Date: 20120824
Docket: IMM-6689-11
Citation: 2012
FC 1012
Halifax,
Nova Scotia, August 24, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
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EVDOKIA REUTOV FILHA
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act) for judicial review of: a decision
of a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) officer (the officer), dated May 2,
2011, rejecting the applicant’s PRRA application; a decision of an enforcement
officer (the enforcement officer), dated September 23, 2011, denying the
applicant’s request for a deferral of the date on which she was required to
leave Canada; and the removal order issued against the applicant. The officer’s
PRRA decision was based on the risk that the applicant would face if returned
to Brazil.
[2]
The applicant requests the following relief: a review of the
officer’s decision and an order for a new PRRA where all the evidence will be
considered; a review of the enforcement officer’s decision; an extension of
time for the applicant to leave Canada and a stay of the removal order issued
against her.
Background
[3]
The
applicant, Evdokia Reutov Filha, is a citizen of Brazil. At a young age, she
moved with her family to Bolivia.
[4]
The
applicant is married to a man in Bolivia. The couple have two daughters; one
lives in Brazil while the other lives in the United States. The applicant also
has a sister living in Alberta who is a Canadian citizen.
[5]
In
1985, when the applicant was fourteen years old, her father arranged her
marriage. Within three years, she gave birth to two daughters. Throughout their
relationship, the applicant’s husband abused her. She filed complaints to the
Bolivian police on several occasions. Occasionally, the police would issue a
citation and have the applicant deliver it to her husband. However, the
applicant’s husband ignored all citations that she gave him.
[6]
To
escape further abuse, the applicant went to Argentina on March 14, 2008 and
applied for a Canadian visitor’s visa. She stayed until a six month visitor’s
visa was granted on or about April 16, 2008. Thereafter, she returned to Bolivia.
[7]
On
June 6, 2008, the applicant came to Canada. She remained after her six month
visa expired. Therefore, on November 23, 2009, a removal order was issued
against her. An arrest warrant for the purposes of removal was issued two days
later.
[8]
On
December 24, 2009, the applicant filed a refugee claim.
[9]
On
January 7, 2010, the applicant was arrested for the purposes of removal. She
was notified that her refugee claim could not be processed as there was a
removal order against her. She was however granted the opportunity to file a
PRRA application, which she filed on or about January 25, 2010.
[10]
The
following year, on January 30, 2011, the applicant was involved in a serious
automobile accident in Fort McMurray, Alberta. The other driver was intoxicated
and hit the applicant’s car head-on. The applicant suffered two broken legs, a
broken hip, several broken teeth, broken ribs and other injuries. Since the
accident, she has been unable to return to her previous employment. The
applicant has commenced a lawsuit in the Court of the Queen’s Bench in Alberta against the other driver. The applicant is also scheduled to appear as a chief
witness for the Crown in the associated criminal proceeding.
Officer’s Decision
[11]
The
officer issued her decision on May 2, 2011. The Notes on File that form part of
the decision, were initially issued in French. Upon request, the applicant
received a translated English version on August 17, 2011.
[12]
The
officer first noted on the notes on file form that the applicant was not excluded
from applying for PRRA protection under either subsections 112(1) or 112(2) of
the Act. She also noted that the applicant was not described under subsection
112(3) of the Act.
[13]
The
officer then delved into the risks identified by the applicant. The officer
first summarized the facts. The officer noted that the applicant filed her PRRA
application on or about January 25, 2010, with additional arguments and
evidence submitted on various subsequent dates.
[14]
The
officer noted the alleged risk that the applicant faced from her husband if she
returned to Bolivia, her last country of permanent residence. The officer
acknowledged the applicant’s
submission that she would also face
risks if returned to Brazil because her husband also held Brazilian citizenship
and could easily track her down there. Further, it would be difficult for her
to return to Brazil as she left that country many years ago and did not speak
Portuguese. Either way, the applicant alleged that she faced similar risks in
Brazil and Bolivia due to both countries’ primitive laws on conjugal violence.
[15]
The
officer noted that the applicant had not made a refugee claim that was rejected
by the Immigration Refugee Board (IRB) and had also not filed a previous PRRA
claim that had been rejected. The officer marked on the notes to file form that
there was new evidence.
[16]
Turning
to the common considerations applicable to all protection grounds, the officer
noted that the risk identified by the applicant was among those described in
sections 96 and 97 of the Act. However, this risk was not personal and other
individuals in a similar situation shared the same risk. Further, the officer
noted that the applicant was not unable, or because of the risk alleged,
unwilling to avail herself to state protection. The officer did not mark
anything down in the sections pertaining to the potential internal flight
alternative or the law of general application on the notes to file form.
[17]
The
officer found that no controversy arose around the alleged spousal abuse.
Rather, the primary issue was whether the applicant would be at risk in Brazil (her country of nationality) and if she would be able to avail herself of state
protection there.
[18]
The
officer noted that aside from the fact that her husband held Brazilian
citizenship, there was no evidence adduced to establish that he would be
interested in tracking her down or how he would do so if he wanted to. There
was also no evidence that he had taken any efforts to track her down since she
came to Canada. Similarly, there was no evidence of any threats or violence
made against the applicant while she was visiting her daughter in Brazil.
[19]
The
officer also noted that the applicant had visited her daughter in Brazil on
three occasions in 2004 and once in 2006. The applicant alleged that she
returned to Bolivia after all three trips in 2004 due to threats that her
husband made against her. However, no such allegation was made for her return
in 2006. Further, after staying in Argentina to undergo the Canadian visa
application process, the applicant returned to Bolivia where she stayed until
her departure to Canada on June 6, 2008. The officer found no explanation for
the applicant’s return to her persecutor after her time in Argentina.
[20]
In
light of this evidence, the officer found that the applicant had failed to
discharge the onus of proving that her husband had any interest in tracking her
down or would have any way of doing so. As such, the officer concluded that the
applicant had not established that there was a reasonable chance that she would
be a victim of spousal abuse if she returned to Brazil. The officer
acknowledged that the applicant would likely face difficulties if she returned
to Brazil, but noted that her eldest daughter lived there. The difficulties of
adapting to a different language and a country that she left as a child did not
correspond to risks referred to in sections 96 or 97 of the Act. As the officer
came to this decision on the risk that the applicant would face if returned to Brazil, she did not assess the risk of the applicant returning to Bolivia.
[21]
Finally,
the officer noted that she consulted the applicant’s refugee claim, PRRA
application, written submissions signed by applicant’s counsel on February 3,
2010 and other documents received on various dates in CIC Calgary.
Issues
[22]
The
applicant, in her memorandums of argument, alleges that there was a breach of
natural justice. In her reply, the applicant submits the following point at
issue:
1. Did the officer
consider all of the evidence?
[23]
Based
on my review of all of the applicant’s submission, I would rephrase the issues
as follows:
1. What is the
appropriate standard of review?
2. Was there a
breach of natural justice?
Applicant’s Written Submissions
[24]
The
applicant submits that she was denied natural justice in three ways.
[25]
First,
the applicant submits that her PRRA application was written in English but
considered by a French speaking PRRA officer whose English language proficiency
was uncertain and not demonstrated. The applicant submits that the fact that
the decision was written in French indicates that the officer was unable to
write in English. If the officer could not write in English, it is unlikely
that she could read and fully appreciate the applicant’s English application.
In support, the applicant highlights the officer’s statement that “PRRA
Application Received CIC Calgary 25, 2010”, which does not include a month and
is therefore not a date.
[26]
Further,
the applicant notes that the officer did not check either the yes or no box to
answer whether “The Risk is faced by the Applicant in every part of the country
or countries of nationality or habitual residence” on the notes to file form.
This was particularly relevant as the applicant’s country of nationality
differed from her country of habitual residence.
[27]
The
applicant also highlights that on the notes to file form, the officer
acknowledged that there was new evidence, but did not specify what it was.
There was therefore no indication that she considered the injuries that the
applicant sustained from the January 2011 automobile accident. This evidence
should have been listed under the section on the notes to file form entitled,
“Sources Consulted”. The officer should also have specified which “other
documents received on various dates in CIC Calgary” she considered.
[28]
In
the applicant’s further memorandum of argument, she highlights various
typographical errors in the officer’s letter to this Court’s administrator. The
applicant submits that this evidence is further indicative that the officer is
less than fluent in English.
[29]
Second,
the applicant submits that the officer failed to consider important new
information, specifically the serious automobile accident that occurred on
January 30, 2011. The injuries that the applicant sustained from this accident
render her unable to flee spousal abuse and have disabled her in such a way
that she is unable to support herself and must depend on her abusive husband.
[30]
Third,
the applicant submits that it would be a breach of natural justice to force an
injured and uncompensated person to leave Canada; the place where she was
injured and where she has an operation scheduled eight days after her
deportation date. As she was injured by a Canadian, she is entitled to help
from the Canadian health system. She is also entitled to access the Canadian
legal system to seek compensation for her injuries. At a minimum, the applicant
submits that she should be permitted to recover, which necessitates more
surgeries, and to complete her personal injury claim before being forced to
leave. The applicant notes that it is not practical for her to pursue her
personal injury claim from South America.
[31]
Finally,
the applicant submits that she must remain in Canada as she is a chief witness
for the Crown in the criminal prosecution pertaining to the January 2011
automobile accident. The applicant’s testimony is required to prove that the
intoxicated driver caused her bodily harm. Without this testimony, the accused
has a better chance of avoiding criminal punishment, thereby frustrating the
Canadian criminal justice system.
Respondent’s Written Submissions
[32]
As
a preliminary point, the respondent submits that the applicant has submitted documents
(Exhibits E, F, G, H, I and J) that post-date the officer’s decision. As they
were not before the officer, they are inadmissible on judicial review and
should be disregarded by this Court on this application.
[33]
The
respondent submits that the appropriate standard of review in this case is
reasonableness. The Court should show significant deference to the officer in
reviewing her decision. The respondent acknowledges that a breach of procedural
fairness would be assessed on a correctness standard; however, the respondent
submits that no such breach occurred in this case.
[34]
The
respondent notes that the PRRA process is outlined in the Act. Where applicants
do not have a prior refugee decision, such as the applicant in this case, all
the evidence presented must be considered. PRRA applications are considered on
the basis of sections 96 to 98 of the Act and these represent the sole relevant
protection risk factors.
[35]
The
respondent submits that under the PRRA statutory process, the applicant’s
submission that the officer did not properly consider all the evidence is
incorrect. The officer did consider all the evidence relevant to the protection
claim. The sole evidence she did not consider was that which was irrelevant.
[36]
The
respondent submits that there is no presumption that a decision written in
French means that the decision maker did not understand the English submissions
and evidence. Rather, the jurisprudence clearly states that unless a particular
prejudice is shown in a specific case, a decision maker is entitled to make a
decision in either of Canada’s official languages. The respondent submits that
the applicant has not identified any misconstruction of the applicant’s
submissions or any material error in the officer’s findings of fact. The
jurisprudence clearly states that absent any real prejudice, there is no
reviewable error.
[37]
With
regards to the omission in the decision of the month in which the PRRA
application was received, the respondent submits that the officer stated
earlier in her decision that the PRRA
application was received on or about
January 25, 2010. Further, the decision as a whole shows that the officer knew
that the application had been received and on what date and considered the
materials submitted in the PRRA application in rendering her decision.
[38]
The
respondent notes the applicant’s submission that the officer did not consider
humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) factors related to her establishment,
family and automobile accident. However, the respondent submits that this does
not raise a reviewable error because the officer only had the jurisdiction to
consider the risk factors, not H&C factors.
[39]
The
relevant risks under section 97 of the Act are risks caused directly by another
person or organization in the country to which the applicant would be returning
to. The respondent notes that the Federal Court of Appeal in Covarrubias v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 365, [2006] FCJ
No 1682 held that a section 97 risk cannot arise due to an inability of a
country to provide medical services. Nevertheless, there was no evidence before
the officer to suggest that the applicant’s injuries would subject her to
persecution or section 97 risks in Brazil. Similarly, there was no evidence
before the officer to associate the applicant’s injuries with forward looking
risks from her alleged persecutor in Brazil.
[40]
The
respondent submits that the officer considered the submissions and evidence
relevant to the PRRA decision. The officer’s finding of insufficient evidence
that the applicant’s ex-husband would find her if she returned to Brazil was reasonable based on the evidence. The applicant has not highlighted any relevant
facts that should have been considered but were not.
[41]
In
summary, the respondent submits that the applicant merely disagrees with the
officer’s conclusions without demonstrating that any of them were wrong. Thus,
the officer’s decision was reasonable based on the evidence before her.
Applicant’s Written Reply
[42]
In
reply to the respondent’s preliminary point, the applicant submits that the
officer did not consider the protection risk factors of the applicant’s
extensive injuries. However, this was likely not the officer’s fault. The
relevant evidence (Exhibits E, F, G, H, I and J) was submitted to the Calgary
PRRA unit within 48 hours of the January 30, 2011 accident, long before the
date of the officer’s decision. However, it appears that it never reached the
officer in Montreal.
[43]
The
applicant also submits that her medical health is a relevant consideration. The
officer should have specifically considered it, which she did not do.
Analysis and Decision
[44]
Issue
1
What is the appropriate
standard of review?
Where previous jurisprudence
has determined the standard of review applicable to a particular issue before
the Court, the reviewing court may adopt that standard (see Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paragraph 57).
[45]
It
is trite law that the standard of review of PRRA decisions is reasonableness
(see Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC
799, [2010] FCJ No 980 at paragraph 11; and Aleziri v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 38, [2009] FCJ No 52 at paragraph 11).
In reviewing the officer’s decision on this standard, the Court should not
intervene unless the officer came to a conclusion that is not transparent,
justifiable and intelligible and within the range of acceptable outcomes based
on the evidence before it (see Dunsmuir above, at paragraph 47; and Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] SCJ No 12
at paragraph 59). It is not up to a reviewing Court to substitute its own view
of a preferable outcome,
nor is it the function of the reviewing
Court to reweigh the evidence (see Khosa above, at paragraphs 59 and
61).
[46]
Conversely,
issues of natural justice are reviewable on a correctness standard (see Wang above, at paragraph 11; Malik v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1283, [2009] FCJ No 1643 at paragraph 23;
and Khosa above, at paragraph 43). No
deference is owed to the officer on this issue (see Dunsmuir above, at
paragraph 50).
[47]
Issue
2
Was there a breach of
natural justice?
Although the PRRA officer’s
decision was at issue in this case, the applicant framed her submissions in
terms of a breach of natural justice. The applicant alleges that she was denied
natural justice for the following reasons:
1. The applicant’s
English application was assessed by a French-speaking officer with a
demonstrated lack of English proficiency;
2. The officer did
not consider the new evidence pertaining to the applicant’s automobile accident
in January 2011; and
3. The applicant is
entitled to remain in Canada as she was injured here by a Canadian, is
receiving medical care for her injuries, is pursuing legal action and is a key
witness in the Crown’s prosecution.
[48]
To
support her first argument, the applicant highlights that: the decision was
originally written in French; the month in which the PRRA application was
received was omitted; the officer did not check off either box for one of the
statements in the notes to file form; and there were typographical errors in
the officer’s letter to this Court’s administrator.
[49]
Although
these errors were present, they are minor and insignificant when considering
the officer’s decision as a whole. As highlighted by the respondent, the
officer did correctly note the month in which the applicant’s application was
received at an earlier point in her decision. Further, although the decision
was written in French, it addresses the different aspects of the applicant’s
application, including the complexity of her Brazilian nationality and Bolivian
residency. I therefore find no merit in the applicant’s submission on this
point. When read as a whole, there is nothing to suggest that because the
officer wrote her decision in French she did not understand the applicant’s
English submissions or that the applicant suffered any prejudice from this
process (see Alexis v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 273, [2008] FCJ No 493 at paragraphs 12 to 14).
[50]
Turning
to the second point, the applicant submits that she filed evidence of her
injuries from the January 2011 automobile accident that should have been
considered by the officer when she rendered her decision on May 2, 2011. The
officer did note on the notes to file form that new evidence had been received.
Admittedly, she did not specify what this new evidence was, but it is notable
that there was no space provided for such information, nor any explicit
requirement to specify what such new evidence was on the notes to file form.
[51]
The
officer does broadly state in the sources consulted section of the notes to file
form that she consulted “other documents received on various dates in CIC
Calgary”. However, no where in her decision does she explicitly refer to the
automobile accident in which the applicant suffered her injuries. The officer’s
decision indicates that she rendered it primarily on the threat of the
applicant’s husband which the applicant would face if she returned to Brazil. The officer found no evidence to suggest that he would pursue her or would even
have the means to do so. However, the applicant submits that her injuries are
such that she would have to depend on her husband if returned to South America, thereby re-exposing her to spousal abuse. This possibility is not addressed
by the officer in her decision.
[52]
In
her affidavit dated October 3, 2011, the applicant submits that she informed
the PRRA unit of the accident within 48 hours of its occurrence. As a result,
she was allegedly relieved of the twice weekly reporting conditions of her
release. In support, she attaches the police accident report and the
information of criminal charges laid against the intoxicated driver. The latter
document is dated May 11, 2011; after the officer’s decision was rendered.
Similarly, the other documents appended to the applicant’s October 2011
affidavit also post-date the officer’s decision.
[53]
Thus,
the police accident report is the sole evidence of the automobile accident that
would have been before the officer. It is also notable that the applicant did
not explain the increased risk of spousal abuse that these injuries would
expose her to until more recently in her memorandum of argument for this
application. There was therefore nothing before the officer to relate the
automobile accident with the risk that the applicant might face from her
abusive husband.
[54]
As
such, I do not find that the officer erred in her treatment of the evidence on
the automobile accident. It was sufficient for her to broadly reference this
evidence as “other documents received on various dates in CIC Calgary” under
the sources consulted section of the notes to file form.
[55]
Finally,
the applicant submits that she is entitled to remain in Canada because she was injured here by a Canadian, is receiving medical care for her injuries,
is pursuing legal action and is a key witness in the Crown’s prosecution. The
applicant does not cite any statutory provisions or jurisprudence to support
this assertion. Further, the review of PRRA applications is clearly described
in subsection 113(c) of the Act, requiring that consideration be made on the
basis of sections 96 to 98 of the Act. Nothing in these provisions suggests
that the above mentioned facts entitle the applicant to a positive PRRA
finding.
[56]
However
unfortunate the accident was, the mere fact that it occurred in Canada and was caused by a Canadian does not entitle the applicant to rights that she was
not previously entitled to. Greater leeway may be available under an H&C
application. However, as stated by Mr. Justice Evans in Varga v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 394, [2006] FCJ No
1828, in comparing the PRRA process with the H&C process, “the two
decision-making processes should be neither confused, nor duplicated” (at
paragraph 12).
[57]
As
mentioned above, the applicant in this case framed her submissions as a breach
of natural justice. Several of her arguments would be more correctly framed as
concerns with the officer’s decision. The former attracts the stricter
correctness standard of review, whereas the latter attracts the more deferent
reasonableness standard. Nevertheless, my analysis of the applicant’s
submissions indicates that they must fail on both standards.
[58]
I
find no error as alleged in the officer’s decision. Although she wrote her
decision in French, there was no indication that this prejudiced the applicant.
I also find the officer did consider the evidence that was before her at the
time of her decision. Finally, although it is very unfortunate that the
applicant suffered serious injuries from the automobile accident, this does not
entitle her to rights that she did not previously have. The alleged increased
risk of spousal abuse arising from these injuries was not presented to the
officer and I find no reviewable error in her decision based on the evidence
before her. I would therefore dismiss this application.
[59]
The
respondent did not propose a certified question of general importance.
[60]
The
applicant proposed the following question as a serious question of general
importance for my consideration for certification:
Is a change in the applicant’s medical condition
caused by a serious traffic accident relevant to a PRRA decision?
[61]
I
am not prepared to certify this question as a serious question of general
importance as it would not be determinative of this application.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the
application for judicial review is dismissed.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant
Statutory Provisions
Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27
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72. (1) Judicial
review by the Federal Court with respect to any matter — a decision,
determination or order made, a measure taken or a question raised — under
this Act is commenced by making an application for leave to the Court.
96. A
Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is
outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b) not
having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country.
97. (1) A
person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their
country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of
nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them
personally
(a) to
a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to
a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if
(i) the
person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the
risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not
faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the
risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the
risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate
health or medical care.
. . .
98. A
person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention
is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.
112. (1) A
person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may,
in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if
they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a
certificate described in subsection 77(1).
113. Consideration
of an application for protection shall be as follows:
(a) an
applicant whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected may present
only new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably
available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in
the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection;
(b) a
hearing may be held if the Minister, on the basis of prescribed factors, is
of the opinion that a hearing is required;
(c) in
the case of an applicant not described in subsection 112(3), consideration
shall be on the basis of sections 96 to 98;
. . .
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72. (1) Le
contrôle judiciaire par la Cour fédérale de toute mesure — décision,
ordonnance, question ou affaire — prise dans le cadre de la présente loi est
subordonné au dépôt d’une demande d’autorisation.
96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a) soit
se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle
avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut
y retourner.
97. (1) A
qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit
au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit
à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle
ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle
y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes
originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
. . .
98. La
personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la Convention sur
les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger.
112. (1) La
personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n’est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1)
peut, conformément aux règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle
est visée par une mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat
visé au paragraphe 77(1).
113. Il
est disposé de la demande comme il suit :
a) le
demandeur d’asile débouté ne peut présenter que des éléments de preuve
survenus depuis le rejet ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement accessibles
ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’il n’était pas raisonnable, dans les circonstances,
de s’attendre à ce qu’il les ait présentés au moment du rejet;
b) une
audience peut être tenue si le ministre l’estime requis compte tenu des
facteurs réglementaires;
c) s’agissant
du demandeur non visé au paragraphe 112(3), sur la base des articles 96 à 98;
. . .
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