Date: 20120614
Docket: T-1318-11
Citation:
2012 FC 755
Ottawa, Ontario, June 14, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
BETWEEN:
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PHU QUOC HUY (MINOR ADOPTED
SON)
REPRESENTED BY PHU THO QUANG
(ADOPTIVE FATHER)
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Applicant
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and
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MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of the decision of the Operations Manager
[the manager] at the High Commission of Canada in Singapore, dated June 16,
2011, refusing the citizenship application of Phu Quoc Huy [the applicant],
adopted son of Canadian citizen Phu Tho Quang [Mr. Phu], who presented
arguments on behalf of the applicant at the hearing. The manager was not
satisfied that the adoption was not entered into primarily for the purpose of
acquiring a status or privilege in relation to citizenship, in contravention of
paragraph 5.1(3)(b) of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29 [the
Citizenship Act].
I. Background
[2]
The
applicant is a Vietnamese citizen born on November 27, 1992. On December 12,
2007, at the age of 15 and following the divorce of his parents in 2006, he was
adopted by his uncle, Mr. Phu, a Canadian citizen living in the province of Quebec.
[3]
The
applicant first applied for citizenship in March of 2008. The officer reviewing
the application, identified several concerns and recommended that proof of a
genuine parent-child relationship be provided (Computer Assisted Immigration
Processing System [CAIPS] notes, Trial Record [TR] at 4). Receiving further
submissions from the applicant, the reviewing officer was concerned that
despite proof of five visits to Vietnam by Mr. Phu between 2005 and 2007, only
two photos could be provided of him with the applicant. The photos were of the
applicant at a funeral procession for his grandmother, accompanied by his
father and Mr. Phu. The officer did not find evidence of a parent-child
relationship and also had concerns, based on the addresses provided in their
household registrations and divorce documents, as to whether the applicant’s
parents were in fact divorced and living apart (CAIPS notes, TR at 6).
[4]
An
interview was held with the applicant and his father in the presence of an
interpreter. Following the interview, a determination was made that the
applicant did not meet the requirement set out in paragraph 5.1(3)(b) of
the Citizenship Act, which requires that “the adoption was not entered
into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege in relation
to immigration or citizenship.” During the interview, the applicant stated that
while he lived with his aunt, his father visited him every 10 days to one month
and that his sister took him to visit his mother about once a month, which it
was determined showed a significant parent-child relationship with his
biological parents and that the adoption was therefore one “of convenience for
the purpose of acquiring Canadian citizenship” (CAIPS notes, TR at 10). It was
also found there was no significant information on file to indicate a genuine
relationship between the applicant and Mr. Phu.
[5]
The
applicant applied for judicial review of that decision and on consent, the
application was granted and the matter was remanded for re-assessment. At that
point, after reviewing the entire file, the manager identified several continued
concerns surrounding the applicant’s adoption, his current residence, whether
his younger brother resided with him, and whether he would be adopted as well. It
was noted that the Household Register on file showed that the applicant’s
family lived together, including his father, mother, older sister, and younger
brother. Accordingly, the manager determined that another interview with the
applicant was necessary.
[6]
On
March 3, 2010, Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] anti-fraud officer Jack
Avery [the officer] visited the applicant’s residence in the company of a
translator. The applicant was not there at the time, but the officer spoke with
his older sister and his aunt. During the interview with the sister, the aunt
contacted Mr. Phu, who was on vacation in Vietnam at the time. Mr. Phu asked to
speak with the officer, but the officer informed him that he had to complete
the interview with the sister before she returned to work and that he could
call the officer when he returned to Ho Chi Minh City. Approximately 15 minutes
later, the aunt summoned her niece to the phone. The officer presumed it was
probably Mr. Phu on the phone and that he might be coaching her on what to say.
The officer went over to her and she confirmed that it was her uncle on the
phone. The officer asked him not to call as he was taking valuable time from
the interview and reiterated his statement that Mr. Phu could call him when he
returned to Ho Chi Minh City (CAIPS notes, TR at 16-17).
[7]
After
the visit, the officer provided the following summary (CAIPS notes, TR at 19):
The
circumstances of this adoption point to one of design in obtaining permanent
residence in Canada for the boy. The actual adoption takes place after the boy
has reached the age of 15, which is illegal in Vietnam. Both his mother and
father live within short distances to where he is residing. We believe that the
father still resides with him at this address. A telephone call that [the
interpreter] made to a neighbour indicates as much.
[8]
Unable
to speak to the applicant or his parents during the first visit, the officer
returned with the interpreter to the home on August 4, 2010, hoping to
establish if the applicant’s father did in fact reside at the same residence. They
first spoke to a street vendor located directly in front of the residence, who
was renting the space from the family. The vendor confirmed that the
applicant’s father lived at the home. The officer and interpreter then proceeded
to the home, where they found a young boy watching television. Speaking to the
boy, they confirmed that he was the applicant’s younger brother, lived there
for years with his mother, that she was out selling, and that the applicant
would take his mother’s place at noon while she had lunch (CAIPS notes, TR at
20).
[9]
The
applicant then came into the house. He sent his brother out and indicated that
his brother was “just visiting.” The officer and interpreter introduced
themselves and explained why they were there. They proceeded to interview the
applicant in Vietnamese. The applicant at first stated that while his parents
divorced in 2006, the situation had since improved and the family was back
together as one. Their financial situation was difficult however and his uncle
was sending them money regularly. Questioned further, the applicant admitted
that his family had actually never lived apart (CAIPS notes, TR at 21-22):
Q. You have always lived here?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Has your brother always lived
here?
A. Before he lived with mother and just back.
Q. When did your mother and
brother come back?
A. A long time back.
Q. After 2006?
A. (he pauses and doesn’t answer,
appearing to not know what to
say)
Q. Were you ever actually living
apart?
A.
No.
[10]
The
officer resumed his findings as follows (CAIPS notes, TR at 22):
During
the course of the interview, the [applicant] gave an elaborate answer regarding
a family problem that occurred in 2006. It seems that there was some kind of
major crisis in the family. His sister told us during the first interview that
the father had a mistress. Today the [applicant] talked of his father’s mother
passing away in 2006 and that everyone hated his father at the time. It appears
as though a rift was created and that it was decided that the [applicant]
should go and live with his uncle in Canada. According to the sister, her
father went bankrupt when the mother was pregnant with the younger brother. She
says that the father blamed his bad luck on the [applicant].
With
time the parents appear to have resolved their situation but are still carrying
on with the charade of being divorced for the sole purpose of having their son
get to Canada. Everyone of the family members are participants in the scheme
except for the youngest brother as he appears to have not been told. Today he
spoke the truth as he knows nothing else. When confronted with this, the
applicant had no choice but to admit the truth as well. The mother, father, and
two children have always lived together as a family unit, in spite of some
challenges and difficulties. The adoption is a sham.
[11]
In
correspondence dated August 5, 2010 addressed to the Canadian High Commission,
which included photos of Mr. Phu with the applicant and money transfer receipts,
Mr. Phu wrote the following (TR at 28-29):
According
to my adopted son, on August 4, 2010, there were an unknown Immigration
Officer and an unknown interpreter from Consulate General of Canada to Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City came to my sister residence […] without any confirmation.
There
was no one home except for my adopted son and eight years old boy. At first the
unknown Immigration Officer and unknown interpreter spoke with the eight
years old boy without the present of an adult in the family. Then they spoke
with my adopted son for about half an hour about the family status and his
future. The unknown Immigration Officer and an unknown interpreter had
convinced to my adopted son that life for my adopted son is better in Vietnam than in Canada and my adopted son has no chance to reunite with his adopted family in Canada.
I
feel sorry for the negative feedback from this unknown Immigration Officer that he gave it to my
adopted son while on the other side of the world his adopted father is working
extremely hard to prepare for the family to be together.
Immigration Officer Jack Every came to my sister residence before and
this unknown Immigration Officer came again probably for the same
purpose about my adopted son’s biology parents status.
Just a reminder that this adopted event happened back in 2006 during my trip in
Vietnam. It has been more than three years since I applied to sponsor my
adopted son. Please accept the fact that people do change from times to times
but my adoption remain solid with my commitment that I had made four years ago.
My
older sister Phu Thi Thu Nga had refused to look after my adopted son in
reasoning that she does not want extra stress from this affaire. Therefore I’ve
decided to move my adopted son to live with my family in law in another
province. [Emphasis in original.]
[12]
Having
reviewed the entire application and in light of the evidence provided by the
officer, the manager determined that the applicant did not meet the
requirements of the Citizenship Act. In a letter dated June 16, 2011,
the manager informed the applicant of her decision to refuse the application, based
on the investigation conducted by the CBSA anti-fraud officer, which provided
evidence that the adoption did not create a genuine parent-child relationship
with Mr. Phu and was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring status
or privilege in relation to citizenship, contrary to paragraph 5.1(3)(b)
of the Citizenship Act: “His investigation results provide concrete
evidence that, contrary to the information you had provided on the application
and at interviews, you actually live with your biological parents, your younger
brother and your aunt. Although both you and your father claimed to the
contrary, you do have an ongoing parent-child relationship with your biological
parents” (TR at 26).
II. Issues
and Standard of Review
[13]
While
the applicant has set out a number of issues (which will be addressed within
these reasons), the determinative issue is whether the manager erred in her
assessment of the evidence. The fact-driven inquiry and assessment of the
evidence required by section 5.1 of the Citizenship Act calls for the
reasonableness standard of review (Satnarine v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 91 at para 9, [2012] FCJ 97 and Jardine
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 565 at paras
16-17, [2011] FCJ 782). Accordingly, this Court will only intervene if the
decision does not fall within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes or
does not accord with the principles of justification, transparency, and
intelligibility (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008]
1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir]).
III. Analysis
[14]
As
outlined above, the officer visited the applicant’s home on two occasions and
his investigation led him to conclude the adoption was a sham. Contrary to the
account initially given by the applicant, his father, aunt, sister, and Mr. Phu,
the applicant never stopped living with his parents and the adoption appeared
to have been entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring status or
privilege in relation to citizenship, contrary to subparagraph 5.1(3)(b)
of the Citizenship Act:
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Citizenship
Act,
RSC 1985,
c
C-29
Adoptees
— minors
5.1
(1) Subject to subsection (3), the Minister shall on application grant
citizenship to a person who was adopted by a citizen on or after January 1,
1947 while the person was a minor child […]
Quebec adoptions
(3)
The Minister shall on application grant citizenship to a person in respect of
whose adoption — by a citizen who is subject to Quebec law governing
adoptions — a decision was made abroad on or after January 1, 1947 if
[…]
(b)
the adoption was not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a
status or privilege in relation to immigration or citizenship.
|
Loi
sur la citoyenneté,
LRC
(1985), ch C-29
Cas
de personnes adoptées — mineurs
5.1
(1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3), le ministre attribue, sur demande, la
citoyenneté à la personne adoptée par un citoyen le 1er janvier 1947 ou
subséquemment lorsqu’elle était un enfant mineur […]
Adoptants
du Québec
(3)
Le ministre attribue, sur demande, la citoyenneté à toute personne faisant
l’objet d’une décision rendue à l’étranger prononçant son adoption, le 1er
janvier 1947 ou subséquemment, par un citoyen assujetti à la législation
québécoise régissant l’adoption, si les conditions suivantes sont remplies
[…]
b) l’adoption ne visait pas
principalement l’acquisition d’un statut ou d’un privilège relatifs à
l’immigration ou à la citoyenneté.
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[15]
Section 10.9 of
the Citizenship Policy Operations Manual on Adoptions (CP 14) indicates that if
an officer determines that “the adoption was entered into primarily for the
purpose of acquiring status or privilege in relation to immigration or
citizenship (i.e. an adoption of convenience), the officer must refuse the
application [emphasis in original].” Section 10.10 sets out how to identify an
adoption of convenience, stating that an officer “must form his or her opinion
on factors which, taken together, could make a reasonably prudent person
conclude the adoption has taken place to circumvent the IRPA or the Citizenship
Act.” It is noted that no formal criteria exist for deciding whether or not
an adoption is bona fide, but that the officer should look at
relevant information, and a non-exhaustive list of potential elements to
consider is provided. Elements listed which are pertinent to this case include:
▪ the
circumstances of the adoption;
▪ the whereabouts
of the child’s biological parents and the nature of their personal
circumstances;
▪ who was included
in the child’s household before and after the adoption (e.g. did the child
continue to live in the same household as the biological parents even after the
adoption);
▪ supplanting of
the authority of the child’s biological parent(s) by that of the adopting
parent(s); and
▪ the relationship
between the adopted child and the biological parent(s) after the adoption.
[16]
The
officer’s investigation revealed that the applicant and his family had misled
Canadian authorities as to the circumstances of the adoption and the continued
relationship between the applicant and his parents. Mr. Phu’s correspondence of
August 5, 2010 and additional evidence clearly failed to alleviate the concerns
raised by this deception. In light of the pertinent elements set out in the
policy manual and the related findings made by the officer, it was reasonable
for the manager to conclude that the applicant had failed to satisfy her that
his adoption was not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring status
or privilege in relation to citizenship, as set out in paragraph 5.1(3)(b)
of the Citizenship Act. This conclusion falls within the
range of possible, acceptable outcomes and adheres to the principles of
justification, transparency and intelligibility set out by the Supreme Court in
Dunsmuir, above.
[17]
In
his submissions, Mr. Phu alleges that the manager failed to consider all the
evidence before her, but fails to identify any specific evidence, let alone
explain how this evidence could have affected the outcome of the application. Having
reviewed the record, this Court finds the evidence submitted by the applicant
and Mr. Phu was insufficient to cast doubt on the reasonability of the manager’s
decision.
[18]
Mr.
Phu has also questioned the adequacy of the reasons provided by the manager,
but this Court finds that the reasons meet the bar set in Newfoundland and
Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011
SCC 62 at para 16, [2011] SCJ 62. Specifically, the reasons dated June 16, 2011
allow this Court to understand why the manager made her decision and permit it
to determine whether her conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes,
as it was established above.
[19]
Mr.
Phu alleges a breach of the principles of natural justice caused by the
manager’s alleged failure to consider whether or not to recommend an exercise
of discretion under subsections 5(3), 5(4) or 9(2) of the Citizenship Act,
as set out in subsection 15(1):
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Citizenship
Act,
RSC 1985,
c
C-29
Recommendation
re use of discretion
15. (1) Where a citizenship judge is unable to
approve an application under subsection 14(2), the judge shall, before
deciding not to approve it, consider whether or not to recommend an exercise
of discretion under subsection 5(3) or (4) or subsection 9(2) as the circumstances
may require.
[Emphasis added.]
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Loi
sur la citoyenneté,
LRC
(1985), ch C-29
Exercice
du pouvoir discrétionnaire
15.
(1) Avant de rendre une décision de rejet, le juge de la citoyenneté examine s’il y a lieu
de recommander l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire prévu aux paragraphes
5(3) ou (4) ou 9(2), selon le cas.
[Nous
soulignons.]
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[20]
In
the English version, a citizenship judge’s duty to consider whether or not to
recommend an exercise of discretion under subsections 5(3), 5(4), and 9(2) comes into play
only when he is unable to approve an application under subsection 14(2). While
the French version does not explicitly specify subsection 14(2), it also only
speaks of the duty of the citizenship judge. In either case, section 14 makes
clear which applications are to be considered by a citizenship judge:
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Citizenship
Act,
RSC 1985,
c
C-29
Consideration
by citizenship judge
14.
(1) An application for
(a)
a grant of citizenship under subsection 5(1) or (5),
(b)
[Repealed, 2008, c. 14, s. 10]
(c)
a renunciation of citizenship under subsection 9(1), or
(d)
a resumption of citizenship under subsection 11(1)
shall
be considered by a citizenship judge who shall, within sixty days of the day
the application was referred to the judge, determine whether or not the
person who made the application meets the requirements of this Act and the
regulations with respect to the application.
[…]
Advice
to Minister
(2)
Forthwith after making a determination under subsection (1) in respect of an
application referred to therein but subject to section 15, the citizenship
judge shall approve or not approve the application in accordance with his
determination, notify the Minister accordingly and provide the Minister with
the reasons therefor.
[…]
[Emphasis added.]
|
Loi
sur la citoyenneté,
LRC
(1985), ch C-29
Examen
par un juge de la citoyenneté
14.
(1) Dans les soixante jours de sa saisine, le juge de la citoyenneté statue
sur la conformité — avec les dispositions applicables en l’espèce de la présente
loi et de ses règlements — des demandes déposées en vue de :
a) l’attribution de
la citoyenneté, au titre des paragraphes 5(1) ou (5);
b) [Abrogé, 2008, ch.
14, art. 10]
c) la répudiation de la
citoyenneté, au titre du paragraphe 9(1);
d) la réintégration dans
la citoyenneté, au titre du paragraphe 11(1).
[…]
Information
du ministre
(2)
Aussitôt après avoir statué sur la demande visée au paragraphe (1), le juge
de la citoyenneté, sous réserve de l’article 15, approuve ou rejette la demande
selon qu’il conclut ou non à la conformité de celle-ci et transmet sa
décision motivée au ministre.
[…]
[Nous
soulignons.]
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[21]
As
it is made clear in section 14, the application for citizenship of a person
adopted by a Canadian citizen, governed by section 5.1, is not an application
to be considered by a citizenship judge. Consequently, the obligation set out
in subsection 15(1) for a citizenship judge to consider a recommendation under
subsections 5(3), 5(4), and 9(2) did not apply to the applicant in this case.
[22]
Mr.
Phu also alleges that the manager failed to clearly select and apply the
appropriate test to determine whether the applicant had met the requirements
under paragraph 5.1(3)(b) of the Citizenship Act. This argument appears
to refer to the various tests considered by citizenship judges when examining
applications for citizenship made under section 5 of the Citizenship Act.
As explained above, an application for citizenship of a person adopted by a
Canadian citizen is made under section 5.1, a different provision with
different requirements, and does not require the application of the tests
established under section 5.
[23]
Finally,
Mr. Phu implies that the manager intentionally waited for the status of the
applicant’s biological family to change so that she could question the
information provided in the application. There is no evidence in the record of
such an intentional delay. Furthermore, the account according to which the
parents divorced and moved away, leaving the applicant with his aunt, proved
false. The applicant confirmed that his parents continued to live with him
throughout. The application was processed normally, concerns raised in light of
the evidence were investigated, and the investigation revealed a significant
degree of deception which cast doubt as to whether the adoption was
entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring status or privilege in
relation to citizenship.
For all of these reasons, this Court finds the manager’s decision to be
reasonable, falling within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes, and
adhering to the principles of justification, transparency, and intelligibility
set out in Dunsmuir, above.
[24]
Mr.
Phu was given every opportunity to explain the case and to present his
arguments at the hearing. He did so in an elaborate way and this Court has
taken his oral submissions into consideration.
[25]
Counsel
for the respondent is claiming costs. Using my discretion, pursuant to Rule 400
of the Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106, I will limit them to $250.00.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the
application for judicial review of the June 16, 2011 decision is dismissed.
Costs of $250.00 are in favour of the respondent.
“Simon Noël”