Date: 20100319
Docket: IMM-1041-09
Citation: 2010 FC 319
Ottawa, Ontario, March 19, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
SILVIA
MATA DIAZ
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
O’KEEFE J.
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) for judicial review of a
decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (the Board), dated January 27, 2009, wherein the applicant was found to
be neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection under
sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
[2]
The
applicant seeks:
1. an order setting
aside the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board determining that the applicant
is not a Convention Refugee or a person in need of protection; and
2. an order sending the
applicant’s claim back to the Immigration and Refugee Board for redetermination.
Background
[3]
Silvia
Mata Diaz (the applicant) was born in the state of Mexico. In 1988, the
applicant began a relationship with her former partner, Pedro Penaloza
Gonzalez. The applicant had two children before she began her relationship with
Mr. Gonzalez and gave birth to two more children during her relationship. One
of her sons is in Canada as a refugee claimant.
[4]
The
applicant alleged that her partner abused her physically, emotionally and
sexually. The applicant stated that she made informative reports with the
police, but that these reports were never acted upon. In 1998, the applicant
states that she left her home and went to live with her family as a result of
the abuse suffered at the hands of Mr. Gonzalez. The applicant then states that
she returned home approximately four years later, in 2002, until she fled again
in 2007 to a friend’s house in Villa Del Carbon.
[5]
The
applicant alleged that Mr. Gonzalez found her in Villa Del Carbon and
threatened her again. The applicant claimed that she told Mr. Gonzalez that she
would return, but she was able to buy some time in order to flee to Canada, which she
did on August 16, 2007. She then made a claim for refugee status on August 23,
2007. The applicant alleges that Mr. Gonzalez still threatens members of her
family through telephone calls and she claims that she cannot return to Mexico because of
what he may do to her upon her return.
Board’s Decision
[6]
First,
the Board addressed the reasons for denying certain procedural requests made by
applicant’s counsel prior to the hearing. Counsel had requested permission to
submit a psychological report after the hearing as it had been difficult to
schedule one due to the holidays prior to the hearing. The Board denied this
request, as the applicant had filed her PIF on November 5, 2007 and had also
successfully postponed the hearing twice. The first scheduled hearing which was
to occur on May 6, 2008, had been postponed to allow the applicant more time to
receive documents from Mexico. The Board found it unreasonable that the
applicant could not have obtained a psychological report in the seven months
when her hearing was postponed for the purpose of obtaining documents, or
within the 14 months since her PIF had been filed.
[7]
The
Board then went on to consider the credibility of the allegations made by the applicant
regarding her relationship with Mr. Gonzalez after 1998. The Board noted that
there were no documents to establish that she had resumed living with Mr.
Gonzalez after 1998. The applicant stated that she did not have documents
because she had fled quickly and Mr. Gonzalez had the important documents. The Board
did not accept this because she still had two sons living with Mr. Gonzalez and
many family members who could have sworn affidavits. The Board also noted that
there was no mention in the letters from her family of the time period during
which the abuse occurred. Finally, the Board noted that the addresses listed on
her port of entry (POE) notes overlap and this error undermines her claim that
she lived with Mr. Gonzalez after 1998. The applicant claimed that it was
because someone helped her with the forms and that it was wrong. The Board
rejected this explanation as she would have had to provide the information to
the person helping her with the forms. The applicant also claimed that she
informed someone working for her counsel of the error before submitting her
PIF, but the Board found it would have been reasonable to have included those
errors in the PIF narrative. Thus, the Board was not persuaded that the applicant
had a relationship with Mr. Gonzalez after 1998.
[8]
The
Board then found that the applicant did not provide sufficient credible or
trustworthy evidence that she had been abused. The Board noted that the applicant
had provided a document which indicated that she left the marital home because
of verbal aggressions. However, when questioned about the report and why it
failed to indicate physical abuse, the applicant claimed it was because the
police do not put details of abuse in reports unless there are visible marks or
if they are offered money and that Mr. Gonzalez beat her in a manner that did
not leave marks. The Board rejected this explanation because it was
unreasonable for the police to have recorded verbal aggressions if they were
not interested in her allegations of abuse. The Board also noted that the applicant
claimed she made three police reports, but none were ever acted upon. The Board
found that it was implausible that the applicant would have returned to file
two more police reports after the first if she knew that the police were not
going to follow up on her allegations.
[9]
Next,
the Board found that the applicant did not provide sufficient credible or
trustworthy evidence to support the claim that she had been physically harmed.
The applicant asked to submit a document from a doctor after the hearing
because it was late being delivered due to the holidays. The Board refused this
request because the applicant had had ample time to arrange for the document.
The applicant also claimed that her previous lawyer did not tell her she needed
to bring a medical report, but the Board rejected this claim as the same lawyer
had been the solicitor of record since the PIF was submitted and because the
applicant and counsel were aware that documents should be provided as this was
the basis for requesting that the first hearing be postponed.
[10]
The
Board then considered the applicant’s claims that there are ongoing threats to
her family and concluded there was insufficient evidence from her family to
support these allegations. The Board noted that the letters from family were
self-serving and not from uninterested sources. Also, although the applicant
claimed her sister was the victim of a kidnapping, there was no evidence of the
incident, such as an affidavit from the sister, nor did the sister mention the
incident in her letter. The letters from other family members did not include
specific details of abuse or any indication that the family witnessed the abuse
first hand. The Board acknowledged that the letter from the applicant’s cousin
indicated that Mr. Gonzalez called often but it did not match the applicant’s
claim in her PIF that he made threatening calls to the family. Thus, the Board
assigned little weight to the letters.
[11]
The
Board then outlined a number of inconsistencies between the applicant’s
testimony and the information in the PIF. First, the applicant testified that
one of the main motivations for the abuse was that Mr. Gonzalez did not believe
that one of the applicant’s children was his son. This was not in the PIF and
the applicant did not provide a reason for its exclusion. Similarly, the applicant
testified that she was raped frequently, but this was also not included in the
PIF, so the Board was not persuaded that there was sexual abuse. The applicant
testified that the abuse was more sexual than physical, but this did not
conform to her descriptions of abuse in her PIF, which indicated the abuse was
physical. The applicant testified that she was locked in the house for several
days after Mr. Gonzalez found the police reports and that she sought the
assistance of a Domestic Violence Prevention and Care Unit, but neither of
these claims was included in her PIF. The applicant testified that she left a
number of things out. Finally, the applicant testified that Mr. Gonzalez kept
her from communicating with her family, but this was also not in the PIF. The applicant
explained that she did not narrate her story well. The Board found these
omissions to be unreasonable because the applicant affirmed her PIF was
complete, she had an opportunity to review and revise it prior to the hearing
and the applicant in fact made amendments to the PIF prior to the hearing. In
the Board’s view, these inconsistencies undermined the credibility of the applicant.
[12]
The
Board found that the applicant’s claim that she was found by Mr. Gonzalez in
Villa Del Carbon was implausible. The applicant did not know the date which she
was found, except that it was in June of 2007. The applicant claimed that she
did not work, she did not call her children, and that she hid in the house. The
Board noted that Villa Del Carbon was located 1.5 hours away from Mr.
Gonzalez’s home, that he had no relatives in town and when she was asked about
how he could have found her simply walking down the street when he had no
reason to be there, the applicant claimed that he may have followed someone to
the town and found her and that he has many friends in the police. The Board
did not accept this explanation as the applicant had earlier stated that she
did not know how he found her and that the applicant had never mentioned in her
PIF that he had friends in the police, which was an important fact relating to
the availability of state protection, the existence of an IFA and Mr.
Gonzalez’s ability to act with impunity.
[13]
Finally,
the Board noted that the timing of the applicant’s departure from Mexico coincided
with her son’s surgery in Canada and found that this undermined her
credibility. The Board found that given the lack of evidence regarding her
alleged abuse, more weight should be placed on the explanation that she came to
be with her son.
Issues
[14]
I
would state the issues as follows:
1. What is the
standard of review?
2. Did the Board fail
to articulate its reasons in “clear and unmistakable terms”?
3. Did the Board err
in its determination that the applicant was not credible, based on the evidence
before it?
4. Did the Board err
in requiring corroborating documents?
Applicant’s Written Submissions
[15]
First,
the applicant submits that a misstatement of critical or key evidence
constitutes a patently unreasonable error of law. While the Board is able to
make findings of fact, the Board must get the facts right. The Board stated
that it found the letters to be self-serving because the applicant testified
that she requested them. However, the applicant notes that in her testimony,
she did not say that she requested the letters, only that she told her family
why she was in Canada and provided them with her address.
[16]
Similarly,
the Board states that when the applicant was questioned about the omission of
the allegations of rape from the PIF, the applicant responded that she had
indicated that he had “checked all [her] body” and that that was the same as
rape. The applicant submits that this is a misstatement of the evidence as she
said that he would check her body and that she wrote it wrong. It was perverse
to say that the applicant would have stated that checking her body was the same
as rape. The applicant submits that these misstatements of the evidence were
used to make negative inferences regarding the applicant’s credibility and that
this brings into question the validity of the Board’s whole analysis.
[17]
Next,
the applicant submits that the law requires the Board to provide its findings
in clear and unmistakeable terms and that it must be clear to a claimant why
she is being rejected. The applicant notes that the Board made contradictory
findings, as the reasons state that “[t]he panel finds that the claimant did
not provide sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence to support her
allegation that she continued in a relationship with her partner after 1988
[sic]” and goes on to state that the Board found that the applicant was in a
relationship with Mr. Gonzalez and that “the claimant left him in November of
1998as per her evidence.” The Board appears to make two separate findings that
cannot co-exist and it is impossible to determine the Board’s findings on the
issue.
[18]
Similarly,
the Board noted that Amparo, an author of one of the letters, is the applicant’s
cousin and then goes on to state that “Amparo’s letter indicates that Pedro has
called often; however, the letter does not conform to the claimant’s PIF
allegations that Pedro has made threatening calls to the claimant’s relatives.”
The letter indicates that the phone calls were of a threatening nature, and
therefore it was nonsensical for the Board to find that the applicant’s family
was not receiving threatening phone calls.
[19]
The
Board stated in its reasons that the applicant did not note in her PIF that
part of Mr. Gonzalez’s motivation for abusing her was because he did not
believe that one of the applicant’s children was his son. However, the Board
made this finding without regard to the evidence before it, as the applicant
did make a statement to that effect in her PIF.
[20]
Similarly,
the applicant notes that the Board had questioned her as to why she did not
include the fact that Mr. Gonzalez kept her from her family in her PIF.
However, there was a statement to that effect as well in her PIF and that the Board
disregarded the evidence.
[21]
The
applicant submits that there is no legal requirement for a refugee claimant to
provide corroborating documents for all key pieces of evidence. The applicant cites
the Federal Court of Appeal in Selvarajah v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, [1994] F.C.J. No. 532, where the Court held that a lack of
supporting documentation cannot provide the basis for doubting otherwise
credible evidence. The applicant also submits that a failure to provide
documentation to corroborate a claim cannot be related to the applicant’s
credibility in the absence of evidence to contradict the allegations, as the
Court stated in Mahmud v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] F.C.J. No. 729. The Board concluded that by failing to provide
documents, there was no credible evidence of the applicant’s claims, including:
1. Documentary
evidence to establish that she returned to Mr. Gonzalez in 2002;
2. Evidence, such
as an affidavit from the applicant’s sister, regarding the alleged kidnapping
of her sister.
The Board provided no other reason to
reject these claims other than the lack of documentation and thus, these
findings were made in error.
[22]
The
applicant submits that the Board engaged in speculation when analyzing the
document provided by the applicant that indicated the applicant left the
marital home because of verbal aggressions. The Board stated in the reasons
that “if officials were not interested in her allegations of abuse, it would
not be reasonable for them to include the fact that the claimant had received
verbal aggressions.” The Board could not know what the police officers were
thinking when the report was issued and had no reason for concluding based on
this assumption that the applicant had not been abused, particularly when the
country condition evidence shows that Mexican police are regularly unreasonable
and apathetic.
[23]
Similarly,
the Board engaged in speculation when it concluded that it was implausible that
the applicant would return to the police twice after there was no action taken
on her first police report. Such a finding puts her in a no-win situation
because if she had not continued to seek help from the police, then there was a
risk that the applicant would have been found to have not made reasonable
efforts to seek state protection.
[24]
The
Board engaged in speculation when it rejected the applicant’s explanation for
why the addresses on her POE notes overlapped. The Board had no evidentiary
basis for refusing to believe there had been a mistake and to decide that the
wrong address must be the applicant’s partner’s address. In Neto v. Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration, 2004 FC 565, the Court held that it was
unreasonable to discount the applicant’s testimony that there was a mistake on
her POE notes because it could not be known what was said between the applicant
and the interpreter.
[25]
The
Board found that the allegations regarding physical and sexual assaults were
not credible because the applicant stated in her testimony that the abuse was
more sexual than physical, but the PIF described physical violence. The mere
fact that physical abuse occurred does not preclude the possibility that sexual
abuse occurred more often. It was not possible to conclude that the sexual
abuse did not occur more often or that the applicant was not telling the truth
regarding the abuse on the basis that some physical abuse occurred.
[26]
The
applicant notes that the Board asked her to explain how Mr. Gonzalez found her
when she moved to Villa Del Carbon. The applicant could not be expected to know
how he found her and this line of questioning required the applicant to
speculate, which the Board then used against her. The applicant submits that
this line of questioning and reasoning was made in a perverse and capricious
manner and constituted a reviewable error.
Respondent’s Written Submissions
[27]
In R.K.L. v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003]
F.C.J. No. 162, the Court found that failure to mention key evidence in a
written statement to the authorities, or the existence of inconsistencies
between a written statement and a subsequent testimony can sustain a negative
credibility finding. The applicant was accorded significant time to amend her
PIF if she wished to ensure its adequacy and completeness, particularly because
the hearing had been postponed twice. The applicant did make some amendments
before the hearing. The respondent then notes a number of occasions where the
transcript indicates that the Board asked the applicant why certain key events
were not in her PIF or why the PIF was not amended to include these events. The
respondent admits that the transcript indicated that the Board member conceded
that the applicant had not failed to mention that part of the motivation for
the abuse was because Mr. Gonzalez did not believe he was the father of one of
her sons. However, the respondent submits that this minor error does not
warrant a remedy on judicial review, as it was not central to the Board’s
decision.
[28]
The respondent also submits that the applicant should have gone
into more detail in her PIF. In Basseghi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 1867, the Court held that all relevant
and important facts should be included in a PIF and the oral evidence should
only explain the information contained in the PIF. The Board properly put the
omissions before the applicant and considered her explanations. It was open to
the Board not to accept these explanations.
[29]
The respondent also submits that the Board is properly entitled to
use inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence before it to make negative
credibility findings. The respondent notes that the applicant has submitted
that the Board misstated her evidence regarding the type of abuse she suffered.
However, while the transcript indicates that she did not say that checking her
body was the same as rape, it was open to the Board on the basis of all the
evidence before it to conclude that the applicant had omitted an important fact
from her PIF.
[30]
The applicant has submitted that the Board misstated her evidence
when it said she requested the letters from her family and that the Board erred
by assigning little weight to them. However, the applicant has ignored the fact
that the Board made a number of other findings regarding the letters. For
instance, the Board found that the letters did not indicate instances of abuse
or that the family members had witnessed abuse. Also, the Board found that the
letters were inconsistent with the information in the PIF regarding threatening
phone calls. Although the applicant argues that the Board misstated the
evidence regarding the phone calls, the respondent notes that the PIF states
that the applicant’s family had been threatened by anonymous phone calls, while
the letter states that Mr. Gonzalez has called and threatened the applicant,
not her family. Finally, the respondent notes that while the applicant did not
testify that she requested the letters, she did testify that she had provided
them with the address and told them why she was in Canada.
[31]
The respondent points to a number of instances in the hearing
where the Board questioned the applicant regarding documents that could have
supported her claims. The Board’s finding that the applicant failed to provide
credible evidence was not based solely on the lack of documents to corroborate
her claims, but instead was based on a number of concerns with the credibility
of the evidence. There was inconsistent evidence provided regarding the nature
and timing of the abuse, and thus the Board’s observations of the lack of
corroborating documents are relevant. In Juarez v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC
288, the Court said that if there are concerns regarding the reliability of
testimony, the decision maker may search for corroborating evidence. The respondent
also notes Muchirahondo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 546, where the Court stated that the Board is entitled to conclude that
evidence is not credible if the applicant does not corroborate her claims.
Based on these cases, the respondent submits that the decision is reasonable
overall because the Board’s decision does not rely solely on the failure to
provide corroborating evidence, but on other credibility concerns as well.
[32]
The respondent submits that the applicant’s submission that the Board’s
decision is unclear is based on a typographical error regarding the years that
the applicant was in a relationship with Mr. Gonzalez. It is clear from the
reasons as a whole, that the Board accepted that the applicant was in a
relationship with Mr. Gonzalez from 1988 to 1998, and the main issue was
whether this relationship was resumed from 2002 to 2007. The respondent relies
on Petrova v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2004 FC 506,
where the Court held that an overall reading of the decision showed that the
mistake was typographical in nature and not a misunderstanding of the material
evidence and thus, there was no reviewable issue. The reference to 1988 instead
of 1998 in this case was also a typographical error and does not raise a
reviewable issue.
[33]
The
respondent finally submits that there is a high threshold that an applicant
must meet when challenging a decision based on credibility and plausibility
findings. The Federal Court has repeatedly held that even where there are
certain credibility or plausibility findings that are not supported on the
record, the decision as a whole may still be upheld where the overall findings
were not unreasonable. Also, the Board was entitled to make reasonable findings
based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality and may reject evidence
if it is not found to be consistent with the case as a whole. Finally, even if
the Court finds there is an error, the cumulative effect of the deficiencies is
not sufficient to undermine the Board’s overall conclusion on credibility.
Analysis and Decision
[34]
Issue
1
What is the standard of
review?
In this case,
the applicant has raised a number of issues, all relating to the Board’s
findings regarding the applicant’s credibility and the treatment of the
evidence. It is well established that these questions are highly factual and
require a high level of deference (see Ortiz Juarez v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 288). The Board is a specialized
tribunal that is in the best position to make assessments of credibility and to
weigh the evidence presented to it. Thus, the standard of review is reasonableness.
The Court should not intervene on judicial review unless the Board has come to
a conclusion that is not transparent, justifiable and intelligible and within
the range of acceptable outcomes based on the evidence before it (see Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, at paragraph 47, Khosa v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 SCC 12 at paragraph 59).
[35]
I
wish to first deal with Issue 3.
[36]
Issue
3
Did the Board err in its
determination that the applicant was not credible, based on the evidence before
it?
The main basis for the failure
of the applicant’s claim was that the Board found her not to be a credible
witness. The Board gave a number of reasons for this finding. I now wish to
look at some of these reasons.
[37]
The
Board considered letters submitted by neighbours and relatives but the Board
assigned little weight to the letters for, among other reasons, they were
requested by the applicant and the letters were self-serving. A review of the
evidence shows that the applicant did not ask for the letters but only provided
her address to the writers. As well, it would seem to me that any letter
written to support the applicant’s claim would be, by the Board’s reasoning,
self-serving. This cannot be the case. An applicant has to be able to establish
their case.
[38]
The
applicant testified that things got worse after their second child was born as
her husband did not believe he was the father of the child. In the decision,
the Board member stated this was not included in the applicant’s PIF and that
when asked, the applicant could not give any reason for this information not
being included. This is not correct as the information was included in the PIF.
[39]
At
the hearing, the applicant’s oral evidence was that Mr. Gonzales prevented her
from communicating with her family. The Board asked her why this was not in her
PIF. This is another error as these facts are stated in the PIF.
[40]
The
Board found it implausible that the applicant’s ex-partner would find her in a
town 1.5 hours away by driving by her on the street. I do not agree that this
is implausible, particularly when the evidence shows that Mr. Gonzales was
searching for her.
[41]
The
Board also stated that the timing of the applicant’s departure from Mexico coincided
with the time when her son, who is also a refugee claimant in Canada, was having
surgery. While this is correct, her testimony also establishes the fact that
the applicant formed the intention to flee Mexico in February
2008. The son’s surgery was in August 2008. If this evidence in its totality had
been considered by the Board, the findings on credibility may have been
different.
[42]
I
would note that there were other credibility findings but in my view, the above
mentioned errors are sufficient to cause me to find that the Board’s decision
with respect to credibility was in error. If the Board had considered all of
the evidence on these matters, its decision on credibility may have been
different. Based on these findings, I find that the Board made a reviewable
error. Its decision was not reasonable and the decision must be set aside and
the matter referred to a different panel of the Board for redetermination.
[43]
Because
of my finding on this issue, I need not deal with the remaining issues.
[44]
Neither
party wished to submit a proposed serious question of general importance for my
consideration for certification.
JUDGMENT
[45]
IT
IS ORDERED that the application for judicial review is allowed and the
matter is referred to a different panel of the Board for redetermination.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant Statutory Provisions
The relevant statutory provisions are set
out in this section.
The Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA):
|
96. A Convention refugee is a person who,
by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
(a) is outside
each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that
fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
countries; or
(b) not having
a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual
residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to
that country.
97.(1) A person in need of protection is a
person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a
danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk
to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person
is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of that country,
(ii) the risk
would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced
generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk
is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in
disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk
is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or
medical care.
(2) A person
in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
|
96.
A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
a)
soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du
fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces
pays;
b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
97.(1)
A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
a)
soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b)
soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i)
elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii)
elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes
originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
(2)
A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au
Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
|
Email this Content