is not the case of a Board “ignore[ing]” the
evidence as occurred in Galindo v. Minister of Employment and Immigration,
... . The Board did in fact refer to the medical evidence of PTSD. However,
it failed to give this evidence the proper weight or recognition on the crucial
issue of credibility. Admittedly, there is a presumption that a decision-maker
takes into account all of the evidence provided and that there is no need to
explicitly refer to each piece of evidence: (Hassan v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration ...)). However, in this instance, the Board in
fact mischaracterized the medical evidence because it did not highlight the
effects of PTSD on the applicant’s credibility when credibility was the
linchpin of its decision.
[citations omitted]
On the facts of this
matter, I am satisfied that the Officer appropriately and explicitly explained
his or her justification for preferring his or her own assessment of the
Applicant’s credibility despite the expert advice of Dr. Devins that was before
him or her.
[29]
Counsel
for the Respondent referred me to the decision in Garay Moscol et al. v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration)
where my colleague, Justice Martineau, wrote at paragraph [10] of his reasons:
The case law emphasizes that the RPD must
take into account the fact that a claimant’s psychological state can sometimes
explain the omissions in the claimant’s story at the port of entry or the lack
of details or confusion regarding dates referred to in the claimant’s
testimony, hence the responsibility to examine the general scope of a
psychological report before too hastily determining that a claimant is not
credible... . But it must also be established to the Court’s satisfaction that
there is a certain connection with the “cognitive errors that are referred to
in the psychologist’s report ...” and the inconsistencies or omissions
identified by the RPD in the impugned decision. Considering the record as a
whole, including the contents of the psychological report in question, I do not
believe that the RPD’s mere omission to comment on the applicant’s
psychological state in its decision amounts in this case to an error in law
justifying that the decision be set aside and the matter referred to the RPD to
reweigh the evidence.
[citations omitted]
[30]
Once
again, on the facts of this matter, the Officer did not simply omit to comment
on the Applicant’s psychological state and the Devins report in his or her
decision. The Officer did acknowledge the report before him or her and, I am
satisfied, reasonably explained his or her reasons for rejecting it in favour
of his or her own assessment of the testimony and demeanour of the Applicant
before him or her.
[31]
In
the result, I am satisfied that the Applicant simply cannot succeed on this
ground against a standard of review of reasonableness.
c) Was
the decision of the Officer that is here under review reasonably open to him or
her?
[32]
I
am satisfied that, in summary, the answer to this issue question must be
“yes”. It may not have been the decision that another Officer or this Court
might have reached on the very sympathetic evidence that was before the
Officer. That being said, if that evidence is found not to be credible, for
good and sufficient reasons adequately explained, as I am satisfied was the
case here, it is not for this Court to substitute its own interpretation of the
Applicant’s evidence and, more particularly, of its credibility, for that of
the Officer who had the opportunity to observe and to hear the testimony of the
Applicant over the course of an extensive direct interview. I find no basis to
conclude that the Officer ignored or failed to adequately take into account any
element of the totality of the evidence that was before him or her.
Conclusion
[33]
For
the foregoing reasons, this Application for Judicial Review will be dismissed.
[34]
An
unsigned copy of these reasons and this Order was distributed in advance to
counsel solely for the purpose of providing them an opportunity to comment on
the steps taken to suppress the Applicant’s identity and the identity of his or
her home state.
Certification of a
Question
[35]
At
the close of hearing, counsel were advised of the Court’s conclusion that this
Application for Judicial Review must be dismissed. Neither counsel recommended
certification of a question. The Court itself is satisfied that the
determination here under review is based upon the unique facts of this matter
and that no serious question of general importance that would be dispositive of
an appeal from its conclusion herein arises. In the result, no question will
be certified.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that:
1.
Of
the Court’s own motion, the style of cause herein is amended to that appearing
on these Reasons for Order and Order.
2.
This
Application for Judicial Review is dismissed.
3.
No
question is certified.
"Frederick
E. Gibson"
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