Docket:
IMM-5410-11
Citation:
2012 FC 132
Ottawa, Ontario, February 2, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Boivin
BETWEEN:
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BUNOTI JAMES WOKWERA
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act) for judicial review of the
decision rendered by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board (the Board) dated July 18, 2011, which refused the applicant’s
refugee claim to be deemed a convention refugee or a person in need of
protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
[2]
The applicant seeks an order setting aside the decision and
remitting the matter for redetermination by a differently constituted panel of
the Board.
Factual
Background
[3]
Mr.
Bunoti James Wokwera (the
applicant) is a thirty-six (36) year old citizen of Uganda. The applicant is a
medical doctor who is married with two children. The applicant seeks protection
in Canada on the basis of his imputed political opinion as someone who is
sympathetic to homosexuals in Uganda.
[4]
While
studying to become a doctor, the applicant befriended a gay man and became
interested in the plight of homosexuals in Uganda. In February 2001, the
applicant’s friend introduced him to a secret fraternity of homosexuals called
the Brotherhood of Samia that existed in the area where he would be practicing.
The HIV positive members of the fraternity were particularly in need of a
doctor in whom they could confide without facing the stigmatization of
attending a designated HIV clinic or fear of being reported to the government
security agents.
[5]
After
completing his medical internship, the applicant took a medical officer
position with the Busia Local Government in 2001. As the only
doctor in the district, the applicant decided to help the members of the
fraternity by providing medication, free consultation, and counselling services
at his clinic. The members would display a secret signal to the applicant. He
would then provide them with the confidential treatment. As a show of thanks,
the fraternity made the applicant an honorary member of their group.
[6]
After
working in Busia for a few months, the applicant allegedly became known as a
“homosexual sympathizer”. The applicant began to experience administrative
challenges by being denied supplies and equipment for his clinic and was
threatened with harm by his supervisor if he did not stop helping gay patients.
The applicant was also harassed by anonymous telephone death threats,
surveillance by persons he suspected were security personnel. In mid-2001, the
applicant was threatened by a man at gunpoint and was told to leave Busia
(which he reported the threat to the police). After the threat, the applicant’s
motorcycle was stolen, which he also reported to the police, but a few days
later the applicant was notified that the police suspected that he had been
involved with orchestrating the theft. A goat’s carcass was placed by his
clinic and home compound as a message that he was not wanted in the local
village. In July 2001, the applicant was placed on forced leave for one year. In
July 2002 the applicant’s employment was terminated. The applicant appealed the
forced leave and termination and he was reinstated with full pay, but the
harassment continued.
[7]
The
applicant resigned his public service job in Busia and began working on
contract in Kampala in January 2005 until he was appointed full time at a
hospital in Kampala in May 2007. The applicant maintained his contacts with the
fraternity while working at the hospital, but realized that he was being
discriminated against and he was forced out of the hospital by his superiors.
The applicant then rejoined the public service on July 1, 2008, but remained at
the hospital so that he answered to the Ministry of Health instead of the
hospital administrators. However, his contract was terminated on September 24,
2008, and the applicant gave notice of intent to launch a lawsuit for wrongful
dismissal. The applicant withdrew this suit because he feared it would further
expose his assistance to homosexuals in Busia and interfere with his ability to
leave Uganda. At his request, the applicant was posted to another location in the
western part of Uganda where he served for approximately one month before
coming to Canada.
[8]
During
his time in Kampala, the applicant allegedly continued to be harassed with
threatening phone calls which referenced his work in Busia, in spite of
changing his phone number several times. The applicant attempted to report the
calls to police but would not disclose the motivation for the calls, and so the
police did not investigate. In October 2009, the applicant was attacked and
stabbed by a man who alleged that the applicant was a homosexual sympathizer.
The applicant required medical attention for the laceration which he
administered himself with the help of a medical assistant. The applicant then
reported the attack to police as an attempted robbery but nothing came of the
investigation.
[9]
The
applicant sat for the Medical Counsel of Canada Evaluating Exam and learned
that he had passed in March 2009. The applicant applied for and was granted a Visa.
He arrived in Canada on October 28, 2009. He filed his claim for refugee status
on March 15, 2010.
[10]
The
applicant’s claim was heard by the Refugee Protection Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board on June 20, 2011. The Board rendered its decision
on July 18, 2011.
Decision under
Review
[11]
The
Board found that there was insufficient credible or trustworthy evidence to
determine that the applicant would be persecuted for a Convention reason if he were
returned to Uganda. The Board accepted the applicant’s identity. The Board found
that the determinative issues of the claim were credibility and a lack of an
objective basis for his fear.
[12]
The
Board found that the applicant had been straightforward with his answers at the
hearing and that there were no major omissions, contradictions or
inconsistencies between the applicant’s testimony and documentary evidence.
However, the Board found that the applicant had failed to provide sufficient
reliable and trustworthy evidence to show that he had been persecuted in Uganda, or to show that an objective basis for his fear exists.
[13]
The
Board observed that the applicant supplied many documents to establish his
credentials as a doctor and his employment record. However, the applicant
supplied no document that links him to a fraternity supporting homosexuals or
any document that corroborates his claim to have treated and counselled homosexuals
beyond what would be normal for any physician who was treating any other member
of the general public.
[14]
The
applicant responded to questions about the lack of corroborative documentation
by stating that it would have been too dangerous for him to have any documents
that linked him to a secret fraternity or the gay community in Uganda. The Board accepted this explanation as reasonable while the applicant was in Uganda, but noted that the applicant has been in Canada since 2009, allowing him time to seek
documentation from those he treated or know his work in Uganda.
[15]
The
Board noted that the documentation supplied between the applicant and the
medical health authorities contain no mention of work with gay or HIV infected patients.
The Board rejected the applicant’s explanations for the lack of such
references.
[16]
The
applicant was unable to obtain a copy of the police report he made after being
stabbed in October 2009, or any verification for the medical treatment he
received. He claimed that such records are not often kept in Uganda. The Board rejected this explanation and found that a physician of the applicant’s
stature could have obtained at least affidavits to attest to the events.
[17]
The
Board acknowledged that as a developing country Uganda may have less rigorous
administrative practices than other countries. However, the Board found that a
highly educated and experienced doctor, with the benefit of legal counsel and a
father who is a retired senior public official, could have provided
corroboration of his allegations.
[18]
The
Board found that the applicant’s delay in leaving Uganda and delay in filing
his refugee claim in Canada, while not fatal to his claim, undermined the
applicant’s subjective fear in Uganda. The Board noted that while the applicant
claimed to have been harassed in Busia beginning in 2001, he did not resign
from his employment until December 2004, and shortly after relocated to Kampala. The applicant remained in Uganda for five years without major incident until he
was stabbed in October 2009. The Board noted that, at the time of the stabbing,
the applicant had already planned his departure for Canada. The Board also
noted that the applicant waited nearly five (5) months after arriving in Canada before he claimed refugee status.
[19]
The
Board was of the view that there was insufficient evidence to show an objective
basis for the applicant’s fear as a medical officer who provided counselling to
homosexuals and treatment to gay and HIV infected persons. The Board accepted
that homosexuals in Uganda face discrimination and legal restrictions and that
people with HIV/AIDS are discriminated against and prevented from obtaining
treatment and support. The Board also took note of the draft “Anti-homosexuality”
bill that was introduced in the Ugandan parliament in September 2009 which
contained draconian measures and penalties for homosexuals and those “aiding
and abetting” homosexuality. However, the Board found no evidence that the bill
was adopted, or contained a prohibition on physicians from counselling or
treating HIV patients. The Board accepted that the introduction of the bill in
2009 may expose gay rights activists to increased risk, however the Board found
that the applicant does not fit the profile of a gay rights activist as his
advocacy was not in the public domain.
[20]
The
Board also found that there was no objective documentation to establish that
anyone providing counselling and treatment would automatically be considered to
be a “homosexual sympathizer” in Uganda. The Board found that notwithstanding
discrimination against homosexuals in Ugandan society, medical authorities
continue to offer assistance to patients.
Issues
[21]
The
only issue to be determined on this review is as follows:
1.
Was
the Board’s assessment of the evidence and its conclusion on the applicant’s
credibility reasonable?
Statutory
Provisions
[22]
The
following provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are
applicable in this proceeding:
Refugee
Protection, Convention Refugees and Persons in Need of Protection
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason
of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries
of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of
nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
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Notions d’asile, de réfugié et de personne à
protéger
Définition de « réfugé »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention -
le réfugié - la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait
de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un
groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit
se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a
pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y
retourner.
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Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in
Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they
do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual
residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial
grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk
of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part
of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from
that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful
sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards,
and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that
country to provide adequate health or medical care.
Person in
need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class
of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is
also a person in need of protection.
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Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne
qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout
pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans
lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit
au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit
à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de
l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à
protéger
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est
reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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Standard of
Review
[23]
With
respect
to the Board’s findings of fact, including its conclusions on the applicant’s
credibility, the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness (see Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir]; and Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 [Khosa]).
Arguments
Position
of the Applicant
[24]
The
applicant argues that the Board selectively chose to rely on information
provided in the documents that were suitable to the Board’s position, while
ignoring elements of corroborating documents that demonstrate the applicant’s
credibility. Essentially, the applicant argues that his story is entirely
consistent with the documentary evidence, the documentation supports and
establishes the applicant’s story, and the Board failed to assess numerous
exhibits supporting the applicant’s claim. The applicant argues that the Board
erred with regard to its assessment of several pieces of evidence:
·
The
Board failed to give any weight to the fact that a dead goat was placed before
the applicant’s compound to signify a threat to his safety, or the fact that
the applicant submitted a letter which highlights the fear he had for his
safety after this incident.
·
The
Board ignored evidence demonstrating that Ugandan government authorities
ignored the applicant’s requests for help to obtain security, fences and lights
for his compound.
·
The
Board failed to properly analyze the documents that demonstrate that the
applicant was undermined by his superiors in Kampala without any legitimate
basis and dismissed for an improper reason. These documents also show that
while living in Kampala, the applicant argues that he faced a threat to his job
safety and corresponding financial situation which was overlooked by the Board.
[25]
The
applicant argues that based on the documentation and his affidavit evidence,
there was a basis for the harassment he endured in Uganda, that basis is the
applicant’s assistance to homosexuals and the Board erred by failing to give
the applicant’s story sufficient credibility.
[26]
The
applicant further argues that the Board erred by not finding an objective basis
for the applicant’s subjective fear. Although no documentation was submitted to
show that anyone who provides medical treatment to homosexual individuals would
be considered a “homosexual sympathizer”, the applicant suggests that it is
obvious that a doctor such as himself would be considered as such. The
applicant also argues that, although the Board took note of the draft “Anti-homosexuality”
bill, the Board failed to consider it as indicative of the widespread negative
attitude towards homosexuals in Uganda.
[27]
The
applicant argues that he could not provide particular documentation to
corroborate his assistance of HIV positive homosexuals as such documentation
would require the identification of homosexual individuals, putting them in danger
of physical and legal consequences. Also, the applicant argues that identifying
any of his former patients would be a flagrant disregard for the medical
profession’s ethical code of doctor and patient confidentiality.
[28]
The
applicant also argues in reply that procuring corroborating documents from
individuals he had assisted in Uganda to support his claim, as suggested by the
Board and the respondent, would be too dangerous to individuals still residing
in Uganda. The applicant contends that providing an affidavit in support for
the applicant could involve revealing an individual’s identity and exposing this
individual to legal consequences as it is illegal to be a homosexual in Uganda.
Position
of the Respondent
[29]
The
respondent argues that the applicant disagrees with the interpretation of and
the weight afforded to the evidence by the Board. The respondent argues that
these are highly fact specific findings that attract a deferential standard of
review, and in this case the Board’s decision falls within the range of
possible, acceptable outcomes that are defensible in respect of the facts and
law
(Khosa, above, at para 59).
[30]
The
respondent disagrees with the applicant’s argument that he could not reveal the
identities of former patients as it would put those individuals in danger and
constitute a breach of the medical profession’s ethical code. The respondent
argues that the applicant does not explain why he could not ask former patients
for their consent to release their identities, or ask them to voluntarily write
letters corroborating his evidence as surely some members of the fraternity
would. The respondent argues that the applicant does not indicate how
authorities in Uganda would discover that a letter or affidavit had been
written. Further, the respondent suggests that the applicant does not explain
why he could not have asked someone other than a former patient to swear an
affidavit corroborating his involvement in the gay community in Uganda.
[31]
The
respondent contends that given the applicant’s position, education and familial
ties, it was reasonable for the Board to expect the applicant to provide
corroborating documentation for his association with the gay community, the
reason behind his lawsuit for unjust dismissal and the robbery report. The
respondent argues that the onus is on the applicant to prove each aspect of his
claim. In this case, the applicant failed to discharge this burden so it was
open to the Board to draw an adverse inference from the lack of corroborating
evidence.
[32]
The
respondent alleges that the Board carefully considered the documentary evidence
in determining that it did not support an objective basis for the applicant’s
claim. The respondent argues that the Board reasonably determined that the
applicant did not fit the profile of a gay activist as his services were
provided in secret. Also, the respondent argues that the Board reasonably
concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant would be
considered a “homosexual sympathizer” and in danger of persecution in Uganda for his medical treatment of homosexual individuals.
Analysis
[33]
It
is trite law that the Board has the discretion to make findings of fact,
determinations on credibility and to weigh evidence. In the case at hand, the
Court finds that the Board conducted a thorough analysis of the evidence before
it, and reasonably found that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the
applicant’s claim.
[34]
The
Court is not persuaded by the applicant’s argument that the Board ignored or
erred in its assessment of any individual facts or pieces of evidence; the
examples referred to by the applicant are all mentioned in the decision and were
properly considered by the Board. It is not the role of the Court on a judicial
review to re-weigh the evidence that was before a decision maker whom is owed
deference, but it is instead “…concerned with whether the decision falls within
a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.” (Dunsmuir, above, at para 47).
[35]
More
particularly, the Board noted at paragraph 13 of the decision:
… [The applicant] has provided a
plethora of documents that establish his credentials as a medical doctor and
his employment record in Uganda. However he has provided no document that in
any way links him to gay support “fraternity” nor has he provided documentation
to corroborate that he has been active in treating and counselling homosexuals
in Uganda beyond what would be normal for any physician or medical officer who
are treating members of the general public.
[36]
The
Board also noted at paragraph 15 of the decision:
In examining the various letters
between the claimant and the medical authority that employed him in Busali and Kampala I find no mention of the claimant’s work with the gay or HIV community in Uganda.
[37]
The
applicant argues that the Board erred in its assessment because the body of
documentation demonstrates a history of persecution against the applicant that
could only have been brought on by his medical assistance of homosexual
individuals. After a careful review of the evidence before the Board, the Court
does not agree with the applicant’s contention; none of the documentation
specifically mentions or links the adverse events that the applicant lived
through with his assistance of homosexuals. The Board specifically considered
whether the evidence submitted regarding the applicant’s interaction with his
employers demonstrated adverse treatment due to the applicant’s activities of
treating homosexuals at his clinic. The Board rejected this conclusion at
paragraph 15 of the decision and found that the evidence could support a
contrary conclusion:
… The employment issues raised do
refer to the claimant’s “attitude” and “wanting display of professionalism” and
there is clearly a dispute between the claimant, police and the health
authority over the incident of a stolen motorcycle. However, there is no
reference in any of these documents to the claimant’s work with gay or HIV
infected patients. When I raised this with the claimant he pointed to his
letter that appealed his “interdiction” which mentions that a friend of the
claimant has the opinion that his “interdiction was a conspiracy by some people
to punish (him) for obvious reasons of (his) inflexibility on several
principles of administration in Busia district. I do not find that this
reference addresses the issue of the claimant’s work with gay or HIV infected
patients or explains the lack of such references in other documents. Indeed a
plain reading of the passage indicates that his problems result from his
inflexibility around administrative failures within the health authority as the
claimant has noted in his PIF narrative and that include the failure of the
authority to provide him with a vehicle and medical equipment he determined was
necessary in his role.
[Emphasis added]
[38]
Also,
the newspaper articles submitted by the applicant do not correspond to the
profile of the applicant who is not a public gay activist. To the contrary, the
evidence shows that the applicant secretly provided treatment. While it is true
that the Board failed to make specific reference to the ‘goat incident’, the
Court finds that, based on the overall objective evidence and the decision, the
Board was alive to the situation and, it and of itself, this omission is not
material in the present case. Finally, the Court observes that counsel for the
applicant confirmed at the hearing that the draft “Anti-homosexuality” bill
introduced in 2009 has not been adopted and is therefore not law.
[39]
The
Court further notes that the central issue in this case is whether it was
reasonable for the Board to expect that the applicant could and should have
provided corroborating evidence, and whether it was open to the Board to draw a
negative inference from the failure to produce any. In this analysis, the Court
refers to Lopera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 653, [2011] FCJ No 828 [Lopera], which relied on Ortiz Juarez
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 288, 146 ACWS
(3d) 705. In Lopera, above, the Court states at para 31 that: “Whether
corroborative evidence can reasonably be demanded depends upon the facts of
each case”. Both cases stand for the proposition that it is reasonable for the
Board to demand corroborating evidence where the applicant can be reasonably
expected to have such evidence available to them.
[40]
The
Board asked the applicant specifically for some sort of corroborating evidence
during the hearing, beginning at page 15 of the hearing transcript:
Q: Do you have any
documentation that -- at all that links you with working in the gay community?
Leaving the fraternity aside for a moment, but just working with HIV patients
and working with the gay community in Uganda?
A: Not specifically
gay community. I would say that I worked with the HIV-positive people
throughout my Ugandan career and I made sure that any documentation linking me
with -- would cause me trouble. I had to make sure there wasn’t such a
documentation.
[41]
The
Board explained at paragraph 14 of the decision that it considered this
explanation, but rejected it, finding that the applicant could have supplied
corroborating evidence:
While it may have been reasonable
for the claimant to be cautious about incriminating documentation while he was
in Uganda, I note he has been in Canada since the fall of 2009 and I find it
has been open to him during this time to seek affidavits or letters of support
from those he treated or who knew of his work in Uganda on behalf of gays yet
he has not done so.
[42]
The
Board also found at paragraph18 of the decision that as a highly educated
individual with legal representation and family connections in Uganda, such as the applicant, could be expected to provide corroboration for his
allegations.
[43]
The
applicant insists that it is unreasonable to expect him to provide evidence of
his treatment of homosexuals as that would necessitate the identification of
individuals who could face legal consequences and physical danger in Uganda. However, the Court notes that the applicant in fact named two individuals in his
Personal Information Form narrative: one individual is referred to as a
homosexual whom the applicant met during his studies, and the other individual
is identified as a member of the Brotherhood of Samia and employee of the
administration in the Busia District.
[44]
It
was also reasonable for the Board to assume that there are other sources from
which the highly educated applicant could acquire corroborating evidence in the
form of affidavits or letters other than from individuals who would be put in
danger. This is equally applicable for corroborating evidence that would
support the applicant’s subjective fear of persecution on a Convention ground
and objective fear as a physician who has provided treatment to homosexuals in Uganda.
[45]
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the decision of the
Board was reasonable and that the Court’s intervention is not warranted. As
neither party proposed a question for certification, none will be certified.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that
1. The
application for judicial review is dismissed.
2. No
question of general importance is certified.
“Richard
Boivin”