Date: 20100825
Docket: T-990-09
Citation: 2010 FC 839
Ottawa, Ontario,
August 25, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn
BETWEEN:
TELE-MOBILE
COMPANY PARTNERSHIP,
TELUS
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY PARTNERSHIP,
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS
INC.,
1219723 ALBERTA
LTD. and MTS ALLSTREAM INC.
Applicants
and
CANADA REVENUE
AGENCY
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) is seeking to strike the application of the applicants
(collectively, TELUS) who are seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the CRA
from assessing TELUS for goods and services tax (GST) on the international
roaming fees charged by TELUS to its customers from October 2004. In the
alternative, the CRA appeals the Order of Prothonotary Aalto, dated December
29, 2009, of Prothonotary Aalto, whereby he ordered that the CRA's affiant,
Alyson Trattner, inform herself and provide answers in writing to a series of
questions put to her on cross-examination, and to provide TELUS with a number of
documents, to the extent that they are available.
Background
[2]
In
2006, the Rulings Directorate of the CRA in Edmonton, Alberta, informed TELUS that the CRA was of the
view that fees for international roaming services were subject to GST. Central
to that view was its determination that roaming charges were treated in the
industry as a single supply of telecommunications services. This determination,
in turn, was based on the finding that one major mobile provider, Bell Canada, treated international roaming
services as a single supply of telecommunications services.
[3]
In
response, TELUS contacted the Compliance Programs Branch at CRA Headquarters in
Ottawa, Ontario, and requested, inter alia, that any assessment with
respect to international roaming services be conducted starting only from
January 1, 2006. By letter dated May 13, 2009, under the signature of
Jean-Jacques Lefebvre, the Compliance Programs Branch confirmed the Rulings
Directorate position, and rejected the request for a January 1, 2006 start
date.
[4]
TELUS
filed its Notice of Application on June 19, 2009. It provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
This
is an application for an Order of prohibition prohibiting the Respondent, the
Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”), from proceeding with assessments or
reassessments against the Applicants for goods and services tax (“GST”) on
“roaming fees” under the provisions of Part IX of the Excise Tax Act,
R.S.C., 1985, c. E-15, as amended (the “ETA”) for any periods ending prior to
the date of this Application (the “Proposed Reassessments”).
In its application, TELUS
submits that the CRA had relied on irrelevant factors and erroneous assumptions
in exercising its discretionary power to reassess it and that the CRA was
applying the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-15 (ETA) in a manner
that prejudiced TELUS.
[5]
As
part of the respondent’s materials, the CRA filed the affidavit of Alyson
Trattner, who is a manager in the Rulings Directorate. On cross-examination,
Ms. Trattner was unable to answer a series of questions regarding the decision
that was conveyed in the letter of Mr. Lefebvre. On advice of counsel, Ms.
Trattner refused to inform herself of answers to these questions. TELUS
brought a motion to compel Ms. Trattner to inform herself and answer these questions,
as well as to provide a series of relevant documents.
[6]
The
Prothonotary accepted the general proposition submitted by the CRA that an
affiant “has no obligation to inform herself.” However, the Prothonotary then
held that “there are circumstances where this general proposition should not be
applied.” The Prothonotary relied on the decision in Stanfield v. Minister
of National Revenue, 2004 FC 584, for the proposition “that to allow one
lower echelon witness to be the only affiant in a case where several levels of
administrative action are engaged and where different directorates are involved
is not proper.” The Prothonotary held that Ms. Trattner was such a lower
echelon witness and that Stanfield, as well as Merck & Co. v. Apotex (1996), 110 F.T.R. 155 (T.D.),
supported the decision to compel her to inform herself and to provide written
answers.
[7]
The
Prothonotary stated that “the main ground of attack in this judicial review is
whether the process followed by CRA and the factors it considered in making its
decision were consistent with the proper exercise of discretion under the
ETA.” The Prothonotary held that the unanswered questions on cross-examination
were relevant to this main ground of attack and therefore ought to be
provided. The Prothonotary therefore ordered that Ms. Trattner inform herself
and provide answers in writing to the specified questions, and that she produce
a series of documents where possible.
Issues
[8]
There
are two issues before the Court – the first arises from a motion to dismiss the
application and the second from an appeal of the Order of the Prothonotary.
The issues are as follows:
(1)
Whether the application for prohibition should be struck on
the basis that the Court cannot grant the relief sought; and
(2)
Whether the Prothonotary based his
decision on wrong principles or upon a misapprehension of the facts and, if so,
whether his Order requiring the respondent's affiant to further inform herself,
to provide additional answers in writing, and to produce additional documents,
ought to be reversed.
[9]
The
parties dealt with these discrete issues separately, as shall I in these
reasons.
Analysis
Whether the application for prohibition should be struck.
[10]
The
test on a motion to strike is onerous. The moving party must prove that it is
“plain and obvious” that the application or action in question will not
succeed: Inuit Tapirisat of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735 at
740; see also Sweet v. Canada,
[1999] F.C.J. No. 1539 (F.C.A.) (QL). Put another way, the application must be
“so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success:” David
Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 F.C. 588 at
para. 15. Is this one of those cases?
[11]
TELUS contends that the timing of
the CRA's motion to strike should be considered by the Court as a factor
militating against granting the motion. While the timing of such a motion is a
relevant consideration in most circumstances, in these circumstances I am of
the view that the timing is not a matter that weighs in favour of refusing to
strike if the test is otherwise met.
[12]
The
Court of Appeal has instructed in David Bull Laboratories that motions
to strike in the context of judicial review applications are to be avoided even
though a party may bring a motion to strike at any time: see also Coca-Cola
Ltd. v. Pardhan (c.o.b. as Universal Exporters), [1999] F.C.J. No.
484 (F.C.A.) (QL). The CRA explained that but for the Order of the
Prothonotary, it would not have brought this motion:
The
underlying rationale for the Federal Court of Appeal’s words of restraint in David
Bull Laboratories is that, unlike an action, judicial review is intended to
be a swift procedure, not involving discovery or trial and that entertaining
preliminary motions in an application is not generally the most efficient use
of the court’s resources. This application is not the “summary judicial
proceeding” contemplated in David Bull Laboratories. Rather, if further
enquiries must be undertaken, additional questions answered and documents
produced with the potential for further questions arising from those answers
and documents, the cross-examination is effectively an examination for
discovery, and one with no clear end in sight. This matter is not moving
swiftly towards hearing and, given these circumstances, a motion to strike
brought at this juncture is appropriate. (Respondent’s Written Representations,
para. 31 – footnotes omitted)
[13]
In
my view, the explanation offered by the CRA for bringing the motion at this
stage rings true. The result of the Order of the Prothonotary has arguably
changed the nature of this application into something more complex.
Accordingly, in my view, it makes sense to bring the motion now, rather than
occupy the time of the parties and Court with what is claimed to be an
application doomed to fail.
[14]
There
is a dispute between these parties as to whether the obligations of the
Minister under the ETA are mandatory or discretionary. The CRA says that the Minister must assess TELUS in
accordance with the law, that TELUS must exhaust the statutory appeal
procedures before seeking judicial review, and that “a denial of 'procedural
and substantive fairness' is not a ground to challenge an assessment.”
[15]
TELUS responds by submitting that the
use of the word “may” in subsection 296(1) of the ETA indicates that the
Minister has discretion and is not obligated to reassess taxpayers. TELUS
further responds by saying that the statutory appeal process is irrelevant
until the CRA actually assesses the taxpayer - an event TELUS is seeking to
prevent.
[16]
The provisions of the ETA that are
relevant to the motions before the Court are reproduced in Annex A. These
provisions set out the following regime with respect to GST.
[17]
Pursuant to the ETA the “Minister may
assess” the net tax of a person for a reporting period “and may reassess
or make an additional assessment of tax… (s. 296(1), emphasis added).” An
assessment, “subject to being reassessed or vacated as a result of an objection
or appeal [is] deemed to be valid and binding, notwithstanding any error,
defect or omission therein… (s. 299(4)).” A taxpayer has 30 days following an
assessment to file an objection with the Minister, who will either reconsider
the assessment or confirm it (s. 301(1.1)). A taxpayer, after receiving
notification of the Minister’s action, and within specified time periods, may
appeal the assessment to the Tax Court (s. 306).
[18]
CRA
submits that the facts before this Court parallel those before the Court of
Appeal in Webster v. Canada, 2003 FCA 388, where the Court of Appeal quashed
an application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister to confirm
tax reassessments. TELUS submits that this authority, which is based on the Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th supp.) is distinguishable. TELUS
submits that s. 152(1) of the Income Tax Act, unlike the ETA, uses the
mandatory word “shall” in describing the duties and obligations of the Minister
to assess or reassess a taxpayer and not the permissive word “may” that is used
in the ETA.
[19]
I
agree with TELUS that these statutory provisions, on their face, differ.
Section 152(1) of the Income Tax Act stipulates that “The Minister shall,
with all due dispatch, examine a taxpayer’s return of income for a taxation
year, assess the tax for the year, the interest and penalties, if any, payable
and determine [any refund owing or tax payable]” (emphasis added). This is to
be contrasted with section 296(1) of the ETA which stipulates that the
“Minister may assess” the tax payable (emphasis added). I agree with
TELUS that Webster is therefore not determinative of this application. In
any event, the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Webster was
not based on mandatory language setting out the Minister’s duties, but rather
was based on section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
F-7. The jurisdiction of this Court to judicially review a decision is limited
by section 18.5 of the Federal Courts Act, which provides as follows:
|
18.5
Despite sections 18 and 18.1, if an Act of Parliament expressly provides for
an appeal to the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Court Martial Appeal Court, the Tax Court of Canada, the
Governor in Council or the Treasury Board from a decision or an order of a
federal board, commission or other tribunal made by or in the course of
proceedings before that board, commission or tribunal, that decision or order
is not, to the extent that it may be so appealed, subject to review or to be
restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with, except in
accordance with that Act.
|
18.5 Par dérogation aux articles 18 et
18.1, lorsqu’une loi fédérale prévoit expressément qu’il peut être interjeté
appel, devant la Cour fédérale, la Cour d’appel fédérale, la Cour suprême du Canada,
la Cour d’appel de la cour martiale, la Cour canadienne de l’impôt, le
gouverneur en conseil ou le Conseil du Trésor, d’une décision ou d’une
ordonnance d’un office fédéral, rendue à tout stade des procédures, cette
décision ou cette ordonnance ne peut, dans la mesure où elle est susceptible
d’un tel appel, faire l’objet de contrôle, de restriction, de prohibition,
d’évocation, d’annulation ni d’aucune autre intervention, sauf en conformité
avec cette loi.
|
[20]
Pursuant
to section 306 of the ETA, the assessment or reassessment made by the Minister
under section 296(1) of the ETA may be appealed to the Tax Court of Canada.
Therefore, the decision of the Minister that TELUS seeks to prevent him from
making cannot be subject to an application for judicial review in this Court.
However, that does not answer the question as to whether the Minister may be
prevented, by Order of this Court, from making the decision in the first
place.
[21]
Neither
party was able to assist the Court by pointing to any authority directly on
point. The Court has identified three
decisions that address the availability of prerogative writs such as
prohibition in the context of CRA (re)assessments. Two of these may support
the availability of remedies such as prohibition.
[22]
In McCaffrey v. Canada,
[1993] 1 C.T.C. 15 (F.C.T.D), a taxpayer sought to dispute assessments made by
the CRA and brought a motion in the Federal Court claiming certiorari and
prohibition. The respondent attempted to have these claims struck out. The
Court struck out the claim for certiorari, holding that allowing such a
claim would be tantamount to setting aside the assessments. However, the Court
declined to strike out the part of the motion seeking prohibition because the
applicant made “serious allegations” regarding the Minister’s exercise of his
authority to conduct audits.
[23]
In Cambridge Leasing Ltd. v. Canada (Minister
of National Revenue – M.N.R.), 2003
FCT 112, the taxpayer brought an application for mandamus which was
ultimately dismissed because the CRA had acted by the time the matter came on
for hearing. However, Justice MacKay considered the statutory scheme under the
ETA and concluded at para. 11 that the objection and appeal procedure did not
remove the remedy of mandamus from the Federal Court’s jurisdiction:
My
reading of those various statutory provisions leads me to conclude that they do
not expressly provide, as required by s. 18.5 of the Federal Court Act, that an
application for mandamus is removed from this Court's jurisdiction, which would
otherwise be heard in appropriate circumstances to require the Minister to
perform a public duty under the Excise Tax Act.
[24]
Lastly, in Walsh v. Canada (Minister
of National Revenue – M.N.R.), 2006
FC 56, the taxpayer sought certiorari and prohibition quashing the CRA’s
decision to reassess and preventing further reassessments. Counsel for the applicant
conceded at the hearing that these remedies were outside the Federal Court’s
jurisdiction. At para. 4, Justice Hugessen cited a number of cases supporting
this lack of jurisdiction. However, the authorities cited by Justice Hugessen all
appear to address the lack of jurisdiction over judicial reviews that seek to
vacate or review an assessment – not the decision to issue the assessment
itself, which TELUS is seeking to prohibit in this application.
[25]
These limited authorities, in my
view, support the position of TELUS that its application is not clearly bereft
of any chance of success.
[26]
The CRA submits that the
application is bereft of any chance of success because it would defy common
sense to allow taxpayers to prevent the Minister from assessing their tax
obligations simply by seeking a writ of prohibition. The CRA cites Canada v.
Addison & Leyen Ltd., 2007 SCC 33 and Morris v. Canada (Minister
of National Revenue – M.N.R.), 2009 FCA 373, for the proposition that “courts should be very
cautious in authorizing judicial review in such circumstances.”
[27]
TELUS submits that the remedy of
prohibition is available to prevent “administrative authorities from exceeding
or misusing their powers,” and that the application is not bereft of any chance
of success such that a motion to strike is warranted.
[28]
At
the hearing, CRA took the position that no decision of the Minister to assess
or reassess a taxpayer is ever open to an order of prohibition, even if the
Minister’s decision to assess is discretionary and even if the Minister acted
in bad faith or ignored relevant evidence in making the decision. When
pressed, counsel agreed that the bona fides of the decision to assess is
not a matter within the jurisdiction of the Tax Court and offered that perhaps
the remedy of the taxpayer in those circumstances was to commence an action for
damages.
[29]
No
jurisprudence was offered in support of that position. The submission was described
by counsel for the applicants as an “extraordinary proposition.”
[30]
Simply
because a party raises a novel issue does not dictate that it is bereft of any
chance of success. Writs of prohibition are available to prevent authorities
from acting beyond their jurisdiction or to prevent unfairness. In this
application, TELUS acknowledges that the Minister has the jurisdiction to make
the proposed assessments but asserts that it would be unfair to do so. While I
acknowledge that TELUS will have a steep hill to climb to convince a Court that
the Minister has a duty of fairness in these circumstances and that it was not
met, I cannot, at this early stage, say that it is not possible that they may
succeed in that climb. Accordingly, the respondent has not met the stringent
test required to strike the application at this stage without a full hearing
and its motion to strike is dismissed.
Whether the Prothonotary based his decision on wrong principles or
upon a
misapprehension of the facts.
[31]
The
CRA submits that the Prothonotary was clearly wrong in compelling their affiant
to inform herself, to answer the questions in dispute, and to provide the
requested documents. The CRA argues that the Prothonotary mischaracterized the
basis for the judicial review application, and therefore compelled their
affiant to provide answers to questions that were not relevant to the writ of
prohibition sought, particularly as these questions relate to fairness. The
CRA further argues that the Prothonotary erred in stating that the position of
the CRA was that it has discretion to assess as opposed to an obligation to
assess. The CRA contends that their affiant was not a “lower echelon witness;”
rather, she was properly informed and the Prothonotary erred in finding to the
contrary. The CRA further contends that the case of Simpson Strong-Tie Co.
v. Peak Innovations Inc., 2009 FCA 266, is contrary to the conclusion
reached by the Prothonotary. Finally, the CRA argues that the Prothonotary
could not order documentary disclosure given that Rule 91 of the Federal
Courts Rules was not complied with by TELUS. The CRA asks that if the
Court finds the Prothonotary not to be clearly wrong that the Court conduct an
assessment of the questions de novo and remove any inappropriate questions
from the Prothonotary's Order.
[32]
The
Court of Appeal in Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., 2003 FCA 488 at para.
17, has instructed that discretionary orders of a Prothonotary are only to be
disturbed on appeal where:
(a)
they
are clearly wrong, in the sense that the exercise of discretion by the
Prothonotary was based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the
facts, or
(b)
in
making them, the Prothonotary improperly exercised his discretion on a question
vital to the final issue of the case.
[33]
The
issues in the case at bar are not related to a question vital to the final
issue, therefore this Court may only exercise its discretion de novo if
the Prothonotary’s decision is shown to be clearly wrong. In my view, the
respondent has not met this test.
[34]
After
a careful and complete reading of the Prothonotary’s decision, I have concluded
that he did not err in his characterization of the underlying application. The
CRA has not shown that the Prothonotary was clearly wrong in issuing the Order
that he did, even if the Prothonotary did mischaracterize the CRA’s submissions
in some parts. In this regard, I note that counsel for the respondent informed
the Court that she had no recollection of having said to the Prothonotary that
the Minister’s decision was discretionary and further stated that she could not
believe that she would say such a thing. This must be weighed against the
statement of the Prothonotary to the contrary. Absent direct evidence under
oath that the statement was not made, I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of
the Prothonotary’s statement.
[35]
The Federal
Court of Appeal in Simpson Strong-Tie Co. did not address the cases Prothonotary
Aalto relied on in concluding “that to allow one lower echelon witness to be the only
affiant in a case where several levels of administrative action are engaged and
where different directorates are involved is not proper.” In my view, Simpson
Strong-Tie Co. is not contrary to Stanfield. The Prothonotary’s
finding that the CRA’s affiant was a “lower echelon witness” was not clearly
wrong and should not be disturbed.
[36]
The
CRA states that Rule 91 was not complied with in that TELUS’ further request
for documents was not given with sufficient notice as it was made only during
the cross-examination. The CRA submits that the Prothonotary erred in ordering
production of these documents despite Rule 91.
[37]
The
CRA is technically correct that the request for further documents was not made
in accordance with Rule 91. At the same time, it seems to me that if an issue
arises during cross-examination, parties are to be encouraged to make their
requests at that time with the hope and, in most situations, with the
expectation that the opposing side will be willing to provide the documents.
It would be extremely inefficient and not in keeping with the practices this
Court encourages if, in such circumstances, the party questioning had to submit
a direction to re-attend with a new list of documents sought, given that the
opposing side may have been willing to provide the documents in the first
place. While litigation is adversarial, there is no reason that counsel cannot
be collegial and accommodating.
[38]
Prothonotaries
are to be given some flexibility to apply the Rules in a manner that is
efficient, practical, and just. If a situation such as this one arises, and
the Prothonotary is of the view that production of documents is warranted, then
a technical reading of Rule 91 should not invalidate the Order.
[39]
The
Court will not re-weigh the questions that the Prothonotary ordered answered as
doing so, in my opinion, would effectively be a de novo assessment of
the propriety of the questions in the first instance. Since the Prothonotary
was not clearly wrong, this Court cannot review the matter de novo.
[40]
For
these reasons, the appeal of the Prothonotary’s Order is dismissed.
Conclusion
[41]
The
respondent’s motion to strike is dismissed with costs as is the appeal of the Order
of the Prothonotary. The parties were canvassed as to the appropriate award of
costs. The respondent proposed an award of $3,000 for both whereas the
applicants proposed an award of $5,000 for the motion to strike and $5,000 for
the appeal. In my view, an award of $4,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements
and taxes for both matters is an appropriate award of costs.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. The motion to strike the
application is dismissed;
2. The appeal of the Order
of Prothonotary Aalto dated December 29, 2009, is dismissed; and
3. The applicants are
awarded costs fixed at $4,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements and taxes.
“Russel W. Zinn”
Docket: T-990-09
Citation: 2010 FC 839
ANNEX “A”
Excise Tax Act (R.S., 1985, c. E-15)
Loi
sur la taxe d’accise
(L.R., 1985, ch. E-15)
|
296. (1)
The Minister may assess
(a)
the net tax of a person under Division V for a reporting period of the
person,
(b)
any tax payable by a person under Division II, IV or IV.1,
(c)
any penalty or interest payable by a person under this Part,
(d)
any amount payable by a person under any of paragraphs 228(2.1)(b) and (2.3)(d)
and section 230.1, and
(e)
any amount which a person is liable to pay or remit under subsection 177(1.1)
or Subdivision a or b.1 of Division VII,
and may
reassess or make an additional assessment of tax, net tax, penalty, interest
or an amount referred to in paragraph (d) or (e).
...
299. (1) The Minister is not bound by any
return, application or information provided by or on behalf of any person and
may make an assessment, notwithstanding any return, application or
information so provided or that no return, application or information has
been provided.
Liability not
affected
(2) Liability
under this Part to pay or remit any tax, penalty, interest or other amount is
not affected by an incorrect or incomplete assessment or by the fact that no
assessment has been made.
(3) An
assessment, subject to being vacated on an objection or appeal under this
Part and subject to a reassessment, shall be deemed to be valid and binding.
(3.1) Where a
person (referred to in this subsection as the “body”) that is not an
individual or a corporation is assessed in respect of any matter,
(a) the
assessment is not invalid only because one or more other persons (each of
which is referred to in this subsection as a “representative”) who are liable
for obligations of the body did not receive a notice of the assessment;
(b) the
assessment is binding on each representative of the body, subject to a
reassessment of the body and the rights of the body to object to or appeal
from the assessment under this Part; and
(c) an assessment
of a representative in respect of the same matter is binding on the
representative subject only to a reassessment of the representative and the
rights of the representative to object to or appeal from the assessment of
the representative under this Part on the grounds that the representative is
not a person who is liable to pay or remit an amount to which the assessment
of the body relates, the body has been reassessed in respect of that matter
or the assessment of the body in respect of that matter has been vacated.
(4) An
assessment shall, subject to being reassessed or vacated as a result of an
objection or appeal under this Part, be deemed to be valid and binding,
notwithstanding any error, defect or omission therein or in any proceeding
under this Part relating thereto.
(5) An appeal
from an assessment shall not be allowed by reasons only of an irregularity,
informality, omission or error on the part of any person in the observation
of any directory provision of this Part.
...
301. (1) Where an assessment is issued to a
person in respect of net tax for a reporting period of the person, an amount
(other than net tax) that became payable or remittable by the person during a
reporting period of the person or a rebate of an amount paid or remitted by
the person during a reporting period of the person, for the purposes of this
section, the person is a “specified person” in respect of the assessment or a
notice of objection to the assessment if
(a) the person
was a listed financial institution described in any of subparagraphs
149(1)(a)(i) to (x) during that reporting period; or
(b) the person
was not a charity during that reporting period and the person’s threshold
amounts, determined in accordance with subsection 249(1), exceed $6 million
for both the person’s fiscal year that includes the reporting period and the
person’s previous fiscal year.
(1.1) Any
person who has been assessed and who objects to the assessment may, within
ninety days after the day notice of the assessment is sent to the person,
file with the Minister a notice of objection in the prescribed form and
manner setting out the reasons for the objection and all relevant facts.
(1.2) Where a
person objects to an assessment in respect of which the person is a specified
person, the notice of objection shall
(a) reasonably
describe each issue to be decided;
(b) specify in
respect of each issue the relief sought, expressed as the change in any
amount that is relevant for the purposes of the assessment; and
(c) provide
the facts and reasons relied on by the person in respect of each issue.
(1.3) Notwithstanding
subsection
(1.2), where a notice of objection filed by a person to whom that subsection
applies does not include the information required by paragraph (1.2)(b) or
(c) in respect of an issue to be decided that is described in the notice, the
Minister may in writing request the person to provide the information, and
those paragraphs shall be deemed to be complied with in respect of the issue
if, within 60 days after the request is made, the person submits the
information in writing to the Minister.
(1.4)
Notwithstanding
subsection
(1.1), where a person has filed a notice of objection to an assessment (in
this subsection referred to as the “earlier assessment”) in respect of which
the person is a specified person and the Minister makes a particular
assessment under subsection (3) pursuant to the notice of objection, except
where the earlier assessment was made under subsection 274(8) or in
accordance with an order of a court vacating, varying or restoring an
assessment or referring an assessment back to the Minister for
reconsideration and reassessment, the person may object to the particular
assessment in respect of an issue
(a) only if
the person complied with subsection (1.2) in the notice with respect to that
issue; and
(b) only with
respect to the relief sought in respect of that issue as specified by the
person in the notice.
Application of
subsection (1.4)
(1.5) Where a
person has filed a notice of objection to an assessment (in this subsection
referred to as the “earlier assessment”) and the Minister makes a particular
assessment under subsection (3) pursuant to the notice of objection,
subsection (1.4) does not limit the right of the person to object to the
particular assessment in respect of an issue that was part of the particular
assessment and not part of the earlier assessment.
(1.6)
Notwithstanding
subsection
(1.1), no objection may be made by a person in respect of an issue for which
the right of objection has been waived in writing by the person.
(2) The
Minister may accept a notice of objection notwithstanding that it was not
filed in the prescribed manner.
(3) On receipt
of a notice of objection, the Minister shall, with all due dispatch,
reconsider the assessment and vacate or confirm the assessment or make a
reassessment.
(4) Where, in
a notice of objection, a person who wishes to appeal directly to the Tax
Court requests the Minister not to reconsider the assessment objected to, the
Minister may confirm the assessment without reconsideration.
(5) After
reconsidering an assessment under subsection (3) or confirming an assessment
under subsection (4), the Minister shall send to the person objecting notice
of the Minister’s decision by registered or certified mail.
...
306. A person who has filed a notice of
objection to an assessment under this Subdivision may appeal to the Tax Court
to have the assessment vacated or a reassessment made after either
(a) the
Minister has confirmed the assessment or has reassessed, or
(b) one
hundred and eighty days have elapsed after the filing of the notice of
objection and the Minister has not notified the person that the Minister has
vacated or confirmed the assessment or has reassessed,
but no appeal
under this section may be instituted after the expiration of ninety days
after the day notice is sent to the person under section 301 that the
Minister has confirmed the assessment or has reassessed.
...
309. (1) The Tax Court may dispose of an appeal
from an assessment by
(a) dismissing
it; or
(b) allowing
it and
(i) vacating
the assessment, or
(ii) referring
the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment.
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296.
(1) Le
ministre peut établir une cotisation, une nouvelle cotisation ou une cotisation
supplémentaire pour déterminer :
a)
la taxe nette d’une personne, prévue à la section V, pour une période de
déclaration;
b)
la taxe payable par une personne en application des sections II, IV ou IV.1;
c)
les pénalités et intérêts payables par une personne en application de la
présente partie;
d)
un montant payable par une personne en application des alinéas 228(2.1)b) ou
(2.3)d) ou de l’article 230.1;
e)
un montant qu’une personne est tenue de payer ou de verser en vertu du
paragraphe 177(1.1) ou des sous-sections a ou b.1 de la section VII.
…
299.
(1) Le
ministre n’est pas lié par quelque déclaration, demande ou renseignement
livré par une personne ou en son nom; il peut établir une cotisation
indépendamment du fait que quelque déclaration, demande ou renseignement ait
été livré ou non.
Obligation
inchangée
(2)
L’inexactitude, l’insuffisance ou l’absence d’une cotisation ne change rien
aux taxes, pénalités, intérêts ou autres montants dont une personne est
redevable aux termes de la présente partie.
(3)
Sous réserve d’une nouvelle cotisation et d’une annulation prononcée par
suite d’une opposition ou d’un appel fait selon la présente partie, une
cotisation est réputée valide et exécutoire.
(3.1)
Dans le cas où une cotisation est établie à l’égard d’une personne (appelée «
entité » au présent paragraphe) qui n’est ni un particulier ni une personne
morale, les règles suivantes s’appliquent :
a)
la cotisation n’est pas invalide du seul fait qu’une ou plusieurs autres
personnes (chacune étant appelée « représentant » au présent paragraphe) qui
sont responsables des obligations de l’entité n’ont pas reçu d’avis de
cotisation;
b)
la cotisation lie chaque représentant de l’entité, sous réserve d’une
nouvelle cotisation établie à l’égard de celle-ci et de son droit de faire
opposition à la cotisation, ou d’interjeter appel, en vertu de la présente
partie;
c)
une cotisation établie à l’égard d’un représentant et portant sur la même
question que la cotisation établie à l’égard de l’entité lie le représentant,
sous réserve seulement d’une nouvelle cotisation établie à son égard et de
son droit de faire opposition à la cotisation, ou d’interjeter appel, en
vertu de la présente partie, pour le motif qu’il n’est pas une personne tenue
de payer ou de verser un montant visé par la cotisation établie à l’égard de
l’entité, qu’une nouvelle cotisation portant sur cette question a été établie
à l’égard de l’entité ou que la cotisation initiale établie à l’égard de
l’entité a été annulée.
(4)
Sous réserve d’une nouvelle cotisation et d’une annulation prononcée lors
d’une opposition ou d’un appel fait selon la présente partie, une cotisation
est réputée valide et exécutoire malgré les erreurs, vices de forme ou
omissions dans la cotisation ou dans une procédure y afférent en vertu de la
présente partie.
(5)
L’appel d’une cotisation ne peut être accueilli pour cause seulement
d’irrégularité, de vice de forme, d’omission ou d’erreur de la part d’une
personne dans le respect d’une disposition directrice de la présente partie.
…
301.
(1) Pour
l’application du présent article, la personne à l’égard de laquelle est
établie une cotisation au titre de la taxe nette pour sa période de
déclaration, d’un montant (autre que la taxe nette) qui est devenu à payer ou
à verser par elle au cours d’une telle période ou du remboursement d’un
montant qu’elle a payé ou versé au cours d’une telle période est une personne
déterminée relativement à la cotisation ou à un avis d’opposition à celle-ci
si, selon le cas :
a)
elle est une institution financière désignée visée à l’un des sous-alinéas
149(1)a)(i) à (x) au cours de la période en question;
b)
elle n’était pas un organisme de bienfaisance au cours de la période en
question et le montant déterminant qui lui est applicable, déterminé en conformité
avec le paragraphe 249(1), dépasse 6 000 000 $ pour son exercice qui comprend
cette période ainsi que pour son exercice précédent.
(1.1)
La personne qui fait opposition à la cotisation établie à son égard peut,
dans les 90 jours suivant le jour où l’avis de cotisation lui est envoyé,
présenter au ministre un avis d’opposition, en la forme et selon les
modalités déterminées par celui-ci, exposant les motifs de son opposition et
tous les faits pertinents.
(1.2)
L’avis d’opposition que produit une personne qui est une personne déterminée
relativement à une cotisation doit contenir les éléments suivants pour chaque
question à trancher :
a)
une description suffisante;
b)
le redressement demandé, sous la forme du montant qui représente le
changement apporté à un montant à prendre en compte aux fins de la
cotisation;
c)
les motifs et les faits sur lesquels se fonde la personne.
(1.3)
Malgré le paragraphe (1.2), dans le cas où un avis d’opposition produit par
une personne à laquelle ce paragraphe s’applique ne contient pas les
renseignements requis selon les alinéas (1.2)b) ou c) relativement à une
question à trancher qui est décrite dans l’avis, le ministre peut demander
par écrit à la personne de fournir ces renseignements. La personne est
réputée s’être conformée à ces alinéas relativement à la question à trancher
si, dans les 60 jours suivant la date de la demande par le ministre, elle
communique par écrit les renseignements requis au ministre.
(1.4)
Malgré le paragraphe (1.1), lorsqu’une personne a produit un avis
d’opposition à une cotisation (appelée « cotisation antérieure » au présent
paragraphe) relativement à laquelle elle est une personne déterminée et que
le ministre établit, en application du paragraphe (3), une cotisation donnée
par suite de l’avis, sauf si la cotisation antérieure a été établie en
application du paragraphe 274(8) ou en conformité avec l’ordonnance d’un
tribunal qui annule, modifie ou rétablit une cotisation ou renvoie une
cotisation au ministre pour nouvel examen et nouvelle cotisation, la personne
peut faire opposition à la cotisation donnée relativement à une question à
trancher :
a)
seulement si, relativement à cette question, elle s’est conformée au
paragraphe (1.2) dans l’avis;
b)
seulement à l’égard du redressement, tel qu’il est exposé dans l’avis,
qu’elle demande relativement à cette question.
Application
du paragraphe (1.4)
(1.5)
Lorsqu’une personne a produit un avis d’opposition à une cotisation (appelée
« cotisation antérieure » au présent paragraphe) et que le ministre établit,
en application du paragraphe (3), une cotisation donnée par suite de l’avis,
le paragraphe (1.4) n’a pas pour effet de limiter le droit de la personne de
s’opposer à la cotisation donnée relativement à une question sur laquelle
porte cette cotisation mais non la cotisation antérieure.
(1.6)
Malgré le paragraphe (1.1), aucune opposition ne peut être faite par une
personne relativement à une question pour laquelle elle a renoncé par écrit à
son droit d’opposition.
(2)
Le ministre peut accepter l’avis d’opposition qui n’a pas été produit selon
les modalités qu’il détermine.
(3)
Sur réception d’un avis d’opposition, le ministre doit, avec diligence,
examiner la cotisation de nouveau et l’annuler ou la confirmer ou établir une
nouvelle cotisation.
(4)
Le ministre peut confirmer une cotisation sans l’examiner de nouveau sur
demande de la personne qui lui fait part, dans son avis d’opposition, de son
intention d’en appeler directement à la Cour canadienne de l’impôt.
(5)
Après avoir examiné de nouveau ou confirmé une cotisation, le ministre fait
part de sa décision par avis envoyé par courrier recommandé ou certifié à la
personne qui a fait opposition à la cotisation.
…
306. La personne qui a produit
un avis d’opposition à une cotisation aux termes de la présente sous-section
peut interjeter appel à la Cour canadienne de l’impôt pour faire annuler la
cotisation ou en faire établir une nouvelle lorsque, selon le cas :
a)
la cotisation est confirmée par le ministre ou une nouvelle cotisation est
établie;
b)
un délai de 180 jours suivant la production de l’avis est expiré sans que le
ministre n’ait notifié la personne du fait qu’il a annulé ou confirmé la
cotisation ou procédé à une nouvelle cotisation.
Toutefois,
nul appel ne peut être interjeté après l’expiration d’un délai de 90 jours
suivant l’envoi à la personne, aux termes de l’article 301, d’un avis portant
que le ministre a confirmé la cotisation ou procédé à une nouvelle
cotisation.
…
309.
(1) La Cour
canadienne de l’impôt peut statuer sur un appel concernant une cotisation en
le rejetant ou en l’accueillant. Dans ce dernier cas, elle peut annuler la
cotisation ou la renvoyer au ministre pour nouvel examen et nouvelle
cotisation.
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