Date: 20100118
Docket: IMM-3273-09
Citation:
2010 FC 1
Montréal, Quebec, January
18, 2010
PRESENT:
The Honourable Mr. Justice Boivin
BETWEEN:
ALAIN
NDABAMBARIRE
Applicant
and
MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an
application under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C., 2001, c. 27 (the Act) for judicial review of a
decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board (the panel) dated May 29, 2009, determining that the applicant is
excluded from the definition of refugee within the meaning of the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention)
and from the status of “person in need of protection” within the meaning of
article 1F(a) of the Convention.
Issue
[2]
The only
issue in this case is whether it was reasonable for the panel to exclude the
applicant.
Factual Background
[3]
The
applicant, a citizen of Burundi, made a claim for refugee protection based on
sections 96 and 97 of the Act, claiming that he had a well-founded fear of
persecution by reason of his membership in a particular social group and his
political opinion, and alleging that he was personally subject to a risk to his
life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.
[4]
The
applicant alleges that in 1996 an anti-tank mine was laid in his neighbourhood
in Bujumbura near the Prince Louis
Rwagasore hospital and a car exploded as a result of the mine. The government
conducted an investigation and the conclusion was that Pierre Nkurunziza, a
member of the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour
la défense de la démocratie (CNDD/FDD), was responsible for the explosion. The
applicant alleges that Pierre Nkurunziza was sentenced to death.
[5]
The
applicant alleges that at the time of the incident he was working for the
security commission in his neighbourhood, to watch the neighbourhood and
announce genocidal attacks on the neighbourhood as early as possible, using an
alarm and communications system.
[6]
The
applicant explained that he was selected as head of the Kiriri/Gatoke neighbourhood
in Bujumbura in 1998, and that in that
position he was responsible for the neighbourhood. His role was to report
regularly on the security situation in the neighbourhood, and those reports
were submitted to the Minister of the Interior and Security.
[7]
The
applicant alleges that the head of the neighbourhood changed in 2000, but he
stayed on the neighbourhood security committee and was also part of the Association
de lutte contre le genocide [anti-genocide association]. The applicant stated
that at that time, a number of people were arrested, tried and sentenced by soldiers
and gendarmes. Some people were sentenced to death for participating in
terrorism.
[8]
The
applicant alleges that his neighbourhood was attacked on April 30, 2002,
and his wife and son Alex were killed, while he himself received a head wound.
The applicant notes that a number of assailants were then arrested and tried by
the military; some were sentenced to death and others were imprisoned for life.
[9]
In 2005,
Pierre Nkurunziza was elected President of the Republic of Burundi. The applicant notes that the new
President appointed the same person, who was Minister of the Interior at the
time he was head of the neighbourhood, from 1998 to 2000, to the position of
Minister of the Interior.
[10]
The
applicant stated that the Minister of Justice decided to release more than
2,000 prisoners in 2006, some of whom had earlier been sentenced to death and
life in prison. The applicant believes that these releases were
unconstitutional and immoral and he notes that nothing was done to protect
victims and witnesses.
[11]
The
applicant alleges that he began receiving anonymous telephone calls in February
2006 telling him they wanted to see him. The applicant states that it was
obvious the calls were coming from people who had been released from prison and
wanted to eliminate him.
[12]
The
applicant alleges that he is well acquainted with the current President of the
Republic of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, because
they studied together at the Université nationale du Burundi and were on the same rugby team in 1990
and 1991. The applicant states that the President might find him to take
revenge, regardless of where he might be living in Burundi.
[13]
On
April 4, 2006, the applicant left Burundi and went to the United States. He then came to Canada, where he claimed refugee
protection on April 11, 2006.
Impugned Decision
[14]
Having regard
to all of the evidence before it, both oral and documentary, the panel
concluded that there are serious reasons to believe that the self-defence
groups, the neighbourhood watch committees and the Burundian armed forces
committed crimes against humanity in Burundi during the period when the
applicant was on his neighbourhood watch committee, from 1993 to 2006.
[15]
The
applicant explained that his functions in defending his neighbourhood since
1993 included carefully monitoring people who entered and left the
neighbourhood and informing the national defence forces, the gendarmerie and
the police of those movements. The applicant distinguished between the patrol
done by the military, which moved around, and monitoring done by residents of
the neighbourhood, which was done without moving, by watching through
binoculars. The applicant explained that the military and the rebels were armed
with rifles, machetes and knives, while the people doing the monitoring, like
himself, used dogs. The applicant also stated that he took part in meetings.
[16]
The
applicant stated he had been head of the neighbourhood from 1998 to 2000, and
his role was to inform people in the neighbourhood. The applicant wrote a
number of reports on what was seen during the monitoring and he stated that the
events were violent.
[17]
In
addition, the applicant generally denied the truth of the information presented
in those reports and submitted that when a decision deals with what the person
concerned did or did not do, preference should be given to direct evidence and
less weight given to generalized statements that are not based on any precise
evidence, even if from an apparently reliable source (Jalil v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 246, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 471 at para. 39,
quoting Bedoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005
FC 1092, 141 A.C.W.S. (3d) 612 at para. 16).
[18]
Given the
historical context over the years when the applicant was involved in his
neighbourhood watch activities, the panel found that the applicant’s attitude
was not credible, when he assigned responsibility for all the violations
committed in his country to the Hutu rebel groups alone.
[19]
Even
though the applicant systematically denied committing crimes of this nature at
the hearing, he acknowledged that he had collaborated with all of the Burundian
authorities, in particular Défense nationale et la Sécurité [national defence
and security], throughout the period when he was involved in the neighbourhood
watch committee, from 1993 to 2006. The panel noted that the applicant was head
of his neighbourhood from 1998 to 2000, and consequently was paid by the Ministère
de l’Intérieur [ministry of the interior], which also controlled the police,
and that the head of the neighbourhood was the only ministry employee in the
neighbourhood. The applicant also had to take part in at least four meetings
with the security forces, including soldiers, gendarmes and police, every month.
[20]
The
applicant alleged that the entire country has a right and duty to defend itself
against the enemy, and it was in this context that he was involved in
neighbourhood watch activities. The applicant stated that when he was head of
the neighbourhood, if someone was apprehended committing a crime, the
authorities were alerted and the guilty parties were arrested by the
authorities: police, gendarmes or soldiers. The applicant did not know what
happened to them after that, unless they were tried and sentenced.
[21]
The panel
noted that the applicant stated he joined the neighbourhood watch committee
voluntarily and took part in the committee for several years, and was even head
of the neighbourhood for some years. The panel noted that the applicant could
have left the neighbourhood watch committee, but he stayed on until there was a
change of government, a few months before he left Burundi. The applicant admitted having indirect
knowledge, that is, via the newspapers or radio, of crimes committed by the
Burundian defence and security forces, but the panel found that he constantly
sought to minimize, if not deny, the extent of the crimes committed, and even
to justify the actions taken by the military, the gendarmes and the police,
stating that the actions and acts of violence committed were to protect the
Burundian population as a whole.
[22]
In its
decision, the panel stated, referring to the decisions of the Federal Court of
Appeal, that a claimant’s actions may be more revealing than their testimony
and a simple denial cannot suffice to negate the presence of a common purpose (Harb
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 39, 238
F.T.R. 194 at para. 27). The applicant explained that he continued to cooperate
with the military during the years that followed because it was his duty to
continue to protect the public in his neighbourhood. The applicant admitted
that he was aware of the actions of the Burundian military forces, but noted
that it was within the authority of the military to act as they did and in fact
the rebel groups were the ones committing aggression. The applicant also
admitted that he had heard that civilians had been killed by the army, but he
justified that situation by saying that the civilians were either wrongdoers,
collaborators or armed individuals.
[23]
In light
of the applicant’s testimony, the panel concluded that his acquiescence in the
acts committed by the Burundian military forces was not passive; rather, it
manifested itself in concrete actions over many years, not only in his
neighbourhood watch role, but also because he went to the sites of massacres on
several occasions to bury civilians. The panel concluded that this acquiescence
was sufficient for it to conclude that from 1993 to 2005 the applicant shared a
common purpose with the Burundian military forces, which committed crimes
against humanity.
[24]
Accordingly,
having regard to all of the documentary evidence and all of the applicant’s
testimony, and taking into account the six factors to be considered in
determining whether an individual has been complicit in crimes against
humanity, the panel concluded that there was more than a mere suspicion, there
were serious reasons for considering that the applicant was complicit in crimes
committed by members of the Burundian military forces, by reason of his close
association with the persons who committed those crimes. The applicant was
therefore excluded by the application of the Convention and section 98 of
the Act.
Relevant Legislation
[25]
Section 98
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27:
Exclusion
— Refugee Convention
98. A person referred to in
section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention
refugee or a person in need of protection.
|
Exclusion
par application de la Convention sur les réfugiés
98. La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier
de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de
personne à protéger.
|
[26]
Chapter I
of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:
Article
1. Definition of the term “refugee”
F. The provisions of this
Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are
serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes;
(c) he has been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
|
Article
premier. – Définition du terme « réfugié »
F. Les dispositions de cette
Convention ne seront pas applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons
sérieuses de penser:
a) qu’elles ont commis un
crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité, au
sens des instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions
relatives à ces crimes;
c) qu’elles se sont rendues
coupables d’agissements contraires aux buts et aux principes des Nations
Unies.
|
Standard of Review
[27]
The
applicant’s complicity and exclusion under article 1F(a) of the Convention are
a question of mixed law and fact and the applicable standard review is
reasonableness simpliciter (Mankoto v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
2005 FC 294, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1107 at para. 16; Harb at
para. 14). Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190, the applicable standard has been the new standard of reasonableness. Reasonableness
relates primarily to the justification for the decision, the transparency and
intelligibility of the decision-making process and whether the decision falls
within a range of possible outcomes that are defensible in respect of the facts
and law (Dunsmuir at para. 47). The Court must not intervene if the
decision of the administrative tribunal is reasonable, and it may not
substitute its own opinion simply because it would have come to a different conclusion.
Applicant’s Argument
[28]
The
applicant admits that he contradicted himself, but he alleges that the panel
exaggerated the extent of the imprecisions or contradictions it attempted to
identify in the applicant’s words, as in Kinyomvyi v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 607, [2009] F.C.J. No. 737 (QL).
[29]
The
applicant submits that the panel should have referred to the evidence relating
directly to the issue under consideration, that is, the issue of the
applicant’s membership in an organization that is guilty of committing serious
human rights violations. In the applicant’s submission, the panel made its
decision without regard to the relevant evidence that was favourable to the applicant.
[30]
In the
applicant’s submission, the panel reached a hasty conclusion for which there
were insufficient findings of fact, and this constitutes an error of law (La
Hoz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
2005 FC 762, 278 F.T.R. 229 at para. 29).
[31]
The
applicant submits that he was simply part of a neighbourhood watch organization
and was simply responsible for making reports; he was not armed and he did not
have the power to make arrests. The applicant submits that he was not part of
any of the self-defence groups referred to in the documentary evidence
introduced by the Minister and never worked for the army or took military
training. The applicant explained that his involvement in neighbourhood watch
activities was limited to the role of a member of the public who called for
help and that he did not assist the army except in that limited sense (Ramirez
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992], 2 F.C. 306, 135
N.R. 390 at para. 16).
Respondent’s Argument
[32]
The
respondent submits that the panel’s decision was sound in fact and in law. The
Minister need only show serious reasons for considering that the applicant
participated in crimes to justify exclusion under article 1F(a) of the Convention.
That standard is well below what is required in criminal law (beyond a
reasonable doubt) or civil law (on a balance of probabilities or preponderance
of the evidence) (Teganya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 590, 154 A.C.W.S. (3d) 454; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Sumaida, [2003] 3 F.C. 66, 179 F.T.R. 148 at para. 77
(F.C.A.); Bazargan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
(1996), 205 N.R. 282, 67 A.C.W.S. (3d) 132 at p. 287 (F.C.A.); Moreno
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298, 159
N.R. 210 at p. 308 (F.C.A.); Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433, 163 N.R. 197 at p. 445
(F.C.A.); Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1994] 3 F.C. 646, 170 N.R. 302 at pp. 653-654 (F.C.A.); Ramirez). As
well, complicity essentially depends on there being a common intention and all
the parties concerned having knowledge of it (Ramirez; Bazargan).
Analysis
[33]
The
primary objective of article 1F of the Convention is to ensure that people
who commit serious crimes are not able to obtain refugee protection in the
country where they claim it.
[34]
A person
may be found to be responsible for a crime even if they did not commit it
personally, that is, if they were an accomplice. The principle of complicity by
association was described as follows in Bazargan at paras. 11-12:
[11] In our view, it goes
without saying that “personal and knowing participation” can be direct or
indirect and does not require formal membership in the organization that is
ultimately engaged in the condemned activities. It is not working within an
organization that makes someone an accomplice to the organization's activities,
but knowingly contributing to those activities in any way or making them
possible, whether from within or from outside the organization. At p. 318 F.C.,
MacGuigan, J.A. said that “[a]t bottom complicity rests . . . on the existence
of a shared common purpose and the knowledge that all of the parties in
question may have of it”. Those who become involved in an operation that is not
theirs, but that they know will probably lead to the commission of an
international offence, lay themselves open to the application of the exclusion
clause in the same way as those who play a direct part in the operation.
[12] That being said,
everything becomes a question of fact. The Minister does not have to prove the
respondent's guilt. He merely has to show – and the burden of proof resting on
him is “less than the balance of probabilities” (Ramirez, supra, at p.
314 F.C.) – that there are serious reasons for considering that the respondent
is guilty.
[35]
In Harb,
at paragraph 11, Justice Décary, writing for the Federal Court of Appeal,
explained how this idea of complicity by association could be the basis for
exclusion under article 1F(a) of the Convention:
It is not the nature of the crimes with
which the appellant was charged that led to his exclusion, but that of the
crimes alleged against the organizations with which he was supposed to be
associated. Once those organizations have committed crimes against humanity and
the appellant meets the requirements for membership in the group, knowledge,
participation or complicity imposed by precedent (see inter alia, Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.); Moreno v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 298 (C.A.); Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.); Sumaida v. Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 66 (C.A.); and Bazargan
v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1996),
205 N.R. 232 (F.C.A.)), the exclusion applies even if the specific acts
committed by the appellant himself are not crimes against humanity as such. In
short, if the organization persecutes the civilian population the fact that the
appellant himself persecuted only the military population does not mean that he
will escape the exclusion, if he is an accomplice by association as well.
[36]
In this
case, in its 31‑page decision, the panel analyzed the documentary
evidence. That evidence indicates that self-defence and neighbourhood watch
groups, as well as the Burundian armed forces, committed serious human rights
violations during the years when the applicant was involved in monitoring his
own neighbourhood. That information comes from various sources: non‑governmental
organizations (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International); a government
organization (the United States State Department); and an international
institution (the United Nations Human Rights Commission). The panel was of the
opinion that although this evidence was not necessarily the best evidence, it
has sufficient probative weight to conclude that these were not mere suspicions
(Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
2005 FC 1053, 141 A.C.W.S. (3d) 613 at para. 15).
[37]
Among that
evidence, the panel noted that in 1997, the armed forces almost doubled in
strength. The evidence also indicates that civilian militias were involved in
violent attacks, including murders and rapes. During the period when the
applicant was involved in monitoring his neighbourhood, the Burundian armed
forces committed serious human rights violations in the course of a generalized
or systematic attack against part of the civilian population for political
reasons, when they suspected that the civilians supported or might join the
rebels. Civilians had to move and stay in camps. In 1998, both government
troops and insurgents or rebels killed unarmed civilians and committed other
serious human rights violations, including arbitrary executions, rapes and
torture, as well as looting and destruction of property.
[38]
A person
who is a member of a persecuting group that commits human rights violations,
continuously and in the course of a regular operation, will be considered to be
an accomplice if the individual in question has knowledge of the activities
being committed by the group and neither takes steps to prevent them occurring
nor disengages themself from the group at the earliest opportunity, but lends
support to it (Ryivuze v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2007 FC 134, 325 F.T.R. 30 at para. 31, quoting Penate v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 2 F.C. 79, 71 F.T.R. 171 (F.C.A.). Complicity
by association is established by analyzing the nature of the crimes of which
the persecuting organization or group with which the claimant was associated is
accused, even if the persecuting group is not an organization directed to a
limited, brutal purpose. Complicity by association can be established even if
the person covered by the exclusion clause was not a member of the persecuting
group. To arrive at that conclusion, a number of factors set out in the case
law must be considered.
1. Method of recruitment
[39]
In this
case, the applicant voluntarily began neighbourhood watch activities in 1993,
because, he said, it was his duty to ensure the protection and security of his
neighbourhood.
2. Position and rank in the organization
[40]
The
applicant was head of his neighbourhood from 1998 to 2000. Consequently, he was
the only employee of the Minister of the Interior and Security at that time,
and he was paid. The applicant wrote reports on the security situation in the
neighbourhood, which were submitted to the Minister of the Interior and
Security. The applicant also took part regularly in meetings. As a
neighbourhood watch participant, the applicant monitored the people who entered
and left the neighbourhood and reported attacks to the authorities. The
applicant acknowledged that some people had been sentenced during the conflict,
over the years.
3. Nature of the organization
[41]
The
neighbourhood watch committee is a self-defence group made up of residents who
are not armed. They stay where they are and report attacks, and do not patrol
as the military army does.
4. Knowledge of atrocities
[42]
The
applicant states that he does not know what happened to the people who were
arrested by the authorities after they gave the alerts, unless they were tried
and sentenced. The applicant admits, however, that he has indirect knowledge of
crimes committed by the Burundian defence and security forces, from the
newspapers and radio. The applicant also explained that he was sometimes
present at the site of massacres after the attacks, to help bury the victims
and move people.
5. Length of participation in the
organization’s activities
[43]
The
applicant was a member of the neighbourhood watch committee from 1993 to 2006,
until a few months before he left for Canada,
after the election in Burundi in 2005 and the change of
government that followed.
6. Opportunity to leave the organization
[44]
The
applicant had an opportunity to leave the neighbourhood watch committee before
2006. However, he explained that he stayed because it was his duty to protect
the people in his neighbourhood.
[45]
The
evidence in the record shows that the applicant had knowledge of crimes but did
not dissociate himself from the neighbourhood watch committee after seeing the
atrocities committed against civilians and even helping to bury the corpses.
Those actions are revealing in terms of the applicant’s participation in the
group’s activities. The applicant stayed in his position until 2006 when the
government changed. Having regard to the evidence, it is difficult to conclude
that the applicant was a mere spectator (Harb at para. 18, in which
the Federal Court of appeal cited Bazargan with approval at para. 11)
or did not have knowledge (Sivakumar at p. 442), or that he did not
share the common purpose, as the panel pointed out.
[46]
The panel
applied the facts to the appropriate factors and did not commit any error in
applying the law. It was not unreasonable for the panel to conclude that the
applicant may not be granted refugee status, by operation of article 1F(a) of
the Convention, having regard to the evidence in the record, his testimony and
the applicable legal principles. In light of the principles stated by the
courts, it was possible for the panel, on the evidence as a whole, to have
serious reasons for considering that the applicant had been complicit by
association in crimes referred to in article 1F(a) of the Convention.
[47]
For all
these reasons, the intervention of the Court is not warranted. No question was
proposed for certification and this case does not raise any question.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that the application for judicial review be dismissed. No
question will be certified.
“Richard Boivin”
Certified
true translation
Brian
McCordick, Translator
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-3273-09
STYLE OF CAUSE: Alain
Ndabambarire v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal,
Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: December 17, 2009
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT: BOIVIN J.
DATED: January 18, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Ruxandra Cornelia Ipean
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FOR THE APPLICANT
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Michel Pépin
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FOR THE RESPONDENT
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Ruxandra Cornelia Iepan
Montréal, Québec
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
John H. Sims, Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
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