Date: 20101004
Docket: IMM-3254-09
Citation: 2010 FC 987
Ottawa, Ontario, October 4,
2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
MALIHA
ADIL
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
This is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
(Act) for judicial review of a decision of a Visa
Officer (Officer), dated 27 March 2009 (Decision), which
refused the Applicant’s application for a permanent
resident visa as a member of the Convention Refugee Abroad class or as a member
of the Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad class.
BACKGROUND
[1]
The
Applicant, Maliha Adil, is a citizen of Afghanistan. In January
2008 the Applicant, accompanied by her husband and five children, left Afghanistan and crossed
the border into Tajikistan, where they currently reside. According to the
Applicant, they fled Afghanistan to protect their
daughter from a local warlord, Razul, who, beginning in October 2007, had
threatened repeatedly to kidnap and marry by force their eldest daughter. The
daughter was 13 years of age; Razul was 43 years of age and married with
children. The Applicant explained to the Officer that she and her husband had
consulted the local police, who said that Razul had money and power and that
they couldn’t help them.
[2]
The
Applicant applied for a permanent residence visa as a member of either the
Convention Refugee Abroad Class or the Humanitarian-Protected Persons Class. The Officer
interviewed the Applicant and her husband in Tajikistan on 23 March
2009. Prior to the interview, the Applicant submitted for review photocopies of
documents, including diplomas, as proof of their education and employment
histories. They brought to the interview the original documents as well as a
video recording that was identified by the Applicant’s nephew and sponsor in
his affidavit dated 5 July 2010 as a recording of the ceremony in which the
Applicant’s husband received his diploma in pharmacy from the Balkh
Intermediate Medical Institute.
[3]
The
application was rejected at the interview. The Officer stated the following
reasons: the responses of the Applicant and those of her husband were vague and
lacked credibility; an expert had identified as fake the diplomas evidencing
the educational qualifications of the Applicant and her husband; and the
Applicant was a member of neither the Convention Refugee Abroad Class nor
the Humanitarian-Protected Persons Class.
[4]
On
25 June 2009, the Applicant filed an application for judicial review of the Officer’s
negative Decision. Leave was granted on June 7, 2010.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[5]
In
the Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System, or CAIPS notes, the Officer
identified his two primary concerns regarding the application. First, the
diplomas offered as proof of the Applicant’s education and that of her husband
were determined by a specialist to be fake. Second, during the interview many
of the Applicant’s responses as well as those of her husband were “very vague,”
particularly with respect to their education and employment. Based on these
concerns, the Officer concluded that the Applicant and her husband were not
truthful in answering all questions and, therefore, the Applicant did not meet
the definition of a refugee.
[6]
In
his letter to the Applicant dated 27 March 2009, the Officer elaborated on
these reasons. According to his assessment of what the Applicant stated in the
interview, she was not facing any persecution in Afghanistan. For this
reason, she did not meet the requirements of section 96 of the Act and Regulations
139(1)(e), 145 and 147 (sic) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Regulations.
ISSUES
[7]
The Applicant has formally stated the following issues:
1.
Did
the Officer err in law and in fact when he made erroneous findings of fact or
misinterpreted the law?
2.
Did
the Officer fail to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness
or other procedure he was required to observe, or did he act in a perverse and
capricious manner by basing his Decision on irrelevant or extraneous
considerations and, having done so, by refusing the application for not meeting
the criteria of the Act?
3.
Did
the Officer fail to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness
or other procedure that he was required by law to observe when he failed to
consider the relevant evidence, the facts particular to the Applicant’s case
and the publicly available documents in reaching his Decision?
[8]
In
her argument, the Applicant also raises the following specific issues:
1.
Whether the Officer erred in finding that the Applicant was not a person
in need of protection under the Act;
2.
Whether the Officer failed to provide the Applicant with an
opportunity to prove the authenticity of her educational/employment documents;
3.
Whether the Officer erred in finding that the Applicant’s
educational/employment documentation was not credible;
4.
Whether the interpretation provided during the interview was
inaccurate.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[9]
The following provisions of the Act are applicable in these
proceedings:
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear
of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country
of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to return to that country.
Person in
need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of
protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country
and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless
imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide
adequate health or medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of
protection.
|
Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le
réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de
sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe
social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors
du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne
à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays
dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le
croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la
Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements
ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de
l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2)
A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au
Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
|
[10]
The following provisions of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 are also applicable in these
proceedings:
139. (1) A
permanent resident visa shall be issued to a foreign national in need of
refugee protection, and their accompanying family members, if following an
examination it is established that
(a) the foreign national is outside
Canada;
(b) the foreign national has submitted
an application in accordance with section 150;
(c) the foreign national is seeking to
come to Canada to establish permanent residence;
(d) the foreign national is a person
in respect of whom there is no reasonable prospect, within a reasonable
period, of a durable solution in a country other than Canada, namely
(i) voluntary repatriation or resettlement in
their country of nationality or habitual residence, or
(ii) resettlement or an offer of resettlement
in another country;
(e) the foreign national is a member
of one of the classes prescribed by this Division;
…
145. A foreign national is a
Convention refugee abroad and a member of the Convention refugees abroad
class if the foreign national has been determined, outside Canada, by an officer to be a
Convention refugee.
…
147. A foreign national is a member of the country of
asylum class if they have been determined by an officer to be in need of
resettlement because
(a) they are outside all of their countries of
nationality and habitual residence; and
(b) they have been, and continue to be, seriously
and personally affected by civil war, armed conflict or massive violation of
human rights in each of those countries.
148. (1) A foreign national is a member of the source country class if
they have been determined by an officer to be in need of resettlement because
(a) they are residing in their country of
nationality or habitual residence and that country is a source country within
the meaning of subsection (2) at the time their permanent resident visa
application is made as well as at the time a visa is issued; and
(b) they
(i) are being seriously and personally affected by civil
war or armed conflict in that country,
(ii) have been or are being detained or imprisoned with
or without charges, or subjected to some other form of penal control, as a
direct result of an act committed outside Canada that would, in Canada, be a
legitimate expression of freedom of thought or a legitimate exercise of civil
rights pertaining to dissent or trade union activity, or
(iii) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a
particular social group, are unable or, by reason of such fear, unwilling to
avail themself of the protection of any of their countries of nationality or
habitual residence.
(2) A source country is a
country
(a) where persons are in refugee-like situations as
a result of civil war or armed conflict or because their fundamental human
rights are not respected;
(b) where an officer works or makes routine
working visits and is able to process visa applications without endangering
their own safety, the safety of applicants or the safety of Canadian embassy
staff;
(c) where circumstances warrant humanitarian
intervention by the Department in order to implement the overall humanitarian
strategies of the Government of Canada, that intervention being in keeping
with the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and
(d) that is set out in Schedule 2.
|
139. (1) Un visa de résident permanent est
délivré à l’étranger qui a besoin de protection et aux membres de sa famille
qui l’accompagnent si, à l’issue d’un contrôle, les éléments suivants sont
établis :
a) l’étranger se trouve hors du Canada;
b) il a présenté une demande conformément à l’article 150;
c) il cherche à entrer au Canada pour s’y établir en permanence;
d) aucune possibilité raisonnable de solution durable n’est, à son égard,
réalisable dans un délai raisonnable dans un pays autre que le Canada, à
savoir :
(i) soit
le rapatriement volontaire ou la réinstallation dans le pays dont il a la
nationalité ou dans lequel il avait sa résidence habituelle,
(ii)
soit la réinstallation ou une offre de réinstallation dans un autre pays;
e) il fait partie d’une catégorie établie dans la présente section;
…
145. Est un réfugié au sens de la Convention outre-frontières et
appartient à la catégorie des réfugiés au sens de cette convention l’étranger
à qui un agent a reconnu la qualité de réfugié alors qu’il se trouvait hors
du Canada.
…
147. Appartient à la catégorie de personnes de pays
d’accueil l’étranger considéré par un agent comme ayant besoin de se
réinstaller en raison des circonstances suivantes :
a)
il se trouve hors de tout pays dont il a la nationalité ou dans lequel il
avait sa résidence habituelle;
b)
une guerre civile, un conflit armé ou une violation massive des droits de la
personne dans chacun des pays en cause ont eu et continuent d’avoir des
conséquences graves et personnelles pour lui.
148. (1) Appartient à la catégorie de personnes de pays source l’étranger
considéré par un agent comme ayant besoin de se réinstaller en raison des
circonstances suivantes :
a)
d’une part, il réside dans le pays dont il a la nationalité ou dans lequel il
a sa résidence habituelle, lequel est un pays source au sens du paragraphe
(2) au moment de la présentation de la demande de visa de résident permanent
ainsi qu’au moment de la délivrance du visa;
b)
d’autre part, selon le cas :
(i) une guerre civile ou un conflit armé dans ce pays ont
des conséquences graves et personnelles pour lui,
(ii) il est détenu ou emprisonné dans ce pays, ou l’a
été, que ce soit ou non au titre d’un acte d’accusation, ou il y fait ou y a
fait périodiquement l’objet de quelque autre forme de répression pénale, en
raison d’actes commis hors du Canada qui seraient considérés, au Canada,
comme une expression légitime de la liberté de pensée ou comme l’exercice
légitime de libertés publiques relatives à des activités syndicales ou à la
dissidence,
(iii) craignant avec raison d’être persécuté du fait de
sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de ses opinions politiques ou de
son appartenance à un groupe social particulier, il ne peut ou, du fait de
cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection du pays dont il a la
nationalité ou de celui où il a sa résidence habituelle.
(2) Est un pays
source celui qui répond aux critères suivants :
a)
une guerre civile, un conflit armé ou le non-respect des droits fondamentaux
de la personne font en sorte que les personnes qui s’y trouvent sont dans une
situation assimilable à celle de réfugiés au sens de la Convention;
b)
un agent y travaille ou s’y rend régulièrement dans le cadre de son travail
et est en mesure de traiter les demandes de visa sans compromettre sa
sécurité, celle des demandeurs ni celle du personnel de l’ambassade du Canada;
c)
les circonstances justifient une intervention d’ordre humanitaire de la part
du ministère pour mettre en oeuvre les stratégies humanitaires globales du
gouvernement canadien, intervention qui est en accord avec le travail
accompli par le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés;
d)
il figure à l’annexe 2.
|
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[11]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, held that a standard of review analysis need not be
conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review applicable
to the particular question before the court is well-settled by past
jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. Only
where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing court undertake a
consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis.
[12]
The issue of
whether the Officer erred in assessing the Applicant as a Convention refugee or
a person in need of protection as per sections 96 and 97 of the Act is
concerned with whether the Officer applied the legal test to the facts at hand
in an appropriate way. This is an issue of mixed fact and law and is to be
reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. See Dunsmuir, above, at
paragraph 164.
[13]
The issue of
whether the Officer erred in his assessment of the evidence before him is a
factual issue. Accordingly, it will be reviewed on a standard of
reasonableness. See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph 64.
[14]
Whether the Officer based his decision on irrelevant
considerations is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness. See Baker v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paragraph
53 (QL); Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph 14.
[15]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process and [also] with whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir,
above, at paragraph 47. Put another way, the Court should intervene only if the
Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the “range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
[16]
A
standard of correctness is the appropriate standard for the review of issues
involving procedural fairness and natural justice.
See Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404, at paragraph
46, and Dunsmuir, above, at
paragraphs 126 and 129. As such, correctness is
the appropriate standard when considering whether the Officer breached
procedural fairness by: a) not providing proper language interpretation; and b)
depriving the Applicant of the opportunity to respond.
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
Officer
Did Not Raise Credibility Concerns Regarding Fear of Persecution
[17]
The
Applicant submits that the Officer erred in fact and in law because he based
his finding that the Applicant was neither a member of the Convention Refugee
Abroad class nor a member of the
Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad class on the authenticity of the
educational diplomas and on credibility concerns about the education and
employment experience of the Applicant and her husband and not, as he should
have, on the Applicant’s claim that she feared persecution in Afghanistan.
[18]
The
Officer’s decision letter stated: “from what you have told (sic) during
the interview you were not facing any persecution in Afghanistan.” Given that
the Applicant claimed that she feared persecution, procedural fairness and
principles of fundamental justice demanded that she be told the extent to which
the Officer believed her evidence. However, there is no indication in the CAIPS
notes that the Officer raised his credibility concerns with her. See Sadeora
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 430.
Consideration
#1: Authenticity of Documents
Authenticity
is Irrelevant
[19]
The first factor upon which the Officer based his negative finding
was his belief that the documents offered by the Applicant and her husband as
proof of their education were fake. In Ngongo v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1627 (F.C.) (QL),
Justice Tremblay-Lamer held that the authenticity of the document was irrelevant
to the issue of whether or not the Applicant would be in danger if he were to
return to his country. See also Muhazi v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1392. In such circumstances, the
Officer is nevertheless obliged to determine whether or not the Applicant
feared such persecution. Doubt concerning the credibility of the applicant’s
documents does not release the Officer from that duty. See Attakora v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1989] F.C.J. 444 (F.C.A.) (QL).
No
Opportunity to Address Concerns about Documents
[20]
Procedural
fairness and principles of fundamental justice required the Officer put to the
Applicant his credibility concerns regarding the authenticity of the documents
and to provide her with an opportunity to respond. See Sharma v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) (1984), 55 N.R. 71 (F.C.A.). Most of the
documents were issued by independent sources that would have supported the
Applicant’s claims. Instead, the Officer raised his concerns at the end of the
interview and refused to look at the original documents. In so doing, he
ignored relevant evidence.
Officer
Should Have Considered Original Copies
[21]
The
documents assessed by the expert as fake were, in fact, photocopies of the originals.
The Applicant had the originals with her at the interview and offered them for
inspection so that the Officer might lay to rest his concerns about their
authenticity. The Officer refused to look at them, despite having assured both
the Applicant and her husband that they would have an opportunity to respond to
his credibility concerns. Moreover, he did not explain why reviewing the
original documents could not alleviate his concerns.
[22]
In
refusing to review the original documents, the Officer disregarded evidence
relevant to his determination of the Applicant’s credibility. See (Saddo v.
Canada (Immigration Appeal Board) (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 764 (F.C.A.). In Owusu-Ansah
v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) (1989), 8 Imm. L.R. (2d) 106, the Federal Court
of Appeal stated at paragraph 12 that “the failure to take account of material
evidence has been variously characterized by this court in allowing s. 28
applications.”
[23]
The
Officer’s erroneous finding that the documents were fake was sufficiently
prejudicial to colour his assessment of all other factors relating to the
Applicant’s fear of persecution. See Sicaja-Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 1020 (F.C.) (QL).
Consideration
#2: Credibility of Education/Employment Experience
[24]
The second factor upon which the Officer based his negative
finding was his belief that the answers given by the Applicant and her husband
concerning their education and job histories were vague.
No Evidence that
Applicant Lied About Education/Employment Experience
[25]
The
Officer indicated in the CAIPS notes and the Decision that the Applicant and
her husband lied about their education and work experience. This finding was
based on inference, not evidence, and as Justice Barnes noted in Sadeora,
above, at paragraph 14, such a finding can attract “danger” and be more
amenable to review than a credibility ruling based on testimonial
inconsistencies. The husband’s response to the question of how he could
afford to study for two years without working, as recorded in the CAIPS notes,
indicates that he misunderstood the question. The husband speaks Dari and a
little English. The interpreters were not from Afghanistan, and the
question was not rephrased.
[26]
In
his affidavit, the Officer again says that the Applicant lacked credibility,
but he has no evidentiary basis for so doing. For example, the Officer assumes
that the Applicant and her husband, having grown up in peasant families, could
not have afforded higher education. This was in spite of their assertions that
they had completed their educational programs and their explanations as to how
they were able to afford them. Similarly, the Officer had no evidence that the
explanation offered by the Applicant and her husband as to why the husband had
been exempted from military service (that is, because he had elected to become
a teacher for a six-year term) was inaccurate. Nevertheless, he concluded that
it was.
[27]
On
this point, the Applicant seeks to introduce into evidence a letter from the
Consulate General of Afghanistan in Toronto. This letter attests
that, before the 1978 revolution, Afghanistan did have a policy
exempting from military service males who had a grade 12 education and were
willing to serve as teachers for six years. It remains unclear, however,
whether that policy was still in place at the time the Applicant’s husband
claimed to have availed himself of it.
[28]
The
jurisprudence states that an Applicant has the right to be assessed according
to the particular facts of her case. See Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paragraph 821.
Moreover, the Applicant’s testimony is to be believed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. See Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (F.C.A.) at paragraph 5.
Officer
Disregarded Evidence Supporting Claims
[29]
The
Officer should have but did not take judicial notice of the fact that education
in Afghanistan is free. The
Applicant’s Record includes an entry from the website of the Library of
Congress entitled “Library of Congress Country Studies: Afghanistan: Education.”
It states: “In 1935, education was declared universal, compulsory and free.”
[30]
Moreover,
the Officer disregarded the Applicant’s explanation that she worked to support
the family so that her husband could attend to his studies.
Inaccuracies in Translation
[31]
The
Applicant also submits that some of the vague answers offered by the
Applicant’s husband should be considered evidence not of the husband’s
intention to deceive but rather of the interpreter’s poor translation. For
example, in the CAIPS notes, the husband states: “After graduating this two
years, my wife also studied at the institute as a nursery.” This sentence makes
no sense, particularly in light of the fact that the husband had already told
the Officer that his wife was a nurse when he took his entrance exam.
ARGUMENTS
The
Respondent
No Arguable
Issue
[32]
The
Respondent submits that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate an arguable
issue of law upon which the application for judicial review might succeed. The
Officer properly assessed the Applicant’s application. The Applicant and her
husband were clearly given an opportunity to respond to his concerns about the
authenticity of their diplomas; the Applicant was simply unable to alleviate
the Officer’s concerns. It was open to the Officer to assess the explanations
offered and determine whether they were reasonable in the circumstances. The
Officer did so in this case.
Applicant’s
Reply and Further Memorandum
The
Officer’s Affidavit Should Be Given Little or No Weight
[33]
The
Officer’s affidavit raises issues and provides explanations that were not
reflected in the Decision or the CAIPS notes. See Abdullah v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1185. For example, in his
affidavit the Officer explains that he refused the application because the
Applicant was not persecuted as a member of an at-risk group or minority, nor
had she suffered massive human rights violations as a direct result of the
civil war in Afghanistan. Rather,
“her claim rested solely on the demand that this commander made against her
daughter.” Nowhere in the Decision or the CAIPS notes did the Officer offer
this explanation as a basis for refusing the application. Similarly, in his
affidavit the Officer states that he found the Applicant’s allegations
regarding Razul not credible, and yet this finding was not recorded in the
CAIPS notes nor in the Decision.
[34]
This
position is supported by the jurisprudence. In Kalra v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 CarswellNat 2333, Justice Martineau
stated at paragraph 15:
In my view, the CAIPS notes can
constitute the reasons for the visa officer’s decision but not the affidavit. The
affidavit should only be considered as a means to enter into evidence the CAIPS
notes and to elaborate on the information found in the CAIPS notes but not as a
late explanation for the decision. The affidavit is usually filed for the
purpose of the judicial review and is filed many months or a year after the
decision. It is usually based on the CAIPS notes which should reflect the
reasoning followed by the visa officer to reject or allow the application. As
pointed out in Idedevbo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2003 FCT 175, [2003] F.C.J. No. 255, if the visa officer’s affidavit is
inconsistent with the CAIPS notes, the latter should be considered more
accurate considering that they were entered following the review of the file
and were closer in time to the actions than the former. In the case at bar, if
I compare the visa officer’s CAIPS notes and affidavit, it is obvious that the
latter incorporates a lot more information than the former which raises the
question: upon what documents, information or notes did the visa officer base
her affidavit, which was executed a little less than a year after the decision?
In Idedevbo, above, this
Court gave no weight to the affidavit since it was inconsistent with the CAIPS
notes. Further, this Court in Bonilla v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (2001) 12
Imm. L.R. (3d) 83 (F.C.) found that the letter to the applicant together with
the visa officer’s notes comprised the reasons. In the instant case, the
Officer did not identify the documents upon which he relied in the affidavit.
Procedural fairness and natural justice demand that the Decision and the CAIPS
notes alone should constitute the Officer’s reasons and that the affidavit be
given little or no weight. See Kalra, above; Fakharian v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 CarswellNat 1288.
[35]
The
affidavit is, at times, inconsistent with the CAIPS notes. For example, in the affidavit
the Officer states that the Applicant did not refer to any direct meeting between
the Applicant and her husband and the warlord, Razul. This is contradicted in
the CAIPS notes, where the Applicant states that Razul came to see them.
[36]
Finally,
the considerable lapse of time between the interview and the affidavit is an
important consideration. The affidavit was sworn 16 months after the Officer’s
interview with the Applicant and her husband. Without doubt, the Officer
interviewed many other applicants within that period of time. In Alam v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 182, Justice Mactavish held at
paragraph 19:
It is apparent from the affidavit that,
at the time that the affidavit was signed, the officer continued to have a
specific recollection of the interview with Mr. Alam. Nevertheless, the
affidavit was sworn several months after the interview, presumably at a point
where the officer was aware that her decision was being challenged. In the
circumstances, I prefer to focus my attention on the reasons expressed in the
CAIPS notes, and to give little weight to the after-the-fact explanation
provided by the officer.
See also Najat v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1237, where Justice Mactavish adopts
the above passage from Alam. The Decision and the CAIPS notes are closer
in time to the interview and therefore are more likely to be accurate.
Family Is Valid
a Social Group
[37]
The
Applicant and her family are not mere spectators with respect to the
persecution that is directed at their daughter. Razul threatened violence
against the Applicant and her husband too if they refused his proposal of
marriage to her. See Tomov v. Canada, [2004] R.P.D.D. No. 863.
Respondent’s
Further Memorandum
The
Applicant Is Not a Convention Refugee
[38]
In
order for the Applicant to be a Convention refugee as a member of a familial
social group, the risk must be directed toward the Applicant as a member of
that family. It is not enough that the Applicant’s relative is being
persecuted. See Musakanda v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2007 FC 1300; Devrishashvili v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 1528 (F.C.) (QL).
[39]
Further,
the family constitutes a social group where there is evidence that the family
is itself subject to reprisals and vengeance, and where the Applicant is
targeted simply because he or she is a member of that family. That is not the
case here. See Al-Busaidy v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1992), 139 N.R. 208 (F.C.A.); Casetellanos v. Canada (Solicitor General),
[1995] 2 F.C. 190 (F.C.); Addullahi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (1996), 122 F.T.R. 150 (F.C.); Lakatos v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 657 (F.C.) (QL); Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Bakhshi, [1994] F.C.J. No. 977
(F.C.A.) (QL); Granada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2004] F.C.J. No. 2164 (F.C.).
[40]
Persecution
against one family member does not entitle all family members to be considered
refugees. See Pour-Shariati v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (1997), 215 N.R. 174 (F.C.A.); Marinova v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 178.
The
Officer’s Affidavit Offers No New Reasons
[41]
The
Officer’s Affidavit does not constitute reasons. Instead, it adopts the reasons
in the CAIPS notes and the Decision and elaborates on them. The Affidavit is
entirely consistent with the reasons contained in the CAIPS notes.
The
Officer Put Concerns to the Applicant
[42]
Contrary
to the Applicant’s submissions, the Officer did put his concerns to the
Applicant and allow her to respond. With respect to Razul, the educational and
employment experience of the Applicant and her husband, and the husband’s
exemption from military service, the Officer questioned them extensively during
the interview and advised them that their evidence was not credible. The
Officer offered the Applicant at the end of the interview an opportunity to
respond to his concerns regarding the fake documents but their responses did
not alleviate the Officer’s concerns.
The Letter
from the Consulate General Should Not Be Considered in the Application for
Judicial Review
[43]
This
letter was not before the Officer, was not included in the Application Record
and was not attached to a further affidavit. The jurisprudence states that the
judicial review of a decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal
should proceed only on the basis of evidence that was before the decision
maker. It is not open to the Applicant to ask this Honourable Court to make new
findings of fact. See Lemiecha (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 1333 (F.C.) (QL).
The Duty of
Fairness
[44]
The
Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal have held that the
content of the duty of fairness is contextual. Baker, above, at
paragraph 21; Khan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 345, at paragraphs 22, 30-32. In
deciding what that duty entails, with respect to visa applicants, the Courts
have been careful to balance the requirements of fairness with the needs of the
administrative immigration process. See Khan, above, at paragraphs
30-32; and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Patel,
2002 FCA 55 at paragraph 10.
[45]
The
duty of fairness in cases involving an administrative decision maker, such as
the instant case, are more limited than those involving a quasi-judicial
tribunal where the obligation to confront an applicant may be more stringent: Khan,
above, at paragraphs 31-32. The Federal Court has held that the Officer is
under no duty to provide a running score of weaknesses in the Applicant’s
application: Thandal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 489, at paragraph 9; Nabin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 200, at paragraphs 7-10; Soor v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1344, at paragraph 12.
[46]
The
duty of fairness was met in this case. The Applicant was given an opportunity
to respond to the Officer’s concerns at the end of the interview but was unable
to satisfy them. This Court in Rahim v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1252, at paragraphs 15-16 held:
… the duty to inform applicants of the
case against them will be fulfilled where “the visa officer adopts an
appropriate line of questioning or makes reasonable inquiries which give the
applicant the opportunity to respond”: Liao v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1926
(T.D.) (QL) at para. 17.
Therefore, so long as an applicant is confronted with the
concerns of the officer at their interview, and they are given a reasonable
opportunity to respond, the duty of fairness will be met. It is otherwise
immaterial at what point during the interview this occurs: Khwaja,
above, at para. 18.
[47]
The
onus is on the Applicant to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, and
the Applicant did not meet the onus in this case.
ANALYSIS
Basis For Decision
[48]
The
Decision is contained in the Officer’s undated letter to the Applicant and in
the CAIPS notes.
[49]
In
the letter, the Officer says:
After carefully assessing all factors
relative to your application, I am not satisfied that you are a member of any
of the classes prescribed because from what you have told me during the
interview you were not facing any persecution in Afghanistan. Therefore you do
not meet the requirements of this paragraph.
[50]
It
is not possible to tell from the letter what the Officer concluded” He may be
saying that the Applicant does not face persecution in Afghanistan because,
even though the Officer accepts her story, he does not think that what the
Applicant fears is “persecution” as that term is defined by the relevant
jurisprudence. Alternatively, it may be that the Officer just does not accept
the Applicant’s account of what has happened to her in the past and the dangers
that she says she and her family face. The CAIPS notes provide further
clarification on this point.
[51]
The
core of the Decision is rendered as follows:
We had your diplomas verified by our
specialist in Islamabad, and he told us they were
fakes for the following reasons: although both docs have been issued at the
same time, the top right side shows a big difference. There is no date of
issuance on these documents. Photos of degree or diploma are always stamped,
yet there is no such think on these documents. Stamp is not readable and dates
are not clear.
In answering many of my questions today,
I found very vague, especially concerning your job and education and how you
could finance them, which makes me doubt whether your husband was ever a
teacher and a pharmacist.
All of this leads me to believe that you
were not truthful in answering all my question sand in turn, leads me to
believe that you do not meet the definition of a refugee.
[52]
Although
it is not entirely clear, this looks like a general negative credibility
finding. The Officer is saying that, because the diplomas are fake, and because
he found the Applicant vague about her job and education and how she could
finance them, the Applicant was not truthful “in answering all my questions.”
This could mean that, although the Applicant was not truthful in answering all
of the Officer’s questions, there were some that were answered truthfully, but
I have to reject this interpretation because the Officer nowhere explains what
he accepts and what he does not accept.
[53]
In
my view then, the basis of the Decision is a general negative credibility
finding based upon supposedly fake diplomas and vagueness about the Applicant’s
job and education and how she could finance them, and doubt as to whether the
husband ever was a teacher and a pharmacist.
[54]
It
is possible for the Officer to reject a claim based upon a general negative credibility
finding. On this issue, the Federal Court of Appeal stated in Sellan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FCA 381, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1685 at
paragraph 3: “where the Board makes a general finding that the claimant lacks
credibility, that determination is sufficient to dispose of the claim unless
there is independent and credible documentary evidence in the record capable of
supporting a positive disposition of the claim. The claimant bears the onus of
demonstrating there was such evidence.”
[55]
One
of the problems with the present Decision is that it is not explicit on the
reasons why the Officer thought the Applicant was vague about her job and
application. The Applicant was clear that she had obtained a nursing diploma in
1997 and that she was a nurse in a hospital. She also made it clear that her
husband was a teacher, that she had encouraged him to study pharmaceuticals and
that he studied and eventually worked as a pharmacist. The husband provided
confirmation on point.
[56]
Why
any of this should be considered “vague” is unclear in the Decision but, as the
CAIPS notes suggest, the Officer seems to have concluded that he was not
convinced that they would have been able to finance their education. As I read
the Decision, however, it is clear that this issue of finance was never fully
raised with the Applicant. The Applicant was never asked how she financed her
education and it seems obvious from the context that the husband financed his education
because his wife was a nurse and working at the hospital.
[57]
In
his affidavit, sworn for the purpose of this application, the Officer says that
it does not seem consistent that the
Applicant and her husband would come from simple families of peasants if they
were able to pursue higher education as they did. The Applicant claimed to have
become a nurse and her husband to have obtained a diploma in pharmacology.
Higher education in Afghanistan is a sign of prestige that
only well-off families can afford. If the Applicant and her husband had been
from simple families of peasants, they would not have been able to continue
higher education.
[58]
If
this was a concern, then it was never clearly put to the Applicant and her
husband. They were not fully alerted to the issue and they were not asked how
they had managed to finance their educations.
[59]
The
Applicant explained clearly that, although her father was a peasant and her
mother was a housekeeper, she was able to go to school and college. If the
Officer was, as his affidavit suggests, relying upon extrinsic evidence for his
conclusion that this was unlikely, then the Applicant should have been given
that evidence and an opportunity to explain how she acquired her education despite
coming from a humble background.
[60]
So,
apart from the diplomas, the Officer’s conclusions on the issue of education
and jobs are nothing more than speculation based upon extrinsic evidence that
was never placed before the Applicant.
[61]
Negative
findings have to be made in clear and unmistakable terms. See Hilo v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration) (1991), 130 N.R. 236, [1991] F.C.J. No. 228
(F.C.A.). What is more, discrepancies have to be placed before the Applicant
and an opportunity provided to explain. In Li v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1231, (1999) 90 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 464 at paragraph 5, Justice Gibson of this Court observed:
At the interview, he was entitled to a degree
of procedural fairness. More particularly, he was entitled to have the visa
officer put to him the visa officer's concerns regarding the applicant's
application and to have an opportunity to respond to those concerns. It is of
no consequence that his responses might very likely have failed to assuage the
concerns of the visa officer.
[62]
The
CAIPS notes record the Officer as saying that “I will explain my concerns in
details (sic), then I will give you an opportunity to respond.” However,
this does not occur. As the Officer’s affidavit makes abundantly clear, the
Officer did not explain his concerns in detail. He merely referred to the
diplomas and some unexplained vagueness about jobs and education.
[63]
Even
as regards the diplomas, it cannot be said that the Applicant was given an
opportunity to explain. The CAIPS notes record the following response from the
Applicant:
Just one second, I have all my diplomas
here and I want to show them to you. I have to say that before getting the
diploma, I received several awards and certificates. Even my students, once
they graduated they gave their appreciation letter to me. If you want, I can
show all of these letters, I have them myself.
[64]
The
Officer’s reply is revealing:
I have listened to your answer but
unfortunately, the appreciation of your students doesn’t mean that you obtained
this diploma or that you answered all questions truthfully. I am therefore
refusing your application today.
[65]
This
answer demonstrates that the Officer is focussed upon the diploma and what the
expert in Islamabad has told
him. The Officer is not open to any kind of explanation. The fact that student
appreciation might not authenticate her diploma is no reason not to look at the
original diplomas and/or other awards and certificates. It may be that the
original of the diploma might have revealed something that did not show up in
the photocopies. The Officer could have asked what the difference was between
the original and the copy. The Applicant is explicit that the copies examined
by the expert did not clearly show the authenticating stamps which are clear on
the originals, so that if the Officer had looked at the originals he would have
seen that the expert had no basis for his opinion that the diplomas were false.
But now we will never know if the original would have solved the problems
created by the copy because the Officer refused to look at it and to ask for an
explanation. In my view, this cannot constitute an opportunity to respond, even
on the issue of the fake diploma. It is also clear evidence of the Officer’s
refusal to take into account highly material evidence regarding the whole basis
of his negative credibility finding. This in itself is a breach of procedural
fairness that requires the Decision to be reconsidered.
[66]
Even
more problematic is the Officer’s attempt, through an affidavit, to bolster and
expand significantly upon his Decision by preparing and submitting a very
detailed account, which he says was sworn for the specific purpose of
supporting “the Respondent’s position on the within application… .”
[67]
The
affidavit is an obvious attempt to shore up a defective decision and is not
admissible for such purpose. In Yue v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 717, at paragraph 3, Justice
Strayer observes:
… [I]t is inappropriate to file such an affidavit prepared after
the event, supplementing the Officer's reasons given in her letter and the record
of the interviews upon which it was based. Such an affidavit as to the nature
of the hearing can only be relevant and admissible if it is somehow necessary
to describe the procedure or some event in the decisional proceeding which is
in dispute, but not to elaborate on the evidence before the Officer or her
decision.
[68]
However,
the affidavit is revealing in other ways. The Officer cannot have it both ways.
If the affidavit is a true account of the basis for his Decision, then it
reveals that the Decision was based upon extrinsic evidence and discrepancies
that were never clearly placed before the Applicant. The affidavit, if it is
true, gives the lie to the Officer’s words in the CAIPS notes that he will
place his concerns before the Applicant and give her an opportunity to respond
to those concerns. This is a further breach of procedural fairness that
requires this matter to be returned for reconsideration.
[69]
Both
counsel agree that there is no question for certification.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that
1.
The
application is allowed. The Decision is quashed and returned for
reconsideration by a different Officer.
2.
There
is no question for certification.
“James
Russell”