Date: 20100201
Docket: T-463-08
Citation: 2010 FC 110
Ottawa, Ontario, February 1,
2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
YURI
BOIKO
Applicant
and
NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (Commission) dated February 26,
2008 that the applicant’s complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the of the
Commission pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(c) of the Canadian Human Rights Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 (the Act) and barred by the 1-year limitation period pursuant
to paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act.
FACTS
Background
Employment
[2]
The
applicant was a scientist employed by the respondent, the National Research
Council of Canada (NRC).
[3]
On
November 16, 2001 the applicant accepted a probationary offer of employment from
the NRC as an Associate Research Officer in the Radiation Standards and Optics
section, Optics Group. The applicant’s employment was for a period of three
years, terminating on November 24, 2004. Dr. Chander Grover was the applicant’s
supervisor. Dr. Grover conducted four performance reviews during the
applicant’s period of employment.
[4]
The
first performance review found the applicant’s performance during the first
four months of his employment to be “satisfactory”. The remaining three reviews
concluded that the applicant’s performance was “unsatisfactory”. On July 19,
2004, three months before the end of the probationary period, the applicant was
terminated for “unsatisfactory” performance.
The complaint dated July
31, 2006
[5]
The
applicant alleges that Dr. Grover harassed him on the basis of his Slavic ethnic
origin, his Russian nationality, and his status as an unmarried man. On July
31, 2006 the applicant complained to the Commission that the NRC retaliated
against him for filing human rights complaints and grievances against Dr.
Grover and the NRC by failing to investigate his grievances against Dr. Grover.
The applicant’s history
of filing complaints and grievances from his employment at the NRC
[6]
Between
September 30, 2003 and August 3, 2004 the applicant filed 12 workplace grievances against the NRC. The Applicant has also filed three complaints
to the Canadian Human Rights Commission, two against the NRC and one against
his superior, Dr. Chander Grover.
Four
applications for judicial review before the Federal Court by Mr. Boiko, three from
decisions of the Commission, one from a decision of the NRC
[7]
The applicant has also filed four applications for judicial
review before the Federal Court, including one which was recently decided on
December 18, 2009 by Madam Justice Danièle Tremblay-Lamer in Boiko v. Grover,
2009 FC 1291, dismissing the judicial review of a decision by the Commission which
dismissed a complaint of harassment by the applicant against his supervisor,
Dr. Grover.
[8]
The
applicant also commenced an action in the Federal Court against the NRC which
was struck out on January 14, 2008.
First
application T-136-08 (decided by the Federal Court on December 18, 2008)
[9]
This
application to review a decision of the Commission with respect to a complaint was
filed on October 22, 2004 against the applicant’s supervisor, Dr. Grover. This
was a decision by the Commission which declined to refer to the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal a complaint for harassment against Dr. Grover on the basis of
national or ethnic and marital status. This application was heard on December 7,
2009 by Madam Justice Danièle Tremblay-Lamer in Boiko, supra, who then rendered her judgment on December 18, 2009. In
that case the Commission declined to investigate allegations of harassment
based on marital status, but investigated allegations based on race or ethnic
origin. Justice Tremblay-Lamer held at paragraph 23 that there was no need to
investigate the allegations of harassment based on marital status:
¶23 I
agree with the Respondent's position on the need for an investigation.
Investigating the Applicant's allegations on this point would not have helped him,
since the Commission did not actually doubt that the facts that he described
took place. The Commission concluded that the Respondent's words and actions
had nothing to do with the Applicant's marital status and that they did not
amount to harassment. In my opinion, this conclusion is not unreasonable.
Justice Tremblay-Lamer found the applicant’s arguments “unpersuasive”,
“lack evidence” and to be “logically flawed”: Boiko, supra, at
paragraph 32. Justice Tremblay-Lamer concluded at paragraph 37 that the
applicant could not adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim of
discrimination or harassment:
¶37 But,
unfortunately the Applicant did not submit enough evidence to persuade the
Commission that he may have been a victim of discrimination or harassment, so
that a referral to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal was warranted. Further,
he also failed to convince this Court that the decision of the Commission was
unreasonable.
Second
application T-137-08
[10]
This
application is for review of the Commission’s decision dismissing a complaint
filed August 13, 2004, against the respondent, the NRC, on the same grounds as
the complaint against Dr. Grover. This application has been dismissed by the
Court on procedural grounds.
Third application T-463-08
(the application at bar)
[11]
This
application is for review of a second complaint against the NRC, filed July 31,
2006, which the Commission held was beyond its jurisdiction and time-barred pursuant
to paragraphs 41(1)(c) and 41(1)(e) of the Act. This is the application at bar.
Fourth application
T-735-08
[12]
This
application, filed May 8, 2008, is for review of the NRC’s decision to
terminate Dr. Boiko’s employment. A hearing date for this application has been
requisitioned but not yet set by the Court.
Dr.
Boiko’s Human Rights complaint against the NRC which is the subject of this
application
[13]
On July
31, 2006 Dr. Boiko filed a complaint which begins:
This complaint is about (sic) retaliatory
nature of the dismissal of my appeal to National Research Council’s (NRC)
administration in June 2005 and failure to resume the internal investigation in
November 2005 – June 2006.
[14]
The
narrative of the complaint continues for three pages, single-spaced on 14” long
paper. It is difficult to comprehend. However, the Commission Report dated
November 28, 2007 (the Report), which constitute the reasons for the decision
in this case, accurately and generously summarize the factual basis of the
complaint at paragraph 20 of the Report, which reads as follows:
¶20 In
this complaint the complainant alleges that the following retaliatory acts took
place:
1.
November
3, 2005 – the respondent decided not to proceed with one of his grievances;
2.
June 25,
2005 – the respondent refused the complainant’s request to proceed with an internal
investigation;
3.
July 2004
– an external investigator hired by the respondent “intimidated” the
complainant at a “mediation” session.
[15]
On the
third page of the complaint narrative the applicant states in the last
paragraph:
This retaliation is motivated in part by
the fact of my filing the complaint with the Commission as well as at least in
part my national origin.
(Underlining added for
emphasis)
[16]
The
applicant sought the following remedy:
1.
letters of
apology from the participants of the retaliation;
2.
dismissing
the investigator, Phil Chodos, from the investigation;
3.
appointing
a new investigator;
4.
completing
it in a timely manner;
5.
temporary
reinstatement in the position until the completion of the investigation.
Decision under review
[17]
The
Commission set out the following grounds pursuant to paragraphs 41(1)(c) and
41(1)(e) of the Act for not dealing with the applicant’s complaint:
1.
the
complaint is based on acts which occurred more than one year before the
complaint was filed; and
2.
the
allegations made in the complaint are beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction.
See Commission letter, dated February 26,
2008 and Report dated November 28, 2007.
[18]
The
Commission defined retaliation at paragraphs 15 to 19 of the Report. Its
analysis is summarized as follows:
i.
retaliation
is a form of discrimination prohibited under section 3 of the Canadian Human
Rights Act;
ii.
an action
by the NRC that has adverse or prejudicial outcome for Dr. Boiko may be
considered a form of retaliation and this could include intimidation or
discrimination against Dr. Boiko for filing a human rights complaint; and
iii.
Dr. Boiko
must have reasonable grounds for believing that the NRC has engaged in
retaliatory acts and the threshold for reasonable grounds while low, must go
beyond speculation or assertion. Allegations which are clearly lacking any
reasonable basis will not be entertained by the Commission.
[19]
The
Commission identified three retaliatory acts which the applicant alleged, and
set them out at paragraph 20 of the Report (which I repeat for ease of
reference):
¶20 In
this complaint the complainant alleges that the following retaliatory acts took
place:
i.
November
3, 2005 – the respondent decided not to proceed with one of his grievances;
ii.
June 25,
2005 – the respondent refused the complainant’s request to proceed with an
internal investigation;
iii.
July 2004
– an external investigator hired by the respondent “intimidated” the complainant
at a “mediation” session.
[20]
With
respect to the first retaliatory act, the Commission held that the NRC’s
November 3, 2005 decision not to proceed with the grievance complaint against
Dr. Grover was not retaliatory in nature based on the following reasons set out
by the Commission at paragraph 22 of the Report:
¶22 The complainant lacks
reasonable grounds for alleging that the respondent’s decision on November 3,
2005, not to proceed with his grievance was retaliatory in nature, for the
following reasons:
i. The complainant
filed 12 grievances (see chart attached as Appendix “A” to the respondent’s submissions);
ii. The respondent
made separate decisions regarding how to proceed with respect to each
individual grievance;
iii. With respect to
the grievance in question, the respondent decided not to proceed because the
subject of the grievance is being addressed by the Commission in another
complaint filed by the complainant.
iv. There is no
indication that the complainant will be precluded from proceeding with the
grievance at the conclusion of the Commission’s process.
[21]
The
evidence before the Court established that the NRC wrote to Dr. Grover on
November 2, 2005 to state that upon his scheduled return to the workplace on
November 1, 2005, the investigation of Dr. Boiko’s complaint against Dr. Grover
will resume and the investigator will contact “you directly for your
involvement”. The other evidence is that Dr. Grover only returned to the
workplace for 30 non-consecutive days over the course of a three month period.
Dr. Grover had been on sick leave and the NRC could not investigate the complaints
against him when he was on sick leave and away from the office. Accordingly,
the evidence was that the NRC did not fail to proceed with the investigation on
November 3, 2005, which is the date that Dr. Grover returned to the workplace,
not for reasons of retaliation against the applicant, but because Dr. Grover
was never in the office available for the investigator to schedule meetings
with him. Accordingly, there was no evidentiary basis for a reasonable
complaint of retaliation arising from the November 3, 2005 return to the
workplace by Dr. Grover and the NRC’s failure to resume the investigation of
the complaint by Dr. Boiko against Dr. Grover.
[22]
The second
alleged retaliatory act identified by the Report in paragraph 20 is “June 25,
2005 – the respondent refused the complainant’s request to proceed with an
internal investigation”. This allegation arises from a letter dated June 28,
2005 to Dr. Boiko from the NRC stating that his complaint against Dr. Grover
remains active and that the investigator will complete the investigation upon
Dr. Grover’s return to the workplace. Accordingly, this alleged retaliatory act
is the same as the retaliatory act described above and again the evidence discloses
no reasonable grounds for concluding that this could be considered a
retaliatory act. The NRC in fact intended to proceed with the investigation but Dr.
Grover only returned sporadically for a short time to his office. On the
evidence, this was the reason that the internal investigation did not proceed.
However, the Commission dismissed this aspect of the complaint because the
complaint form was filed more than a year after the June 28, 2005 “refusal” to
proceed with an internal investigation. In fact, the Court will not need to
decide whether the Commission directly found this aspect of the complaint to be
time barred by the one year limitation period due to the complaint actually
being dated July 31, 2006 because the underlying facts demonstrate that there
was no reasonable basis for concluding from the June 28, 2005 letter that the
NRC refused to proceed with the internal investigation. Rather, the letter stated
that the internal investigation would resume as soon as Dr. Grover returned to
the office.
[23]
The third alleged
retaliatory act in the complaint is entitled “July 2004 – An external
investigator hired by the Respondent” “intimidated” the complainant at a
“mediation” session”. This incident purportedly occurred before any human
rights complaints were filed by Dr. Boiko. The Commission found that this
incident happened well past the one-year limitation period. The complaint was
filed on July 31, 2006 which is two years after the alleged intimidation
without any explanation by Dr. Boiko for the delay.
LEGISLATION
[24]
Subsection
14.1 of the Canadian Human Rights
Act
prohibits a person against who a human rights complaint has been filed to
retaliate against the individual who filed the complaint:
14.1 It is a
discriminatory practice for a person against whom a complaint has been filed
under Part III, or any person acting on their behalf, to retaliate or
threaten retaliation against the individual who filed the complaint or the
alleged victim.
|
14.1 Constitue
un acte discriminatoire le fait, pour la personne visée par une plainte
déposée au titre de la partie III, ou pour celle qui agit en son nom,
d’exercer ou de menacer
d’exercer des
représailles contre le plaignant ou la victime présumée.
|
[25]
Section
40 of the Act requires a complainant to have reasonable grounds for believing
that a person has engaged in discriminatory conduct:
40. (1)
Subject to subsections (5) and (7), any individual or group of individuals
having reasonable grounds for believing that a person is engaging or has
engaged in a discriminatory practice may file with the Commission a complaint
in a form acceptable to the Commission.
|
40. (1) Sous
réserve des paragraphes (5) et (7), un individu ou un groupe d’individus
ayant des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une personne a commis un acte
discriminatoire peut déposer une plainte devant la Commission en la forme
acceptable pour cette dernière.
|
[26]
Paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act allows the Commission to decline to
deal with human rights complaints pursuant to certain grounds:
41. (1)
Subject to section 40, the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed
with it unless in respect of that complaint it appears to
the Commission that
…
(c) the
complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission;
…
(e) the
complaint is based on acts or omissions the last of which occurred more than
one year, or such
longer period of time as the Commission considers appropriate in the
circumstances, before receipt of the complaint.
|
41. (1) Sous
réserve de l’article 40, la Commission
statue sur toute
plainte dont elle est saisie à moins qu’elle estime celle-ci irrecevable
pour un des motifs
suivants :
…
c) la
plainte n’est pas de sa compétence;
…
e) la
plainte a été déposée après l’expiration d’un délai d’un an après le dernier
des faits sur lesquels elle est fondée, ou de tout délai supérieur que la Commission
estime indiqué dans les circonstances.
|
[27]
Subsection
42(1) of the Act requires the Commission to set out its reasons for not dealing
with a human rights complaint:
42. (1) Subject to subsection (2), when the Commission
decides not to deal with a complaint, it shall send a written notice of its
decision
to the complainant setting out the reason for its
decision.
|
42. (1) Sous
réserve du paragraphe (2), la Commission motive par écrit sa décision auprès
du plaignant dans les cas où elle décide que la plainte est irrecevable.
|
ISSUE
[28]
The main issue before the Court is whether the Commission
reasonably rendered its decision with respect to the following:
i.
Did the
NRC retaliate against Dr. Boiko when on November 3, 2005 the NRC decided not to
proceed with one of his grievances?
ii.
Did the
NRC retaliate against Dr. Boiko when on June 25, 2005 the NRC refused Dr.
Boiko’s request to proceed with an internal investigation?
iii.
Did the
NRC retaliate against Dr. Boiko when in July, 2004 an external investigator
hired by the NRC “intimidated” the complainant at a “mediation” session?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[29]
In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 372 N.R.
1, the Supreme Court of Canada held at paragraph 62
that the first step in conducting a standard of review analysis is to
“ascertain
whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a
satisfactory manner the degree of (deference) to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question”: see also
Khosa v. Canada (MCI), 2009 SCC 12, per Justice
Binnie at paragraph 53.
[30]
The
standard of review of a decision pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(c) of the Canadian
Human Right Act where the Commission finds that there is no basis for the
underlying complaint is reasonableness: Hatjes v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2008 FC 380, per Justice Snider at
para. 21.
[31]
In
reviewing the Commission’s decision using a standard of reasonableness, the
Court will consider "the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process" and "whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law”: Dunsmuir at paragraph 47; Khosa,
supra, at para. 59.
ANALYSIS
[32]
At the
outset, the Court has before it the December 18, 2009 Reasons for Judgment and
Judgment of Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer in Boiko, supra. This
case was heard on December 7, 2009. Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer held:
1.
Dr. Boiko,
following his firing, filed a complaint against the NRC with the Commission.
(That complaint was not before Justice Tremblay-Lamer or before myself.);
2.
On August
22, 2004, Dr. Boiko filed a complaint against his supervisor, Dr. Grover,
alleging harassment. The Commission dismissed the complaint and concluded at
paragraph 13, that the evidence was “insufficient” to demonstrate racial
discrimination. As discussed above, Justice Tremblay-Lamer found at paragraph
32 that the applicant’s arguments were “not persuasive; evidence to support
them is lacking; and there logic is flawed”. Justice Tremblay-Lamer concluded
at paragraph 37:
¶37 … the applicant did not submit
enough evidence to persuade the Commission that he may have been a victim of
discrimination or harassment, so that a referral to the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal was warranted. Further, he has also failed to convince this Court that
the decision of the Commission was unreasonable.
[33]
The issues
before this Court in this application for judicial review arise from another
complaint by Dr. Boiko where it was alleged that the NRC took retaliatory action
against Dr. Boiko for filing a complaint against the NRC. Dr. Boiko filed a
complaint against the NRC on August 13, 2004 and the complaint against Dr.
Grover on October 22, 2004. The complaints alleged that the NRC, through Dr.
Grover, discriminated against Dr. Boiko.
[34]
The
test for refusing to deal with a human rights complaint was set out by Justice
Rothstein (as he then was) in Canada Post Corp. v.
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) (1997), 130 F.T.R. 241, at paragraph 3:
¶3 A
decision by the Commission under section 41 is normally made at an early stage
before any investigation is carried out. Because a decision not to deal with
the complaint will summarily end a matter before the complaint is investigated,
the Commission should only decide not to deal with a complaint at this stage in
plain and obvious cases. The timely processing of complaints also supports such
an approach. A lengthy analysis of a complaint at this stage is, at least to
some extent, duplicative of the investigation yet to be carried out. A time
consuming analysis will, where the Commission decides to deal with the
complaint, delay the processing of the complaint. If it is not plain and
obvious to the Commission that the complaint falls under one of the grounds for
not dealing with it under section 41, the Commission should, with dispatch,
proceed to deal with it.
[Emphasis added]
[35]
Under section 14.1 of the Act, there are two ways to establish a
retaliation complaint. The first is where there is evidence that the respondent
intended the act to serve as retaliation; and the second is where the applicant
reasonably perceives the act to be retaliation for the human rights complaint: Wong v. Royal Bank of Canada, [2001] C.H.R.D. No. 11 at
paragraph 219. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that it is plain and obvious to the
Court that the Commission reasonably found that the facts did not substantiate
a retaliation complaint.
Issue No.1: Did the NRC retaliate against
Dr. Boiko when on November 3, 2005 the NRC decided not to proceed with one of
his grievances?
[36]
The
evidence establishes that the NRC did not make this decision. It intended to
resume the investigation of the grievance when Dr. Grover returned to his
office from sick leave. In fact Dr. Grover did return but so sporadically that the
investigation was not able to proceed. The applicant’s
allegations of retaliation consist of outright speculation which cannot form
the basis for a human rights complaint: Singaravelu v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 1103 per Justice Harrington at paragraph 23. It is plain and obvious to the
Court that the Commission reasonably found that the facts did not substantiate
a retaliation complaint. There is no factual basis for this allegation and
there is no basis for supporting a retaliation complaint on any reasonable
basis that would meet the low threshold for accepting the complaint.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commission that the complaint is outside its jurisdiction
because it does not meet the low threshold to establish a reasonable ground for
retaliation was reasonably open to the Commission.
Issue No.2: Did the NRC retaliate against
Dr. Boiko when on June 25, 2005 the NRC refused Dr. Boiko’s request to proceed
with an internal investigation?
[37]
Dr. Boiko
states that on June 25, 2005 the NRC refused to proceed with an internal
investigation about Dr. Grover’s conduct toward Dr. Boiko. In fact the June 25,
2005 letter (which is in fact dated June 28, 2005) stated that the internal
investigation will resume when Dr. Grover returns to the office. The applicant’s
allegations rest entirely on speculation attributing mala fides to the
NRC. Again these facts demonstrate that it was plain and obvious that there was
no reasonable basis for the
Commission deciding that the low threshold required for a retaliation complaint
has been met. This decision was reasonably open to the Commission.
Issue No.3: Did the NRC retaliate against
Dr. Boiko when in July, 2004 an external investigator hired by the NRC
“intimidated” the complainant at a “mediation” session?
[38]
Dr. Boiko
states that in July 2004 an external investigator hired by the NRC
“intimidated” Dr. Boiko at a “mediation” session. At first, the Commission
decided that this complaint is outside the one year limitation period. Dr.
Boiko’s complaint was filed on July 31, 2006 which is two years after this
alleged incident. Moreover, on the facts, this alleged incident could not have
been retaliation by the NRC against Dr. Boiko for filing the complaint against
the NRC because Dr. Boiko only filed the complaint against the NRC on August
13, 2004, one month after this alleged intimidation. Again it is plain and
obvious to the Court that the Commission reasonably concluded that the facts
did not substantiate a retaliation complaint.
CONCLUSION
[39]
The Court
is sympathetic to Dr. Boiko. He is probably a scientific genius, but as a
self-represented litigant, he provided the Court with a record that was
difficult to comprehend and at times incomplete. In fact, Dr. Boiko continually
referred to the National Research Council Motion Record as a source of relevant
documentation for his case. Moreover, the Court found that Dr. Boiko did not
have reasonable grounds to allege that the NRC acted in a retaliatory and
therefore discriminatory manner against Dr. Boiko because he filed a complaint
against the National Research Council. It was plain and obvious
that the facts could not substantiate the retaliation complaint which the
Commission reasonably chose not to deal with. Dr. Boiko’s application for
judicial review of that decision must therefore be dismissed.
COSTS
[40]
The
National Research Council has requested legal costs in accordance with the Tariff
including costs awarded to the NRC on the applicant’s motion to compel answers
on cross-examination. This Order by the Prothonotary was dated October 23,
2008. The NRC has submitted a detailed Bill of Costs which is in correct form
subject to some adjustments since the hearing lasted 3.5 hours, rather than 7
hours as scheduled. The applicant has stated that he is unemployed and has returned
as a student with a student loan and is not in a position to pay any legal
costs. In the application before Justice Tremblay-Lamer, legal costs were
awarded at $3,000 against Dr. Boiko payable forthwith.
[41]
Dr. Boiko
also submitted that he requested that these applications before the Court be
consolidated so that he would not be exposed to more than one set of legal
costs. The Court will offer no comment on the wisdom of the decision refusing
to consolidate. However, the National Research Council clearly did not support
consolidation which means that the National Research Council is going to be
exposed to a multiplicity of proceedings and the compounding the legal costs
which the NRC will have to bear to defend itself against Dr. Boiko.
[42]
The total
fees and disbursements submitted by the NRC total $7,208.41 which counsel for
the respondent quickly pointed out includes 3.5 extra hours for the hearing.
This equates to $1,137.50. Accordingly, the total fees and disbursements
submitted by the NRC is $6,070.91. In view of Dr. Boiko’s unemployment status
and in view of the fact that Dr. Boiko asked that these matters before the
Court be consolidated so that he would not be exposed to a number of legal
costs, I will fix the costs, as Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer did, in the
application before her last month, at $3,000 payable forthwith by Dr. Boiko to
the National Research Council.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
The
application for judicial review is dismissed with costs in the amount of $3,000
payable forthwith.
“Michael
A. Kelen”