Date: 20100730
Docket: IMM-3998-09
Citation: 2010 FC 794
Ottawa, Ontario, July 30,
2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mandamin
BETWEEN:
ABADIR
ALI
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
Mr.
Abadir Ali applies for judicial review of the June 30, 2009 decision by the
Minister’s Delegate concluding he constitutes a danger to the Canadian public.
The Delegate also found Mr. Abadir Ali would neither face a serious possibility
of persecution, nor risk to his life or cruel or unusual treatment on being
returned to Somalia.
[2]
On
May 9, 2008 the Minister served Mr. Abadir Ali with notice of the intention to
seek an opinion inquiring into whether he constituted a danger to the Canadian
public and whether he could be removed to Somalia. On June 30, 2009 the Minister’s Delegate found Mr. Abadir
Ali to be a danger to the public pursuant to paragraph 115(2)(1) of IRPA. Mr. Abadir Ali
applies for judicial review of that decision.
[3]
Mr.
Abadir Ali also commenced a separate judicial review of the September 21, 2009
refusal by an Enforcement Officer to defer his removal to Somalia. In refusing Mr.
Abadir Ali’s request for deferral, the Enforcement Officer relied upon the
Minister’s Delegate assessment of risk. Mr. Abadir Ali received a stay of his
removal pending the hearing of this judicial review as well as the judicial
review of the refusal to defer removal.
[4]
I
heard both judicial review applications concerning the Danger Opinion,
IMM-3998-09 and the Refusal to Defer Removal, IMM-4721-09. I will address the
latter in a separate decision.
Background
[5]
The
Applicant is 26 years old. He was eight years old in 1991 when he entered Canada as a
dependent of his stepmother. They were accepted as Convention refugees from Somalia in October
1992 and he became a permanent residence of Canada on May 28,
1993.
[6]
As
a youth, he was convicted of several Criminal Code, C-46 (CC) offences:
i.
October
12, 1995 Assault with a Weapon
ii.
December
12, 1995 Mischief under $5,000.
iii.
December
10, 1996 Assault
iv.
November
8, 2001 Assault.
[7]
On
February 10, 2004 Mr. Abadir Ali became the subject of an inadmissibility
report pursuant to subsection 44(1) of IRPA on grounds of serious
criminality. On February 16, 2004 Mr. Abadir Ali was arrested and detained. At
that time he was awaiting trial on charges of robbery, assault with a weapon
and aggravated assault.
[8]
On
May 12, 2004 a deportation order was issued against him. On May 17, 2004 he
filed an appeal against the removal order with the Immigration Appeal Division.
This appeal was dismissed.
[9]
On
December 7, 2004 Mr. Abadir Ali was released from detention on conditions. He
was later rearrested for failing to report. He was again released on conditions
in November 2006.
[10]
On
November 23, 2006 immigration officials decided not to seek a Minister’s
Opinion, they did not proceed with removal, and warned Mr. Abadir Ali to lead a
more productive life and stop committing crimes.
[11]
On
June 11, 2007 an immigration warrant was issued for Mr. Abadir Ali’s arrest
because he failed to report to Immigration on three occasions. He was arrested
June 13, 2007
[12]
On
January 30, 2008 Mr. Abadir Ali became the subject of an inadmissibility report
for further serious criminal convictions. He was transferred from Court hold to
Immigration hold. On May 9, 2008 Mr. Abadir Ali was given notice of the
intention to seek the opinion of the Minister that he is a danger to the public
and could be removed to Somalia pursuant to subsection 115(2) (a) of IRPA.
[13]
As
an adult, Mr. Abadir Ali was convicted of further criminal offences:
i.
February
4, 2002 Assault causing Bodily Harm s. 267(b) CC, 9 months conditional
sentence, 27 months probation
ii.
October 1,
2002 Obstruct Peace Officer, s.129(a) CC, 7 days imprisonment, credit
for 2 days pre-sentence custody
iii.
September
21, 2004 Obstruct Peace Officer, s. 129(a) CC, 1 day imprisonment, credit
for 45 days pre-sentence custody
iv.
January 3,
2008 Aggravated Assault s. 268, imprisonment 47 days, credit for 160
days pre-sentence custody, 3 years probation
[14]
On
June 30, 2009 the Minister’s Delegate issued her decision concluding Mr. Abadir
Ali represented a danger to the public and could be returned to Somalia.
Decision
Under Review
[15]
The Minister’s Delegate concluded the Applicant constitutes
a danger to the public in Canada. She found there was insufficient evidence of
potential for rehabilitation. The Delegate also found Mr. Abadir Ali would not
face any more risk on return to Somalia than would be faced
generally by other Somalis.
[16]
The
Delegate began by reviewing the legislation and case law underlying her mandate
to write a Danger Opinion. In addition to the legislative framework, the Delegate
also considers the Supreme Court’s Decision in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1. That decision requires her to balance the
risk Mr. Abadir Ali faces should he be refouled to Somalia and the danger to
the public should he remain in Canada. She asserts her conclusion must answer this question: “If
the risk to the Canadian public outweighs the risk of return and any
humanitarian and compassionate considerations, Mr. Abadir Ali may be returned
to Somalia pursuant to paragraph 115(2)(1) of IRPA.”
[17]
The
Delegate summarizes Mr. Abadir Ali’s immigration file, his criminal record and
a chronology of events. She then considers danger information and the
circumstances surrounding his criminal offences. She quotes extensively from
Court documents laying out findings in the Applicant’s conviction for a vicious
and unprovoked assault on a woman; he injured his victim permanently. She also
considered statements made at Mr. Abadir Ali’s sentencing hearing, including
the reading of a victim impact statement.
[18]
The
Delegate explicitly excludes Mr. Abadir Ali’s youth convictions and focuses her
attention on the violent nature of his adult offences. She also takes into
account his troubled upbringing, addictions and the lack of available resources
to address his problems in detention.
[19]
The
Delegate concludes there is not enough evidence suggesting Mr. Abadir Ali may
be rehabilitated. She also finds he has no community support and few, if any,
positive influences in his life. She concludes, influenced by the nature and
seriousness of his previous offences, that Mr. Abadir Ali is a present and
future danger to the public in Canada.
[20]
The
Delegate then considers submissions from Mr. Abadir Ali with the reasons why he
does not want to return to Somalia. He is concerned about the security situation in Somalia and the
unavailability of resources, jobs and aid. She considers Mr. Abadir Ali’s
limited knowledge of the culture and mores in Somalia.
[21]
The
Delegate concludes there are dangers in Somalia, but they are common to all Somalis. She finds there is no
evidence to demonstrate Mr. Abadir Ali would face a personalized risk in the north
of the country where there is more stability and plans for democratic
elections. She finds there is no evidence Mr. Abadir Ali, once refouled to Somalia, couldn’t make his
way to more stable places in the country. The Delegate concludes that Mr. Abadir Ali will not be at
any more risk than anyone else in Somalia.
[22]
With
these conclusions set down, the Delegate balanced the individual risk to the
Applicant upon refoulement with the danger he poses to Canadian society. She
concludes that she is not persuaded Mr. Abadir Ali will be subject to
discriminate persecution or a risk to his life or to a risk of cruel and
unusual punishment, “should he be removed to Somalia today”. The Delegate concludes Mr.
Abadir Ali poses a great enough risk to Canadian society to “greatly outweigh”
the risks he may face in Somalia.
Legislation
[23]
The IPRA
provides:
Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act,
(2001, c. 27)
|
36. (1) A
permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of
serious criminality for
(a) having
been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of
Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years,
or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment
of more than six months has been imposed;
…
48. (1) A
removal order is enforceable if it has come into force and is not stayed.
(2) If a
removal order is enforceable, the foreign national against whom it was made
must leave Canada immediately and it must be enforced as
soon as is reasonably practicable.
…
96. A
Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside
each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that
fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b) not having
a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual
residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to
that country.
97. (1) A
person in need of protection is a person in Canada
whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not
have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence,
would subject them personally
(a) to a
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk
to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person
is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk
is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
…
115. (1) A
protected person or a person who is recognized as a Convention refugee by
another country to which the person may be returned shall not be removed from
Canada to a country where they would be at risk of persecution for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment.
(2) Subsection
(1) does not apply in the case of a person
(a) who is
inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality and who constitutes, in the
opinion of the Minister, a danger to the public in Canada; or
(b) who is
inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights
or organized criminality if, in the opinion of the Minister, the person
should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature and
severity of acts committed or of danger to the security of Canada.
(3) A person,
after a determination under paragraph 101(1)(e) that the person’s claim is
ineligible, is to be sent to the country from which the person came to
Canada, but may be sent to another country if that country is designated
under subsection 102(1) or if the country from which the person came to
Canada has rejected their claim for refugee protection.
|
36.
(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits
suivants :
a)
être déclaré coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi fédérale
punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans ou d’une infraction
à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est
infligé;
…
48.
(1) La mesure de renvoi est exécutoire depuis sa prise d’effet dès lors
qu’elle ne fait pas l’objet d’un sursis.
(2)
L’étranger visé par la mesure de renvoi exécutoire doit immédiatement quitter
le territoire du Canada, la mesure devant être appliquée dès que les
circonstances le permettent.
…
96.
A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a)
soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du
fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces
pays;
b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
97.
(1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
a)
soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b)
soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i)
elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii)
elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes
originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
…
115.
(1) Ne peut être renvoyée dans un pays où elle risque la persécution du fait
de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un
groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques, la torture ou des traitements ou
peines cruels et inusités, la personne protégée ou la personne dont il est
statué que la qualité de réfugié lui a été reconnue par un autre pays vers
lequel elle peut être renvoyée.
(2)
Le paragraphe (1) ne s’applique pas à l’interdit de territoire :
a)
pour grande criminalité qui, selon le ministre, constitue un danger pour le
public au Canada;
b)
pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux
ou criminalité organisée si, selon le ministre, il ne devrait pas être présent
au Canada en raison soit de la nature et de la gravité de ses actes passés,
soit du danger qu’il constitue pour la sécurité du Canada.
(3)
Une personne ne peut, après prononcé d’irrecevabilité au titre de l’alinéa
101(1)e), être renvoyée que vers le pays d’où elle est arrivée au Canada sauf
si le pays vers lequel elle sera renvoyée a été désigné au titre du
paragraphe 102(1) ou que sa demande d’asile a été rejetée dans le pays d’où
elle est arrivée au Canada.
|
(emphasis
added)
Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms¸
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
|
1. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
…
7. Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not
to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
|
1.
La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés garantit les droits et libertés
qui y sont énoncés. Ils ne peuvent être restreints que par une règle de
droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la justification
puisse se démontrer dans le cadre d'une société libre et démocratique.
…
7.
Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne
peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu'en conformité avec les principes de
justice fondamentale.
|
Issues
[24]
The Applicant raises the following issues:
1.
Was there a breach of
the duty of fairness owed by the Minister in forming a “danger” opinion…where
document based on the decision were not disclosed to the Applicant and the Applicant
is given no opportunity to respond to it and were document was signed nor
submitted or prepared its content by the applicant?”
2.
Did the Minister’s Delegate
err in determining that the Applicant does not face personalized risk upon
return to Somalia?
3.
Did the Minister’s
Delegate err in relying on part of the documentary evidence without regard or
analysis to the current condition of the country?
4.
Are there reasons of
the Minister’s Delegate’s danger opinion adequate?
[25]
The Respondent
submits these issues:
1.
Did the Minister’s
Delegate provide the Applicant with sufficient procedural fairness?
2.
Were the Minister’s Delegate’s
factual findings and assessment of the evidence reasonable?
[26]
In my view, the above
can be addressed by articulating two issues. First, did the Minister’s Delegate
afford the Applicant sufficient procedural fairness? Second, was the Minister’s
Delegate’s decision reasonable?
Standard
of Review
[27]
The
Supreme Court of Canada found in Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 (Dunsmuir) that
question of fact and mixed questions of fact and law should be afforded a
degree of deference and reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.
[28]
The
Supreme Court developed the notion of reasonableness in Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 (Khosa).
Significant deference is owed the Minister’s Delegate for factual findings and
weighing of the evidence. The Court wrote at para. 59:
“Reasonableness is a single standard that
takes its colour from the context. One of the objectives of Dunsmuir was to
liberate judicial review courts from what came to be seen as undue complexity
and formalism. Where the reasonableness standard applies, it requires
deference. Reviewing courts cannot substitute their own appreciation of the
appropriate solution, but must rather determine if the outcome falls within
"a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect
of the facts and law" (Dunsmuir, at para. 47). There might be more than
one reasonable outcome. However, as long as the process and the outcome fit comfortably
with the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, it is
not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view of a preferable
outcome.”
[29]
The content of the
duty of procedural fairness is a question of law. The application of the Charter
is a question of law reviewable on the standard of correctness. (Dunsmuir)
Analysis
Did
the Minister’s Delegate afford the Applicant sufficient procedural fairness?
[30]
The
Applicant submits that the Minister’s Delegate did not observe procedural fairness
in three ways. First, the Applicant says he was not provided with certain
documents that were before the Delegate when she rendered her decision. Second,
the Applicant says the documents disclosed were presented in a confusing manner
without markings and numbering of exhibits as required by the “Guide to
Proceedings Before the Immigration Division Legal Services”. Finally, the
Applicant claims the Applicant’s previous counsel presented a submission to the
Delegate received which had not been reviewed by the Applicant beforehand.
Disclosure
of Documents
[31]
The
Respondent submits that all documents before the Delegate were disclosed to the
Applicant. The Applicant was provided with three disclosure packages which the
Applicant acknowledged receipt by signature.
[32]
A
careful review of the Certified Tribunal Record indicates that the Applicant’s
signature acknowledges receipt of the three disclosure packages on May 9, 2008,
December 12, 2008 and March 21, 2009. I am satisfied the Applicant was provided
with disclosure of the documents in question.
Organization
of Disclosure Packages
[33]
The
Applicant submits the documents were made up of almost 300 pages, they were not
listed and they were confusing. The Applicant submits the disclosure packages
were not organized as required by the “Guide to proceedings before the
immigration division legal services”. That guide refers to the Federal
Court Rules respecting the form of documents, in particular Rule 24 and
indicates that exhibits should be marked and numbered.
[34]
The
short answer is that the Guide referred to sets out rules and procedures before
the Immigration Appeal Division or the Federal Court. These rules and
procedures do not set out the procedural requirements in a proceeding before
the Minister’s Delegate. In addition, the Certified Tribunal Record does not
show the documentation to be arranged in a haphazard fashion.
[35]
More
importantly, the salient documentation concerns the Applicant’s personal
history and criminal record. This is information the Applicant would be
personally aware of and would not find confusing.
Previous
Counsel’s Submission
[36]
Allegations
of misconduct are to be treated with great caution by the Court. Notice must be
provided to the counsel against whom the allegation is made and the law society
to which the counsel belongs. The response of counsel or evidence of a
complaint to the law society must accompany the allegations. Nduwimana v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1837 at para. 12.
[37]
The
Applicant submits he did not sign a submission dated October 21, 2008 to the
Delegate which the Delegate relied upon in coming to her decision. The
Applicant says he was neither aware of, nor consulted on the submission by his
former counsel. The Applicant says he was not able to contact his former
counsel while he was in detention at the Innes detention centre. He says he
complained to the Law Society of Upper Canada about his former counsel’s
conduct.
[38]
The
Respondent says the Applicant was given the opportunity to respond. The Applicant
provided written submissions which were signed by the Applicant and faxed to
the Delegate on October 21, 2008. The Respondent adds that counsel for the
Applicant provided further submissions to the Delegate of April 30, 2009.
[39]
The
Respondent also submits the Applicant has provided no evidence beyond a bare
assertion of a compliant to the Law Society of Upper Canada about his counsel’s
conduct.
[40]
A
review of the Certified Tribunal Record discloses the Applicant signed the
submission he now disavows. The Applicant has not provided evidence of filing a
compliant with the law society beyond his assertion. I find there is no basis
for the Applicant’s claims of not being consulted on the submissions made to
the Delegate.
[41]
In
result I find that the
Applicant was afforded sufficient procedural fairness in the danger opinion
process.
Were the
Minister’s Delegate’s factual findings and assessment of the evidence
reasonable?
[42]
The
Applicant alleges the decision is unreasonable because it does not take into
account evidence the Applicant considers central to the analysis of the risks
he might face in Somalia.
[43]
The
Respondent submits that the Minister’s Delegate’s Danger Opinion was
reasonable. The Respondent notes that the Minister’s Delegate considered the
meaning of “danger to the public” concluding it means an individual is a
possible re-offender whose presence in Canada creates an
unacceptable risk to the public. She then considered the Applicant’s criminal
record against that test and found he was a danger to the public.
[44]
With
respect to the risk on return, the Respondent submits the Applicant has not
shown the Delegate overlooked any evidence central to the Applicant’s case.
[45]
It
is well established that a decision maker need not refer to every piece of
evidence before her. Decision makers are in error when they fail to refer to
evidence central to the case and contrary to the decision. Cepeda-Guiterrez
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425 at para. 16. That
is not the case here.
[46]
The
Minister’s Delegate expressly excluded consideration of the Applicant’s
criminal record as a youth and only considered the Applicant’s adult criminal
record. The Delegate considered the Applicant’s circumstances, his adult
criminal record, his failure to abide by release conditions in regards to both
immigration and criminal matters and his failure to rehabilitate in coming to
her conclusion on the Danger Opinion.
[47]
The
Minister’s Delegate considered the Applicant’s submission that he does not want
to return to Somalia because his
life would be in danger. She considered the evidence submitted by the
Applicant’s counsel. She notes the UNHCR considers some forced returns to
northern Somalia are possible
under certain conditions. She states that she has considered all the evidence
on record, the human rights situation and the volatile humanitarian situation
and concludes that while there is hardship on forced removal, her assessment is
the Applicant would not face personalized risk. The Minister’s Delegate also
refers to the evidence weighing against risk.
[48]
I
agree the general principle set out in Cepeda-Guiterrez applies. The
Minister’s Delegate need not refer to all of the evidence before her. However,
she did have regard for evidence central to the case.
[49]
I
conclude the Minister’s Delegate arrived at a reasonable conclusion concerning
the risk the Applicant faces on removal to Somalia. I so
conclude in light of the Supreme Court’s explanation of reasonableness in Khosa.
[50]
The
application for judicial review of the Danger Opinion does not succeed.
[51]
Neither
the Applicant nor the Respondent has proposed a question of general importance
for certification and I see none arising in this application.
Conclusion
[52]
Having
decided that the Applicant was afforded procedural fairness in the process and
the Minister’s Delegate’s
decision concerning the Danger Opinion and the risk of return to Somalia to be reasonable, the application for judicial
review of the Danger Opinion is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that:
1.
The application for judicial
review of the Danger Opinion is dismissed.
2.
I
make no order for a general question for certification.
“Leonard
S. Mandamin”