Date:
20120928
Docket:
T-1739-11
Citation:
2012 FC 1151
Ottawa, Ontario,
September 28, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
BETWEEN:
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TANIA EL-KASHEF
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
This
is an appeal by Ms. Tania El-Kashef (Ms. El-Kashef), pursuant to subsection
14(5) of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29 [Act], of a decision
rendered by citizenship judge Alain Ayache, dated August 12, 2011, denying her
application for Canadian citizenship.
[2]
For
the following reasons, this appeal is dismissed.
II. Facts
[3]
Ms.
El-Kashef is a 27 year old citizen of Egypt. She acquired her Canadian
residency in 2001.
[4]
On
June 27, 2006, Ms. El-Kashef and her family made an application for Canadian
citizenship in Mississauga, Ontario. On April 21, 2008, they withdrew their
application. They filed a second application on June 17, 2008.
[5]
Ms.
El-Kashef declared trips outside Canada for a total of 198 days of absence over
the period.
[6]
In
November 11, 2008, further to a request from an immigration officer, Ms.
El-Kashef provided the following documents in support of her application:
1.
A letter by Me Hrair Djihanian dated November 11, 2008;
2.
Miramar Communications’ certificate of incorporation; and
3.
An extract from the “Registraire des Entreprises du Québec” on the East West
Communications Company.
[7]
On
July 25, 2011, Ms. El-Kashef appeared before the citizenship judge. On August
12, 2011, the citizenship judge rendered his decision rejecting her application
on the following grounds:
“She
failed her knowledge test and therefore did not demonstrate that she had
sufficient knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of
citizenship (subsection 5(1)(e) of the Act);
She
did not prove that she was physically present in Canada for at least 1095 days
within the three years prior to her citizenship Application: her testimony was
improbable, contradictory and not supported by any evidence.” (see Respondent’s
Record, vol. 1, at page 344)
[8]
Furthermore,
the citizenship judge decided not to make a recommendation for an exercise of
discretion under subsections 5(3), 5(4) and 15(1) of the Act.
III. Legislation
[9]
Paragraphs
5(1)(c) and (e); and subsections 5(3), 5(4) and 15(1) of
the Act provide as follows:
5. (1) The Minister
shall grant citizenship to any person who
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5. (1) Le
ministre attribue la citoyenneté à toute personne qui, à la fois :
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(c) is a permanent
resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, and has, within the four years immediately
preceding the date of his or her application, accumulated at least three
years of residence in Canada calculated in the following manner:
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c) est un
résident permanent au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur
l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés et a, dans les quatre ans
qui ont précédé la date de sa demande, résidé au Canada pendant au moins
trois ans en tout, la durée de sa résidence étant calculée de la manière
suivante :
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(i) for
every day during which the person was resident in Canada before his lawful
admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to
have accumulated one-half of a day of residence, and
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(i) un demi-jour pour
chaque jour de résidence au Canada avant son admission à titre de résident
permanent,
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(ii) for
every day during which the person was resident in Canada after his lawful
admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to
have accumulated one day of residence;
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(ii) un jour pour chaque
jour de résidence au Canada après son admission à titre de résident
permanent;
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. . .
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[…]
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(e) has
an adequate knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of
citizenship; . . .
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e) a une
connaissance suffisante du Canada et des responsabilités et avantages
conférés par la citoyenneté;
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5. (3) The Minister may, in
his discretion, waive on compassionate grounds,
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5. (3) Pour des
raisons d’ordre humanitaire, le ministre a le pouvoir discrétionnaire
d’exempter :
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(a) in
the case of any person, the requirements of paragraph (1)(d) or (e);
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a) dans tous les
cas, des conditions prévues aux alinéas (1)d) ou e);
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(b) in
the case of a minor, the requirement respecting age set out in paragraph (1)(b),
the requirement respecting length of residence in Canada set out in paragraph
(1)(c) or the requirement to take the oath of citizenship; and
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b) dans le cas
d’un mineur, des conditions relatives soit à l’âge ou à la durée de résidence
au Canada respectivement énoncées aux alinéas (1)b) et c),
soit à la prestation du serment de citoyenneté;
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(c) in
the case of any person who is prevented from understanding the significance
of taking the oath of citizenship by reason of a mental disability, the
requirement to take the oath.
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c) dans le cas
d’une personne incapable de saisir la portée du serment de citoyenneté en
raison d’une déficience mentale, de l’exigence de prêter ce serment.
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5. (4) In order to alleviate
cases of special and unusual hardship or to reward services of an exceptional
value to Canada, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the
Governor in Council may, in his discretion, direct the Minister to grant
citizenship to any person and, where such a direction is made, the Minister
shall forthwith grant citizenship to the person named in the direction.
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5. (4) Afin de
remédier à une situation particulière et inhabituelle de détresse ou de
récompenser des services exceptionnels rendus au Canada, le gouverneur en
conseil a le pouvoir discrétionnaire, malgré les autres dispositions de la
présente loi, d’ordonner au ministre d’attribuer la citoyenneté à toute
personne qu’il désigne; le ministre procède alors sans délai à l’attribution.
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15. (1) Where a
citizenship judge is unable to approve an application under subsection 14(2),
the judge shall, before deciding not to approve it, consider whether or not
to recommend an exercise of discretion under subsection 5(3) or (4) or
subsection 9(2) as the circumstances may require.
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15. (1) Avant de
rendre une décision de rejet, le juge de la citoyenneté examine s’il y a lieu
de recommander l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire prévu aux paragraphes
5(3) ou (4) ou 9(2), selon le cas.
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IV. Issues
and standard of review
A.
Issues
1.
Did
the citizenship judge err by finding that Ms. El-Kashef failed to meet the
requirements set out in paragraphs 5(1)(c) and (e) of the Act?
2.
Did
the citizenship judge breach his duty of procedural fairness?
B.
Standard
of review
[10]
The
applicable standard of review of a decision rendered by a citizenship judge is
the standard of reasonableness (see Bhatti v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2010 FC 25 at para 14). In
reviewing the citizenship judge's decision on the standard of reasonableness,
the Court will consider “the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process” and “whether the decision
falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC
9 at para 47 [Dunsmuir]).
[11]
Furthermore,
issues of procedural fairness and natural justice require the application of
the standard of correctness (Navidi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 372 at para 13; Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 43).
V. Parties’
submissions
A.
Ms.
El-Kashef’s submissions
[12]
Ms.
El-Kashef submits that considering the number of errors committed by the judge
on the issue of her credibility, the decision must bet set aside. She also
claims that the judge failed to properly assess all of the evidence adduced
before him (see Owusu-Ansah v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1989] FCJ No 442 (QL); and Pourzand v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 395). Ms. El-Kashef argues that the
judge failed to take into account all of the documentary evidence demonstrating
her presence in Canada for 2004 and 2005. He did not mention the Egyptian
Government document showing her entries to and exits from Egypt. Ms. El-Kashef underlines that it would be unconceivable to travel without having entry stamps
or visas from other countries in her passport. She also submits that even if
the stamps do not demonstrate that she was physically in Canada at the time, it
does not contradict her testimony (see Tanveer v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 565 at para 11).
[13]
Ms.
El-Kashef notes that the judge failed to take in consideration her Revenue
Canada assessment for the year 2004 and a document showing that she was a
director of Miramar Corporation. The judge also failed to mention the following
documents: a letter from the Bank of Montreal confirming that she was a client
at that bank from June 2003 to March 2009, a letter from the Rotary Club letter
confirming her participation in the organization of fund raising events and her
donation to the Montreal Children’s Hospital on May 3, 2005.
[14]
Ms.
El-Kashef further submits that the citizenship judge improperly applied the
strict residency test in Pourghasemi (Re) (1993), 62 FTR 122 [Pourghasemi].
Having assessed improperly the evidence adduced, Ms. El-Kashef alleges that the
judge could not have possibly applied the proper criterion. The failure to
properly address the existence of more than one test and to consider the
application of the three residency tests is a reviewable error. Ms. El-Kashef
also relies on Khan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 215 at para 31 [Khan], where I held that “I am of the opinion
that Takla and the more recent line of cases that require a Citizenship
Judge to consider the Koo factors, once a threshold of residency is
established (as referred to by Justice Harrington in paragraph 21 of Salim,
above), should be applied to the present case”. Some recent judgments of this
Court have held that where a citizenship Applicant does not meet the physical
presence test, the citizenship judge must proceed to the qualitative assessment
and apply the qualitative test set out in Koo (Re), [1993] 1 FC 286 (TD)
at para 10 [Koo]).
[15]
It
is submitted by Ms. El-Kashef that the judge’s reliance on the analysis of
immigration officers and the failure to assess all of the evidence adduced constitutes
a failure to exercise his jurisdiction under the Act.
[16]
Ms.
El-Kashef also contends that the judge breached his duty of procedural fairness
as he did not provide sufficient reasons to explain his refusal to make a
recommendation under subsection 15(1) of the Act and failed to properly
administer the citizenship knowledge of Canada test. She is also of the opinion
that the judge did not provide sufficient reasons for dismissing her
application under paragraphs 5(1)(c) and (e) of the Act.
B. Respondent’s
submissions
[17]
The
Respondent underlines that in order for the citizenship judge to accede to her
demand, Ms. El-Kashef had to meet all the requirements found in subsection 5(1)
of the Act. When an Applicant fails to meet these requirements, a citizenship
judge has the discretion, under subsections 5(3), 5(4) and 15(1) of the Act, to
make a recommendation to the Minister for a waiver on these requirements. The
failure to make such recommendation cannot be appealed, according to the
Respondent, who relies on the following cases: Koo cited above at paras
25 to 27; Goudimenko v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2002] FCJ No 581 at para 22; and Henoud v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [2003] FCJ No 889 at para 12.
[18]
The
Respondent further asserts that it is not uncommon, nor does it amount
to an error, for a citizenship judge to address both the residency and the
adequate knowledge of Canada test requirements under subsections 5(1)(c)
and 5(1)(e) of the Act (Alfonso v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2003] 2 FC 683; Haddad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2003 FCT 692; Haddad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2003 FCT 690; and El Fihri v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1106).
[19]
In
the case at hand, according to the Respondent, the Applicant failed her
knowledge test and did not adduce sufficient probative evidence before the
citizenship judge to allow the exercise of his discretion and make a favorable recommendation
to the Minister for a waiver on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.
[20]
In
addition, the Respondent submits that the judge correctly applied the physical
presence test, following the Pourghasemi decision. Ms. El-Kashef failed
to prove that she was physically present for at least 1 095 days in Canada. The citizenship judge, according to the Respondent, properly questioned the lack of
probative evidence presented with respect to the period extending from June 17,
2004 to August 28, 2005.
[21]
Furthermore,
the Respondent affirms that Ms. El-Kashef is not credible as her testimony was both
contradictory and implausible.
[22]
Finally,
the Respondent argues that the citizenship judge’s reasons for decision were
adequate and sufficient. He clearly explained why he refused Ms. El-Kashef’s
application.
VI. Analysis
1. Did
the citizenship judge err by finding that Ms. El-Kashef failed to meet the
requirements set out in paragraphs 5(1)(c) and (e) of the Act?
[23]
The
citizenship judge did not err by finding that Ms. El-Kashef failed to meet the
requirements of the subsection 5(1) of the Act.
[24]
To
qualify for her Canadian citizenship, Ms. El-Kashef had to demonstrate that she
was physically present at least 1 095 days in Canada within a time frame of
four years preceding her citizenship application.
[25]
Ms.
El-Kashef failed to adduce sufficient probative evidence to demonstrate that
she had fulfilled the requirements of the Act particularly with respect to the
period extending from June 17, 2004 to August 28, 2005. In that respect, the
citizenship judge wrote the following remarks:
“[Ms. El-Kashef] submitted many other documents that
do not place her physically or confirm her presence on balance for a minimum of
1, 095 days in Canada;
[Ms. El-Kashef] submitted pay slips from her work at
San REMO Boutique after the appropriate period. This boutique’s [owner] is the
same as the applicant’s [lawyer], namely Esq. Hrair Djihanina. When I asked the
lawyer about the Boutique in question he answered that it was his brother’s.
Since the information is beyond the examined period and is not concerned by
this analysis, I disregarded the information and did not take it into
consideration.
…
Since the supporting documents that have been
returned by [Ms. El-Kashef] are not sufficient and since she failed to
satisfactorily demonstrate that she was physically present in Canada during the
examined period, and precisely from June 14th, 2004 until at least
August 24th, 2005;
Due to the report on file from Immigration at P.E.T.
that place [Ms. El-Kashef] for a maximum of 886 days from May 14th,
2004 until May 14th, 2008 (see Justice Muldoon in Re: Pourghasemi);
Due to the multiple unsupported claims she has made,
on balance [Ms. El-Kashef] failed to satisfy me that she was physically present
in Canada for 1,095 days of her material time period;
As such, she has not met the residence requirements
of s. 5(1)(c) of the Act.” (see citizenship judge’s decision at pages 14
and 15 of the Certified Tribunal Record)
[26]
The
evidence adduced by Ms. El-Kashef does not demonstrate her physical presence in
Canada between June 2004 and August 2005. For instance,
the letter from the Bank of Montreal only mentions that “Tania El Kashef est
cliente avec la Banque de Montréal depuis le 20 juin 2003 et que tout est en
règle à ce jour” (see Respondent’s Record, vol.1, at page 238). Furthermore, her
donation to the Montreal Children’s Hospital Foundation, on May 3, 2005, does
not necessarily demonstrate that she was physically present in Canada at the
time (see Respondent’s Record, vol. 1, at page 324). The letter from Mahesh
Sharma of the Montreal-Westward Rotary Club is also silent as to the dates of
her involvement in the fund raising activities (see Respondent’s Record, vol.
1, at page 325).
[27]
Ms.
El-Kashef submitted an income tax form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency for
the year 2004, stating that she earned 5 250 $. Again, this form does
not attest that the revenue earned over the period can be attributable to a
physical presence through employment in Canada. Moreover, Ms. El-Kashef affirms
that between 2004 and 2005, she was a director of Miramar Communications. The
Notice of Director issued by Industry Canada does not prove her presence in Canada.
[28]
In
addition, the Court must underline that she waited 14 days after her hearing
before the citizenship judge to adduce additional evidence to explain her
failure to provide more documentary evidence for the period questioned by the
citizenship judge. She wrote that she had lost most of her documents when she
moved.
[29]
More
importantly, it is apparent, from a list of her travels provided by the
Ministry of the Interior of Egypt, that she was in Europe in 2004 and 2005 (see
Respondent’s Record, vol. 1, at page 24).
[30]
The
judge had no obligation to apply the qualitative test as set out in Koo.
Contrary to Ms. El-Kashef’s interpretation of my judgment in Khan cited
above, a threshold of residency must be met before a citizenship judge elects
to apply the Koo decision. In the present case, the evidence adduced by
Ms. El-Kashef did not demonstrate that she had met that residency threshold.
Consequently, the judge did not have to consider applying the qualitative test.
[31]
For
these reasons, the citizenship judge’s decision is reasonable and “falls within
the range of possible and acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect
of the facts and law” (see Dunsmuir cited above at para 47).
2. Did
the citizenship judge breach his duty of procedural fairness?
[32]
The
citizenship judge did not breach his duty of procedural fairness. There is no
evidence on file to substantiate Ms. El-Kashef’s claim that the judge
misapplied the knowledge of Canada test. In reading the judge’s decision, it is
also clear that he provided sufficient reasons for his decision. “if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why
the tribunal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the
conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes, the Dunsmuir
criteria are met” (see Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 16). The
judge’s decision is indeed within the range of acceptable outcomes.
VII. Conclusion
[33]
This
appeal of the citizenship judge’s decision is dismissed. The judge reasonably
determined that Ms. El-Kashef failed to meet the requirements of subsection
5(1) of the Act.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that
1.
This
appeal of the citizenship judge’s decision is dismissed.
2.
The
whole with costs to the Respondent.
"André F.J.
Scott"