Date: 20100330
Docket: IMM-1266-09
IMM-1267-09
Citation: 2010 FC 347
Ottawa, Ontario, March 30, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice O'Keefe
BETWEEN:
JESUS
FRANCISCO QUINTERO PACHECO
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
O’KEEFE J.
[1]
These
are two separate applications for judicial review, pursuant to subsection 72(1)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act),
of two separate decisions of immigration officers. The first decision, by immigration
visa officer, Phillippe de Varennes (the visa officer) on or about October 20,
2008, refused to issue the applicant an authorization to return to Canada and found
the applicant inadmissible. The second decision, by immigration officer, M.
Lourdes Hernandez (the officer) on or about October 21, 2008, refused the
applicant’s application for a permanent resident visa. The second decision
depended entirely on the first.
[2]
At
the hearing, the applicant stated he would be dealing with Court file
IMM-1267-09 as the success of Court file IMM-1266-09 depended on the success of
Court file IMM-1267-09.
[3]
The
applicant seeks orders setting aside both decisions and referring the
applications back for new assessments by different officers.
[4]
For
the reasons that follow, I find that the applicant was offered a fair process
and received a reasonable decision from the visa officer. Therefore, I would
dismiss the application for judicial review of the visa officer’s decision in
Court file IMM-1267-09. By necessary implication, the judicial review of the
officer’s decision in Court file IMM-1266-09 is also dismissed.
Background
[5]
The
applicant is a failed refugee claimant from Mexico. He signed a
departure order in October of 2003 that would become effective upon a negative
refugee decision. His claim was denied by the Refugee Protection Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) in a decision dated March 27,
2006. The Board found that the applicant’s story was simply not credible. This
Court rejected his application for leave and judicial review in May of 2006 and
a departure order for the applicant became effective on or about July 27, 2006.
He did not depart within 30 days and alleges that his lawyer did not advise him
of the requirement to leave within 30 days. Instead, in November of 2006, the
applicant applied for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA), an option the
Minister had given him.
[6]
Back
in April of 2005, prior to his refugee hearing, the applicant had also
submitted an application for permanent residency as a skilled worker. On May
15, 2007, while still awaiting his PRRA decision, the Canadian Embassy in Mexico advised him
that in order for his permanent residency application to be processed further,
he would have to depart Canada. He was given 60 days to provide proof
that he had departed Canada.
[7]
The
applicant was issued a negative PRRA decision in a letter dated May 25, 2007.
[8]
The
applicant alleges that he did not receive either correspondence until June of
2007 and that upon receiving the correspondence from the Embassy, he
immediately informed the PRRA office that he wished to withdraw his PRRA
application. A direction to report dated June 15, 2007 was hand delivered to
the applicant advising him that his removal from Canada was scheduled for July
10, 2007 and directed him to report to the immigration office at Pearson International Airport on that day.
On July 10, 2007, the applicant obtained a certificate of departure and
departed for Mexico.
[9]
In
a letter dated August 3, 2007, the Canadian Embassy acknowledged confirmation
of his departure but stated that since the applicant had obtained the
certificate more than 30 days after his departure order had become enforceable,
he would need an authorization to return to Canada (ARC) and to provide an
explanation for his late departure.
[10]
The
applicant’s counsel responded on behalf of the applicant, requesting an ARC
decision and provided explanations for the late departure. Not satisfied with
the explanations provided, the Canadian Embassy sent another request for
additional reasons in January of 2008, to which applicant’s counsel responded
with further argument.
The Authorization to Return
to Canada Decision
[11]
In
a decision letter dated October 20, 2008, the visa officer first noted that the
rationale informing the regulatory provision of departure orders being
converted into deportation orders is to provide incentive for failed refugee
claimants to comply with removal orders. The visa officer stated that he gave
significant consideration to the reasons offered as to why the applicant did
not comply with the departure order within 30 days of July 27, 2006. The visa officer
expressly considered the applicant’s submission that his lawyer had not advised
him of the 30 day rule.
[12]
In
regards to the PRRA application, the visa officer found:
Although you were entitled to a PRRA
review, it is my opinion that this was done for the sole reason of gaining more
time in Canada and not because of a life
threatening situation in Mexico. In fact, you decided to
withdraw your PRRA application and to return to Mexico when you learned you had an immigration
interview, making me believe that you were not facing any danger in your
country of origin.
[13]
In
the end, the visa officer determined that despite the applicant’s subsequent
cooperation with the removals officer, he had not provided a sufficient
explanation for his failure to depart Canada within 30 days of his departure
order becoming effective and determined that he was inadmissible to Canada.
The Officer’s Decision
[14]
In
a short decision letter dated October 21, 2008, the officer rejected the
applicant’s application for a permanent resident visa. Since the applicant had
been the subject of an enforced removal order and had been denied authorization
to return to Canada, the
applicant was inadmissible.
Applicant’s Written Submissions
[15]
The
applicant submitted with regard to withdrawing the PRRA, that there was a
change in his fear of return to Mexico which enabled him to
return safely. The visa officer did not consider this when he found that the
PRRA was initiated for bogus reasons.
[16]
The
applicant submits that the visa officer erred in concluding that the 11 month
delay amounted to a misrepresentation. The visa officer imported an incorrect
standard by assigning a motive to the filing of the PRRA application, as
opposed to the failure to depart with 30 days. If the visa officer’s analysis
is correct, no one with a previous refugee claim who also applies for a PRRA
will be eligible for an ARC.
[17]
Visa
officers have a duty to let an applicant know their immediate impressions and
concerns are so that the applicant can address them. In sum, procedural
fairness dictates that the visa officer was obliged to reveal to the applicant
that the visa officer’s sole consideration was the failure to depart within 30
days.
[18]
The
applicant also submits that the visa officer failed to consider the following:
1. The
applicant left Canada voluntarily;
2. He
purchased his own plane ticket;
3. He
was a contributing and employable member of society; and
4. He
was otherwise approved for immigration.
[19]
The
applicant further submits that the visa officer’s credibility findings were
based on misconstrued evidence and violated the duty of fairness. The visa
officer concluded that because the applicant withdrew his PRRA application in
2007, he had no legitimate reason for submitting one in 2006. The visa officer
did not inform the applicant of his credibility concerns, giving the applicant
no opportunity to respond.
Respondent’s Written Submissions
[20]
The
appropriate standard of review for an ARC decision is reasonableness. Little in
the way of reasons or justification is required of a decision maker in this
context.
[21]
The respondent submits that the visa officer did consider the
applicant’s explanation that there may have been a change in the applicant’s
fear but rejected it. The visa officer was clearly open to granting an ARC if
the applicant could provide a satisfactory explanation for why he did not leave
on time. There is no criteria set out in the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) or
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
S.O.R./2002-227, (the Regulations) to follow in
considering an ARC request. However, the reason for an applicant not leaving Canada
is pivotal. The visa officer considered the applicant’s response to the
question of why he had taken so long to leave, but simply did not think the
applicant gave a direct response. The record suggests that the applicant never
really answered the question.
[22]
Overall, the respondent submits that the visa officer’s decision
was reasonable. The applicant’s argument that he did not know of the case to
meet is without merit. The letters from the Embassy specifically ask for more
in the way of explanation for why the applicant did not leave on time. Thus,
the applicant was well informed that this was a big part of the visa officer’s
decision. Finally, it was not unreasonable for the visa officer to draw a
negative inference from the facts surrounding the applicant’s receipt of the
letter from the Canadian Embassy and his subsequent withdrawal of his PRRA
application.
Issues
[23]
The
following are the issues in this case:
1. What
is the appropriate standard of review?
2. Was
the hearing fair?
3. Was
the visa officer’s decision unreasonable?
Analysis and Decision
[24]
Before
addressing the applicant’s arguments in more detail, I find it helpful to set
out the relevant statutory framework upon which an ARC decision is made. This
was done concisely by Mr. Justice Legacé in Khakh v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 710, [2008] F.C.J. No. 904 (QL).
14 The authority granted to the [ARC]
is contained in subsection 52(1) of the Act, which states:
52. (1) If a removal order has been
enforced, the foreign national shall not return to Canada, unless authorized by an officer or in
other prescribed circumstances.
. . .
15 Failed refugee claimants such as
the applicants are subject to removal from Canada once their claim has been finally
determined. Section 223 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, S.O.R./2002-227 (the Regulations) outlines three types of
removal orders, namely, departure orders, exclusion orders and deportation
orders.
16 Under subsection 224(2) of the
Regulations, a foreign national who is issued a departure order must leave Canada within 30 days of the order
becoming enforceable. Failure to do so results in the departure order becoming
a deportation order.
17 This transformation is
significant. Under section 224 (1) of the Regulations, a foreign national
subject to an enforced departure does not need to obtain authorization under
subsection 52(1) of the Act in order to return to Canada. However, once a departure order becomes
an enforceable deportation order, removal from Canada carries significant consequences.
Section 226 of the Regulations, which governs deportation orders, states that a
foreign national subject to an enforced deportation order cannot return to
Canada at any point in the future without first obtaining written authorization
to do so.
[25]
In
the case at bar, the applicant became subject to an enforceable departure order
in May 2006 when this Court dismissed his application for leave and judicial
review of his refugee claim. Because the applicant did not leave until July 10,
2007, after it had become a deportation order, he needed to obtain the ARC
before he could re-enter Canada.
[26]
Issue
1
What is the
appropriate standard of review?
With respect
to the issue of procedural fairness, the standard of review is correctness.
[27]
The
appropriate standard of review for a decision of this type (ARC decision) is
reasonableness. This Court recently addressed this issue in the context of an
ARC decision in the case of Umlani v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1373, 77 Imm.
L.R. (3d) 179. In that case, Mr. Justice Russell held:
21 The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir also held
that the standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance.
Instead, where the standard of review applicable to the particular question
before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may
adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the
reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the
standard of review analysis.
22 The Court in Sahakyan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
[2004] F.C.J. No. 1875, 2004 FC 1542 (Sahakyan) held that on judicial
review of an application under section 52 of the Act, the standard of review is
reasonableness simpliciter.
23 Thus, in light of the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Dunsmuir and the previous jurisprudence of
this Court, I find the standard of review applicable to the issue of whether
the Officer properly exercised his discretion to be reasonableness. When
reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be
concerned with "the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law" (Dunsmuir at paragraph
47). Put another way, the Court should only intervene if the Decision was
unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the "range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law."
…
60 I agree with the Respondent that,
given the highly discretionary and fact-driven nature of ARC decisions, the
Court should extend considerable deference in reviewing any such decision
against the reasonableness standard. As the case law makes clear, little in the
way of reasons or justification is required of a decision maker in this
context. …
[28]
I
agree with this analysis and would accord considerable deference in reviewing
an ARC decision.
[29]
Issue
2
Was the
hearing fair?
I have come to the conclusion
that the applicant was given a fair hearing. The applicant claims he was not
adequately informed of the visa officer’s concerns or the case he was required
to meet and thus was robbed of the opportunity to address those concerns. The
applicant, however, was sent not one but two letters asking specifically for
the applicant to provide an explanation for why he did not leave Canada within the
prescribed time. In my view, he was adequately informed of the case he was
required to meet and given more than a sufficient amount of time to respond.
There was no breach of procedural fairness.
[30]
This
application does not turn on the level of procedural fairness required in the
processing of ARC requests, although in my opinion, these decisions are at the
lower end of the spectrum. This application alleges a specific and fundamental
breach.
[31]
The
principle of audi alteram partem is a fundamental tenet of natural
justice. In the immigration context, whenever the Minister proposes to exercise
his discretion to refuse an application on the basis of particular facts, the
principle applies and the applicant must be afforded a fair opportunity to
state his position with respect to any matters that would lead to the rejection
of his application (see Lazarov v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1973]
F.C. 927 (C.A.) at paragraph 25).
[32]
I
find Sahakyan v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1542, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1875 (QL),
to be quite helpful in this particular context. In that case, Mr. Sahakyan was
a failed refugee claimant. He should have left Canada by March of
2000, after which his departure order became a deportation order. He left
voluntarily in June of 2000, but because of his late departure, he required an
ARC in order to return. In processing his request, the Canadian Embassy sent
him a form letter which asked him to explain in detail the reasons why it was
in Canada’s national
interest to give that authorization. Predictably, Mr. Sahakyan’s response
addressed this concern as best he could, emphasizing his qualifications and
intention to work hard and become a productive member of society. The letter
rejecting his request for authorization made it clear that the officer’s
primary concern was Mr. Sahakyan’s failure to comply with immigration
requirements.
[33]
In
quashing the rejection, Mr. Justice Harrington articulated his concern with
procedure afforded to Mr. Sahakyan as follows:
25 "Audi alteram partem" is
at the heart of natural justice. It means that Mr. Sahakyan had the right to be
heard, to know the case he had to meet and to have the opportunity to respond
to that case. The officer had a legitimate concern in his late departure. Even
though Citizenship and Immigration, Montreal,
had informed him it had no objection to Mr. Sahakyan's returning to Canada, the decision was his to
make. He would have been derelict in his duty if he ignored the late departure.
However, his duty was to enquire, a duty he did not discharge.
…
29 Had Mr. Sahakyan been given an
opportunity to explain the delay he would have said, as he said before this
Court, that he was applying to the Québec Delegate for Immigration status
through Mexico, had to give up his Armenian passport in order to get a Mexican
visa, and could not leave Canada before the passport was returned to him.
[34]
In
the case at bar, the visa officer did inquire, twice in fact. The first letter
sent August 3, 2007, included the specific direction: “Your written submission
should include an explanation of the reasons you did not depart Canada within the
30 days of your departure order becoming enforceable”. After being unsatisfied
with the applicant’s response, the Minister afforded the applicant an
additional opportunity with its letter dated January 18, 2008, that again asked
specifically for “Letter explaining additional reasons of why you did not leave
Canada after being
ordered to depart in 2006”. The applicant’s letter in response dated February
1, 2008, indicated that the applicant knew what the Minister was requesting. It
stated in part: “Departure Order: You wish to have an explanation for the fact
that Mr. Pacheco did not affect his departure in late 2006, before the PRRA was
offered to him.”
[35]
For
the above reasons, there can be no claim that the applicant was not informed of
the case he was required to meet. The applicant was more than adequately informed
that an explanation for his late departure was the visa officer’s main concern
and he was given more than sufficient opportunities to state his position. I
would not allow judicial review on this ground.
[36]
Issue
3
Was the visa
officer’s decision unreasonable?
I have
reviewed the correspondence between the parties, the decision itself and the
affidavits of both the applicant and the visa officer. In my opinion, the visa officer’s
decision was reasonable. Even though extensive reasons are not required for
these highly discretionary administrative decisions, the reasons provided by
the visa officer display transparency, intelligibility and justification for
his ultimate conclusion.
[37]
In
arguing that the decision was unreasonable, the applicant makes two primary
submissions. First, the applicant argues that the visa officer based his
decision on an unreasonable credibility finding. Second, the applicant submits
that the visa officer misconstrued evidence in general and failed to consider
several ameliorating factors. I will deal with each challenge separately.
Credibility Finding
[38]
As
stated above, in the visa officer’s opinion, the sole reason the applicant
submitted a PRRA application was to gain more time in Canada. The visa officer
also concluded that the applicant’s reasons for later withdrawing the PRRA
application had more to do with the letter he received from the Canadian
Embassy than any change in the circumstances surrounding his claimed fear. I
would agree with the applicant that by doing so, the visa officer openly
doubted the applicant’s credibility. It was akin to making a negative
credibility finding.
[39]
The
applicant says that if the truth of his motive in seeking the PRRA were of
prime concern to the visa officer, the visa officer had a duty to make this
concern known to the applicant and give him a proper opportunity to respond. I
disagree. The applicant’s credibility had already been impugned in the refugee
and PRRA decision and in any event, the applicant’s true motive for seeking a
PRRA was not the basis upon which the visa officer made his decision. The visa
officer did not need to make any finding on what the applicant’s precise
motives were.
[40]
After
examining the decision and the correspondence that preceded it, it is apparent
that the applicant’s true motive for seeking a PRRA was not the visa officer’s
prime concern. The visa officer’s prime concern, as clearly indicated in the
letters, was getting a full explanation for the applicant’s failure to depart
on time.
[41]
In
response to those letters, the applicant, citing his PRRA application, denied
breaching any immigration rules or not departing on time. It is easy to
understand why the visa officer would not find this to be a satisfactory
explanation. The applicant was supposed to leave Canada voluntarily
before July 27, 2006 and did not even receive the PRRA offer until November of
2006.
[42]
The
applicant’s implicit explanation and his primary submission now is that he did
not return earlier because he was still in fear. This made the sincerity of his
fear the key part of his explanation for staying late and the applicant made
submissions to the visa officer substantiating his fear. However, since both
the Board and a PRRA officer had dismissed his applications in part for reasons
of a lack of credibility, it was not improper for the visa officer to respect
those decisions and similarly question the applicant’s fear. The visa officer
would have been derelict in his duty to ignore those previous decisions.
[43]
The
applicant’s sudden willingness to return to Mexico, combined with the evidence
of the letter from the Canadian Embassy, was but an additional reason to agree
with the Board and the PRRA officer’s conclusions that there was not a
sufficient degree of harm awaiting the applicant in Mexico.
[44]
The
visa officer was not required to ask specifically for an explanation for his
sudden willingness to return. The applicant knew the case to be met and I am
satisfied that if such an explanation existed, it would have been offered by
the applicant.
[45]
In
sum then, the visa officer’s negative credibility finding was justified based
on the evidence and previous decisions. It was also appropriate in this context
because the applicant had made it the centerpiece of his answer to the visa officer’s
primary inquiry, the reason for the applicant’s late departure.
Evidence Ignored
[46]
The
applicant alleges that the visa officer improperly focused on the applicant’s
failure to depart within 30 days to the exclusion of all else. Specifically, he
improperly ignored the following factors:
1. That the applicant
left Canada voluntarily;
2. He
purchased his own plane ticket;
3. He
was a contributing member of society and was employable on his return (i.e. his
past and potential economic contribution); and
4. The
fact that he was otherwise approved for immigration (i.e. he had the requisite
number of points).
[47]
Unlike
some other discretionary decisions made under the Act, delegates of the
Minister making ARC decisions are not required to undertake any specific
considerations. In Chazaro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 966, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1234 (QL), on similar facts,
Mr. Justice Blais described the lack of set requirements but also found that an
applicant’s explanation for not departing on time will be of central importance
and cannot be ignored:
19 Neither the Act nor the Regulation
specifies any criteria for the officer in charge of assessing the application
for authorization to return. However, guidelines are given in Sahakyan, supra.
In paragraph 23, Harrington J. wrote that the pivotal issue for the type of
assessment that was conducted in this case is the analysis of the reasons for
which the applicant delayed in leaving Canada:
In the final resort, it falls upon the
courts, not the Minister or his officers, to construe the Act. The officer's
focus on matters which would not have been relevant had Mr. Sahakyan left in
time, shows that he misconstrued the Act. This is not to say that Mr.
Sahakyan's Canadian history is not relevant. What it does mean is that that
history must be relevant to his late departure. The centrepiece of the
officer's concern had to be the reasons why Mr. Sahakyan left in June, rather
than in March.
[Emphasis in original]
[48]
The
applicant however, points to Akbari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 1421, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1773 (QL) for the proposition
that it is a reviewable error for ARC decision to be based solely on an
applicant’s immigration history, without considering other factual circumstances.
Ms. Akbari was also a failed refugee claimant who also had green card status in
the U.S.A., went to the
U.S.A. and unwittingly effected her own removal from Canada and was
refused an ARC to return. She was married to a Canadian citizen, but he could
not enter the U.S.A. without a
waiver because he was married to a green card holder. At the same time,
Canadian immigration authorities had seized her passport and then lost it and
she had been unable to obtain a new passport. Thus, Ms. Akbari and her husband
could not meet in a third country. She was in a very awkward situation (not
totally of her own making) and the Court recognized that. Madam Justice
Layden-Stevenson explained that it was the failure of the officer to make any
reference to her situation in her reasons that constituted a reviewable error.
13 If the immigration officer
considered Ms. Akbari's specific submissions, his notes do not reflect that
consideration. Absent some indication in the notes that the officer at least
turned his mind to Ms. Akbari's circumstances, I have little choice but to
assume that he did not.
[49]
Madam
Justice Layden-Stevenson then restricted her conclusion to that bizarre set of
circumstances.
14 In my view, it follows that the
failure of the officer to consider the totality of the evidence resulted in a
denial of procedural fairness to Ms. Akbari. I emphasize that my conclusion is
factually driven and it applies to the unique circumstances of this matter.
Further, my determination is not to be construed as constituting an opinion or
position regarding the merits of Ms. Akbari's ARC application.
[50]
Despite
its reference to procedural fairness, I read the facts in Akbari above,
as also giving rise to a reviewable substantive error. In other words, on those
facts, Ms. Akbari demonstrated that the officer made an unreasonable decision.
[51]
Generally
in ARC decisions, an officer has discretion to determine which factual
circumstances he or she will consider. ARC decisions should not be construed as
mini humanitarian and compassionate applications. Instead, ARC decisions are
not only highly discretionary in nature but are “largely based on open-ended
and subjective discretion.” (see Akbari above, at paragraphs 8 and 11).
[52]
Without
special circumstances akin to the circumstances in Akbari above, visa
officers are not required to specifically address all of an applicant’s
circumstances in their reasons, “Nor is there a requirement that formal reasons
be provided.” (Akbari above, at paragraph 11).
[53]
Ms.
Akbari’s unique situation required special consideration. Similar circumstances
do not exist in the case at bar. Moreover, there is no evidence to rebut the
presumption that the visa officer did in fact consider the above noted factors.
An ARC decision maker is not required to give formal or comprehensive reasons.
[54]
On
balance, the applicant has not shown that the decision was unreasonable. I
would not allow judicial review on this ground.
[55]
With
respect to Court file IMM-1266-09 which was a judicial review of the decision of
the officer refusing the applicant’s application for a permanent residence visa
as a member of the economic class, this application must fail. Since the
applicant did not leave Canada before a deportation order was issued
against him, he could not return to Canada without an ARC (see
subsection 52(1) of the Act). As his ARC application was denied, he remains
inadmissible to Canada. This was the reason that the officer gave for
denying the application.
[56]
The
applications for judicial review are therefore dismissed.
[57]
Neither
party wished to submit a proposed serious question of general importance for my
consideration for certification.
JUDGMENT
[58]
IT
IS ORDERED that the applications for judicial review are dismissed.
“John
A. O’Keefe”
ANNEX
Relevant
Statutory Provisions
The Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
|
52.(1) If a removal order has been
enforced, the foreign national shall not return to Canada, unless authorized by an officer or in other prescribed
circumstances.
|
52.(1)
L’exécution de la mesure de renvoi emporte interdiction de revenir au Canada,
sauf autorisation de l’agent ou dans les autres cas prévus par règlement.
|
The Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227
|
223. There are three types of removal
orders, namely, departure orders, exclusion orders and deportation orders.
224.(1) An enforced departure order is
prescribed as a circumstance that relieves a foreign national from having to
obtain authorization under subsection 52(1) of the Act in order to return to Canada.
(2) A foreign
national who is issued a departure order must meet the requirements set out
in paragraphs 240(1)(a) to (c) within 30 days after the order becomes
enforceable, failing which the departure order becomes a deportation order.
(3) If the
foreign national is detained within the 30-day period or the removal order
against them is stayed, the 30-day period is suspended until the foreign
national's release or the removal order becomes enforceable.
. . .
226.(1) For the
purposes of subsection 52(1) of the Act, and subject to subsection (2), a
deportation order obliges the foreign national to obtain a written
authorization in order to return to Canada at any time after the deportation
order was enforced.
|
223.
Les mesures de renvoi sont de trois types : interdiction de séjour,
exclusion, expulsion.
224.(1)
L’exécution d’une mesure d’interdiction de séjour à l’égard d’un étranger est
un cas prévu par règlement qui exonère celui-ci de l’obligation d’obtenir
l’autorisation prévue au paragraphe 52(1) de la Loi pour revenir au Canada.
(2)
L’étranger visé par une mesure d’interdiction de séjour doit satisfaire aux
exigences prévues aux alinéas 240(1)a) à c) au plus tard trente jours après
que la mesure devient exécutoire, à défaut de quoi la mesure devient une
mesure d’expulsion.
(3) Si l’étranger est détenu au cours de la période de trente
jours ou s’il est sursis à la mesure de renvoi prise à son égard, la période
de trente jours est suspendue jusqu’à sa mise en liberté ou jusqu’au moment
où la mesure redevient exécutoire.
. .
.
226.(1)
Pour l’application du paragraphe 52(1) de la Loi, mais sous réserve du
paragraphe (2), la mesure d’expulsion oblige l’étranger à obtenir une
autorisation écrite pour revenir au Canada à quelque moment que ce soit après
l’exécution de la mesure.
|
Email this Content