Date:
20121127
Docket:
IMM-1838-12
Citation:
2012 FC 1377
Ottawa, Ontario,
November 27, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
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NNAEMEKA GODFREY
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This
is an application under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (Act) for judicial review of the decision of
the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board,
dated 3 February 2012 (Decision), which refused the Applicant’s application to
be deemed a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection under sections
96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The
Applicant is a 34-year-old citizen of Nigeria. He came to Canada in 2001 to study at the University of Saskatchewan. His uncle, who was in Canada at the time, acted as the Applicant’s sponsor for his studies. His uncle returned to
Nigeria in 2003. The Applicant finished school in 2004 and moved to Toronto, where he lived with friends who supported him.
[3]
The
Applicant claimed refugee protection on 13 March 2011. An oral hearing was held
on 16 December 2011. Between 13 December and 15 December, the Applicant filed
four separate sets of disclosure, including an amended Personal Information
Form (PIF) narrative. The PIF sets out the details of his claim.
PIF Narrative
[4]
In
2008, the Applicant’s uncle decided to get into politics in Nigeria. A few months later the uncle was arrested by the Nigerian Police and accused of being a
financier for the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB). The uncle’s wife told the Applicant on the phone that his
uncle was not actually a MASSOB member, and it was all a ploy by his political
opponents to quash his political ambitions. Since that time, the Applicant’s
uncle has been detained by Nigerian state security agents at an undisclosed
location.
[5]
Before
the Applicant’s uncle was arrested, state agents ransacked his house in Nigeria. They took receipts from electronics, furniture, and other items the Applicant had
sent from Canada to Nigeria in 2003. They also asked the uncle’s wife lots of
questions about the Applicant. The interrogators thought the Applicant was
acting for MASSOB as a conduit for foreign money.
[6]
The
Applicant was having financial problems in Canada without his uncle’s help. He
called home to his family in Nigeria saying that he wanted to come back, but
his parents told him to try and stay in Canada because the police and state
security agents suspected him of financing MASSOB and that he would be a target
if he returned to Nigeria.
[7]
The
uncle’s wife was interrogated again by state agents in December 2010. They
asked her about the Applicant and whether he had any plans to visit Nigeria. This has made the Applicant scared to return to Nigeria because he fears he will
be arrested and detained like his uncle.
Oral Hearing
[8]
The
RPD heard the Applicant’s claim on 16 December 2011. At the oral hearing, the
RPD asked the Applicant why he submitted an expanded PIF. The Applicant replied
that he wanted to “connect some things…[that he] felt would be necessary to
have in [it].” When the Applicant was asked why it took him so long to change
his PIF he replied that he wanted to elaborate and that he had only learned of
some information later on. For example, the Applicant said that he only learned
about his uncle’s wife being interrogated in December 2010, two or three weeks
before the hearing; he did not talk to her often because of faulty telephone
lines.
[9]
The
Applicant explained he did not include the information about the state agents
seizing the receipts for the furniture he bought for his uncle in the original
PIF because he did not learn until later on that it was the reason the Nigerian
authorities thought he was involved with MASSOB. The RPD asked the Applicant
for details on how he shipped the furniture from Saskatoon to Nigeria. The Applicant replied that he had a friend who was involved with shipping, but
when asked for receipts he could not provide any. The RPD asked the Applicant
why receipts for furniture would indicate to anyone that he was a financier for
MASSOB, especially considering that it would be possible to check whether the
furniture had passed through customs. The Applicant replied that it is because Canada is on the Nigerian authorities’ list as a place where lots of MASSOB funds are
raised, and because he is almost like a child to his uncle, so the authorities
would just assume he was involved in whatever his uncle was involved in.
[10]
The
RPD asked the Applicant why he did not claim refugee protection in 2008, and
the Applicant replied that he initially thought his uncle would be released, so
he was not worried. He said that he did not see his life as in danger at that
point. The Applicant went on to say that his family told him not to come back
at some point in 2009, but he still did not feel his life was in danger. It was
at the point in 2010 when his uncle’s wife was interrogated that he became worried
about the police arresting him if he were to return to Nigeria. The Applicant also said that his father had been arrested in 2011 for inquiring
about his uncle. The RPD said that it found it strange that this was not
included in the Applicant’s PIF.
[11]
On
3 February 2012, the RPD rejected the Applicant’s claim.
DECISION
UNDER REVIEW
[12]
The
RPD rejected the Applicant’s claim because it found that his delay in filing
his refugee claim rendered him non-credible.
[13]
The
RPD acknowledged that delay in claiming will not always be determination, but
if a reasonable explanation is not provided it may play a decisive role. In
this case, considering the length of the delay and the circumstances of the
Applicant, the RPD did not accept the Applicant’s explanation for the delay as
reasonable. The RPD also said that the Applicant could have provided
corroborative evidence of the information he claimed to have received from Nigeria in the way of affidavits or letters, but he did not.
[14]
The
Applicant arrived in Canada on 1 September 2001, and his visa expired in April
2004. He waited from this time until March 2011 to make his claim. When the
Applicant was asked why he waited so long to claim refugee protection, he
stated that he simply did not think that he needed it.
[15]
When
the Applicant was asked why he did not inquire about his status prior to the
time he made his claim he said it was because he was afraid of being deported.
The RPD asked why he did not try to obtain information online about refugee
protection, and he replied that he was being looked after by his friends. The
RPD rejected this explanation, and found it unreasonable. The RPD found that
the Applicant did not seek any assistance in filing a refugee claim between
2004 and March 2011. The Applicant is educated, and the RPD would have expected
him to be more diligent in filing for refugee status.
[16]
The
RPD found on a balance of probabilities that the Applicant had not provided a
reasonable explanation for the delay. Delay has been recognized as an important
factor in the assessment of an applicant’s credibility and subjective fear. A
seven year delay in claiming is very substantial, and it undermined the
Applicant’s credibility (Mesidor v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 1245; Espinosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2003 FC 1324).
[17]
The
RPD cited the case of Williams v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 793 [Williams], as authority that delay can be
determinative of a claim if the “explanations of the applicant, viewed in the
context of her uncorroborated evidence in its entirety, warranted the dismissal
of her claim by the Board.” The RPD rejected the Applicant’s explanation for
the delay, and found he is not a Convention refugee or person in need of protection.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[18]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in this proceeding:
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96. A Convention
refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political
opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of
nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of each of those countries;
[…]
97. (1) A person
in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds
to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention
Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk,
unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part
of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from
that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful
sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards,
and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that
country to provide adequate health or medical care
[…]
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96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques:
a)
soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du
fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces
pays;
[…]
97. (1)
A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
a)
soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit
à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne
peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y
est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires
de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
[…]
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ISSUES
[19]
The
Applicant raises the following issue in this application:
a.
Whether
the RPD’s credibility finding was reasonable.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
[20]
The
Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9
held that a standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every
instance. Instead, where the standard of review applicable to a particular
question before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing
court may adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves
fruitless must the reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four
factors comprising the standard of review analysis.
[21]
The
standard of review applicable to the issue in this case is reasonableness. It
is well established that the standard of review applicable to the RPD’s
findings on credibility is reasonableness. See Aguebor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 732 (FCA); Elmi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 773, at paragraph 21, and Wu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 929, at paragraph 17.
[22]
When
reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be
concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible
in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph 47,
and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,
2009 SCC 12 at paragraph 59. Put another way, the Court should intervene
only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the
“range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
[23]
The
Applicant submits that the RPD’s credibility finding was unreasonable. The RPD
based its analysis of the delay on the seven years between 2004 and 2011, but
the Applicant explained that he did not fear returning to Nigeria until December 2010.
[24]
The
Applicant explained to the RPD that he did not think his life was at risk in Nigeria until he heard about his uncle’s wife being interrogated about his whereabouts in
December 2010. The RPD did not acknowledge this explanation offered by the
Applicant and simply rejected it. The Applicant submits that this renders the
Decision unreasonable.
The Respondent
Reasonable
Credibility Finding
[25]
The
Respondent submits that the RPD’s negative credibility finding was reasonable
due to the following errors, omissions, and inconsistencies in the Applicant’s
testimony:
a.
He
wrote in his PIF that his problems began “sometime in 2003,” but then alleged
that his uncle became involved in politics in 2008;
b.
In
the three days before his hearing, the Applicant filed four separate sets of
disclosure, including an amended PIF. At the hearing, the RPD commented on this
and expressed concern that the Applicant submitted a new narrative which had
“changed quite a bit,” and questioned why it had taken him “so long” to amend
his PIF. The Applicant was asked at the hearing why certain information was
omitted from his first narrative;
c.
The
Applicant could have validated the information he allegedly received from Nigeria, but he did not;
d.
The
Applicant did not provide the RPD with a reasonable explanation for the delay
in seeking refugee protection.
[26]
The
Respondent submits that the RPD was entitled to dismiss the Applicant’s claim
after finding he had failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay.
The RPD noted the Applicant said that he did not claim protection earlier
because he did not fear returning to Nigeria until he spoke with his parents;
the RPD was not, however, required to accept this explanation. The Respondent
points out that the RPD noted the Applicant’s education, and that he could have
been more diligent in seeking advice.
[27]
The
Respondent submits that in the case of Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’
Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, the
Supreme Court of Canada held at paragraph 15 that a reviewing court may, if
necessary, look to the record for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness
of the outcome. In light of the record that was before the RPD, it was
reasonable to dismiss the Applicant’s claim.
[28]
The
Respondent further submits that it is not required that every element of
reasoning in the Decision must pass an independent test for reasonableness (Law
Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at paragraph 56; Corona
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 174 at
paragraphs 29-31; Gan v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2006 FC 1329 at paragraphs 16-17). The RPD relied on
the Williams decision, above, where a two year delay was sufficient to
dismiss a claim in light of overall credibility concerns. Regardless of the
length, it was reasonable for the RPD to dismiss the Applicant’s claim based on
delay.
[29]
The
Respondent submits that in light of the record that was before the RPD –
including things such as the transcript from the hearing and the omissions from
the PIF – it was reasonable for the RPD to dismiss the Applicant’s claim. The RPD’s
credibility finding was reasonable, as was the Decision as a whole.
ANALYSIS
[30]
Delay
in claiming protection was a significant factor in the RPD’s Decision:
7. Delay in filing a claim for refugee
protection is not always a determinative factor in a refugee claim. However,
there are circumstances, based on the failure of the claimant to satisfactorily
provide an explanation for the delay, where the delay will assume a decisive
role.
8. The claimant arrived in Canada on September 01, 2001, and was permitted to remain in Canada on a student visa to attend
school. From April 2004, he waited for over seven years to make a claim for
protection. He was asked why he had delayed so long in filing for refugee
protection in Canada and he testified that simply he did not see it, in what he
needed at the time.
9. The claimant further testified that it
was not until he spoke to his parents in Nigeria, that he felt that he could
not go back and as a result filed a refugee claim.
10. The claimant could have validated the
information which he alleges to have received from Nigeria in the way of
letters or affidavits from family, relatives or friends. He was asked why he
did not go to Canadian Immigration himself to inquire about the status and he
stated that he was afraid of being deported. He was asked why he did not try to
obtain information “online” with respect to applying for refugee protection in Canada and he testified that he was being fed and housed by friends, who at times would
also give him money. The panel rejects this explanation as being unreasonable.
The claimant, neither in his oral testimony nor in his documentary evidence,
has not produced any evidence to corroborate the allegation that between
September 2004 and March 2011, he sought the legal advice of immigration
lawyers or consultants with respect to filing a refugee claim in Canada.
11. The panel rejects the explanation given by
the claimant as to why he failed to file for refugee protection between the
years 2004 and 2011. The panel finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the
claimant did not seek the assistance of a lawyer or consultant between the
years 2004 and 2011, to determine whether he would have been eligible to file
for refugee status. The claimant has eleven years of education and the panel
would have expected him to be more diligent in seeking advice about claiming in
a timely fashion.
12. For all of the above reasons, the panel
finds on a balance of probabilities that the claimant has failed to provide any
satisfactory explanation for his delay in filing a claim for refugee
protection.
13. Delay has been recognized by the Federal
Court as an important factor in assessing claimants’ credibility and their
subjective fear. It is reasonable to assume that persons with a well-founded
fear of persecution will attempt to apply for refugee protection without
unreasonable delay. The delay in this matter is so substantial — over seven
years — that it undermines the claimant’s credibility and his allegation that
he faces serious harm in Nigeria if he were to return.
[31]
In
the recent decision of Garcia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 412 (CanLII), at paras 19-25, Justice David Near had
occasion to review and apply the relevant jurisprudence of the Court dealing
with delay:
Delay in
making a refugee claim “is not a decisive factor in itself” but it is a “relevant
element which the tribunal may take into account in assessing both the
statements and the actions and deeds of a claimant” (Huerta
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 157 NR 225,
[1993] F.C.J. No. 271 (CA)). It is reasonable to expect that the Applicants
would make a claim at the first possible opportunity (see Jeune
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 835, [2009]
F.C.J. No. 965 at para 15).
Recent
jurisprudence also suggests that while the delay itself is not determinative,
it “may, in the right circumstances, constitute sufficient grounds upon which
to dismiss a claim” (Duarte v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 988, [2003] F.C.J. No.
1259 at para 14). Absent a satisfactory explanation for the delay, it “can be
fatal to such claim, even where the credibility of an applicant’s claims has
not otherwise been challenged” (Velez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 923, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1138 at para
28).
While the
Board implied that the nineteen month delay in this instance would be fatal to
the claims, it proceeded to raise several other issues associated with the
Applicants’ credibility, notably evasive testimony and the lack of
corroborating documents. It is evident from the remainder of the decision that
the delay was a significant factor, but hardly the only basis for the negative
credibility findings. The Board stressed that there were “cumulative reasons”
for its conclusions regarding the Applicants.
As a
consequence, the Applicants’ reference to Juan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 809, [2006] F.C.J. No.
1022 at para 11 is of limited assistance. In that case, Justice Eleanor Dawson
faulted the Board because its “finding with respect to delay is, by itself, an
insufficient basis for maintaining its denial of the claim.” In contrast, the
Board’s issue with the Applicants’ story was the delay in conjunction with
other relevant factors. In addition, more recent jurisprudence referred to
above, suggests there are certain circumstances when the delay would be fatal
to the claim.
Given
various credibility concerns raised, it was also reasonable for the Board to
seek some independent documentary corroboration. This was one of many factors
considered in the assessment of their claims. As the Respondent points out,
factors relevant to credibility were the delay in seeking protection, the lack
of effort to obtain documents, and evasive responses to questions regarding
their story.
The
Applicants’ reliance on the decisions of Ahortor v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993). 65 FTR 137, [1993] F.C.J.
No. 705 at para 45 and Zheng v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 974, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1267 at
para 9 is therefore misplaced. These cases suggest, in the absence of
contradictory evidence, the Board errs in requiring an applicant to produce
corroborative evidence and make a negative credibility finding based solely on
their failure to do so.
However, as
discussed, that is not what occurred in the Board's consideration of the
Applicants’ claims. Credibility was already raised as an important factor based
on the delay and evasiveness in answering questions. The Respondent
appropriately draws the Court's attention to the determination in JJW v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009
FC 793, [2009] F.C.J. No. 915 at paras 24-26 concerning delay where it was
stated that “the explanations of the applicant, viewed in the context of her
uncorroborated evidence in its entirety, warranted the dismissal of her claim
by the Board.”
[32]
In
the present case, the RPD in effect pointed out that the Applicant had failed
to corroborate the exchange with his parents that triggered his fears of
returning to Nigeria. The Applicant says there was some corroborative evidence
in his mother’s and his aunt’s affidavits, but this evidence does not
corroborate the specific targeting of the Applicant that was so crucial to his
case. Even though there is a presumption of truth in favour of the Applicant,
it was not unreasonable of the RPD to expect documentation in the form of
affidavits or letters from family and friends given the RPD’s other concerns
about late filing. Thus, the Applicant had not attempted to corroborate the
triggering event that caused him to claim protection in March, 2011, even
though it would have been easy for him to do so.
[33]
The
RPD goes on to question why the Applicant did not seek refugee protection
between 2004 and 2011. It seems to me that the RPD does this because it does
not accept the Applicant’s evidence that there was a triggering event in 2010.
Consequently, the RPD looks at the whole of the time the Applicant spent in Canada before making a claim, and this is the basis for rejecting the claim.
[34]
The
RPD says at paragraph 17 of the Decision that “Given the extensive delay, seven
years, in filing a claim for refugee protection, and the fact that I reject the
claimant’s explanation as to the his extensive delay in claiming, the panel
finds that the claimant is neither a convention refugee nor a person in need of
protection.”
[35]
At
the judicial review hearing before me, the Applicant argued that the RPD made a
mistake in this regard because it assessed his credibility and subjective fear
against the whole period extending from 2004 to 2011, while the evidence shows
that the Applicant had no reason to fear a return to Nigeria before at least
2008, when the troubles with his uncle began.
[36]
The
Applicant’s account of why he waited until 2011 to make his claim is rejected
by the RPD because of a lack of corroboration in regards to what he was told by
his parents or other family members at the material time. This leaves the
Applicant to account for the delay in making his claim since he came to Canada in 2004. He now argues that the evidence shows he had no reason to fear returning to
Nigeria until 2008 when his uncle was targeted for his political activities.
As the Decision makes clear, however, the RPD “rejects the explanation given by
claimant as to why he failed to file for refugee protection between the years
2004 and 2011.” In other words, the Applicant’s explanation that he did not
need to seek protection until his uncle was targeted by the Nigerian
authorities is not accepted by the RPD. A reading of the CTR reveals that the
RPD did not regard the Applicant as a credible witness and, as the Decision
again makes clear, it concluded that he had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation
as to why he waited so long after 2004 to make a refugee claim. Given all of
the factors mentioned by the RPD, I cannot say that this conclusion was
unreasonable. Not only was there a delay in claiming protection, the Applicant
failed to provide corroborative evidence in a situation where it would have
been easy to obtain from his family, and he could not adequately explain the
late changes to his PIF. The RPD had good reason to suspect his narrative and
explanation for the late claim.
[37]
In
other words, I do not think the RPD accepts the Applicant’s explanation that
relates his position in Canada to what may have happened to his uncle in Nigeria. This is why the RPD “rejects the explanation given by the claimant as to why he
failed to file for refugee protection between the years 2004 and 2011.” It
might have been preferable for the RPD to have elaborated on this finding, but
a reading of the Decision as a whole against the background of the CTR leads me
to conclude that the Decision was not unreasonable in this regard.
[38]
Counsel
agree there is no question for certification and the Court concurs.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that
1.
The
application is dismissed.
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James Russell”