Date: 20090123
Docket: T-1651-07
Citation: 2009 FC 73
Ottawa, Ontario, January 23,
2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mandamin
BETWEEN:
PATRICK
EDWARDS
Applicant
and
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review by Patrick Edwards (the applicant) of the
decision by the National Parole Board (NPB) – Appeal Division (the Appeal
Division) dismissing the applicant’s appeal of the NPB – Trial Division’s (the Board)
conclusion that the applicant caused serious harm to the victim of his
offences.
[2]
The
applicant is serving a ten year, fifty day sentence for attempted murder, two
counts of assault with a weapon, forcible confinement and three counts of
uttering threats. The victim of these offences was the applicant’s former
girlfriend.
[3]
The
applicant, as an offender, was entitled to statutory release after serving two
thirds of his sentence for the offences. The statutory release date was
October 30, 2007. In March 2007, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC)
determined the applicant’s offences caused serious harm to his victim based on
an analysis provided by the Case Management Team dealing with the applicant.
The CSC referred the applicant’s case to the Board pursuant to section
129(2)(a)(i) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992,
c. 20, (CCRA).
[4]
The
Board provided notice to the applicant and conducted a review of his case. The
Board concluded that the applicant did not meet the criteria for detention and
thus was eligible for statutory release. However, the Board did find that the
applicant was serving a sentence for a Schedule 1 offence and that the offence
caused serious harm to the victim. The Board ordered, pursuant to section
130(4) of the CCRA, that in the event that his statutory release was revoked
the applicant would not be entitled to statutory release. This condition is
sometimes termed a “one chance” release. The Board also imposed a number of
conditions on the applicant’s statutory release including a residency
condition.
[5]
Because
of the residency condition, the applicant could not reside with his brother, a
member of the Ontario Provincial Police, who had offered to take him in.
[6]
The
applicant appealed the Board’s decision to the Appeal Division which affirmed
the decision and denied the appeal.
THE DECISION UNDER
REVIEW
[7]
The
Appeal Division in its decision concluded that:
We found that the
referral to the Board was made within the required timeframes set out in law,
and that upon consideration of the referral, the Board accepted it as it
concluded that a sufficient case was made in order to conduct the necessary
review. In that regard, we remind you that the Board is mandated by the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act and Board policy to form an opinion as
to whether your offending caused serious harm. As noted in the Board’s Reasons
for Decision and discussed during the hearing, and also noted by the judge in
the Reasons for Sentence, you terrorized the victim and her family over a
period of several months through your actions. The nature of your offences,
the file information, and the victim impact statement are in our view
sufficient to conclude that your offences caused serious harm to the victim.
We are satisfied that the Board had the jurisdiction to review your case for
detention.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[8]
The
Federal Court of Appeal considered the standard of review which the Appeal
Division would apply in respect of an appeal from the Board in Cartier v. AG,
2002 FCA 384. Justice Décary considered the nature of such an appeal. He noted
that the Appeal Division hears appeals but on grounds akin to judicial review.
He stated:
a. The Appeal
Division is a hybrid. It hears the offender’s “appeal” and s. 147(4)(d)
authorizes it to reverse, cancel or vary the decision made by the Commission
against him. That is a power associated with an appeal. However, the grounds
of appeal listed in s. 147(1) are essentially those associated with judicial
review and s. 147(4) uses the phrase “on the completion of a review” (my
emphasis). What is more, s. 147(5)(a) considerably reduces the Appeal Board’s
power of intervention, and at the same time significantly reinforces the status
of the Commission’s decision, when it requires the Appeal Division to be
“satisfied” before rendering a decision “that results in the immediate release
of an offender” that:
the decision appealed
from cannot reasonably be supported in law, under the applicable policies of
the Board, or on the basis of the information available to the Board in its
review of the case …
b. Section
147(5)(a) is troubling, to the extent that it imposes a standard of review
which for all practical purposes applies only when the Appeal Division,
pursuant to s. 147(4)(d), reverses the Board’s decision and permits the
offender to be released. What standard should be applied when, as in the case
at bar, the Appeal Division affirms the Board’s decision pursuant to s.
147(4)(a)?
c. Section
147(5)(a) appears to indicate that Parliament intended to give priority to
the Board’s decision, in short to deny statutory release once that decision can
reasonably be supported in law and fact. The Board is entitled to err, if the
error is reasonable. The Appeal Division only intervenes if the error of law
or fact is unreasonable. I would be inclined to think that an error of law
by the Board as to the extent to which it must be “satisfied” of the risk of
release – an error which is alleged in the case at bar – is an unreasonable
error by definition as it affects the Board’s very function.
d. If the
applicable standard of review is that of reasonableness when the Appeal
Division reverses the Board’s decision, it seems unlikely that Parliament
intended the standard to be different when the Appeal Division affirms it. I
feel that, though awkwardly, Parliament in s. 147(5)(a) was only ensuring that
the Appeal Division would at all times be guided by the standard of
reasonableness.
e. The
unaccustomed situation in which the Appeal Division finds itself means caution
is necessary in applying the usual rules of administrative law. The judge
in theory has an application for judicial review from the Appeal Division’s
before him, but when the latter has affirmed the Board’s decision he is
actually required ultimately to ensure that the Board’s decision is lawful. (underlining
added)
[9]
Accordingly,
for the Board’s decision to be lawful, it must be reasonably supported by law
and fact.
[10]
The
Supreme Court of Canada held in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
that there are only two standards of review: correctness and reasonableness.
On determining an appropriate standard of review Justice Bastarache and Justice
LeBel wrote:
[57] An exhaustive
review is not required in every case to determine the proper standard of
review. Here again, existing jurisprudence may be helpful in identifying some
of the questions that generally fall to be determined according to the
correctness standard (Cartaway Resources Corp. (Re), [2004] 1 S.C.R.
672, 2004 SCC 26). This simply means that the analysis required is already
deemed to have been performed and need not be repeated.
[11]
Keeping
in mind the Federal Court of Appeal’s analysis in Cartier, I must determine
whether the Appeal Division properly found the Board’s decision to be lawful,
that is reasonably supported by law and fact.
ISSUE
[12]
The
issue before this Court is whether the decision of the Board in the finding
that the applicant caused serious harm to his victim in the commission of his
offences is reasonable in law and reasonable on the facts the Board is entitled
to consider.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[13]
Section
130 (1) of the CCRA is set out in its entirety in Annex A; however, the
portions of relevance are as follows:
|
130. (1)
Where the case of an offender is referred to the Board by the Service
pursuant to subsection 129(2) or referred to the Chairperson of the Board by
the Commissioner pursuant to subsection 129(3) or (3.1), the Board shall,
subject to subsections 129(5), (6) and (7), at the times and in the manner
prescribed by the regulations,
…
(b) review the case,
and the Board shall cause all such
inquiries to be conducted in connection with the review as it considers
necessary.
. . .
Decision of Board
(3) On completion of the review of the case of an
offender referred to in subsection (1), the Board may order that the offender
not be released from imprisonment before the expiration of the offender’s
sentence according to law, except as provided by subsection (5), where
the Board is satisfied
…
Special order by Board
(4) Where the Board is not satisfied as provided in
subsection (3) but is satisfied that
(a) at the time the case was referred to it, the offender was
serving a sentence that included a sentence for an offence set out in
Schedule I or II, or for an offence set out in Schedule I or II that is
punishable under section 130 of the National Defence Act, and
(b) in the case of an offence set out in Schedule I or an offence
set out in Schedule I that is punishable under section 130 of the National
Defence Act, the commission of the offence caused the death of, or
serious harm to, another person or the offence was a sexual offence
involving a child,
it may order that if the statutory
release is later revoked, the offender is not entitled to be released again
on statutory release before the expiration of the offender’s sentence
according to law.
|
130. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes 129(5), (6) et (7), la
Commission informe le détenu du renvoi et du prochain examen de son cas —
déféré en application des paragraphes 129(2), (3) ou (3.1) — et procède,
selon les modalités réglementaires, à cet examen ainsi qu’à toutes les
enquêtes qu’elle juge nécessaires à cet égard.
…
Ordonnance de la Commission
(3) Au terme de l’examen, la Commission
peut, par ordonnance, interdire la mise en liberté du délinquant avant
l’expiration légale de sa peine autrement qu’en
conformité avec le paragraphe (5) si elle est convaincue :
Ordonnance de la Commission
(4) Quand elle n’a pas cette
conviction, la Commission peut ordonner qu’en cas de révocation la libération
d’office ne puisse être renouvelée avant l’expiration légale de la peine que
purge le délinquant si, par ailleurs, elle est convaincue, à la fois :
a) qu’au moment où le dossier lui est
déféré le délinquant purgeait une peine d’emprisonnement comprenant une peine
infligée pour une infraction visée à l’annexe I ou
II, ou mentionnée à l’une ou l’autre de celles-ci et qui est punissable en
vertu de l’article 130 de la Loi sur la défense nationale;
b) que l’infraction — si elle relève de l’annexe I,
ou y est mentionnée et est punissable en vertu de l’article 130 de la Loi
sur la défense nationale — a causé la mort ou un dommage grave
à une autre personne ou est une infraction d’ordre sexuel commise à
l’égard d’un enfant.
|
ANALYSIS
[14]
The
applicant submits that the evidence before the Board did not establish that he
had caused serious harm to the victim of his offence.
[15]
Section 99 of the CCRA defines ‘serious harm’
for the purposes of Part II of the CCRA as “severe physical injury or severe
psychological damage”. The Commissioner’s Directive for Assessing Serious Harm
No. 705 - 8 (Commissioner’s Directive) issued by the Commissioner of CSC
provides guidelines for determining whether physical injury and or
psychological damage was incurred in the commission of an offence.
[16]
The
applicant submits section 99 of the CCRA defines serious harm as “severe
physical injury or severe psychological damage” and that a finding the victim
was terrified is not determinative as to whether the victim suffered severe
harm as defined.
[17]
The
applicant submits that the evidence before the Board, that the applicant’s
offences caused any of the characteristics or signs of severe psychological
harm to the victim as described in the Commissioner’s Directive.
The
following lists identify offence and victim characteristics identified in the
mental health literature as being commonly associated with psychological
disorders resulting from sexual and non-sexual victimization. The presence of
each of these characteristics increased the probability that a victim of a
criminal offence suffered severe psychological damage. It should be noted that
the research literature indicates that sexual offences are more likely to cause
severe psychological damage than non-sexual offences.
Offence characteristics
·
sexual offence
·
if a sexual offence, penetration was involved
·
brutality (e.g., serious physical injury, torture)
·
victim held captive
·
repeated offences against victim
·
long duration
Victim characteristics
·
prior mental health or adjustment problems
·
prior criminal victimization
·
female
·
50 years old or older
Other factors
·
prior positive relationship or relationship of trust with
offender (e.g., parent abuses child, assault by marriage partner)
·
no social support for victim provided (e.g., family
disbelieves child sexual abuse victim, victim isolated from friends, family,
services)
[18]
The
applicant says the Board’s conclusion of serious harm is speculation as there
was no evidentiary basis for a finding of severe psychological harm or physical
damage.
[19]
Notwithstanding
the applicant’s submissions, the Board is not limited to rules of evidence. In
Mooring v. Canada, [1996] S.C.J. No. 10, the Supreme Court held the
Board is not limited to rules of evidence but is required to consider all
relevant information. The Court stated at para. 26 and 29:
26…Clearly then, the
Parole Board does not hear and assess evidence, but instead acts on
information. The Parole Board acts in an inquisitorial capacity without
contending parties – the state’s interests are not represented by counsel, and
the parolee is not faced with a formal “case to meet”. …
***
29 Like the basic
structure and function of the Parole Board, the language of the Board’s
enabling statue makes it clear that the board lacks the ability or jurisdiction
to exclude relevant evidence. The language of the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act confers on the Board a broad inclusionary mandate. Not
only is it not bound to apply the traditional rules of evidence, but it is
required to take into account “all available information that is relevant to a
case”… (Underlining added)
[20]
Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, there was
an abundance of reliable information before the NPB documenting the brutal and
prolonged manner in which the applicant terrorized his victim that amply
supported the Board’s conclusion that he had caused her serious harm in the
commission of his offences.
[21]
The CSC provided to the Board an Assessment for
Decision that included a detailed account of the abuse suffered by the victim
at the hands of the applicant. The Assessment for Decision provided a
description of the applicant’s stabbing of the victim, in addition to his later
attempt to shoot her, taken from the case summary provided by Peel Regional
Police detective:
Edwards prevented her
from exiting the car and handcuffed her to the seat adjuster (he used two sets
of handcuffs, one on each hand). He then pulled out a large knife from a
leather sheath and superficially stabbed [the victim] in the leg stating that
if she screamed or cried she would “get more”. He then stated that he was
going to take her back to his house and have sex with her. [The victim] asked
Edwards if he was “crazy” to which he replied “you haven’t seen anything yet.”
[22]
In support of its finding that the applicant had
caused the victim serious harm, the NPB noted the physical and psychological
elements of the applicant’s offences:
Your index offences,
which took place over a number of hours, are described in file information as
psychologically terrorizing and physically assaultive. The victim reports that
she was sexually assaulted while both hands were handcuffed to the car and her
mouth was covered by duct tape. She also reports that she was stuffed into the
trunk of your car for an unknown length of time. This behaviour on your part
can only be described as brutal.
[23]
The
Appeal Division noted that the Reasons for Sentence, the information on file
and the victim impact statement all showed that the applicant terrorized his
victim and her family over a period of months. This evidence and information was
before the Board when it rendered its decision.
[24]
I
find the Board decided on the basis of relevant information before it which it
was in law reasonably entitled to consider. I further find that the
information before the Board was sufficient basis for the Board to reasonably
that the applicant caused the victim serious harm.
[25]
I
conclude that the Board decided lawfully in that it considered information it
was in law reasonably entitled to consider and that information was sufficient
for it to reasonably decide as it did.
CONCLUSION
[26]
The
applicant has failed to demonstrate any basis to interfere with the Board’s
decision. In this respect, the application for judicial review of the Appeal
Division decision to uphold the Board’s decision does not succeed. The
application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that:
1.
The
application for judicial review is dismissed.
2.
Costs
are awarded to the Respondent.
“Leonard S. Mandamin”
Annex A
|
130. (1)
Where the case of an offender is referred to the Board by the Service
pursuant to subsection 129(2) or referred to the Chairperson of the Board by
the Commissioner pursuant to subsection 129(3) or (3.1), the Board shall,
subject to subsections 129(5), (6) and (7), at the times and in the manner
prescribed by the regulations,
(a) inform the offender of the referral and review, and
(b) review the case,
and the Board shall cause all such inquiries to be
conducted in connection with the review as it considers necessary.
Detention pending review
(2) An offender referred to in subsection (1) is not
entitled to be released on statutory release before the Board renders its
decision under this section in relation to the offender.
Decision of Board
(3) On completion of the review of the case of an
offender referred to in subsection (1), the Board may order that the offender
not be released from imprisonment before the expiration of the offender’s
sentence according to law, except as provided by subsection (5), where the Board
is satisfied
(a) in the case of an offender serving a sentence that includes a
sentence for an offence set out in Schedule I, or for an offence set out in
Schedule I that is punishable under section 130 of the National Defence
Act, that the offender is likely, if released, to commit an offence
causing the death of or serious harm to another person or a sexual offence
involving a child before the expiration of the offender’s sentence according
to law,
(b) in the case of an offender serving a sentence that includes a
sentence for an offence set out in Schedule II, or for an offence set out in
Schedule II that is punishable under section 130 of the National Defence
Act, that the offender is likely, if released, to commit a serious drug
offence before the expiration of the offender’s sentence according to law,
(c) in the case of an offender whose case was referred to the
Chairperson of the Board pursuant to subsection 129(3) or (3.1), that the
offender is likely, if released, to commit an offence causing the death of or
serious harm to another person, a sexual offence involving a child or a
serious drug offence before the expiration of the offender’s sentence
according to law.
When order takes effect
(3.1) An order made under subsection (3) takes effect on
the day on which it is made.
Effect of order where additional sentence
(3.2) Where, before the expiration of a sentence in
respect of which an order under subsection (3) has been made, an offender
receives an additional sentence and the date of the expiration of the
sentence that includes the additional sentence as provided by subsection
139(1) is later than the date of the expiration of the sentence that the
offender was serving before the additional sentence was imposed,
(a) the Board shall review the order at the time and in the
manner prescribed by the regulations where, as a result of the additional
sentence, the statutory release date has already passed or is within nine
months after the day on which the offender received the additional sentence;
and
(b) the order is cancelled where, as a result of the additional
sentence, the statutory release date is nine months or more after the day on
which the offender received the additional sentence.
Board’s powers on review
(3.3) The Board shall, on completing a review under
paragraph (3.2)(a)
(a) confirm the order to prevent the release of the offender
until the expiration of the sentence in respect of which the order was made;
or
(b) amend the order to prevent the release of the offender until
the expiration of the sentence that includes the additional sentence as
provided by subsection 139(1).
Detention pending review
(3.4) An offender in respect of whom an order, that is
subject to review under paragraph (3.2)(a), has been made is not
entitled to be released on statutory release before the Board renders its
decision under subsection (3.3) in relation to the order.
Special order by Board
(4) Where the Board is not satisfied as provided in
subsection (3) but is satisfied that
(a) at the time the case was referred to it, the offender was
serving a sentence that included a sentence for an offence set out in
Schedule I or II, or for an offence set out in Schedule I or II that is
punishable under section 130 of the National Defence Act, and
(b) in the case of an offence set out in Schedule I or an offence
set out in Schedule I that is punishable under section 130 of the National
Defence Act, the commission of the offence caused the death of, or
serious harm to, another person or the offence was a sexual offence involving
a child,
it may order that if the statutory release is later
revoked, the offender is not entitled to be released again on statutory
release before the expiration of the offender’s sentence according to law.
Order not to be released
(5) An offender who is in custody pursuant to an order
made under subsection (3) or amended under paragraph (3.3)(b) is not
eligible to be released from imprisonment under this Act except on a
temporary absence with escort for medical purposes under Part I.
Where order for release revoked
(6) Where an offender is ordered under subsection (3) or
paragraph (3.3)(b) not to be released and is subsequently released
pursuant to an order made under subparagraph 131(3)(a)(ii) or (iii)
and the statutory release is later revoked, the offender is not entitled to
be released again on statutory release before the expiration of the
offender’s sentence according to law.
(7) [Repealed, 1995, c. 42, s. 45]
|
130. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes 129(5), (6) et (7), la
Commission informe le détenu du renvoi et du prochain examen de son cas —
déféré en application des paragraphes 129(2), (3) ou (3.1) — et procède,
selon les modalités réglementaires, à cet examen ainsi qu’à toutes les
enquêtes qu’elle juge nécessaires à cet égard.
Détention
(2) Le délinquant dont le cas est examiné aux termes du
paragraphe (1) ne peut être libéré d’office tant que la Commission n’a pas
rendu sa décision à son égard.
Ordonnance de la Commission
(3) Au terme de l’examen, la Commission peut, par
ordonnance, interdire la mise en liberté du délinquant avant l’expiration
légale de sa peine autrement qu’en conformité avec le paragraphe (5) si elle
est convaincue :
a) dans le cas où la peine d’emprisonnement comprend une
peine infligée pour une infraction visée à l’annexe I, ou qui y est
mentionnée et qui est punissable en vertu de l’article 130 de la Loi sur
la défense nationale, que le délinquant commettra, s’il est mis en
liberté avant l’expiration légale de sa peine, soit une infraction causant la
mort ou un dommage grave à une autre personne, soit une infraction d’ordre
sexuel à l’égard d’un enfant;
b) dans le cas où la peine comprend une peine infligée
pour une infraction visée à l’annexe II, ou qui y est mentionnée et qui est
punissable en vertu de l’article 130 de la Loi sur la défense nationale,
qu’il commettra, s’il est mis en liberté avant l’expiration légale de sa
peine, une infraction désignée en matière de drogue;
c) en cas de renvoi au titre du paragraphe 129(3) ou
(3.1), qu’il commettra, s’il est mis en liberté avant l’expiration légale de
sa peine, l’une ou l’autre de ces infractions.
Prise d’effet de l’ordonnance
(3.1) L’ordonnance — rendue aux termes du paragraphe (3)
— visant à interdire la mise en liberté du délinquant prend effet à la date
de son prononcé.
Peine supplémentaire
(3.2) Si le délinquant assujetti à une ordonnance —
rendue aux termes du paragraphe (3) — visant à interdire sa mise en liberté
avant l’expiration légale de sa peine est condamné à une peine supplémentaire
qui entraîne une augmentation de la durée de la peine d’emprisonnement prévue
au paragraphe 139(1) :
a) l’ordonnance fait l’objet d’un examen par la Commission
selon les modalités réglementaires de temps et autres lorsque, en raison de
la peine supplémentaire, la date de la libération d’office est déjà passée ou
tombe dans la période de neuf mois qui suit;
b) l’ordonnance est annulée lorsque la date de la
libération d’office est postérieure d’au moins neuf mois à celle de la
condamnation.
Décision
(3.3) Au terme de l’examen prévu à l’alinéa (3.2)a),
la Commission :
a) soit confirme l’ordonnance et interdit la mise en
liberté du délinquant avant l’expiration légale de la peine visée par
l’ordonnance;
b) soit modifie l’ordonnance et interdit la mise en
liberté du délinquant avant l’expiration légale de sa peine déterminée
conformément au paragraphe 139(1).
Maintien en détention
(3.4) Le délinquant visé par une ordonnance qui fait
l’objet de l’examen prévu à l’alinéa (3.2)a) ne peut être libéré
d’office tant que la Commission n’a pas rendu de décision aux termes du
paragraphe (3.3).
Ordonnance de la Commission
(4) Quand elle n’a pas cette conviction, la Commission
peut ordonner qu’en cas de révocation la libération d’office ne puisse être
renouvelée avant l’expiration légale de la peine que purge le délinquant si,
par ailleurs, elle est convaincue, à la fois :
a) qu’au moment où le dossier lui est déféré le délinquant
purgeait une peine d’emprisonnement comprenant une peine infligée pour une
infraction visée à l’annexe I ou II, ou mentionnée à l’une ou l’autre de
celles-ci et qui est punissable en vertu de l’article 130 de la Loi sur la
défense nationale;
b) que l’infraction — si elle relève de l’annexe I, ou y
est mentionnée et est punissable en vertu de l’article 130 de la Loi sur
la défense nationale — a causé la mort ou un dommage grave à une autre
personne ou est une infraction d’ordre sexuel commise à l’égard d’un enfant.
Sortie avec escorte
(5) Seule la permission de sortir avec escorte pour
raisons médicales prévue par la partie I peut être accordée au délinquant
dont la Commission a interdit, conformément au paragraphe (3) ou à l’alinéa
(3.3)b), la mise en liberté avant l’expiration légale de sa peine.
Non-renouvellement de la libération
d’office
(6) Lorsque le délinquant assujetti à une ordonnance
rendue en vertu du paragraphe (3) ou de l’alinéa (3.3)b) — visant à
interdire sa mise en liberté — bénéficie de la libération d’office aux termes
de l’alinéa 131(3)a), celle-ci ne peut, en cas de révocation, être
renouvelée avant l’expiration légale de sa peine.
(7)
[Abrogé, 1995, ch. 42, art. 45]
|
Email this Content