Date: 20090713
Docket: T-1289-07
Citation:
2009 FC 720
Ottawa, Ontario, July
13, 2009
PRESENT:
The Honourable Madam Justice Johanne Gauthier
BETWEEN:
AURÉLIEN
MAINVILLE, CLAUDE PAULIN, JEAN-PIERRE PLOURDE
Applicants
and
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
Mr.
Mainville, Mr. Paulin and Mr. Plourde are asking the Court to set aside the
decision by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (Minister) dated June 5, 2007,
allocating each Eastern New Brunswick groundfish-dependent competitive fisher a
share of 0.050925% of the total allowable catch (TAC) (or 0.7143% of the New
Brunswick non-traditional allocation (or new access)) of snow crabs in crab
fishing areas (CFA) 12, 18, 25 and 26.
[2]
Furthermore,
they are asking the Court to declare that they are entitled to receive double
this allocation as well as damages equivalent to the losses suffered because of
the respondent’s conduct in the 2007 season, with costs.
Facts
[3]
It
is appropriate to relate, even briefly, the issues to the more general
framework of the system in which the applicants operate.
[4]
Groundfish fishers in New
Brunswick traditionally fish cod and also flounder. Between
1989 and 1993, they were allowed to choose between the individual transferable
quota (ITQ) system and the competitive system. The ITQ system offers fishers an
individual quota that allows them to fish at their own pace until their maximum
catch quota is filled or until the season closes. Fishers under the competitive
fishing system do not have an individual quota, but rather a global quota
allocated to a designated group of fishers; these fishers then engage in a
catching race until the group quota is filled or until the season closes.
[5]
Competitive
fishers enjoy greater flexibility than ITQ fishers do with respect to
transferring their licence. They have access to certain fishing areas, such as
the Northumberland
Strait,
from which ITQ fishers are excluded. There are other differences between the
two systems, although the applicants have indicated that these have become increasingly
blurred over time.
[6]
As
well, there are distinctions within the same group of groundfish fishers, for
instance, as to the type of fishing gear used – either mobile or fixed. Fishers
with fixed gear just “pull” or place lines in the water and come back the next
day to fish them. By contrast, mobile-gear fishing or trawling involves a net
(the seine) being pulled by the boat, which requires a more powerful motor and
results in greater fuel consumption. As a practical matter, this distinction applies
only to groundfish-dependent competitive fishers because all of the groundfish-dependent
ITQ fishers operate mobile gear.
[7]
The
applicants are groundfish-dependent fishers who use mobile gear and operate under
the competitive system.
[8]
Although
Eastern New Brunswick groundfish fishers are not required by statute or
regulations to be members of a fishing association as are, for example, lobster
or herring fishers, almost all of them are, as a practical matter, members (the
only exception being two of the applicants) of either the Acadian Groundfish
Fisherman’s Association (AGFA) or the Maritime Fishermen’s Union (MFU). It
seems that AGFA represents, among others, the fleet of ITQ groundfish fishers whereas
the MFU, which represents several types of fishers (more than 1,200 members), particularly
lobster fishers, unites competitive groundfish fishers. Before May 10, 2005, only
six (two using fixed gear and four others using mobile gear) fishers who were
MFU members were designated as groundfish‑dependent whereas,
among the AGFA members, fourteen fishers were designated as such.
[9]
Following
the imposition of a moratorium on cod fishing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence
in 1993, groundfish-dependent fishers had access to fishing licences for other
species, namely, snow crab. Access to snow crab was first granted in 2003 to
groundfish and lobster fishers in the southern region of the Gulf of
St. Lawrence, and they were allocated 15% of the TAC, minus the share allocated
to Aboriginals. The share of this allocation for fishers from Eastern New
Brunswick was to be managed by the AGFA and the MFU, to which 10% and 90% respectively
of this share had been allocated. These organizations were responsible for achieving
consensus among their members and proposing to the Minister the list of
licences to be issued in a given year.
[10]
As
indicated in the memorandum that was prepared the Minister and on which he was
to base his decision that is being challenged herein, the applicants and the
other three groundfish-dependent fishers who were members of the MFU had to
continually renegotiate their shares of the association’s total allocation, in
the context of competition with the core group of lobster fishers for whom the
MFU reserved the major part of its crab allocation. This situation was unsatisfactory,
since it was a constant irritant for the association and the groundfish-dependent
fishers. On May 10, 2005, the MFU asked two of the applicants, Mr. Mainville
and Mr. Paulin, to leave the association and notified the Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture of New Brunswick and the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans Canada of this. Mr. Plourde, who had a herring
fishing licence at that time, was to remain a member of the association.
[11]
In
2006, the Minister allocated directly to the fleet of groundfish-dependent
competitive fishers an additional quota of 46.24 tonnes in CFA 12E, a zone farther
away from the coasts and less accessible than CFA 12, 18, 25 and 26. This was a
temporary allocation. As for the group of ITQ groundfish-dependent fishers, they
received until 2005 a temporary snow crab allocation for CFA 12, 18, 25 and 26 which,
in 2005, was 0.636% of the TAC. That year, the AGFA proposed to the Minister
that the allocation be shared equally among seven fishers designated by mutual
agreement by the fleet of ITQ groundfish-dependent fishers (14 fishers) and
that this become a regular allocation. This proposal was adopted by the
Minister.
[12]
It
is not challenged that groundfish-dependent fishers who are part of the ITQ fleet
had a history of significantly larger catches than those in the competitive
fleet. The average value of these catches, from 1989 to 1992, was $204,155 for
the ITQ fleet but only $28,752 for the applicants. The ITQ fleet was therefore,
according to the Minister, hit harder by the moratorium.
[13]
Although
the fishing plan for 2007 was not put in evidence by the applicants, the
parties agreed at the hearing that, when it was made public, it did not include
the snow crab allocation in CFA 12, 18, 25 and 26 for groundfish-dependent
competitive fishers who were not members of an association.
Impugned
decision and issues
[14]
In
a memorandum entitled “Snow Crab and Cod Allocations to Groundfish-Dependent Competitive
Fleet Fishers from Eastern New Brunswick”, the Deputy Minister
of Fisheries and Oceans recommended that the Minister allocate an individual
snow crab quota to members of this fleet (with the exception of a fisher who
already benefited from an additional licence for lobster). On June 5, 2007, the
Minister decided to adopt this recommendation and allocate a snow crab quota to
this fleet (with the exception of the fisher mentioned above) for CFA 12 (but
also 18, 25 and 26) of 0.050925% of the TAC (which, that year, represented
around 11,818 tonnes) per fisher to be deducted from the MFU’s global
allocation for the 2007 fishing season, which had been previously announced.
[15]
The
applicants obviously are not challenging the decision to allocate the above‑mentioned
quota directly to them. However, they submit that the decision must be reviewed
because it contains the following errors:
i.
the Minister
compared the size of the applicants’ vessels and their operating expenses without
making a distinction within the competitive fleet, which includes two fishers
using fixed gear. Furthermore, he compares them to the ITQ fleet, which includes
vessels of disparate sizes such as a small 11-tonne vessel and a very large 31-tonne
vessel, which has a major impact on the fleet’s average vessel size;
ii.
Since the
vessels in the applicants’ fleet are not, in fact, “much smaller”, their
operating costs cannot be said to be lower. Erroneous information cannot be characterized
as relevant in accordance with the Act;
iii.
an error
can also be found in the table attached to the memorandum submitted to the
Minister which describes the cod, crab and lobster quotas allocated to the
applicants and other members of the competitive fleet from 2002 to 2006, particularly
the footnote indicating that the quota they were allocated in 2006 for CFA 12E was
not fished because Mr. Plourde, who had been designated by the other members of
the group to fish this quota, experienced mechanical problems. In fact,
although Mr. Plourde did indeed experience mechanical problems, he was able to
fish half of the tonnage allocated. This information was in the possession of
the Department as was noted by Mr. Vienneau during his examination on the
affidavit filed in support of the respondent’s submissions. This error is in
addition to those mentioned above and together they reveal, according to the
applicants, that the Minister did not act in good faith;
iv.
the scale
adopted to arrive at an allocation of 50% of the quota allocated to the ITQ
fleet is arbitrary since it does not directly express the difference in the size
or the operating costs of the two fleets expressed as a percentage.
[16]
Finally,
the applicants submit that the Minister breached his duty to act fairly by not
allowing them to make comments on the memorandum or at least on the
recommendation therein. In this regard, the applicants acknowledge that the Department
generally consulted them on the fishing plan and that they were given the
opportunity to make submissions on their desire to not be compared to groundfish-dependent
competitive fishers using fixed gear. However, they submit that they were not
informed of the fact that the Minister was considering allocating them a
percentage lower than that allocated to the ITQ fleet because of a difference in
vessel size, loading capacity and restrictions with respect to distances travelled
and operating costs.
[17]
For
the applicants, this is not a policy decision such as fixing global allocations
or a resource management plan, but rather a series of individual decisions that
are subject to a duty of procedural fairness that is higher than that defined
by the case law on policy decisions on fishing allocations.
Preliminary remarks
[18]
The
applicants acknowledged at the hearing that the Court actually has no jurisdiction
to grant damages in judicial review proceedings (Manuge v. Canada, 2009 FCA
29, 384 N.R. 313). Therefore, this prayer for relief need not be addressed any further.
[19]
Also,
the applicants did not make submissions in reply to the respondent’s
application to strike certain paragraphs in Mr. Plourde’s affidavit that the
respondent characterizes as hearsay and that contain opinions based on
information or documents that have not been offered in evidence, such as the
table comparing the dimensions of the vessels of the two relevant fleets, as
well as other elements that are more akin to arguments than facts.
[20]
The Court does not intend to give weight to these elements
of the affidavit since, as mentioned at the hearing, only an expert is able to
give opinions on matters that he or she does not have personal knowledge of,
especially on
its face, Mr. Plourde’s table contains at least one obvious error and the documentation
on which it is based is not before the Court. In this regard, the Court also
notes that nothing indicates that Mr. Plourde considered the modifications made
to certain vessels in the ITQ fleet after their original registration (such as the
45-foot supers).
Analysis
[21]
The
applicable standard of review in relation to issues other than a breach of duty
to act fairly will not be addressed in a detailed analysis since it is clear
that deference is called for since, in this case, the Minister has exercised
his discretion to manage the fishery and establish allocations in accordance
with the licences and leases that could subsequently be issued (Fisheries
Act, R.C.S. 1985, c. F‑14 (the Act), section 7. The parties are also
in agreement as to this (Applicants’ Memorandum of Facts and Law, paragraph 8; Respondent’s
Memorandum of Facts and Law, paragraph 32).
[22]
Before
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Dunsmuir),
a Supreme Court of Canada decision, the standard of review that was applicable
to a decision by the Minister on this matter was that of patent
unreasonableness (Tucker v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans),
2001 FCA 384, 288 N.R. 10, at paragraph 2; Area Twenty Three Snow Crab
Fisher’s Association v. Canada (A.G.) 2005 FC 1190, 279 F.T.R. 137, at paragraphs 19 and 25
(Area Twenty Three Snow Crab Fisher’s Association); and Association
des crabiers acadiens v. Canada (A.G.), 2006 FC 1242, 305 F.T.R. 318, at
paragraph 2 (Assoc. des crabiers acadiens)). Now, the appropriate standard
of review is that of reasonableness.
[23]
With
regard to the submission that the Minister breached his duty to act fairly, the
Court must normally intervene as soon as it is found that this duty was
breached (Sketchley v. Canada (A.G.), 2005 FCA 404, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 392,
at paragraphs 52-55 and Dunsmuir, at paragraph 60).
[24]
Some
general principles recognized by the case law relating to the Minister’s
authority to manage the fishery and allocate quotas in accordance with the Act
should be reiterated at this point. As indicated by Justice Richard Mosley in Area
Twenty Three Snow Crab Fisher’s Association, the Minister’s discretionary
power in this regard is virtually absolute.
[25]
In
Canadian Assn. of Regulated Importers v. Canada (A.G.), [1994]
2 F.C. 247, (C.A.) (Canadian Assn. of Regulated Importers), Justice
Allen Linden explained at paragraph 22 that “[i]t is not fatal to a policy
decision that some irrelevant factors be taken into account; it is only when
such a decision is based entirely or predominantly on irrelevant factors that
it is impeachable.” This remark was cited with approval by the Federal Court of
Appeal in Carpenter Fishing Corp. v. Canada, [1998] 2 F.C. 548, 155 D.L.R. (4th) 572 (Carpenter
Fishing Corp.), where the Minister’s authority to allocate fishing quotas
was under scrutiny. Thus, as indicated by Justice Danièle Tremblay-Lamer in Campbell, at paragraph
40, “[a] Minister's decision is not reviewable when it takes into account a
minor irrelevant factor. Instead, what is necessary is to show that the
Minister predominantly took into account irrelevant factors in arriving
at the decision . . . ” (emphasis in original).
[26]
In
Carpenter Fishing Corp., Justice Robert Décary also remarked at paragraph 39:
Quotas invariably and inescapably carry
with them some element of arbitrariness and unfairness. . . . The need for
objective standards in regulating an industry that was until then self-governed
requires tough decisions to be made that will hurt some less than others.
Seldom, if ever, is the imposition of quotas a win-win situation.
[27]
Furthermore,
Justice Marc Nadon made the following remarks in Assoc. des Senneurs du Golf
Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) (1999), 175
F.T.R. 25, 94 A.C.W.S. (3d)
774, at paragraph 25:
Since
there is no limitation in the Fisheries Act or Regulations regarding matters
over which the Minister should exercise his powers, there is in my opinion no
question that the Minister has the power to manage fishing in accordance with
social, economic or other factors. In my view, there is nothing to prevent the
Minister favouring one group of fishers at the expense of another.
[28]
Finally,
as the Court has indicated on a number of occasions, including in Assoc. des
crabiers acadiens at paragraph 9, in the context of a judicial review “it is not
the province of this Court to dictate to the Minister what is more appropriate,
nor to substitute [its] personal view for that of the Minister in the
assessment and the selection of measures by him in relation to the achievement
of the objectives sought and the objects of the Act and of the Regulations.”
[29]
In
applying the above-stated principles to the facts in this case, it is evident
that the nature of fishing carried on by the ITQ fleet versus that carried on by
the competitive fleet, the size of the vessels as well as the operating costs
are clearly relevant considerations. The Court cannot question the reference
groups used by the Minister to make a comparison on the ground that, according
to the applicants, the use of sub-groups (for example, excluding the biggest vessel
of the ITQ fleet or excluding fixed-gear users in the competitive fleet) would
be fairer or more appropriate.
[30]
That
being said, aside from the above-mentioned comparative table to which the Court
cannot assign probative value, the applicants have not showed that the vessels in
their fleet (or even the applicants’ vessels only) are not “much smaller” than
those in the ITQ fleet. With respect to the evidence as a whole, including the examinations
of the affiants, the Court is also not satisfied that the operating costs of
the applicants’ vessels or the competitive fleet’s other vessels discussed in the
memorandum are not lower than those for the ITQ fleet.
[31]
Regarding
the submission that these elements do not exactly warrant the percentage of 50%
(versus 48% or 52%) used by the Minister, the comments by Justice Décary cited above
at paragraph 25 are particularly apposite here and it is not necessary to
discuss this further.
[32]
With
respect to the note in the appendix to the memorandum concerning snow crab
catches made by Mr. Plourde in 2006, there is no doubt that this is not the main
element on which the Minister relied to arrive at his decision. In fact, the
Court is not even persuaded that there is any connection at all between the half-wrong
information and the decision. There is no evidence of bad faith by the Minister
in this case.
[33]
After
a probing examination of the record, the Court cannot find that the decision is
unreasonable.
[34]
The
applicants’ asubmission that the Minister allegedly breached his duty to act
fairly will now be examined. In this regard, it is appropriate to note that in Carpenter
Fishing Corp., Justice Décary indicated the following, at paragraph 32:
Generally, the principles of natural
justice do not apply to legislative or policy decisions. There may be
cases--this is not one of them--where consultation with the public is required
by statute to be held prior to the adoption of a policy, but even then,
consultation with the public does not import the normal rules of natural
justice into the process. In the case at bar, the Minister was under no legal
duty to hold consultation but he nevertheless chose to do so. It is not the
function of courts to pass judgment on the propriety of the method of
consultation followed by a minister as long as the requirements of the
legislation, if any, have been complied with. The finding by the Trial
Judge that the process was undemocratic
was at best irrelevant, at worst totally unsupported by the evidence.
[References
omitted.]
[35]
Because the Court is bound by this decision, the
applicants attempted to distinguish it on two groundss. First, as previously mentioned,
this is not a policy decision aimed at defining allocations, but rather an
individual decision, which is akin to the distinction raised in more recent
Supreme Court of Canada decisions, such as Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of
Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 (Mount
Sinai Hospital Center).
[36]
The facts in Mount Sinai Hospital Center are
distinguishable from the facts before us since, in the first case, the Minister
in question was acting in response to a request for a licence amendment,
whereas in this case, the applicants not only did not make a licence application,
they did not even have the right to make one since they did not benefit from any
regular snow crab allocation in CFA 12, 18, 25 and 26.
[37]
Furthermore,
even though the decision had a direct impact on a limited number of people,
there is no doubt in my mind that this decision constituted a fisheries
management policy. This regular snow crab allocation is an integral part of a
global fishing plan for the southern region of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. It is likely
that several other elements of the fishing plan target a limited number of
people (such as the allocation to the ITQ fleet). It would be dangerous to make
a distinction between what constitutes establishing allocations and fisheries
management policy and what is not based solely on the number of people affected. The Court is satisfied that the nature of the decision under review is
not different from those that were before the Court in the case law stated
above.
[38]
Second, the applicants claim that Dunsmuir, particularly
at paragraphs 86 to 90, changed the law regarding the scope of the duty of
procedural fairness and that, in this case, the criteria in Baker v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Baker)
should now be applied instead of the principles that applied at the time the
Federal Court of Appeal delivered its judgment in Carpenter Fishing Corp.
[39]
It should first be noted that in Baker,
the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated principles it had already stated in,
among others, Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
653, 69 D.L.R. (4th) 489 (Knight)
and Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 44 (Cardinal),
decisions delivered well before Carpenter Fishing Corp. and Canadian
Assn. of Regulated Importers.
[40]
However, the more structured approach or analysis
established in Baker does not seem to have been formally applied until
now. The Court will therefore proceed to determine the scope of
the Minister’s duty to act fairly in the light of the factors set out in Baker,
that is:
i) the
nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it;
ii) the
nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which
the decision-maker operates;
iii) the
importance of the decision to the rights or privileges enjoyed by the
applicants;
iv) the
legitimate expectations of the applicants;
v) the
choices of procedure made by the decision-maker when the statute gives the
decision-maker the possibility of choosing his or her own procedures.
[41]
With respect to the first factor, as I have said, this is
purely a discretionary decision. The Minister must weigh a set of competing
interests (for example, that of resource conservation, that of various
representative organizations, that of Aboriginal groups, that of various types
of fishers, etc.) in exercising his discretion. Therefore, this is a
polycentric decision (Area Twenty Three Snow Crab Fisher’s Assn.,
paragraph 21) that is not subject to any mechanism under the Act. The Act also
does not provide for a right of appeal. In general, this factor indicates that the
degree of procedural protection should be low.
[42]
Second, the Court accepts that the Minister’s decision is
important for the applicants. However, as mentioned, they had no right to a
snow crab quota for CFA 12, 18, 25 and 26 (or even a privilege). The decision
therefore concerns the granting of a new privilege and, under the
circumstances, this indicates again that a degree of procedural protection that
is lower than that suggested by the applicants is appropriate.
[43]
The applicants did not offer evidence supporting the
existence of legitimate expectations in this case. They are very familiar with Fisheries
and Oceans Canada’s consultation process and were given the opportunity to
indicate their point of view. Indeed, Mr. Plourde indicated during his
examination that the applicants had already reported their objection to being
compared to groundfish-dependent competitive fishers using fixed gear to
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (page 109, lines 11 to 17).
[44]
Regarding the last factor, the Act gives the Minister an
almost absolute discretion, which extends not only to the decision as such but
also to the procedure in making it. The Minister chose a procedure of general
consultation before developing a fishing plan, from which he did not depart in
this case. Given the latitude given to the Minister by the Act, the Court must
accord deference with regard to this choice, unless the other above-mentioned
factors require a higher degree of procedural protection, which is not the case
here.
[45]
In short, the Minister did not breach his duty to act
fairly.
[46]
The
application for judicial review is dismissed, with costs.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that:
This application for judicial review is
dismissed, with costs.
“Johanne
Gauthier”
Certified
true translation
François
Brunet, Revisor
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET : T-1289-07
STYLE OF CAUSE : AURÉLIEN MAINVILLE, CLAUDE
PAULIN, JEAN-PIERRE PLOURDE v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
PLACE OF HEARING : Fredericton, New
Brunswick
DATE OF HEARING : June 1, 2009
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT : GAUTHIER J.
DATED : July 13, 2009
APPEARANCES :
Mr. Jean-Marc Gauvin
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
Mr. Paul Marquis
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD :
Godin Lizotte
Lawyers-Notaries
Shippagan, New Brunswick
|
FOR THE APPLICANTS
|
John H. Sims,
Q.C.
Deputy
Attorney General of Canada
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|