Date: 20100209
Docket: T-940-09
Citation: 2010 FC 132
Ottawa, Ontario, February 9,
2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
ROBERT
NORTON ALLAIRE
Applicant
and
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
[36] While it is open to the Board to inquire into the respondent's
relationships with (criminal) others who conspired with him to commit the
offences of which he was convicted (and indeed to inquire into any ongoing
relation with like-minded persons), it should avoid the use of terms which, if
acknowledged, can give rise to an admission that a criminal offence has been
committed with respect to which no conviction has been obtained, or at least be
mindful of the difficulty which its choice of words can pose.
(As stated in the majority judgment in Canada (Attorney General) v.
Coscia,
2005 FCA 132, [2006] 1 F.C.R. 430).
[2]
Subsequent
to a redetermination, the National Parole Board (NPB) may reach the same
conclusion it did; however, it must be mindful of the questions it poses as per
the majority reasons in the excerpt quoted above.
II. Introduction
[3]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision of the National Parole
Board Appeal Division (NPBAD) affirming the decision of the NPB which refused
to direct the Applicant’s release on day parole in accordance with the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (CCRA).
III. Background
[4]
The
Applicant pled guilty to importing a schedule 1 substance on May 3, 2007 and
was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
[5]
On
November 21, 2004, the Applicant was arrested for failing to yield to U.S.
Customs officers at a border crossing in Washington. During
this encounter, U.S. Customs officials informed the Applicant that his vehicle
would be searched. The Applicant then drove ahead, striking the officer with
the door of his vehicle. The Applicant drove back into Canada where he was
arrested for being in possession of 149 kilograms of cocaine with a street value
of $12 million.
[6]
On
January 16, 2009, the NPB conducted an Accelerated Parole Review (APR) hearing
pursuant to subsection 126(4) of the CCRA and did not direct the Applicant’s
release on Accelerated Day Parole (ADP).
[7]
During
the hearing, the NPB pursued a line of questions regarding the Applicant’s involvement
with organized crime. Although the Applicant denied any direct involvement with
organized crime, the NPB drew negative conclusions and found reasonable grounds
to believe that, if released, he would commit an offence involving violence.
IV. Decision under Review
[8]
The
Applicant appealed the decision of the NPB to the NPBAD pursuant to subsection
147(1) of the CCRA claiming the NPB’s questioning had breached procedural
fairness. The NPBAD affirmed the NPB’s decision to refuse ADP.
[9]
The
NPBAD found the NPB’s questions regarding the Applicant’s ties to organized
crime were fair and reasonable based on the information before the NPB. The
Appeal Division also held that the NPB never inferred that the Applicant was a
member of a criminal organization, but focused on his links to such groups. The
Appeal Division also found the NPB questioned the Applicant’s credibility when
he stated that he was not a member of a criminal organization, when there was
evidence before it to indicate to the contrary.
V. Issue
[10]
Did
the Appeal Board err in not finding that the NPB breached the Applicant’s right
to procedural fairness by questioning the Applicant regarding his alleged
involvement with a criminal organization?
VI. Relevant Legislative Provisions
[11]
ADP
must be directed for a first offender if the NPB is satisfied there are no
reasonable grounds to believe the offender will commit a violent offence if
released, pursuant to sections 125, 126 and 126.1 of the CCRA:
Application
125. (1) This section and section
126 apply to an offender sentenced, committed or transferred to penitentiary
for the first time, otherwise than pursuant to an agreement entered into
under paragraph 16(1)(b),
other than an offender
(a) serving a sentence
for one of the following offences, namely,
(i) murder,
(ii) an offence set out in
Schedule I or a conspiracy to commit such an offence,
(ii.1) an offence under section
83.02 (providing or collecting property for certain activities), 83.03
(providing, making available, etc. property or services for terrorist
purposes), 83.04 (using or possessing property for terrorist purposes), 83.18
(participation in activity of terrorist group), 83.19 (facilitating terrorist
activity), 83.2 (to carry out activity for terrorist group), 83.21
(instructing to carry out activity for terrorist group), 83.22 (instructing
to carry out terrorist activity) or 83.23 (harbouring or concealing) of the Criminal
Code or a conspiracy to commit such an offence,
(iii) an offence under section 463
of the Criminal Code that was prosecuted by indictment in relation to
an offence set out in Schedule I, other than the offence set out in paragraph
(1)(q)
of that Schedule,
(iv) an offence set out in
Schedule II in respect of which an order has been made under section 743.6 of
the Criminal Code,
(v) an offence contrary to
section 130 of the National Defence Act where the offence is murder,
an offence set out in Schedule I or an offence set out in Schedule II in
respect of which an order has been made under section 140.4 of the National
Defence Act, or
(vi) a criminal organization
offence within the meaning of section 2 of the Criminal Code,
including an offence under subsection 82(2);
(a.1) convicted of an
offence under section 240 of the Criminal Code;
(b) serving a life
sentence imposed otherwise than as a minimum punishment; or
(c) whose day parole has
been revoked.
Idem
(1.1) For greater certainty, this
section and section 126
(a) apply to an offender
referred to in subsection (1) who, after being sentenced, committed or
transferred to penitentiary for the first time, is sentenced in respect of an
offence, other than an offence referred to in paragraph (1)(a),
that was committed before the offender was sentenced, committed or
transferred to penitentiary for the first time; and
(b) do not apply to an
offender referred to in subsection (1) who, after being sentenced, committed
or transferred to penitentiary for the first time, commits an offence under
an Act of Parliament for which the offender receives an additional sentence.
Review of cases by Service
(2) The Service shall, at the time
prescribed by the regulations, review the case of an offender to whom this
section applies for the purpose of referral of the case to the Board for a
determination under section 126.
Evidence to be considered
(3) A review made pursuant to
subsection (2) shall be based on all reasonably available information that is
relevant, including
(a) the social and
criminal history of the offender obtained pursuant to section 23;
(b) information relating
to the performance and behaviour of the offender while under sentence; and
(c) any information
that discloses a potential for violent behaviour by the offender.
Referral to Board
(4) On completion of a review
pursuant to subsection (2), the Service shall, within such period as is
prescribed by the regulations preceding the offender’s eligibility date for
full parole, refer the case to the Board together with all information that,
in its opinion, is relevant to the case.
Delegation to provincial authorities
(5) The Service may delegate to
the correctional authorities of a province its powers under this section in
relation to offenders who are serving their sentences in provincial
correctional facilities in that province.
1992, c. 20,
s. 125; 1995, c. 42, s. 39; 1997, c. 17, s. 24; 1998, c. 35, s. 116; 1999, c.
5, ss. 50, 53; 2001, c. 41, s. 90.
Review by Board
126. (1) The Board shall review
without a hearing, at or before the time prescribed by the regulations, the
case of an offender referred to it pursuant to section 125.
Release on full parole
(2) Notwithstanding section 102,
if the Board is satisfied that there are no reasonable grounds to believe
that the offender, if released, is likely to commit an offence involving
violence before the expiration of the offender’s sentence according to law,
it shall direct that the offender be released on full parole.
Report to offender
(3) If the Board does not direct,
pursuant to subsection (2), that the offender be released on full parole, it
shall report its refusal to so direct, and its reasons, to the offender.
Reference to panel
(4) The Board shall refer any
refusal and reasons reported to the offender pursuant to subsection (3) to a
panel of members other than those who reviewed the case under subsection (1),
and the panel shall review the case at the time prescribed by the
regulations.
Release on full parole
(5) Notwithstanding section 102,
if the panel reviewing a case pursuant to subsection (4) is satisfied as
described in subsection (2), the panel shall direct that the offender be
released on full parole.
Refusal of parole
(6) An offender who is not
released on full parole pursuant to subsection (5) is entitled to subsequent
reviews in accordance with subsection 123(5).
Definition of “offence involving violence”
(7) In this section, “offence
involving violence” means murder or any offence set out in Schedule I, but,
in determining whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that an
offender is likely to commit an offence involving violence, it is not
necessary to determine whether the offender is likely to commit any
particular offence.
Termination or revocation
(8) Where the parole of an
offender released pursuant to this section is terminated or revoked, the
offender is not entitled to another review pursuant to this section.
1992, c. 20,
s. 126; 1995, c. 42, s. 40.
Release on day parole
126.1 Sections 125 and 126 apply,
with such modifications as the circumstances require, to a review to
determine if an offender referred to in subsection 119.1 should be released
on day parole.
1997, c. 17,
s. 25.
(Emphasis
added).
|
Application
125. (1) Le présent article et
l’article 126 s’appliquent aux délinquants condamnés ou transférés pour la
première fois au pénitencier — autrement qu’en vertu de l’accord visé au
paragraphe 16(1) — , à l’exception de ceux :
a) qui y purgent une peine
pour une des infractions suivantes :
(i) le meurtre,
(ii) une infraction mentionnée
à l’annexe I ou un complot en vue d’en commettre une,
(ii.1) une infraction
mentionnée aux articles 83.02 (fournir ou réunir des biens en vue de certains
actes), 83.03 (fournir, rendre disponibles, etc. des biens ou services à des
fins terroristes), 83.04 (utiliser ou avoir en sa possession des biens à des
fins terroristes), 83.18 (participation à une activité d’un groupe
terroriste), 83.19 (facilitation d’une activité terroriste), 83.2 (infraction
au profit d’un groupe terroriste), 83.21 (charger une personne de se livrer à
une activité pour un groupe terroriste), 83.22 (charger une personne de se
livrer à une activité terroriste) ou 83.23 (héberger ou cacher) du Code
criminel, ou un complot en vue d’en commettre une,
(iii) l’infraction prévue à
l’article 463 du Code criminel et relative à une infraction mentionnée
à l’annexe I — sauf celle qui est prévue à l’alinéa (1)q) de celle-ci — et ayant
fait l’objet d’une poursuite par mise en accusation,
(iv) une infraction mentionnée
à l’annexe II et sanctionnée par une peine ayant fait l’objet d’une
ordonnance rendue en vertu de l’article 743.6 du Code criminel,
(v) le meurtre, lorsqu’il
constitue une infraction à l’article 130 de la Loi sur la défense
nationale, une infraction mentionnée à l’annexe I ou une infraction
mentionnée à l’annexe II pour laquelle une ordonnance a été rendue en vertu
de l’article 140.4 de la Loi sur la défense nationale,
(vi) un acte de
gangstérisme, au sens de l’article 2 du Code criminel, y compris
l’infraction visée au paragraphe 82(2);
a.1) qui ont été déclarés
coupables de l’infraction visée à l’article 240 du Code criminel;
b) qui purgent une peine
d’emprisonnement à perpétuité à condition que cette peine n’ait pas constitué
un minimum en l’occurrence;
c) dont la semi-liberté a été
révoquée.
Idem
(1.1) Il est entendu que le présent
article et l’article 126 :
a) s’appliquent aux délinquants
visés au paragraphe (1) et qui, après leur condamnation ou leur transfèrement
au pénitencier pour la première fois, sont condamnés pour une infraction —
autre qu’une infraction visée à l’alinéa (1)a) — commise avant cette
condamnation ou ce transfert;
b) ne s’appliquent pas aux délinquants
visés au paragraphe (1) et qui, après leur condamnation ou leur transfèrement
au pénitencier pour la première fois, commettent une infraction à une loi
fédérale pour laquelle une peine d’emprisonnement supplémentaire est
infligée.
Examen par le Service
(2) Le Service procède, au cours
de la période prévue par règlement, à l’étude des dossiers des délinquants
visés par le présent article en vue de leur transmission à la Commission pour
décision conformément à l’article 126.
Critères de l’examen
(3) L’étude du dossier se fonde
sur tous les renseignements pertinents qui sont normalement disponibles,
notamment :
a) les antécédents sociaux et
criminels du délinquant obtenus en vertu de l’article 23;
b) l’information portant sur sa
conduite pendant la détention;
c) tout autre renseignement
révélant une propension à la violence de sa part.
Transmission à la Commission
(4) Au terme de l’étude, le
Service transmet à la Commission, dans les délais réglementaires impartis
mais avant la date d’admissibilité du délinquant à la libération
conditionnelle totale, les renseignements qu’il juge utiles.
Délégation
(5) Le Service peut déléguer aux
autorités correctionnelles d’une province les pouvoirs que lui confère le
présent article en ce qui concerne les délinquants qui purgent leur peine
dans un établissement correctionnel de la province.
1992, ch. 20, art.
125; 1995, ch. 42, art. 39; 1997, ch. 17, art. 24; 1998, ch. 35, art. 116;
1999, ch. 5, art. 50 et 53; 2001, ch. 41, art. 90.
Examen par la Commission
126. (1) La Commission procède sans
audience, au cours de la période prévue par règlement ou antérieurement, à
l’examen des dossiers transmis par le Service ou les autorités
correctionnelles d’une province.
Libération conditionnelle totale
(2) Par dérogation à l’article
102, quand elle est convaincue qu’il n’existe aucun motif raisonnable de
croire que le délinquant commettra une infraction accompagnée de violence
s’il est remis en liberté avant l’expiration légale de sa peine, la
Commission ordonne sa libération conditionnelle totale.
Rapport au délinquant
(3) Si elle est convaincue du
contraire, la Commission communique au délinquant ses conclusions et motifs.
Réexamen
(4) La Commission transmet ses
conclusions et motifs à un comité constitué de commissaires n’ayant pas déjà
examiné le cas et chargé, au cours de la période prévue par règlement, du
réexamen du dossier.
Libération conditionnelle
(5) Si le réexamen lui apporte la
conviction précisée au paragraphe (2), le comité ordonne la libération
conditionnelle totale du délinquant.
Refus
(6) Dans le cas contraire, la
libération conditionnelle totale est refusée, le délinquant continuant
toutefois d’avoir droit au réexamen de son dossier selon les modalités
prévues au paragraphe 123(5).
Infractions accompagnées de violence
(7) Pour l’application du présent
article, une infraction accompagnée de violence s’entend du meurtre ou de
toute infraction mentionnée à l’annexe I; toutefois, il n’est pas nécessaire,
en déterminant s’il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire que le
délinquant en commettra une, de préciser laquelle.
Conséquences de la révocation
(8) En cas de révocation ou de
cessation de la libération conditionnelle, le délinquant perd le bénéfice de
la procédure expéditive.
1992, ch. 20,
art. 126; 1995, ch. 42, art. 40.
Application
126.1 Les articles 125 et 126
s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, à la procédure d’examen
expéditif visant à déterminer si la semi-liberté sera accordée au délinquant
visé à l’article 119.1.
1997, ch. 17,
art. 25.
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[12]
Paragraph
101(b) reads as follows:
Principles guiding parole boards
101. The principles that shall guide
the Board and the provincial parole boards in achieving the purpose of
conditional release are
(a) that the protection of
society be the paramount consideration in the determination of any case;
(b) that parole boards
take into consideration all available information that is relevant to a case,
including the stated reasons and recommendations of the sentencing judge, any
other information from the trial or the sentencing hearing, information and
assessments provided by correctional authorities, and information obtained
from victims and the offender;
(c) that parole boards
enhance their effectiveness and openness through the timely exchange of
relevant information with other components of the criminal justice system and
through communication of their policies and programs to offenders, victims
and the general public;
(d) that parole boards
make the least restrictive determination consistent with the protection of
society;
(e) that parole boards
adopt and be guided by appropriate policies and that their members be
provided with the training necessary to implement those policies; and
(f) that offenders be
provided with relevant information, reasons for decisions and access to the
review of decisions in order to ensure a fair and understandable conditional
release process.
(Emphasis added).
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Principes
101. La Commission et les
commissions provinciales sont guidées dans l’exécution de leur mandat par les
principes qui suivent :
a) la protection de la société
est le critère déterminant dans tous les cas;
b) elles doivent tenir compte
de toute l’information pertinente disponible, notamment les motifs et les
recommandations du juge qui a infligé la peine, les renseignements
disponibles lors du procès ou de la détermination de la peine, ceux qui ont
été obtenus des victimes et des délinquants, ainsi que les renseignements et
évaluations fournis par les autorités correctionnelles;
c) elles accroissent leur
efficacité et leur transparence par l’échange de renseignements utiles au
moment opportun avec les autres éléments du système de justice pénale d’une
part, et par la communication de leurs directives d’orientation générale et
programmes tant aux délinquants et aux victimes qu’au public, d’autre part;
d) le règlement des cas doit,
compte tenu de la protection de la société, être le moins restrictif
possible;
e) elles s’inspirent des
directives d’orientation générale qui leur sont remises et leurs membres
doivent recevoir la formation nécessaire à la mise en oeuvre de ces
directives;
f) de manière à assurer l’équité
et la clarté du processus, les autorités doivent donner aux délinquants les
motifs des décisions, ainsi que tous autres renseignements pertinents, et la
possibilité de les faire réviser.
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VII. Applicant’s Position
[13]
The
Applicant cites the case of Coscia, above, where a party was questioned
by the NPB regarding his involvement with organized crime. The NPB relied on
the party’s evasive answers with respect to his involvement as a reason to refuse
his accelerated release.
[14]
The
Federal Court of Appeal held the NPB had committed a breach of procedural fairness
by asking questions that had a double meaning, as answering questions regarding
involvement with organized crime places the offender in jeopardy of a Criminal
Code, R.S.C., c. C-34, s. 1, conviction. The Applicant submits the NPB can
inquire into an offender’s association with criminals, but should not use terms
which, if acknowledged, can give rise to a criminal conviction.
VIII. Respondent’s Position
[15]
The
Respondent submits the NPB did not make a finding about whether the Applicant
was a member of organized crime. Instead, the NPB questioned the Applicant in
relation to the offence committed, which is usually associated with organized
crime.
[16]
The
Respondent submits the Appeal Division was correct in finding the NPB’s
questions did not cross the line established in Coscia, above. The
Respondent argues the questioning in this case does not take the inquisitorial
tone nor the repetitive nature of the questioning in Coscia. Instead,
the Respondent submits the NPB made inquiries that were open to it on the basis
of the evidence tendered at the hearing, including police documentation and the
Applicant’s statements that he owed money to a “criminal organization” and has
connections with “criminally oriented individuals”. The Respondent submits the
NPB’s questioning was appropriate and fair, as it used the term “organized
crime” only three times during the entirety of the questioning and with each
time it acknowledged the Applicant’s answer and moved on.
[17]
The
Respondent cites the transcript of the hearing and submits the NPB was more
concerned with whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the Applicant
was likely to commit an offence involving violence before the expiration of his
sentence. The Respondent submits the NPB’s concerns regarding the Applicant’s
potential for violence were warranted given the Applicant’s refusal to admit
the potential violent effects of his behaviour and the poor judgment he showed
prior to his arrest.
[18]
The
Respondent cites the case of Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board),
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 75 and paragraph 101(b) of the CCRA for the proposition
that the NPB is obligated to assess all available relevant information in order
to determine whether the test under section 126 of the CCRA has been met. The
Respondent concludes the NPB’s questioning of the Applicant was fair and
relevant in the circumstances.
IX. Standard
of Review
[19]
The
parties agree that the standard of review for a potential breach of procedural
fairness is correctness.
[20]
In
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that a court reviewing a decision on the standard of correctness
will not show deference to a decision-maker’s reasoning process, but will
instead undertake its own analysis of the question (Dunsmuir at para.
50).
X. Analysis
[21]
Central
to this review is the issue of whether the NPB’s questioning runs afoul of the
majority judgment in Coscia, above, by which this Court is bound. The
majority in Coscia described the boundaries of the NPB’s procedure in
the following terms:
[36] While it is open to the Board to
inquire into the respondent's relationships with (criminal) others who
conspired with him to commit the offences of which he was convicted (and indeed
to inquire into any ongoing relation with like-minded persons), it should avoid
the use of terms which, if acknowledged, can give rise to an admission that a
criminal offence has been committed with respect to which no conviction has
been obtained, or at least be mindful of the difficulty which its choice of
words can pose.
[37] Counsel for the appellant, during the
course of her very able presentation, acknowledged that the Board could inquire
into the respondent's relationships with his co-conspirators and others without
using terms such as "organized crime." Indeed, nothing prevented the
Board from exploring all aspects of the respondent's prior convictions and
ongoing relations without using ambiguous terms.
[22]
The
argument that the NPB did not make a finding that the Applicant was a member of
a criminal organization is dealt with in Coscia where the majority
stated:
[34] … it is no justification for the Board
to say that it was not concerned with the respondent being a member of
organized crime in the legal sense. Accepting that the Board had no such
concerns, it remains that if one admits to being a member of or participating
in a criminal organization, one is exposed both to a Criminal Code
conviction and to being found to be a member of a criminal organization
pursuant to the Directive. The Board had no power to grant immunity in this
regard and did not purport to do so.
[23]
The
Respondent’s submission that the NPB did not draw conclusions from the
Applicant’s denial of association with organized crime is dealt with in Coscia
where the majority held:
[38] … the
Board's insistence on using such terms without seeming to
have any appreciation for the difficulty which they created for the respondent
is fundamentally unfair and shows that the respondent was not heard by
the Board in so far as his response to this particular line of questioning was
concerned. This breach was compounded by the Board when it went on to
draw a negative inference from the respondent's denial of his involvement with
the "mafia" and criminal others … (Emphasis added).
[24]
It
is clear from the passages above that asking the questions as posed constitute
a breach of procedural fairness.
[25]
The
excerpts of the two pages of the transcript below are self evident. They
demonstrate, in and of themselves, that which occurred:
JEAN
CUSSWORTH: Okay. Because the file information clearly indicates that was a
belief that you were quite involved in organized crime and bringing drugs
across the border.
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: I’m sorry, I wasn’t. Transcripts, p. 8, ll.19-22.
…
CONNIE
SNOW: Did you admit that you were associated to an organized crime group?
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: No, I’m not associated to an organized crime group. Or not
knowledgeably. The only person I dealt with was Al Turnbull.
CONNIE
SNOW: But did you admit to being associated but you didn’t want to provide
details?
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: Now, and after the fact that I got muscled into the situation where I
agreed to go down, and I knew that there was something more to it, and I had to
assume that it was organized crime, but I wasn’t -- I wasn’t knowingly
associated with them, I’ll put it that way.
JEAN
CUSWORTH: So you basically came to that conclusion after you were threatened?
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: Yes. I never met any of them until I couldn’t pay that second part of
the – the third time I borrowed money from them.
JEAN
CUSWORTH: Mr. Allaire, that’s an awful lot of cocaine worth $12 million, for
them to entrust someone who didn’t really know what they were doing.
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: They were following me, so that they didn’t just entrust it to me. And
I didn’t see it, they just told me what to do and I did it.
JEAN
CUSWORTH: Okay. File information indicates that you pled guilty.
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: Yes, I did.
JEAN
CUSWORTH: Are you guilty?
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: No, I – well, I am, yes. In hindsight, yes, I am guilty.
I
did bring cocaine across the border. Am I sorry it happened? Absolutely.
Would
I do it differently? Absolutely. Transcripts, p. 10, 11. 15-47 and p. 11,
1.1.
…
…
JEAN
CUSWORTH: Mr. Allaire, based on a comprehensive file review and our discussions
with you today, we find some of your explanations very questionable. Given the
fact that you pled guilty to involvement in criminal activity that you yourself
acknowledge is linked to organized crime, drug trafficking, and violence. You
pled guilty to that. We have to take into consideration that you’ve been
convicted for something like that. Transcripts, p. 23, ll. 15-23
…
JEAN
CUSWORTH: Okay. Okay. But you’ve put yourself in an extremely unusual situation
by pleading guilty to a crime that is clearly linked to organized crime, drug
trafficking and violence. So we are satisfied that there is reasonable grounds
to believe that there is the potential for violence to occur before warrant
expiry.
ROBERT
ALLAIRE: May I please? I was given what I considered was the choice of either
doing ten years in Canada or dying the United
States. I had no choice --
well, I chose to plead guilty in Canada. I don’t plead guilty to being involved
with organized crime in any way, shape or form. I was not. I --
JEAN
CUSWORTH: But we have to base our decision on the fact that you did plead
guilty. We’re aware that if you went to the States you were under the
impression that you were certainly going to be putting a lot longer period of
time in jail. Transcripts, p. 23, l. 47 and p. 24, ll. 1-18.
(Applicant’s Record at pp. 172-173).
XI. Conclusion
[26]
The
Court recognizes that the decision in Coscia, above, may place members
of the NPB in a difficult position. On the one hand, they may be informed by
evidence that it is likely that a person has ties to criminal organizations:
“Now and after the fact that I got muscled into the situation where I agreed to
go down, and I knew that there was something more to it, and I had to assume
that it was organized crime, but I wasn’t -- I wasn’t knowingly associated with
them, I’ll put it that way” (AR at p. 172).
[27]
Therefore,
it may be open to them to draw conclusions that the person is likely to commit
violent acts on the basis of that evidence; however, the Coscia decision
dictates that the NPB may not directly question the person about his or
her ties to organized crime or those questions may breach procedural fairness. One
can recognize the quandary the NPB is in, since the NPB ought to put before the
potential parolee any concerns it might have regarding the person’s potential
for violence. It follows that a decision made on the basis of concerns that
were not put before the prisoner might be quashed as being in violation of
procedural fairness.
[28]
The
Court concludes that in order to fairly put concerns regarding a person’s
connections with criminal others before a potential parolee the NPB should take
instruction from paragraph 36 of Coscia and avoid the use of terms
which, if acknowledged, would place the person at risk of criminal prosecution.
[29]
The
Court’s concern in making this order is not with the substantive decision of
the NPB, which was open to it to make, but instead with the procedure that
was used in the hearing.
[30]
The
matter is, therefore, remitted to the NPB for redetermination on the basis of
that which is specified above.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS that
1)
the
application for judicial review be granted;
2)
the
decision of the NPB be set aside and the matter be referred to the NPB for
redetermination of whether day parole should be directed;
3)
no
order be made as to costs as this is a matter of specific importance in the
interest of the public in addition to the parties concerned.
“Michel M.J. Shore”