Date: 20090428
Docket: IMM-1570-09
Citation:
2009 FC 424
Ottawa,
Ontario, April 28, 2009
PRESENT:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
JORGE
FABIAN Rafael Domingo
applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
In
his Personal Information Form (PIF), the applicant alleges that a police
officer had attempted to abuse his spouse. The applicant was struck by the police
officer and detained. Following interventions by several people, including two
journalists, the applicant was released. He filed a complaint against the
police officer, who was relocated to another neighbourhood. The applicant
alleges that he received threatening calls.
[2]
The
PIF also states that the applicant’s children live in the Dominican Republic.
[3]
The
hearing into the claim for refugee protection by the Refugee Protection
Division (RPD) was held on April 1, 2008, when the applicant was represented by
a lawyer.
[4]
The
RPD denied the claim for refugee protection, based on its determination of a
total lack of credibility on the part of the applicant. In a detailed and
thorough decision, the RPD identified a number of contradictions, omissions,
additions and inconsistencies in basic elements in the account given by the
applicant.
[5]
The
RPD also noted that the applicant entered Canada based on false information,
that the reason for his coming to Canada was economic, and that the very long
period before he claimed Canada’s protection revealed no fear of persecution.
[6]
Alternatively,
the RPD also found that the applicant had not rebutted the presumption that the
Dominican Republic was able to provide him with adequate protection. This
finding was based on the content of the objective documentary evidence. In
addition, the RPD found that when the applicant filed his complaint following
the assault, the authorities acted, and he never filed a complaint concerning the
threats he claimed to have later received.
[7]
The
applicant filed an ALJR against this decision, which was dismissed on October
14, 2008 by Chief Justice Allan Lutfy.
[8]
The
applicant must demonstrate that his application is neither frivolous nor
vexatious. For this, it is necessary to first review the grounds for the case
to determine the merits of a question to be reviewed:
[TRANSLATION]
[9] The meaning of the term
“serious issue” is drawn from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Manitoba
(Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110
and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R.
311. Subject to two exceptions that do not apply in this case, the expression
“serious issue” means that the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious
...
(Jaziri c. Canada
(Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), 2007 CF 1086, [2007] A.C.F. no 1417 (QL)).
[9]
None
of the questions raised by the applicant in his claims constitutes a serious
issue.
II. Introduction
[10]
On
March 31, 2009, the applicant filed an Application for Leave and for Judicial
Review (ALJR) against the decision by the pre-removal risk assessment officer,
dated February 18, 2009.
[11]
In
this decision, the officer dismissed the application for a pre-removal risk
assessment (PRRA) filed by the applicant.
[12]
In
conjunction with this ALJR, on April 15, 2009, the applicant filed an
application for a stay of his removal to the Dominican Republic.
[13]
The
applicant did not demonstrate any serious issues in connection with the
officer’s decision.
[14]
Moreover,
no irreparable harm is caused by his removal to the Dominican Republic, and the
balance of convenience favours the public interest when it comes to having the
process provided under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.
2001, c. 27 (IRPA) follow its course.
III. Preliminary remark – amendment of
the style of cause
[15]
Given
the coming into force of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Act, S.C. 2005, c. 10, the Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should be designated as a
respondent in addition to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
in accordance with the order issued on April 4, 2005
(P.C. 2005-0482).
[16]
The
style of cause is amended to add the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness as a respondent, in addition to the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration.
IV. Facts
[17]
The
applicant, Rafael Domingo Jorge Fabian, is a citizen of the Dominican Republic.
[18]
In
2005, the applicant filed a visa application in Port-au-Prince for Canada,
which was approved on August 1, 2005.
[19]
On
September 11, 2005, the applicant arrived in Canada, in Toronto, falsely
indicating that he had come to take part in a sports meet.
[20]
On
February 3, 2006, the applicant filed an application to extend his stay in
Canada. In this application, he indicated that he wanted to remain in Canada
because he liked his job. This application for extension was approved.
[21]
A
sworn statement was attached to this application, indicating that he was
extending his stay in Canada only as a temporary worker, with no further
intention.
[22]
On
September 13, 2006, the applicant filed a claim for refugee protection. In the
document entitled “Information on Individuals Seeking Refugee Protection”, the
applicant mentioned that his two children lived in the Dominican Republic. He
indicated that he was afraid of some police officers and government officials.
[23]
On
October 10, 2006, the applicant said, during an interview with an immigration
officer, that he had learned that he could seek refuge to obtain a work visa.
[24]
On
January 27, 2001, the applicant met with an immigration officer, who gave him
the opportunity to apply for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) by February
11, 2009. The applicant mentioned to the officer that a sponsorship application
had been submitted on January 23, 2009.
[25]
The
PRRA was received late, on February 13, 2009. It indicated that the applicant’s
children lived in the Dominican Republic.
[26]
In
support of his application, the applicant alleged that a police officer had
attempted to abuse his spouse. The applicant allegedly was struck by the police
officer and detained. Following interventions by several people, including two
journalists, the applicant was released. He filed a complaint against the
police officer, who was relocated to another neighbourhood. The applicant
alleged that he had received threatening phone calls. He mentioned that this
police officer was still after him.
[27]
The
only evidence presented by the applicant in support of his PRRA application is
a marriage certificate.
[28]
On
March 17, 2009, the applicant was told that his PRRA had been denied because
the PRRA officer had found that the applicant had not demonstrated any risks
from his returning to the Dominican Republic.
[29]
That
decision was the subject of the ALJR underlying this application for a stay.
[30]
On
March 31, 2009, during a meeting with a removal officer, the applicant
presented a ticket dated April 30, 2009, after having been told that his ticket
was to be dated April 17, 2009.
[31]
The
applicant asked that his removal be postponed, which the removal officer
refused. The removal is scheduled for April 30, 2009.
V. Issue
[32]
Has
the applicant demonstrated the three elements needed to obtain a stay of a
removal order?
VI. Analysis
[33]
In
order to obtain a stay of a removal order, an applicant must meet all three
parts of the following test, stated in Toth v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 86 N.R. 302, 11 A.C.W.S. (3d) 440,
and continuously used thereafter:
a.
that
he raised a serious issue to be decided;
b.
that
he could suffer irreparable harm if the order were not granted; and
c.
that
the balance of convenience favours the issuance of the order based on the
overall situation of the parties.
(For example, see Castillo v. Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008
FC 172, [2008] F.C.J. No. 216 (QL), at paragraph 10).
A.
Serious issue
[34]
The
applicant must show that his application is neither frivolous nor vexatious. To
this end, it is necessary to conduct a preliminary review of the grounds for
the case to determine the merit of an issue to be reviewed:
[TRANSLATION]
[9] The meaning of the term
“serious issue” is drawn from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Manitoba
(Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110
and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R.
311. Subject to two exceptions that do not apply in this case, the expression
“serious issue” means that the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious
...
(Jaziri, supra).
[35]
None
of the issues raised by the applicant in his submissions constitutes a serious
issue.
[36]
For
a PRRA application, the officer must analyze the evidence and the applicant’s
situation to determine whether he risks being tortured or persecuted, to suffer
cruel or unusual treatment or punishment, or to find his life threatened in the
event of removal (Cen v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 337, 167
A.C.W.S. (3d) 138, at paragraph 4).
[37]
It
is settled law that the applicant bears the burden of submitting evidence in
support of his allegations:
[12] Generally, the
Federal Court of Appeal and this Court have stated on many occasions that the
onus is on the applicant to submit evidence on all the elements of his or her
application. Specifically, on a PRRA application, it is settled law that the
applicant bears the burden of providing the PRRA officer will all the evidence
necessary for the officer to make a decision (Cirahan v. Canada
(Solicitor General), 2004 FC 1603, [2004] A.C.F. No. 1943 (QL) at par. 13).
(Emphasis added.)
(Lupsa v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007
FC 311, 159 A.C.W.S. (3d) 419).
[38]
In
his PRRA application, the applicant alleged that a police officer had attempted
to abuse his spouse. The applicant was allegedly struck by the police officer
and detained. Following interventions by several people, including two
journalists, the applicant was released. He filed a complaint against the
police officer, who was relocated to another neighbourhood. The applicant
alleged that he had received threatening phone calls. He said that this police
officer was still after him.
[39]
The
officer correctly notes that these are exactly the same risks as the
ones cited and dismissed before the RPD.
[40]
The
officer then points out that the only document submitted by the applicant in
support of his PRRA was a marriage certificate.
[41]
Given
that the applicant raised exactly the same risks in his PRRA application before
the RPD, which had deemed that the account was not credible, it was entirely
reasonable for the officer to conclude that the risk had not been demonstrated.
In fact, as established in Mikiani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 FC 810, 560 A.C.W.S. (3d)
534:
[14] First of all, the
PRRA Officer first considered the RPD decision and, during the PRRA, found
that the PRRA application was based on the same risks and facts as those
presented by the applicant to the RPD. In such a case, a PRRA Officer may reach
the same conclusions as the RPD:
¶ 14
PRRA officers are not bound by the conclusions reached by the RPD. However,
when the evidence before the PRRA officer is essentially the same as that
before the RPD, it is reasonable for the PRRA officer to reach the same
conclusions (see Klais v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2004] FC 783 at paragraph 11). In addition, PRRA officers do not sit on appeal
or judicial review and therefore may rely on conclusions reached by the RPD
when there is no new evidence (see Jacques v. Canada (Solicitor General),
[2004] F.C. 1481).
(See Isomi v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. No. 1753 (QL)).
[15] In my opinion,
the applicants submitted the same risks and facts as those presented to the
RPD. Therefore, the Officer did not err in this respect. (Emphasis added.)
[42]
The
only new element in the applicant’s account was that the alleged persecuting
police officer was still after him. However, the RPD had established that the
account of persecution by the alleged persecuting police officer was not
credible, and the applicant did not present any evidence to the officer
to corroborate his allegation.
[43]
Absent
any evidence, it was reasonable for the officer to conclude that the applicant
had not demonstrated any risk:
[56] The PRRA officer
could only exercise the jurisdiction granted to him, no more, no less. With no
evidence submitted to him, no submissions made and no details adduced about the
possible risk, he had no other choice but to reject Mr. Bayavuge’s application
for protection.
[57] In this case,
the PRRA officer properly considered Mr. Bayavuge’s PRRA application. He is
blameless in this. The application was rejected because Mr. Bayavuge failed to
file evidence in support of his PRRA application. (Emphasis added.)
(Bayavuge v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007
FC 65, 308 F.T.R. 126).
[44]
With
regard to the general situation in the Dominican Republic, the officer assessed
the documentary evidence and considered that no significant change had occurred
since the RPD’s analysis a year earlier. In that analysis, the RPD found that
the Dominican Republic was a working democracy and was able to protect its
citizens.
[45]
After
weighing the evidence, the officer found that the RPD’s comments still applied.
Thus, the officer rightly rejected the applicant’s PRRA application.
[46]
The
officer did not err in his analysis. It was up to the applicant to show that he
risked torture or persecution, or cruel or unusual treatment, or seeing his
life threatened. This he did not do. As this Court has pointed out:
[34] A PRRA application
is still an exceptional measure that should not be allowed unless there is
new evidence that was not available at the time of the RPD’s decision and
then only insofar as this new evidence establishes a risk for the
applicant if he were to return to his country of origin.
(Sani v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
FC 913, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1144 (QL)).
[47]
The
applicant claims that the alleged persecuting police officer is still after
him, and that the officer erred in overlooking this fact. This allegation
referred to an element that was not deemed reliable by the RPD and was not
corroborated by any evidence. Thus, there was no error on the part of
the officer.
[48]
Regarding
the assessment of the general situation in the Dominican Republic, it is
presumed that the officer considered all of the evidence, without any need to
mention each individual element (El Ghazaly v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 FC 1329, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d)
376, at paragraph 15).
[49]
In this
case, the officer indicated that nothing had changed. In conclusion, the
officer considered the evidence, as specified at the end of the decision.
[50]
The
applicant did not indicate what problems he would face if he returned, or what
evidence should have been considered by the officer, and did not connect the
general situation in the Dominican Republic with his personal situation. Yet it
is settled law that general evidence about a country cannot be used to
determine risk:
[57] With regard to
general conditions in Guinea, Mr. Doumbouya had to prove a connection
between conditions in his country and his personal situation, which he failed
to do. It will be recalled that his lack of credibility with regard to his
involvement in the RPG, as found by the RPD, did not have to be questioned.
[58] As Mr. Justice
Michel Beaudry noted in Ould, supra, citing with approval the
following passage from Jarada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2005 FC 409, [2005] F.C.J. No. 506 (QL):
[28] That said, the
assessment of the applicant’s potential risk of being persecuted if he were
sent back to his country must be individualized. The fact that the
documentary evidence shows that the human rights situation in a country is
problematic does not necessarily mean there is risk to a given individual...
(Emphasis added.)
(Doumbouya v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007
FC 1187, 325 F.T.R. 143).
[51]
The
applicant also alleges that the officer did not take common considerations into
account. This does not demonstrate any error in the officer’s decision.
[52]
In fact,
this is a clear and detailed decision. The decision respects the standards
established by this Court in such matters:
[33] The adequacy of the reasons must be
examined against all the circumstances. While the Applicants are critical that
certain findings are conclusionary without adequate explanation, there is no
suggestion that (except for Horbay) the Committee did not consider the
important issues raised nor that the Applicants could not understand the
basis for the decision. Therefore, I cannot agree that there were
inadequate reasons. (Emphasis added.)
(Adamidis v. Canada
(Treasury Board), 2006 FC 243, 146 A.C.W.S. (3d)
278).
[53]
The fact
that the officer did not check the common considerations boxes has no relevance
since all of the relevant information was contained in section 4 of the
decision, to which the officer referred. The decision is clear and justified,
and the officer made no error in this regard.
[54]
In
light of the preceding, the applicant did not discharge his burden of showing the
existence of a serious issue.
[55]
For the Court
to allow the application for a stay, the applicant had to show that he had a
reasonable chance of success in his main proceeding, namely the ALJR against
the PRRA (Duran c. Canada (Ministre de la
Sécurité publique et de la Protection civile), 2007
CF 738, [2007] A.C.F. no 988 (QL)). This was not done.
[56]
Consequently,
the application should be dismissed for this reason alone:
[36] I am not persuaded
that Mr. Cardoza Quinteros has raised any serious issue that would warrant the
grant of a stay of the removal order. Having failed to meet one of
the branches of the tripartite test, this application for a stay will be
dismissed. It is not necessary that I examine whether the Applicant has met
the other two branches of the Toth tripartite test. (Emphasis added.)
(Cardoza Quinteros v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
FC 643, [2008] A.C.F. no 812 (QL)).
B. Irreparable harm
[57]
The notion
of irreparable harm was defined by the Court in Kerrutt v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 53 F.T.R. 93,
32 A.C.W.S. (3d) 621, as removing a person to a country where there is a danger to his life and safety. In the same decision,
the Court also found that it cannot be a matter of personal inconvenience or
family separation.
[58]
This
decision has since been cited many times, including by Justice Sandra Simpson
in Calderon v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 92 F.T.R. 107, [1995]
F.C.J. No. 393 (QL), where she stated the following regarding the definition of
irreparable harm
established in Kerrutt, supra:
[22] In Kerrutt v.
MEI (1992), 53 F.T.R. 93 (F.C.T.D.), Mr. Justice MacKay concluded that, for the
purposes of a stay application, irreparable harm implies the serious
likelihood of jeopardy to an applicant’s life or safety. This is a very strict
test and I accept its premise that irreparable harm must be very grave and more
than the unfortunate hardship associated with the breakup or relocation of a
family. (Emphasis added.)
(Also, Lewis v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1271, 126 A.C.W.S. (3d) 842, at
paragraph 9).
[59]
The applicant
bears the burden of providing clear evidence of the harm that he alleges:
[23] The evidence in
support of harm must be clear and non-speculative. (John c. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 915 (QL); Wade
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1995] F.C.J. No. 579 (QL).)
...
[25] Moreover, to
demonstrate irreparable harm, the Applicants must demonstrate that if removed
from Canada, they would suffer irreparable harm between now and the time at
which any positive decision is made on their application for leave and for
judicial review. The Applicants have not done so. (Reddy v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship andImmigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 644 (QL); Bandzar
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No.
772 (QL); Ramirez-Perez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2000] F.C.J. No. 724 (QL).)
(Adams v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 256, [2008] F.C.J. No.
422 (QL)).
[60]
The
applicant has not demonstrated that his removal to the Dominican Republic would
cause him irreparable harm.
[61]
None of
the arguments based on pregnancy, children, sponsoring and family separation is
relevant in assessing irreparable harm in a stay application in connection with
an ALJR against a PRRA decision. Instead, these elements are dealt with in the
context of the stay application connected with the ALJR against the decision to
deny a postponement of the removal (case IMM-1623-09).
[62]
In his
brief, the applicant alleges that (1) he will have to face his attacker if he
returns to the Dominican Republic, (2) his ALJR against the PRRA decision is
pending, and (3) his removal contravenes section 7 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, Part I, Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 (Charter).
[64]
This Court
has established and repeated that removal does not constitute a breach of the
Charter:
[52] Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Canada has recently held that deportation does not as such
deprive a non-citizen of his right to life, liberty or security of the person. (Medovarski
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51,
[2005] S.C.J. No. 31, paragraph 46; Romans v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 272, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1416 (QL).)
(Emphasis added).
(Gonzalez v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006
FC 1274, 302 F.T.R. 81).
[65]
Thus, this
argument must be set aside.
[66]
With
regard to the applicant’s allegation that he will have to face his alleged
persecutor upon his return to the Dominican Republic, this allegation is not
credible and there is no evidence to support it.
[67]
The
applicant had to present clear evidence to demonstrate the irreparable harm
that would befall him, but he did not (Zabala
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 415, 166 A.C.W.S. (3d) 301). The harm must not be based on
conjecture: there must be a strong likelihood of a threat to life or safety:
[23] The evidence in
support of harm must be clear and non-speculative. (John v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 915
(QL); Wade v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1995] F.C.J. No. 579 (QL).)
[24] As noted in Gray
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 42,
at paragraph 14, this Court will be reluctant to overturn, on an
interlocutory motion, the findings of decision-makers, on evidence that had
been before the decision-makers, who have considered the risk, and to
substitute its evaluation of risk without clear and convincing evidence that
the decision-makers were in error. (Reference is also made to Raza v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 42,
[2004] F.C.J. No. 31 (QL).) (Emphasis added).
(Adams, supra).
[68]
The risks
were assessed and dismissed by the RPD, as well as by the officer in the PRRA
decision. The account of persecution was not credible. The same account
presented to this Court without any evidence cannot demonstrate irreparable
harm:
[45] The following comments
by this Court are relevant:
[55] The risks of
return were already assessed in two administrative proceedings, by the panel
and by the officer, and both made the same findings. Further, this Court
confirmed the reasonableness of the Board’s decision refusing the ALJR against
the Board’s decision. Since the order of this Court, the situation has not
changed, as the PRRA confirmed.
[56] This Court has
often held that allegations of risk determined to be unfounded by both the
Board and the PRRA cannot serve as a basis for establishing irreparable harm in
the context of an application to stay (Singh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 145, 137 A.C.W.S. (3d) 156). This
principle in regard to credibility is adaptable in the context of the failure
to reverse the presumption of state protection.
(Malagon, supra; see
also, Javier, supra, at paragraphs 15-16).
(Tchoumbou v. Canada (Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FC 1399)
[69]
Regarding
the ALJR against the PRRA, the Court will always have the power to hear the
case despite the fact that the applicant has left Canada.
[70]
The fact
that the applicant has been removed from Canada while he has an ALJR pending
does not demonstrate that his life or safety will be at risk in the Dominican
Republic.
[71]
The
applicant has not discharged his burden of demonstrating that he will suffer
irreparable harm by being removed to the Dominican Republic. The application
for a stay must therefore be dismissed:
[TRANSLATION]
[38] The applicants have adduced
no evidence of personal risk should they return to Mexico.
[39] The absence of
evidence as to the existence of irreparable harm is sufficient in and of
itself to dismiss the stay application.
(Alba c. Canada (Ministre de
la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), 2007 CF
1116, [2007] A.C.F. no 1447 (QL)).
C. Balance
of convenience
[72]
In the
absence of a serious issue and irreparable harm, the balance of convenience
favours the public interest in ensuring compliance with the immigration process
established under the IRPA (Mobley v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 65), as
recently restated by this Court in Patterson v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
CF 406, 166 A.C.W.S. (3d) 300:
[33] The Federal Court
of Appeal has confirmed that the Minister’s obligation is “not simply a
question of administrative convenience, but implicates the integrity and
fairness of, and public confidence in, Canada’s system of immigration control.” (Selliah,
supra, para. 22.)
[34] In the present
case, the Applicant seeks extraordinary equitable relief. It is trite
law that the public interest must be taken into consideration when evaluating
this last criterion. In order to demonstrate that the balance of convenience
favours the Applicant, the latter should demonstrate that there is a public
interest not to remove him as scheduled. (RJR-MacDonald, supra;
Blum v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994),
90 F.T.R. 54, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1990 (QL), per Justice
Paul Rouleau.) (Emphasis added).
[73]
In this
case, the applicant arrived in Canada in 2005, with a visitor’s visa obtained
based on false information. He asked to have his visa renewed so he could
continue to work. More than a year after his arrival in Canada, he chose to
apply for refugee protection. His application was denied in light of his total
lack of credibility and, in addition, in consideration of the fact that the
applicant could obtain state protection in his home country.
[74]
The
applicant challenged this decision in the Federal Court, but was unsuccessful.
He then applied for a PRRA, but the application was refused in view of the
absence of any evidence. The applicant also submitted a sponsorship application
in January 2009, which was returned because the undertaking was not signed.
[75] The applicant used every
recourse to which he was entitled in Canada and all of his applications to date
have been denied. In this case, the balance of convenience favours the
Minister.
VII. Conclusion
[76]
The applicant
has not demonstrated that he meets the tests for a stay of removal, therefore this
stay application cannot be allowed.
[77]
For
all of these reasons, the stay application is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS the dismissal
of the application for a stay.
“Michel
M.J. Shore”
Certified
true translation
Brian
McCordick, Translator
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