Date: 20091202
Docket: T-555-08
Citation: 2009 FC 1226
Ottawa, Ontario, December 2, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
BETWEEN:
RYAN
MURPHY et al
Applicants
and
MINISTER
OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
This
decision addresses a challenge to the Requirements for Information (RFIs)
issued under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c.
1 (Act) to each of the Applicants who are alleged to be members of the UN Gang
located in the Vancouver B.C. area. The Applicants rely on an alleged
continuing course of illegal conduct carried out by certain officials of the
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) which are not authorized and were engaged in for
purposes other than the enforcement of the Act.
[2]
It
is a central tenet of the rule of law that everyone is required to obey the law
and all are entitled to the protections of the law, even those litigants who
may be deserving of little sympathy. In that latter category would be members
of gangs reputed to be engaged in some of the most serious of illegal
misconduct in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia.
[3]
It
is not necessary or even within the scope of this inquiry to determine whether
the Applicants are members of the UN Gang. However, the history of this
litigation, involving change of the lead litigant due to “hits” on other
members and other steps taken by the Applicants to protect personal information
usually available in litigation due to the fear of harm from unknown persons,
is consistent with membership in illegal gangs.
II. BACKGROUND
[4]
This
judicial review focuses on the decision by a member of CRA (purportedly on
behalf of the Minister of National Revenue) to issue RFIs, the initiation of
that process, its purpose and the manner in which it was carried out.
[5]
The
impugned actions of the CRA were those of the Special Enforcement Program (SEP)
of the Vancouver Tax Service Office (VTSO) of CRA. The mandate of the SEP is to
conduct audits and undertake other civil enforcement actions on individuals
suspected of earning income from illegal activities. The SEP had significant
contact with police units during the timeframe at issue in this proceeding.
[6]
The
principal police unit in question is the Proceeds of Crime Unit of the Combined
Forces Special Enforcement Unit – British Columbia (CFSEU – BC). This
organization is a combination of members of the federal, provincial and
municipal law enforcement agencies.
[7]
Critical
to this case are the activities of Wayne Fjoser who was a Team Leader in the
SEP. He is the individual who signed the RFIs. During the course of his time in
the SEP, Fjoser dealt with various police forces and made presentations to
those police forces on the mandate of SEP, the ability of CRA to obtain taxpayer
information and the ability of CRA/SEP to communicate taxpayer information to
police, including the limitations thereon. One of the tools used by CRA/SEP is
the issuance of RFIs.
[8]
Of
particular relevance to this matter in respect of the issuance of RFIs, Fjoser,
as a Team Leader, had not been given power to issue RFIs pursuant to the
National Authorities Matrices “Matrices”, a matter to be discussed later. The
Matrices were the method by which the Minister’s power to issue documents and
institute process was delegated to specific levels or job categories within
CRA.
[9]
By
letters of March 8, 2007 and March 20, 2007, Inspector Michael Ryan, a veteran
RCMP officer and then the officer in charge of the Proceeds of Crime Team of
the CFSEU – BC, provided Fjoser with a list of known or suspected UN Gang
members. Ryan stated in his evidence that he had taken the initiative to make
this referral to CRA. There was no suggestion in his evidence that he or CFSEU
– BC were expecting anything in return.
[10]
In
sharp contrast to Ryan’s evidence, Fjoser stated that it was he who had
requested this information from Ryan after Fjoser had identified the UN Gang as
an association whose members were likely to have unreported earned income from
illegal activities. Fjoser’s evidence was that he arrived at this conclusion
based on a review of media reports.
[11]
There
are a number of difficulties with Fjoser’s evidence on the subject of what led
to the initiation of the RFIs. These difficulties have a significant impact on
the legal requirement that the Minister have a “serious and genuine inquiry
into the tax affairs of the taxpayer”.
[12]
For
reasons to be discussed, the Court finds that Ryan’s evidence is significantly
more credible than that of Fjoser. Indeed Fjoser’s evidence is generally weak
and not persuasive on many important aspects of this case.
[13]
However,
having received the list from Ryan, Fjoser forwarded it to Jacqueline Gomez, a
compliance officer in SEP. Gomez checked to see if the named individuals had
filed tax returns. If they had not, a requirement to file a return was issued. With
respect to the potential for issuing RFIs, Gomez did some public document
searches of the various individuals.
[14]
RFIs
were prepared for specific years requesting net worth statements for 2005 and
2006 for all of the Applicants and 2004 for most of the Applicants. Fjoser
prepared the RFI authorization documentation and then authorized the RFIs by
stamping them with the signature of Arlene White, Director of the VTSO who was
authorized under the Matrices to sign and issue RFIs.
[15]
It
was Fjoser’s evidence that he never discussed his UN Gang project with his
Director, Assistant or Acting Director. His only discussions with these
superiors were in respect to the current litigation.
[16]
In
the context of reportedly one of the most vicious crime gangs and involving a
multi-force sophisticated police crime unit, Fjoser stated explicitly that only
he and Gomez worked on the project and reported to no one.
[17]
The
RFIs were issued by Fjoser in April of 2007 but were not served until early
2008 (between February and April). These RFIs were served personally by Gomez
on each of the Applicants and in most cases accompanied by and with the
assistance of the police.
[18]
The
delay between authorization of the RFIs in 2007 and service in 2008 was
attributed in part to the delay in securing police presence to assist with
service.
[19]
It
was Fjoser who instructed Gomez to effect personal service with police
assistance rather than effecting service as statutorily permitted, through lawyers,
agents or by registered mail. In some very limited circumstances, an Applicant
would have been served through counsel.
[20]
Many
of the police officers accompanying Gomez were members of the integrated gang
task force; some of the Applicants were familiar to the police. The usual
course was for Gomez to identify herself, and tell the Applicant that she was
serving demands under the Income Tax Act. Police presence was clear and
visible and highly obtrusive. The service of the documents was generally carried
out late at night, with multiple police cruisers present, lights on and with all
the paraphernalia of a police raid. Many of the officers were members of the
integrated gang task force.
[21]
Many
of the Applicants were served at home at or around midnight by the police
knocking on the door. In addition to the highly visible police presence to
assist with service, there were numerous incidents where police entered the
grounds of the particular Applicant’s property, took notes concerning the
people present, the vehicles on the property and other details of who and what
was at the particular location. The police were present as both plain clothed
and uniformed officers.
[22]
On
at least one occasion, Gomez provided the police upon request, and after
effecting service, with the names, addresses and dates of birth of the persons
served as well as details of their respective spouses/partners. The information
came from the CRA’s tax information system. The explanation for this disclosure
was in response to a police request to know where they had been and what they
had been doing.
[23]
There
is no evidence that Fjoser or Gomez took any steps or initiated any procedures
to keep taxpayer information secure or to limit its use.
[24]
After
service of the RFIs, no enforcement steps were taken to secure the requested
information and no order sought from this Court that such information be
provided under seal pending the results of this litigation.
III. ISSUES
[25]
The
issues raised in this judicial review are:
a.
Are
the Requirements for Information invalid because they were not issued by a
person authorized to do so?
b.
Did
the foundation for Requirements for Information issued lack the pre-requisite “genuine
and serious inquiry into the tax affairs of the Applicants”?
c.
Is
it appropriate to apply the predominant purpose test to this matter and, if so,
does the Minister’s course of conduct meet the test?
d.
In
the alternative, is section 241(3)(a) of the Act
inconsistent with sections 7 & 8 of the Charter and, to the extent
of the inconsistency, therefore of no force and effect?
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Authority
to Issue the RFIs
[26]
The
issue of whether Fjoser had the authority to decide to issue the RFIs is a
jurisdictional question to be reviewed on a standard of correctness (Dunsmuir
v. New
Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9).
[27]
The
determination of the authority vested in Fjoser depends on the interpretation
of statutory provisions, the scope of the delegation of the Minister’s
authority and the authority of a Ministerial delegate to sub-delegate the very
authority specifically given. These issues have a wide and important range of
implications not only to these parties but to other taxpayers as well. It is
uncontested that Fjoser decided to issue the RFIs and to engage in the impugned
actions. As Fjoser never discussed or communicated with Director White or any
other official in a position of greater authority, the issue in this case is
the scope of Fjoser’s authority to act and not whether White had properly
turned her mind to the issuance of the RFIs.
[28]
The
authority to issue RFIs and the power of the Minister to do so is grounded in
s. 231.2(1) of the Act:
231.2 (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, the Minister may, subject to subsection (2), for any purpose
related to the administration or enforcement of this Act (including the
collection of any amount payable under this Act by any person), of a
comprehensive tax information exchange agreement between Canada and another
country or jurisdiction that is in force and has effect or, for greater
certainty, of a tax treaty with another country, by notice served personally
or by registered or certified mail, require that any person provide, within
such reasonable time as stipulated in the notice,
(a) any
information or additional information, including a return of income or a
supplementary return; or
(b) any
document.
|
231.2 (1) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi, le ministre
peut, sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et pour l’application ou l’exécution de
la présente loi (y compris la perception d’un montant payable par une
personne en vertu de la présente loi), d’un accord général d’échange de
renseignements fiscaux entre le Canada et un autre pays ou territoire qui est
en vigueur et s’applique ou d’un traité fiscal conclu avec un autre pays, par
avis signifié à personne ou envoyé par courrier recommandé ou certifié,
exiger d’une personne, dans le délai raisonnable que précise l’avis :
a) qu’elle fournisse tout
renseignement ou tout renseignement supplémentaire, y compris une déclaration
de revenu ou une déclaration supplémentaire;
b) qu’elle produise des documents.
|
[29]
The
power of the Minister to delegate to officers or a class of officers those
powers and duties of the Minister are very specifically set forth in s. 220 and
most particularly subsection 220(2.01):
220. (1) The Minister shall administer and enforce
this Act and the Commissioner of Revenue may exercise all the powers and
perform the duties of the Minister under this Act.
(2)
Such officers, clerks and employees as are necessary to administer and
enforce this Act shall be appointed or employed in the manner authorized by
law.
(2.01)
The Minister may authorize an officer or a class of officers to exercise
powers or perform duties of the Minister under this Act.
|
220. (1) Le ministre assure
l’application et l’exécution de la présente loi. Le commissaire du revenu
peut exercer les pouvoirs et fonctions conférés au ministre en vertu de la
présente loi.
(2) Sont
nommés ou employés de la manière autorisée par la loi les fonctionnaires,
commis et préposés nécessaires à l’application et à l’exécution de la
présente loi.
(2.01) Le
ministre peut autoriser un fonctionnaire ou une catégorie de fonctionnaires à
exercer les pouvoirs et fonctions qui lui sont conférés en vertu de la présente
loi.
|
[30]
In
accordance with this delegation power, the Minister established a delegation
regime in which certain of his powers and duties were delegated to certain
levels within the CRA bureaucracy. The National Authorities Matrices (which
included the Legislative Matrix and the Policy Matrix) described in detail the
functions which different positions, e.g. Assistant Deputy Minister, Director,
etc., could perform as the delegate of the Minister.
[31]
The
authority to issue a RFI was delegated to several upper levels of the
bureaucracy including that of a Director, the position held by White.
[32]
The
position of Team Leader, the position held by Fjoser, was included in the
Matrices and certain functions were delegated to that position but not that of
issuing RFIs.
[33]
On
November 2, 2004, White purported to delegate her powers to Fjoser due to
“administrative and operational” requirements of her job and in order “to
facilitate the efficient transaction of public business”. This delegation
authorized Fjoser:
(a) to
exercise those powers and duties within her position parameters in the
Legislative Authorities Matrix; and
(b) to
stamp facsimiles of her signature.
[34]
It
is the Respondent’s position that this form of sub-delegation allowed Fjoser to
make the decision to issue RFIs.
[35]
The
Court is not persuaded that White had the authority to delegate to Fjoser in
this manner in the face of clear statutory language governing delegation by the
Minister and in view of the very thorough manner of delegation of various
functions to certain levels of officials as set forth in the Matrices.
[36]
In
Bancheri v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – M.N.R.), [1999]
T.C.J. No. 22 (QL), a case materially similar to the present case, Tax Court
Judge Porter held that where an explicit scheme for delegation exists that does
not contemplate sub-delegation, sub-delegation is precluded. I adopt this
rationale as it is most consistent with the statutory scheme and gives due
regard to the nature of the powers delegated and the manner in which they were
delegated.
[37]
This
is not an instance where delegation power may be inferred as is often the case
in the day-to-day administration of a modern government. It is important to
bear in mind that the function at issue, the initiation of RFIs, is not some benign
bit of bureaucratic curiosity. RFIs have the force of law, they are invasive
and they require a taxpayer to disclose information which may be inculpatory.
RFIs are a “searchless warrant” (as opposed to the pernicious “warrantless
search”), but they have all the impact of compulsory disclosure.
[38]
In
Bancheri, above, an appeals division team leader made a decision that
Mrs. Bancheri was not entitled to E.I. He then affixed the stamp of the Chief
of the Appeals Division on behalf of the Minister. The Tax Court judge quashed
the decision despite concluding that had the decision been made by the proper
authority, it would have been well founded. There was evidence that the Chief
of the Appeals Division had delegated her authority to the Team Leader. However,
the Tax Court found that given a specific scheme of delegation from the
Minister to the Chief with no mention of sub-delegation, any further delegation
of authority to make the decision at issue was precluded.
[39]
In
my view, the ratio of Bancheri is sound law and applicable in this case.
In the present case, there is an elaborate and comprehensive scheme of
delegation of Ministerial power to specifically identified levels within the
CRA. There is no suggestion that the person holding the delegated authority had
authority to further sub-delegate. A Team Leader did not have the delegated
authority to issue RFIs and the official holding the power to issue RFIs
(White) did not have delegated authority to further sub-delegate.
[40]
The
Court’s view that s. 220(2.01) of the Act does not permit the further
delegation of powers to those positions not named in the Matrix is supported by
the maxim “delegatus non potest delegare” – the delegate cannot
delegate. The maxim is a principle of statutory construction and there is
nothing in the legislative scheme that would suggest that the power given to
the Minister to delegate could be further sub-delegated.
[41]
Further,
as held in Forget v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2
S.C.R. 90, the delegatus non potest delegare rule prevents the holder of
a power which entails the exercise of a discretion from conferring the exercise
of that power on some other person or agency.
[42]
Since
at least the decision in R. v. Harrison, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 238, it is
recognised that a power entrusted to a minister will often be performed, not by
the minister, but by delegation to responsible officials in the department.
However, there are clear limits to this form of delegation even in a modern
bureaucracy. One of those limits must be where there is a specific delegation
framework where specific powers are given to specific positions and the same
power is withheld from other positions. It would be inconsistent with the
scheme of delegation to allow a sub-delegate to delegate a power further down
the chain of authority when the Minister was not prepared to do so directly.
[43]
The
issuance of a RFI is a discretionary exercise, not a purely administrative
power. The holders of the power are limited down to those at a Director level
(e.g. Ms. White). As a consequence of the operation of the delagatus non
potest delegare rule, Ms. White, as the delegate of the Minister’s
discretionary power, had no authority to delegate the exercise of that power to
Fjoser.
[44]
The
conclusion that there were strict limits on the delegation of powers and no
authority in a delegate to sub-delegate is consistent with the legislative
history of s. 220(2.01).
[45]
The
provision came into effect with the legislation to create the Canada Customs
and Revenue Agency (CCRA). It was a central concern at the time that the
Minister of National Revenue retain various elements of control over what was
to be a quasi-independent agency. It is clear that while the legislation
allowed the Minister to delegate certain powers to the newly formed CCRA, such
delegation was done under strict conditions.
[46]
Given
all the factors addressed in the preceding paragraphs, a general scheme of
sub-sub-delegation or a power in the delegate to sub-delegate cannot be implied
or read-in.
[47]
Therefore,
I have concluded that as the Minister had explicitly delegated his authority to
issue RFIs, there is nothing in the legislation or the delegation scheme which
supports sub-delegation. Sub-delegation is precluded and it is therefore
irrelevant whether White intended, or in fact did, delegate her authority to
initiate RFIs to Fjoser.
[48]
Aside
from the Respondent’s argument that there was a proper sub-delegation to
Fjoser, the Respondent also argues that s. 244(13) of the Act presumes that the
RFIs were validly made, signed and issued and that the presumption can only be
challenged by the Minister – not by the targeted taxpayer (the Applicants) or
before this Court.
[49]
Section
244(13) deems documents to have been signed, made and issued by authorized
persons unless called into question by the Minister or a person acting for the
Minister or Her Majesty. Section 244(13) reads:
244.
(13) Every document purporting to have been executed under,
or in the course of the administration or enforcement of, this Act over the
name in writing of the Minister, the Deputy Minister of National Revenue, the
Commissioner of Customs and Revenue, the Commissioner of Revenue or an
officer authorized to exercise a power or perform a duty of the Minister
under this Act is deemed to have been signed, made and issued by the
Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Commissioner of Customs and Revenue, the
Commissioner of Revenue or the officer unless it has been called in question
by the Minister or by a person acting for the Minister or Her Majesty.
|
244.
(13) Tout document paraissant avoir été établi en vertu de la
présente loi, ou dans le cadre de son application ou de sa mise à exécution,
au nom ou sous l’autorité du ministre, du sous-ministre du Revenu national,
du commissaire des douanes et du revenu, du commissaire du revenu ou d’un
fonctionnaire autorisé à exercer des pouvoirs ou fonctions conférés au
ministre par la présente loi est réputé avoir été signé, fait et délivré par
le ministre, le sous-ministre, le commissaire des douanes et du revenu, le
commissaire du revenu ou le fonctionnaire, à moins qu’il n’ait été contesté
par le ministre ou par une personne agissant pour lui ou pour Sa Majesté.
|
[50]
Section
244(13) is not as sweeping an exemption from challenge and judicial scrutiny as
the Respondent contends. The Respondent’s position would seriously call into
question the Rule of Law and the right to judicial review of actions and
decisions of CRA officials. It would cloak those officials with an unpalatable
immunity. Therefore, the provision must be narrowly read and applied.
[51]
It
is important to bear in mind that one of the issues in the challenge to the RFIs
is not simply the signing of a document on behalf of someone else, but rather
the very determination to initiate RFIs.
[52]
In
Swyryda v. Her Majesty the Queen (1981), 81 D.T.C. 5109 (Sask. Q.B.), a
seminal case with respect to s. 244(13), the court dealt with the ability of another
employee/officer to sign on behalf of the authorized officer. At no point does
the decision address any issue of whether the sub-delegate exercised the
authorized officer’s decision making power.
[53]
In
subsequent decisions which rely on Swyryda, above, the courts dealt with
the authority to sign a document or the authority to issue notices of
assessment which are matters involving little or no discretion and are
documents which must by law be issued. The determination to issue a RFI is
considerably different from these other documents and is a highly discretionary
matter involving elements of government compulsion against a taxpayer
(generally a citizen).
[54]
In
addition to removing the public’s recourse for unauthorized use of Ministerial
powers and giving such unauthorized use an element of immunity from judicial
scouting, the Respondent’s reliance on s. 244(13) would render the delegation
power in s. 220 redundant except as an internal organizational tool. The
Respondent’s interpretation of s. 244(13) cannot be sustained.
[55]
Section
244(13) is not a provision which renders irrelevant an explicit scheme of
delegation of Ministerial powers. Section 244(13) does not grant the power to
exercise any and all of the Minister’s powers to whomever in government unless
challenged by the Minister herself.
[56]
In
my view, the provision operates to facilitate proof of documents in court
proceedings and operates to ease the evidentiary burden of authenticity of
documents. It also operates to prevent collateral attacks on the RFIs in
enforcement proceedings and other civil and criminal proceedings by awaiting a
challenge to the documents until the Crown takes steps to ensure compliance.
[57]
Therefore,
the Court concludes that the RFIs were issued without proper legal authority,
that Fjoser did not have the authority to initiate, issue or sign the RFIs. As
a consequence, the RFIs are invalid.
[58]
However,
the Applicants’ position and attack on the RFIs is more broadly based on
allegations of improper purpose, improper and illegal actions and disclosures
and of what is tantamount to a conspiracy between the Respondent (Fjoser in
particular) and the police authorities to use the Income Tax Act powers
for purposes other than the purpose of the Act - essentially to secure evidence
for use in criminal prosecutions.
[59]
For
completeness and assuming (having decided differently) that Fjoser did have the
proper delegated authority, the Court will address the other grounds of
judicial review.
B. Improper
Purpose
[60]
The
Applicants’ central theory of the case is that CRA, Fjoser in particular,
entered into some form of agreement or arrangement with police forces to use
income tax powers to secure information/evidence to be used in prosecution of
organized crime gangs such as the UN Gang. It was the Applicants’ contention
that this is an improper use of the Income Tax Act powers, particularly
the issuance of the RFIs at issue here.
[61]
The
issue of the alleged improper purpose behind the RFIs has been clouded by
discussion and the mixing of the “genuine and serious inquiry” test, conditions
precedent to the exercise of powers and the predominant purpose test, to name
but a few principles thrown about. Charter issues have been raised for
good measure.
[62]
The
critical question to be asked is whether the Minister’s powers were truly and
materially used for the administration and enforcement of the Act. Put another
way, were the powers used as part of a genuine and serious inquiry into the tax
liability of the named person? This is a threshold jurisdictional question
because use of these powers for an ulterior purpose vitiates the legitimacy of
the Minister’s actions.
[63]
The
determination of purpose must be an objective test when taken into account all
the relevant circumstances. Generally no one factor will be determinative of
the issue. The Court is mindful of self serving testimony of subjective intent
and the credibility such statements raise.
[64]
There
is no requirement under this “purpose” test that RFIs be issued only where an
audit has been commenced. RFIs may be issued at any time to aid in a legitimate
inquiry into tax liabilities.
[65]
The
real issue before the Court is whether these RFIs were materially related to
the administration and enforcement of the Act or whether they were initiated for
some other purpose.
231.2
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the
Minister may, subject to subsection (2), for any purpose related to the
administration or enforcement of this Act (including the collection of
any amount payable under this Act by any person), of a comprehensive tax
information exchange agreement between Canada and another country or
jurisdiction that is in force and has effect or, for greater certainty, of a
tax treaty with another country, by notice served personally or by registered
or certified mail, require that any person provide, within such reasonable
time as stipulated in the notice,
(a)
any information or additional information, including a return of income or a
supplementary return; or
(b)
any document.
|
231.2
(1) Malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi, le
ministre peut, sous réserve du paragraphe (2) et pour l’application ou
l’exécution de la présente loi (y compris la perception d’un montant
payable par une personne en vertu de la présente loi), d’un accord général
d’échange de renseignements fiscaux entre le Canada et un autre pays ou
territoire qui est en vigueur et s’applique ou d’un traité fiscal conclu avec
un autre pays, par avis signifié à personne ou envoyé par courrier recommandé
ou certifié, exiger d’une personne, dans le délai raisonnable que précise
l’avis :
a)
qu’elle fournisse tout renseignement ou tout renseignement supplémentaire, y
compris une déclaration de revenu ou une déclaration supplémentaire;
b)
qu’elle produise des documents.
[Emphasis
added]
|
[66]
While
the limitations placed on the Minister’s powers to initiate RFIs were discussed
in James Richardson &
Sons, Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – M.N.R.), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 614, and
subsequent decisions, the key principle is that, absent evidence to the
contrary, the Minister is presumed to be validly issuing the RFIs. If evidence
demonstrates that the Minister may have purposes other than a genuine and
serious inquiry into the tax liability of the named person, the Minister must
counter that evidence or the RFI will be quashed.
[67]
In
a decision which has been followed consistently, Justice Girgulis, deciding R. v. Dakus
(1988), 87 A.R. 374 (Q.B.), set out the
basic principles for a challenge to RFIs:
If the tax
liability of an accused person is not the subject of a genuine and serious
inquiry by the Minister, then it cannot be said that the Minister is acting for
a purpose relating to the administration or enforcement of the act when he asks
that accused for information relevant to that accused's tax liability. But
that does not mean to say that the Crown must establish as an essential element
of its case affirmative evidence of genuine and serious inquiry regarding the
information requested relating to the tax liability of a specific person. If
evidence raises an issue as to whether or not the inquiry is a genuine or
serious one, then the Crown must satisfy the trier of fact, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the purpose of the Requirement or demand is not a subterfuge or a
frivolous one, but is a proper demand for information relating to tax liability
of the accused, that is, it is a genuine and serious inquiry.
[Emphasis added]
[68]
There
was discussion before this Court as to the standard of proof applicable. It
must be remembered that the Dakus decision arose in a criminal context
with criminal standards of proof.
[69]
There
is some efficacy in holding the Minister to the highest standard of proof
because failure to comply with RFIs engages potential criminal liability. A
civil standard imposed on the Minister would encourage collateral attacks on
the RFIs rather than the direct attack (and the proper way to proceed) engaged
by the Applicants. It is unnecessary to resolve that issue of the standard of
proof because the civil standard of proof is sufficient to resolve the issue of
“proper purpose”. The Applicants have met the burden of establishing their case
on the balance of probabilities.
[70]
In
N.M. Skalbania Ltd. and Nelson M. Skalbania v. Her Majesty the Queen (1989), 89 D.T.C. 5495 (B.C. Co. Ct.) (QL),
County Court Judge van der Hoop also dealt with the failure of a taxpayer to
respond to a RFI for tax returns from the Minister. However, as County Court
Judge van der Hoop wrote in Skalbania, above, at 5496:
At
trial, in the court below, the Crown admitted as a fact that the … demands that
were made of the company by the tax department were made not as a result of any
ongoing investigation into the affairs of Mr. Skalbania or the corporate
defendant, but merely because no return in question had been filed when it was
due and owing.
County Court Judge van der Hoop held that, given
the admission that the tax liability of the taxpayer was not in question, the
Minister should have used s. 150(2) of the Act, rather than s. 231.2(1).
Subsection 150(2) requires every person, whether or not they are liable to pay
taxes or have already filed a return, to file a return upon demand by the
Minister. Accordingly, the RFIs were set aside as they had been improperly
made. The admissions before County Court Judge Van der Hoop were determinative
of his finding.
[71]
Evidence
which points to a lack of serious and genuine inquiry need not be as direct as
an admission of alternate purpose by the Minister. In Her Majesty the Queen v. Darrell Gordon Schacher (1986), 86 D.T.C. 6580 (Alta. Prov. Ct.), Judge Ketchum found that RFIs issued
by the Minister were invalid, based on the history of the defendant’s Revenue Canada file. Specifically, Judge Ketchum found
that Mr. Schacher’s file was dormant for approximately four years, and no
attempts were being made by Revenue Canada to seek tax information or to collect
taxes owing from Mr. Schacher. Judge Ketchum found that the file was
reactivated for no other reason than the RCMP’s requests and inquiries to
Revenue Canada concerning Mr. Schacher. As such, Judge
Ketchum found that, while the RFIs related to the defendant’s tax liability,
they were not the result of serious and genuine inquiry by Revenue Canada. It is of note that Judge Ketchum specifically remarked
that the RCMP had not provided any information that would lead Revenue Canada to believe that the defendant had taxable income for the
years in question, but was asking for information pertaining to Mr. Schacher.
This is the opposite of what happened in the current matter.
[72]
The
difficulty posed in this case is the directly contradictory evidence as to what
led to the initiation of the RFIs. As indicated earlier, the Court accepts
Inspector Ryan’s evidence that he initiated the referral process rather than
Fjoser’s statement that he approached Inspector Ryan and asked for the names of
UN Gang members. Fjoser had no notes of his meetings whereas Ryan’s notes
indicate that it was the RCMP that referred the matter, not a response to a CRA
request.
[73]
As
a basic matter, there is nothing improper in CRA initiating steps including
RFIs on the basis of a referral from police or other authorities or even based
on tips. Likewise, there is nothing improper in initiating matters based on
media and other reports. The troublesome feature of this case is the
inconsistency of Fjoser’s evidence and his non-reliance on the RCMP referral.
His evidence that he relied on was newspaper articles, when examined in depth,
is precariously thin. He was unable to substantiate the material on which he
relied. The absence of a proper file history is a further disturbing feature of
CRA’s conduct.
[74]
The
issue of what caused the RFIs to be issued is only one factor in the analysis
of “proper purpose”. Other evidence to be discussed points away from a genuine
and serious inquiry and points to Fjoser’s real purpose of assisting the police
investigation of this gang’s criminal activities.
[75]
In
that regard, I reject the notion that there was something of a conspiracy,
arrangement or “quid pro quo” between SEP and the police. I accept
Inspector Ryan’s disavowal of the premise and there is virtually no convincing
evidence of that state of affairs. In my view, the analysis of a legitimate
inquiry starts and stops at SEP. The personal motives of the individuals to
provide that assistance is speculative but objectively the evidence shows
little interest in an inquiry into the Applicants’ tax liability.
[76]
The
Applicants placed considered emphasis upon Fjoser’s powerpoint presentation
which he gave to various police forces from time to time. The Applicants
contend that it was the beginning of the “information loop” arrangement whereby
CRA would provide information to the police. The critical point relied on is a
statement to the effect that the purpose of the CRA Enforcement Division is
attacking the proceeds of organized crime. This statement of purpose is
equivocal and can equally mean attacking by taxation which is a legitimate purpose
under the Act.
[77]
The
Applicants confuse the purpose of the various CRA organizations including the
SEP with the purpose behind the issue of these RFIs. There is nothing improper
or conspiratorial in taxing the proceedings of crime. The purpose of the SEP
does not in itself raise questions as to the appropriateness of the RFIs. There
is other and better evidence which does.
[78]
The
Court has already referred to the contradictory basis upon which Fjoser relies
to support initiating the RFIs – the unnecessary denial that a police request
triggered the RFI process.
[79]
Having
initiated the RFIs, there was no real urgency or even expeditiousness to obtain
the tax information required by the RFIs. Approximately nine months passed from
the signing of the RFIs to their service. The sole explanation for this delay
is the time necessary to coordinate matters with police so that there was
police presence at the time the RFIs were served. That in itself is a
remarkably long time to organize police assistance.
[80]
While
courts will not usually question the method of service of RFIs, in this case it
is necessary to subject the method of service to some scrutiny. The use of
heavy police presence was based on the need to effect personal service. There
is no sensible explanation for using personal service.
[81]
The
parties’ locations were known, and there was no evidence of any previous
attempts to evade service. Yet the Respondent chose the one method of service for
which they could ostensibly justify use of the police. There was no explanation
as to why service by registered mail would not be effective.
[82]
This
Court is well aware of the use of RFIs, and the obtaining of orders by this
Court to enforce compliance. Yet there is no evidence that the use of normal
civil and administrative procedures was ever contemplated.
[83]
Having
chosen the most obtrusive method of service, the Respondent surrendered control
of the process to the police and actively engaged in breaches of the
confidentiality requirements of the Act. Under the guise of service of the
RFIs, the police were able to engage in activities of information gathering not
otherwise available except by search warrant.
[84]
Many
of the incidents of service of the RFIs occurred late at night, at homes with
spouses/partners and children present. The scene has been described as one with
several police cars, flashing lights and police walking about on the premises
taking notes of things observed such as licence plates and names of persons
(not just the Applicants) in and on the premises.
[85]
It
must be borne in mind that all of this heavy police presence was to effect
service of a document which simply required production, at a later date, of financial/tax
information. It was a document which the law stipulated could simply be sent by
registered mail.
[86]
Having
chosen to use the police to assist with service, SEP personnel were cavalier
with respect to the confidentiality rights of these taxpayers. Those
confidentiality provisions are comprehensive and strict. They are a key
component of a self-reporting tax system.
[87]
Subsections
241(1) and (2) of the Act establish the general rule that information collected
pursuant to the Act cannot be divulged or shared except for the purposes of
administering the Act within the CRA. Although the Act has been amended so as
to apply to both officials and “other representative(s) of a government
entity”, the text quoted below was in force at the relevant time and the
subsequent changes are inconsequential to the case at bar:
241. (1) Except as authorized by this
section, no official shall
(a)
knowingly provide, or knowingly allow to be provided, to any person any
taxpayer information;
(b)
knowingly allow any person to have access to any taxpayer information; or
(c)
knowingly use any taxpayer information otherwise than in the course of the
administration or enforcement of this Act, the Canada Pension Plan,
the Unemployment Insurance Act or the Employment Insurance Act
or for the purpose for which it was provided under this section.
(2)
Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament or other law, no official shall
be required, in connection with any legal proceedings, to give or produce
evidence relating to any taxpayer information.
|
241.
(1) Sauf
autorisation prévue au présent article, il est interdit à un fonctionnaire :
a) de fournir sciemment à
quiconque un renseignement confidentiel ou d’en permettre sciemment la
prestation;
b) de permettre sciemment à
quiconque d’avoir accès à un renseignement confidentiel;
c) d’utiliser sciemment un
renseignement confidentiel en dehors du cadre de l’application ou de
l’exécution de la présente loi, du Régime de pensions du Canada, de la
Loi sur l’assurance-chômage ou de la Loi sur l’assurance-emploi,
ou à une autre fin que celle pour laquelle il a été fourni en application du
présent article.
(2)
Malgré toute autre loi ou règle de droit, nul fonctionnaire ne peut être
requis, dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire, de témoigner, ou de
produire quoi que ce soit, relativement à un renseignement confidentiel.
|
[88]
“Taxpayer
information” is defined in section 241 of the Act itself, at subsection 241(10):
"taxpayer
information"
«renseignement confidentiel »
"taxpayer
information" means information of any kind and in any form relating to
one or more taxpayers that is
(a)
obtained by or on behalf of the Minister for the purposes of this Act, or
(b)
prepared from information referred to in paragraph (a),
but does not
include information that does not directly or indirectly reveal the identity
of the taxpayer to whom it relates.
|
«renseignement
confidentiel »
"taxpayer information"
«renseignement
confidentiel » Renseignement de toute nature et sous toute forme concernant un ou
plusieurs contribuables et qui, selon le cas :
a) est obtenu par le ministre
ou en son nom pour l’application de la présente loi;
b) est tiré d’un
renseignement visé à l’alinéa a).
N’est
pas un renseignement confidentiel le renseignement qui ne révèle pas, même
indirectement, l’identité du contribuable en cause.
|
[89]
“Official”
is defined in the same subsection:
“official”
« fonctionnaire
official”
means any person who is employed in the service of, who occupies a position
of responsibility in the service of, or who is engaged by or on behalf of,
(a) Her
Majesty in right of Canada or a province, or
(b) an
authority engaged in administering a law of a province similar to the Pension
Benefits Standards Act, 1985,
or any person
who was formerly so employed, who formerly occupied such a position or who
was formerly so engaged and, for the purposes of subsection 239(2.21),
subsections 241(1) and 241(2), the portion of subsection 241(4) before
paragraph (a), and subsections 241(5) and 241(6), includes a
designated person;
|
« fonctionnaire »
"official"
« fonctionnaire »
Personne qui est ou a été employée par la personne ou l’administration
suivante, qui occupe ou a occupé une fonction de responsabilité au service
d’une telle personne ou administration ou qui est ou a été engagée par une
telle personne ou administration ou en son nom :
a)
Sa Majesté du chef du Canada ou d’une province;
b)
une administration chargée de l’application d’une loi provinciale semblable à
la Loi de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension.
Pour
l’application du paragraphe 239(2.21), des paragraphes (1) et (2), du passage
du paragraphe (4) précédant l’alinéa a) et des paragraphes (5) et (6), une
personne déterminée est assimilée à un fonctionnaire.
|
[90]
While there are
certain statutory exceptions to the privacy requirement (see, for example, s. 462.48 of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 462.48; and the Income Tax Act, above, s. 241(3)),
none have been argued to apply here, and no evidence has been adduced which
would raise any suspicion that they applied. Despite this, taxpayer information
was clearly communicated from the SEP to the police.
[91]
This
flagrant contravention of the privacy provision of the Act seriously calls into
question the goal of the issuance of the RFIs. There was no need to effect
service in the manner carried out and therefore any disclosures of this
information was not for the administration and enforcement of the Act.
[92]
The
SEP not only communicated to the police exactly from whom they were requesting
information, but also gave the police the names, addresses, and birthdates of
the persons being served with the RFIs, in addition to the names of their
spouses or common-law partners where applicable. This information specifically
came from the CRA “tombstones” data. Even if the police had access to some of
this information through other channels, the manner in which this information
was communicated was a violation of s. 241(1) of the Act.
[93]
Furthermore,
Ms. Gomez stated, in the cross-examination on her affidavit, that she informed
the police officers who assisted her in serving the RFIs of her precise role in
the CRA, that she worked with the SEP, and that she was serving demands under the
Act. She could not state with any certainty that the police accompanying her in
the service of the RFIs did not hear the details of her conversations with the
Applicants, given that they were often only a couple of feet away.
[94]
These
breaches are by no means minor. While neither the Applicants nor the Respondent
drew on the provision, subsection 239(2.2) sets out consequences for an
individual officer who breaches the privacy provisions of the Act.
239(2.2) Every person who
(a)
contravenes subsection 241(1), or
(b) knowingly
contravenes an order made under subsection 241(4.1)
is guilty of
an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to both.
…
(2.22) In subsection
239(2.21), "official" and "taxpayer information" have the
meanings assigned by subsection 241(10).
|
239(2.2) Commet une
infraction et encourt, sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire,
une amende maximale de 5 000 $ et un emprisonnement maximal de 12 mois,
ou l’une de ces peines, toute personne :
a)
soit qui contrevient au paragraphe 241(1);
b)
soit qui, sciemment, contrevient à une ordonnance rendue en application du
paragraphe 241(4.1).
…
(2.22)
Pour l’application du paragraphe (2.21), les expressions
« fonctionnaire » et « renseignement confidentiel »
s’entendent au sens du paragraphe 241(10).
|
In addition, the Act specifies similar
penal consequences for the breach of privacy concerning a social insurance
number (SIN), at subsection 239(2.3).
239(2.3) Every person to whom the Social
Insurance Number of an individual or to whom the business number of a
taxpayer or partnership has been provided under this Act or a regulation, and
every officer, employee and agent of such a person, who without written
consent of the individual, taxpayer or partnership, as the case may be,
knowingly uses, communicates or allows to be communicated the number
(otherwise than as required or authorized by law, in the course of duties in
connection with the administration or enforcement of this Act or for a
purpose for which it was provided by the individual, taxpayer or partnership,
as the case may be) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction
to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12
months, or to both.
|
239(2.3) Toute personne à qui le
numéro d’assurance sociale d’un particulier ou le numéro d’entreprise d’un
contribuable ou d’une société de personnes est fourni en application de la
présente loi ou d’une disposition réglementaire, ainsi que tout cadre,
employé ou mandataire d’une telle personne, qui, sciemment, utilise le
numéro, le communique ou permet qu’il soit communiqué (autrement que
conformément à la loi ou à l’autorisation donnée par le particulier, le
contribuable ou la société de personnes, selon le cas, ou autrement que dans
le cadre de fonctions liées à l’application ou à l’exécution de la présente
loi) sans le consentement du particulier, du contribuable ou de la société de
personnes, selon le cas, commet une infraction et encourt, sur déclaration de
culpabilité par procédure sommaire, une amende maximale de 5 000 $ et un
emprisonnement maximal de 12 mois, ou l’une de ces peines.
|
[95]
The
Act does not contemplate specific consequences for a systemic, rather than
individual, breach of the privacy provisions not because it is not a punishable
offence, but because such an act is unthinkable given the functioning of the Act.
[96]
Furthermore,
it is notable that the SEP had alternative means of serving the RFIs that would
not raise any safety concerns, and as such would not involve police in the
service of the RFIs. The SEP had the option of serving the RFIs through
registered mail (s. 231.2(1)). While the Respondent submitted that there was a
regular practice of serving RFIs in person, this does not justify or permit
involving external personnel in the service in a manner which contravenes the
privacy provisions of the Act. In addition, those very personnel had their own
interests in the Applicants. This underscores the questions raised as to
whether the Minister was indeed serving the RFIs as a result of a serious and
genuine inquiry into the Applicants’ tax liability.
[97]
Counsel
for the Respondent did not adduce evidence or present arguments which answered
the questions raised by this obvious breach of the Act’s privacy provisions.
Not only did the Minister’s official breach the privacy provisions of the Act,
but did so when another course of action was clearly available which would have
answered any potential security concerns surrounding service of the RFIs. In
the absence of any explanation as to why this course of action was chosen, the
only possible conclusion is that the RFIs were not issued as a result of a
serious and genuine inquiry into the tax liability of the Applicants.
[98]
Lastly,
the absence of control and reporting by Fjoser to his superiors of these
activities is a disturbing feature of this case. In these circumstances, SEP is
involved in securing the assistance of several police forces to deal with
suspected members of an alleged criminal organization and yet no reports, even
post-incident reports, were ever passed on to Fjoser’s superiors. The absence
of management control may be an issue in some other place; it may have
permitted superiors the cloak of “deniability”. In any event, SEP, even
assuming valid sub-delegation, was apparently free to engage in activities on their
own with no accountability – to, in essence, run amuck.
[99]
The
evidence that SEP initiated the RFIs for purposes other than the administration
and enforcement of the Act can be summarized as:
(a) a
non-credible explanation of the basis for initiating the RFI process;
(b) an unhurried
approach to the collection of this tax information;
(c) a choice of
service which was obtrusive, invasive and unjustified;
(d) an
uncontrolled use of police and the assistance given to police in collecting
police information; and
(e) a
cavalier disregard for the confidentiality provisions of the Act and the
unjustified disclosure of “taxpayer information”.
[100] Therefore, these RFIs
must be quashed because there was no serious and genuine inquiry into the tax
liabilities of these Applicants.
C. Predominant
Purpose Test
[101] The Respondent has
raised the “predominant purpose” test set out in R. v. Jarvis, 2002 SCC
73, as a basis for the legitimacy of the RFIs.
[102] The Respondent argued
that the test must be applied in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s decision
in Ellingson
v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.), 2006 FCA 202, leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 313 (Q.L.). However, both parties
move away from that test (Applicants’ Memorandum, para. 60/Respondent’s
Memoranda, para. 80).
[103] In my view, the
analytical framework of the predominant purpose test is not engaged in these
circumstances. That test is applicable where the issue is the transition from
civil audit inquiries to criminal tax investigations. It presupposes the
existence of a genuine and serious inquiry. It is not applicable to the issue
of whether such an inquiry exists.
[104] Therefore, the
predominant purpose test is not applicable.
D. Charter
Issues
[105] The Applicants raised
the issue of whether s. 241(3)(a) of the Act is inconsistent with
sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.
[106] As these RFIs have been
found to be invalid on other grounds, it is not necessary to enter into an
analysis of this issue. The Supreme Court has cautioned against making
unnecessary pronouncements on Charter rights. The Applicants’ concern
about any exchange of information flowing from the RFIs is premature.
V. CONCLUSION
[107] For these reasons, this
judicial review will be granted, these RFIs will be quashed and the Applicants
shall have their costs.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that this
application for judicial review is granted, these RFIs are quashed and the
Applicants are to have their costs.
“Michael
L. Phelan”