Date:
20120910
Docket:
IMM-2691-12
Citation:
2012 FC 1066
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario,
September 10, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Gagné
BETWEEN:
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DAILON RONALD SCOTT
DEXTON KIMRON C
SCOTT
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision dated February 28,
2012, of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the Immigration and Refugee
Board [IRB], which rejected the claim for refugee protection of the applicants
(the principal applicant and his minor brother), finding that the applicants
were not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection under sections 96
and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27
[IRPA].
[2]
Having
carefully reviewed the applicant’s arguments against this decision, in light of
all of the evidence in the record, the Court finds that there is no reason for
it to intervene in this case since the impugned RPD decision was reasonable in the
circumstances.
Facts
[3]
The
applicants, who are brothers, are citizens of Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines; their father is a retired police officer of that country. They are aged
28 (in the case of the principal applicant) and 13 (in the case of the minor
brother, whose designated representative before the RPD was the principal
applicant).
[4]
The
two brothers’ claims for refugee protection are based on completely separate grounds.
[5]
The
principal applicant alleges that his problems began in December 2002, when
a group of men accosted him and punched him in the face, asking him for money. When
the applicant tried to escape, one of the assailants (later identified as
Steve) stabbed him in the back with a pair of scissors. He fell to the ground
and was beaten up by his assailants. As a result of the police’s intervention,
two individuals (identified as Steve and Baker) were arrested and tried. Since
they were minors at the time the incident occurred, they managed to obtain a pardon
following their conviction, subject to their keeping the peace and not approaching
the principal applicant.
[6]
In
2003, members of the same group allegedly again approached the applicant on his
way home from work. Two individuals known as Boyle and Dario beat him with a
board and punched him. Again, the principal applicant filed a complaint, and
the assailants were convicted and pardoned by the courts because they were
minors.
[7]
The
applicant alleges that, following these events, in January 2005, he found
refuge on Canouan Island, where he found work. In June 2006, he had to
return to Saint Vincent, however, to take care of his sick mother.
[8]
The
applicant was allegedly attacked a third time in July 2008. He alleges
that, during the Jouvert carnival, some masked men threatened him, telling him
that he would be killed and that he was a [translation]
“dead man walking”.
[9]
The
applicant alleges that, following this incident, he travelled to Canada to seek
refuge with his aunt who lives in Toronto. He stayed there for three weeks
before returning to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, but came back to Canada
on November 28, 2008. His claim for refugee protection was filed in
June 2009.
[10]
The
minor applicant’s claim for refugee protection is dated August 2010. The
minor applicant joined his brother in Canada following their mother’s death on
June 16, 2010. He is seeking Canada’s protection on the grounds that he
fears having to live with his violent and abusive father since his mother died.
[11]
The
minor applicant alleges that, in December 2005, after his father assaulted
his mother and made death threats against them, his mother decided to leave the
family home with him. He then lived safely with his mother until her death in
June 2010. In August 2010, the applicants’ older brother who lives
and studies in Barbados took him to Canada. The applicants allege that, today,
no one but the principal applicant can give the minor applicant a home and take
care of him.
The impugned
decision
[12]
Regarding
the principal applicant, the RPD was not satisfied that his narrative was true
since his vague and imprecise testimony did not shed any further light on his
subjective fear. The RPD noted that the applicant had very little knowledge
about the activities of the gang that allegedly attacked him. He knew neither
the gang’s leader nor the personal or criminal profile of its members. The RPD
concluded that, if the principal applicant had truly been persecuted by this
gang, he would have found out more about its members, by paying attention to everything
that was said or written about them.
[13]
Moreover,
the RPD found that the principal applicant’s return to his country after he
spent three weeks in Canada in August 2008 and the delay before he claimed
refugee protection in 2009 (about seven months) were inconsistent with how one
might expect someone who truly fears for his life to behave. When questioned
about this by the RPD, the applicant replied that he was unfamiliar with the
Canadian refugee protection system, that he had been ashamed of claiming
refugee protection and that he had feared being deported from Canada. These
explanations did not satisfy the RPD, which found that the applicant’s
testimony on this subject was unclear, illogical and inconsistent. The RPD
concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, the applicant was not telling
the truth and had failed to establish a subjective fear.
[14]
The
RPD also noted that, even if it believed the principal applicant, he had not
demonstrated that he had tried to protect himself from the Saints by travelling
or by seeking state protection.
[15]
The
RPD first stated that the principal applicant could have gone to live somewhere
other than Greenhill (where he was attacked twice) and that, in doing so, he
would have been relatively safe given the very nature of street gangs which
operate at a highly local level. The RPD noted in this regard that the
applicant had already lived and worked on Canouan for several months without
difficulty and that there was no evidence to contradict the fact that he was
still free to move to one of the larger islands of the Grenadines, such as
Bequia or Canouan.
[16]
Furthermore,
the RPD noted that adequate state protection was available to the principal
applicant in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The fact that the police had
been unable to identify the individuals who attacked the principal applicant at
the Jouvert carnival was not surprising since the assailants had been masked
and the applicant himself had not been able to recognize them. The RPD noted
that the police had intervened at the time of the previous attacks and that the
assailants had been found guilty, partly because of the principal applicant’s
testimony. This would be impossible in countries where the courts are reluctant
to intervene in order to prosecute crimes committed by street gangs. In
addition, the applicant himself was not completely sure that the last attack,
which allegedly took place at the carnival, was related to the previous
incidents.
[17]
Lastly,
the RPD noted that the objective evidence in the National Documentation Package
on Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, dated November 30, 2001 [Package],
did not contain any information suggesting that the police or courts of this country
were corrupt or lacked independence with respect to street gangs (Tab 9.1
of the Package: VCT102596.E). 11 September 2007. Sections of the criminal
code that outline provisions for bodily harm and assault causing bodily harm).
The statistics available show rather that the country has a police and judicial
system to punish violent crimes (Tab 9.2 of the Package: Justice Studies
Center of the Americas. 2007. “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.” Judicial
Systems in the Americas 2006-2007, pp.
535–538).
[18]
The
RPD concluded that the principal applicant did not discharge his burden of
proving that he had been involved in something more serious than a street fight
and had failed to establish his risk of persecution or harm to be able to avail
himself of Canada’s protection under paragraph 97(1)(b) of the
IRPA.
[19]
The
RPD also found that the minor applicant had not discharged his burden of
demonstrating that he faced any risk from his father’s presence in Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, a risk that would justify his claim for protection
under subsection 97(1) of the IRPA. There was no evidence to establish
that the father of the minor applicant was looking for him or that, given the
time that had gone by since 2005, he would abuse or assault him should he find
him. The RPD also noted that, on a balance of probabilities, the applicants’
father had been involved in the process for obtaining the passport and US visa
for his minor son. In that regard, the applicants testified that the minor
applicant had travelled to Canada with their brother and that they did not know
whether their father had agreed to his minor son’s leaving the country.
[20]
The
RPD added that if the minor applicant did not need his father’s consent for
leaving the country, which it doubted, this meant that someone else had signed
the minor applicant’s passport application and that this person could therefore
care for him. According to the RPD, this is a likely possibility according to
the documentary evidence (Tab 5.10 of the Package: VCT103742.FE. 19 May
2011. Information on the protection and resources provided by the government
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to orphaned children and orphans who
have one parent subject to a prohibition order (pages 99–105, Panel
Record)).
[21]
In
light of the information contained in the Response to Information Request (from
the Director of Research at the IRB), the RPD concluded that the minor
applicant could also be placed in a foster family. For a better understanding
of the RPD’s reasons, the relevant excerpt from the consulted document is
reproduced below:
The Director [of the Ministry of National
Mobilization, Social Development, the Family, Persons with Disabilities, Youth,
Sports and Culture] noted that when a particular case involving a child is
brought to the attention of the State, either by a citizen or a social worker,
the State tries to provide assistance (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 29 Apr.
2011). 2011). However, the Director pointed out that since Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines is not a rich country, it can only provide “limited assistance”
(ibid.). The Director also explained that children are considered
orphans if one or both of their parents have died (ibid.).
According to the Director, members of the orphaned children’s families are
sometimes the ones looking after them after their parents have died (ibid.).
In some cases, the people who have taken the children in have the means to
look after them without assistance from the State (ibid.). However, the
Director also explained that the State may offer monthly financial assistance,
depending on the specific needs of the children (ibid.). He indicated as
an example that the State may provide assistance in purchasing school supplies
(ibid.).
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also has a foster home placement program
(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 29 Apr. 2011; ibid. n.d.b). According
to the website of the Family Services Division, this program is intended for
children who cannot live with their biological parents and includes orphans (ibid.).
The children placed with foster families also include children whose parents
cannot take responsibility for them and those whose parents have rejected,
mistreated or abandoned them (ibid.). According to the Director, there
are approximately 225 children living with foster families in the country (ibid.
29 Apr. 2011). The website explains that children between the ages of 0 and
16 can be placed in foster families (ibid. n.d.b). According to the
site, the foster family may be provided with some financial assistance by the
State (ibid.).
[22]
The
RPD also quoted the following excerpt to support its finding that it was
possible for the minor applicant to find a foster family:
Sources indicate that the country has a foster care
system (St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Oct. 2011; SVGHRA 30 Sept. 2011), that
serves children up to 16 years (St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Oct. 2011).
According to the Family Services director, approximately 200 children are in
foster care (St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Oct. 2011). Of the 200 children,
he claims that approximately 60 to 70 per cent are victims of child abuse,
including physical abuse, sexual abuse, and gross neglect (ibid).
[23]
It
should be noted here that the RPD also referred to the document contained at
Tab 5.2 of the Package, namely VCT103849.E. Prevalence and forms of
child abuse, including legislation, state protection and availability of child
protection services (2008–2011), but that only the document found at
Tab 5.10 is reproduced in the Panel Record. Since the responses to
requests for information are not available electronically, the Court assumes
that the excerpt quoted in the last paragraph of the decision under review
comes from Tab 5.2.
[24]
In
light of all of these reasons, the RPD concluded that the risk of abuse alleged
by the minor applicant was no more than a mere possibility, which is not
sufficient to justify his claim for refugee protection. Lastly, the RPD noted
that, in the alternative, the applicant’s older brother who brought him to
Canada could care for him in the event that the child is forced to live with
his father and the father abuses or assaults him.
Issues and
applicable standards of review
[25]
The
applicants raised the following issues in their application for judicial
review:
a. Did
the RPD err in its assessment of the principal applicant’s credibility with
regard to his subjective fear and the minor applicant’s fear?
b. Did
the RPD err in finding that state protection was available for the applicants?
c. Did
the RPD’s failure to inform the principal applicant that the internal flight
alternative was an important issue deny him of the procedural fairness to which
he was entitled?
[26]
The
first issue concerns the RPD’s assessment of the evidence and of the applicants’
credibility, which is reviewable on the standard of reasonableness. Consequently,
the RPD’s conclusions should stand unless the underlying reasoning was flawed
and falls outside “a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at
paragraph 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir]; Byaje v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 90 at paragraph 5, [2010] FCJ 103).
[27]
The same applies to questions of mixed law and fact such as
the RPD’s determination of state protection (Greaves v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 736 at paragraph 5, [2012] FCJ
754) and its findings of fact regarding an internal flight alternative (Franklyn
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1249 at
paragraph 18, [2005] FCJ 1508; Rueda v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2009 FC 828 at paragraph 58, [2009] FCJ 937).
[28]
Lastly,
the issue whether the applicant had the opportunity to make submissions
regarding the internal flight alternative is a question of procedural fairness,
reviewable on the standard of correctness (Gomes v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 419 at paragraph 6, [2006] FCJ
520 [Gomes]).
Analysis
[29]
For
the reasons that follow, it is my view that the Court’s intervention is not
required in the present matter.
Did
the RPD err in its assessment of the principal applicant’s credibility with
regard to his subjective fear and the minor applicant’s fear?
Credibility
of principal applicant
[30]
The
principal applicant submits that the RPD’s analysis of his credibility was
speculative and inferential and that it was unreasonable for the RPD to
criticize him for not knowing the leader or members of the gang that attacked
him, for not keeping informed about the gang through newspapers and for not
really knowing whether members of the gang had committed crimes or served
sentences. He alleges that the RPD imposed an excessive burden of proof on him
given that he has not lived in Saint Vincent since 2008. He also claims that
had he paid special attention to the gang’s activities, he could have incurred
the gang members’ wrath even further. He submits that the RPD could not expect
him to carry out the investigative work of a police officer.
[31]
Considering
that this was the very basis of the principal applicant’s claim for refugee
protection, there is no doubt that it was reasonable for the RPD to question
the facts to ensure that they were true. Upon reading the hearing transcripts,
the Court shares the RPD’s and the respondent’s opinion that the principal
applicant’s testimony on the gang was generally vague and imprecise. It was not
until he was re-examined several times on the activities and the crimes
committed by the members of the gang in question that the principal applicant
finally mentioned some murders and assaults, without, however, clarifying or
providing more information on the outcome of these incidents or the people
involved in them. Contrary to what the applicant asserts, I am not satisfied
that his burden was excessive. His testimony raises reasonable doubts about the
genuineness of his feeling targeted and harassed by the gang. The panel’s reasoning
that if the principal applicant had felt harassed, he would have found out more
about the gang is not unreasonable as such. The RPD’s questions on this matter
clearly concerned the time the applicant lived in his country.
[32]
The
Court cannot intervene to reassess the evidence if the RPD’s finding is
defensible as being reasonable on the basis of the evidence. I consider that to
be the situation here. Since the applicant failed to explain why he believed he
had been the target of members of the gang, the RPD was unable to determine
whether the alleged risk was personalized and prospective.
[33]
The
principal applicant submits that the RPD identified contradictions where there
were none in its analysis of the applicant’s reasons for not making a refugee
claim at the first opportunity, that is, on his first trip to Canada in
August 2008.
[34]
Upon
reviewing the hearing transcripts, it is my view that the principal applicant’s
testimony in this respect does not contain any major contradictions, even
though the RPD’s conclusions do not seem to be unreasonable either. It was reasonable
for the RPD to draw a negative inference on the credibility of the principal
applicant, with regard to his subjective fear of persecution, the time that
elapsed between his arrival in Canada and his claiming refugee protection and
the fact that he returned to Saint Vincent after his first visit to Canada.
[35]
In an older decision, the Federal Court of Appeal indicates
that “(t)he delay in making a claim to refugee status or in leaving a country
of persecution is not a decisive factor in itself. It is, however, a relevant
element which the tribunal may take into account in assessing both the
statements and the actions and deeds of a claimant” (Huerta v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1993 FCA 271, 1993, 157 NR 225
(FCA)). This Court’s case law recognizes that a refugee claimant’s delay in
seeking protection can be a reasonable factor when assessing the truthfulness
of his or her subjective fear, particularly when the credibility of his or her narrative
is already tainted (Peti v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2012 FC 82 at paragraph 42, [2012] FCJ 68; Valera v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1384 at paragraph 13, [2008] FCJ 1775).
Furthermore, a refugee protection claimant’s returning to his or her country
after having left it a first time is another factor that it is reasonable to
take into account (Rocha v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2010 FC 195 at paragraphs 8–10, [2010] FCJ 228). In light of this case
law, I find that the RPD’s conclusion in the present matter was not unreasonable.
[36]
With
regard to the medical report filed by the principal applicant, while it
corroborated the fact that the principal applicant had been physically harmed
in the past, it could not corroborate his alleged subjective and prospective
fear of persecution. Since the RPD concluded that the principal applicant had
likely been involved in street fights, the medical report was of no help, and
the RPD was not required to refer to it in its reasons. The mere fact of not
referring to it does not allow the Court to conclude that it failed to consider
it (Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (FCA),
[1993] FCJ 598).
[37]
The
role of this Court in the context of an application for judicial review is not
to repeat the exercise of assessing the evidence and thus “usurp the Board’s
role as trier of fact”, to quote Justice Mosley in Gardanzari v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1047 at paragraph 14,
[2005] FCJ 1320.
Minor
applicant’s fear
[38]
With
regard to the risk alleged by the minor applicant, namely having to live with
his father, a clarification must be made before reviewing the applicants’
arguments.
[39]
The
applicants are challenging all the other solutions proposed by the RPD, such as
the possibility of the minor applicant being placed in a foster family, living
with other members of his family or, alternatively, living with the brother who
accompanied him to Canada, if, indeed, he has no other choice but to live with
his father and his father turns out to be violent or abusive. It must not be
forgotten that this part of the decision is but a logical extension of the RPD’s
conclusion on the merit of the minor applicant’s claim for refugee protection. The
RPD concluded, on a balance of probabilities, that the minor applicant would
not be at risk of being abused by his father if he had to return to his
country, given that he had not had any problems since 2005 and that there were
valid grounds for believing that his father had agreed to the minor applicant’s
getting a passport and leaving the country.
[40]
The
applicants failed to submit any evidence that the father had been denied his
parental authority or that the parental bond between the minor applicant and
his father had been broken to the point that the father’s consent was not
required for the minor applicant to leave the country. According to the RPD, if
that were the case, the minor applicant would not have to live with his father
should he return to his country, but could live with the person who signed his
passport application, be that his brother or another relative.
[41]
The
applicants submit that this conclusion has no factual basis and that the panel
should have taken all reasonable measures to refine its understanding of the
facts if it wanted to base its decision on this conclusion.
[42]
The
respondent refers the Court to a Response to Information Request (Tab 3.5:
VCT103090.E. 23 March 2009. Procedure for a minor to be issued a passport;
whether written authorization from both parents is a requirement), which
sets out the instructions for applying for a passport for a minor, available on
the Web site of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. The document
states that “(c)hildren under 16 must complete Form B and have the application
signed by the parent”.
[43]
Even
though the RPD did not specifically refer to this document in its reasons, it
nonetheless has specialized knowledge of such procedures. I am of the opinion
that, in the circumstances, the Court owes a certain level of deference to the
RPD’s observations, particularly in the context where the applicants were
unable to shed any light on the issue. The onus was theirs (Soares v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 190 at paragraph 22,
[2007] FCJ 254).
[44]
It
is my view that all the other arguments of the minor applicant, with whom we
can certainly sympathize, fall more within the purview of an application for
permanent residence on humanitarian grounds (if the principal applicant’s claim
for refugee protection were allowed) than a claim for refugee protection on the
grounds listed at sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. In other words, it was
sufficient for the RPD to conclude that the minor applicant has no subjective
fear of persecution should he return to his country to dispose of his claim for
refugee protection in Canada.
[45]
I
conclude therefore that the RPD did not err in its assessment of the minor
applicant’s fear or make other erroneous findings of fact in respect of his
claim for protection.
Did the RPD err in finding that
state protection was available for the applicants?
[46]
The
applicants’ arguments about state protection in their country essentially rely
on the facts. The principal applicant submits that the fact that his assailants
successfully obtained a pardon (after being convicted) demonstrates not only
that the courts are unwilling to punish members of street gangs, but also that
they cannot intervene at the group level even if they can punish individual
members. In other words, convicting the assailants will not stop other gang
members from attempting to take their revenge on him or continuing to persecute
him.
[47]
Both
parties rely on the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Carillo v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 94, [2008] FCJ 399 [Carrillo],
to argue that state protection does (according to the applicant), or does not
(according to the respondent), have to be adequate. According to most of the
case law of this Court, the accepted standard is “adequate” and not “effective”
or “perfect” state protection (Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) v Villafranca, [1992] FCJ 1189, 99 DLR (4th) 334 (FCA); Mendez
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 584 at
paragraphs 18–23, [2008] FCJ 771; Cueto v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 805 at paragraphs 27–28, [2009] FCJ
917).
[48]
In
the decision before me, the RPD relied on objective documentary evidence to
conclude that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have a police and judicial
system to punish violent crimes and that there was no evidence that this system
is corrupt or biased. The RPD’s finding that this principle is confirmed in the
case of the principal applicant who obtained some protection in the two
instances where he was attacked is also reasonable. The fact that the principal
applicant’s assailants were pardoned does not demonstrate that the state was
unable to act or refused to act, given that in the case of the first two
attacks, the assailants were minors, and in the case of the third incident, the
principal applicant himself was unable to identify his assailants.
[49]
Adequate
protection does not include preventive protection as the applicant understands
it, namely, his assailants’ conviction systematically saving him from any
future attacks. The risk the principal applicant faces was analyzed by the RPD,
which concluded, on a balance of probabilities, that it was not significant. The
RPD’s decision is defensible and reasonable in that respect.
[50]
As
regards the minor applicant, the Court notes that it is presumed that states
are capable of protecting their citizens unless they are unable to do so
because of a complete breakdown of state apparatus (Canada (Attorney
General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at paragraph 50). It is well established that it is the
refugee claimant’s responsibility to rebut this presumption by adducing “relevant,
reliable and convincing” evidence that shows, on a balance of probabilities,
that state protection is inadequate in his or her case (Carrillo, above,
at paragraph 30). Nothing of the sort was done by the applicants in this
case to attempt to obtain the state’s protection of the minor applicant; they
also failed to establish that it was objectively unreasonable to do so.
Did the RPD’s failure to inform
the principal applicant that the internal flight alternative was an important
issue deny him of the procedural fairness to which he was entitled?
[51]
The
principal applicant submits that the RPD violated its duty of procedural
fairness since it did not raise the issue of an internal flight alternative at
the start of the hearing and that, consequently, he was denied the opportunity
to make submissions on this issue. The applicants referred to several decisions
of this Court—including Augustine v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1998] FCJ 1069; Sivamayam v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] FCJ 1218; and Gomes, above—to
argue that the RPD had an obligation, at the beginning of the hearing, to bring
all the important issues raised by their claim for refugee protection to their attention.
[52]
In
Gomes, Justice Barnes, reviewed the case law applicable in this matter. It
emerges that the RPD’s duty is to ensure that the claimant is aware of all the
issues “it considers to be . . . potentially determinative” (Gomes,
above, at paragraph 7). At the outset, the RPD told the applicants:
So with respect to the issues,
well we’ll have to investigate the fear of the claimant today, what the
claimants fear if they were returned. Credibility of course is always in play,
and state protection is of course the key concern.
[53]
It is true that the issue of the internal flight
alternative was not mentioned at this stage of the hearing, but counsel for the
applicants examined the principal applicant on this point. He submits, however,
that had this issue been identified as being determinative at the start of the
hearing, he would have spent more time on it during his examination.
[54]
The transcript of the hearing and the written submissions
of counsel for the applicants before the RPD reveal not only that counsel was
aware of this aspect of the claim, but also that he considered it to be
important and determinative enough to address it in both his oral and written
submissions. This argument is therefore rejected (see Thevarajah v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1654 at paragraph 16, [2004] FCJ
2008).
[55]
In conclusion, the Court’s intervention in this case is not
required.
No question of general importance has been proposed, and
none arises from this case.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that
1.
This
application for judicial review be dismissed.
2.
No question is certified.
“Jocelyne Gagné”
Certified true
translation
Johanna Kratz,
Translator
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