Date: 20100104
Docket: IMM-2171-09
Citation: 2010 FC 3
Ottawa, Ontario, January 4, 2010
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice
de Montigny
BETWEEN:
ANTOINE EL MORR
Applicant
and
MINISTER
OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
negative decision of the pre‑removal risk assessment (hereafter “PRRA”)
officer Éric Therriault, made under subsection 112(3) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (hereafter the “Act”).
The officer rejected the PRRA application, considering that the risk identified
by the applicant was not personalized to him. The applicant is a permanent
resident who is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality under paragraph 36(1)(a)
of the Act.
[2]
After having carefully reviewed the file
submitted by the applicant, I find that nothing in the PRRA officer’s decision
warrants this Court’s intervention.
I. Facts
[3]
The applicant is a permanent resident in Canada with Lebanese citizenship. Before arriving
in Canada in the 1980s, he was
a member of the Lebanese Forces (hereafter the “LF”).
[4]
At this point, it is useful to briefly present
the LF. This movement played an important role in the Lebanese civil war, when
its Christian militias resisted the Muslim militias and Syrian interference. At
the end of the war, it reinvented itself as a political party opposing Syrian influence
but was banned from 1994 to 2005. Today, the LF is part of the coalition that
won the June 2009 legislative elections.
[5]
On July 1, 1987, the applicant fled the
civil war in Lebanon and claimed
refugee status on arriving in Canada. Although the Immigration and Refugee Board (hereafter “IRB”) did
not expressly determine him to be a refugee, he benefitted from a simplified
procedure that allowed him to obtain, on July 27, 1991, permanent resident
status as an admissible person whose refugee claim was determined to have a
credible basis by the IRB.
[6]
The applicant alleges that, in 1994, he was tried
in absentia in Lebanon
on a false murder charge. He was convicted and sentenced to eight years’
imprisonment. He also claims that other false charges were brought against him
by the pro‑Syrian regime in place in the 1990s.
[7]
On April 25, 2007, in Montréal, the
applicant was convicted of fraud and various other violent criminal offences
and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.
[8]
On August 12, 2008, following a hearing
before the IRB, the applicant was determined to be inadmissible under
paragraph 36(1)(a) of the Act. On the same day, a deportation order
was made against him.
[9]
On March 6, 2009, the applicant availed
himself of the opportunity to present a PRRA application.
[10]
In a decision dated March 25, 2009, the
PRRA officer rejected the application. This is an application for judicial
review of the officer’s decision.
II. Impugned decision
[11]
The PRRA decision was made under
subsection 112(3) of the Act, as the applicant was inadmissible on grounds
of serious criminality under paragraph 36(1)(a) of the Act. Thus,
only the factors set out in section 97 of the Act and whether the
applicant would be a danger to the public may be considered, as required by
paragraph 113(d) of the Act. In his PRRA application, the applicant
alleged that there would be a risk to his life, or a danger of torture and a
risk of cruel punishment or treatment if he were to return to Lebanon. He fears that he would be
imprisoned and tortured if he were to return to Lebanon, by reason of his membership in the LF and his alleged conviction in
absentia.
[12]
The PRRA officer also rejected the applicant’s
claim that he would be personally targeted because of his membership in the LF
during the 1980s. The documents submitted by the applicant reveal a tense and
violent situation among the various movements in Lebanese society. They also
indicate that politically active public figures, politicians or leaders of
movements such as the LF may be in greater danger of being targeted than the general
population. However, in the officer’s view, nothing showed that the applicant was
visible enough himself to be targeted for attacks or violent acts.
[13]
The officer did not attach any weight to the allegation
that the applicant was convicted of murder in absentia in 1994. The only
documentary evidence submitted by the applicant to establish the conviction is
a letter allegedly faxed to him by the LF movement. The PRRA officer wrote the
following regarding that letter:
[translation]
With respect to
the applicant’s allegations that he was convicted of murder in absentia in
1994, he submits a letter faxed to him by the LF movement stating that he was
sentenced to death on June 23, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that there
is a contradiction between the date of the conviction and that of the sentence,
I attach very little probative value to this document. Even though it bears the
initialism “FL”, there is no date, and it is impossible to know who signed it. In
addition, although it has been documented that FL members have been falsely
accused under the Syrian regime, the recent information reveals that this is no
longer the case since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.
[14]
The officer further explained, in summarizing LF’s
background, that the era of the campaign of terror led by occupying Syrian
forces against LF supporters had ended in 2005. The leader of the movement, Mr. Geagea,
who had been incarcerated since 1994, was even released in 2005. The officer
also mentioned that, indeed, the LF had become a political party whose members had
run in the June 2009 legislative elections. (The PRRA decision, rendered
in March, preceded the June election victory of the coalition that included the
LF.)
[15]
In concluding, the officer recognized that the
applicant had likely had a basis for fleeing Lebanon in the 1980s to seek refuge
in Canada but that the
situation had changed since then, rendering nonexistent the risk to which he
would be subjected on removal.
III. Issue
[16]
Following the hearing, three issues raised by
the parties deserve to be addressed:
1) Did the PRRA breach procedural
fairness in not calling the applicant to a hearing under paragraph 113(b)
of the Act, given the officer’s doubts regarding the letter from the LF?
2) Did the PRRA officer err in law
in analyzing the applicant’s PRRA solely on the basis of the factors set out in
section 97 of the Act rather than under section 96 as well?
3) Was the PRRA officer’s decision
reasonable in light of the evidence in the file?
IV. Relevant legislation
[17]
The following provisions are relevant to this
application for judicial review.
Provision from
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S. C. 2001, c. 27
36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign
national is inadmissible on grounds of serious
criminality for
(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of
Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years,
or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment
of more than six months has been imposed;
. . .
97. (1) A person in need of protection is
a person in Canada whose
removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have
a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would
subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on
substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of
the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to
a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or,
because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that
country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by
the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other
individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or
incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the
inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the
regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of
protection.
112. (1) A person in Canada, other than a
person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the
regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a
removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in
subsection 77(1).
. . .
3) Refugee protection may not result from
an application for protection if the person
. . .
(b) is determined to be
inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality with respect to a conviction
in Canada punished by a term of imprisonment of at least two years or with
respect to a conviction outside Canada for an offence that, if committed in
Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by
a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years;
113. Consideration of an application for
protection shall be as follows:
(a) an applicant whose claim to
refugee protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose
after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant
could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have
presented, at the time of the rejection;
(b) a hearing may be held if the
Minister, on the basis of prescribed factors, is of the opinion that a
hearing is required;
(c) in the case of an applicant
not described in subsection 112(3), consideration shall be on the basis of
sections 96 to 98;
(d) in the case of an applicant
described in subsection 112(3), consideration shall be on the basis of the
factors set out in section 97 and
(i) in the case of an applicant
for protection who is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality, whether
they are a danger to the public in Canada, or
(ii) in the case of any other
applicant, whether the application should be refused because of the nature
and severity of acts committed by the applicant or because of the danger that
the applicant constitutes to the security of Canada.
|
36. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité
les faits suivants:
a) être déclaré coupable au Canada d’une infraction à une loi
fédérale punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans ou d’une
infraction à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six
mois est infligé;
[…]
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au
Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a
la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée:
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être
soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines
cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant:
(i) elle ne
peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y
est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires
de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la
menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace
ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins
médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
(2) A
également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada
et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par
règlement le besoin de protection.
112. (1) La personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n’est pas visée au
paragraphe 115(1) peut, conformément aux règlements, demander la protection
au ministre si elle est visée par une mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou
nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1).
[…]
(3) L’asile ne
peut être conféré au demandeur dans les cas suivants:
[…]
b) il est interdit de territoire pour grande criminalité pour
déclaration de culpabilité au Canada punie par un emprisonnement d’au moins
deux ans ou pour toute déclaration de culpabilité à l’extérieur du Canada
pour une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à
une loi fédérale punissable d’un emprisonnement maximal d’au moins dix ans;
113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit:
a) le demandeur d’asile débouté ne peut présenter que des éléments
de preuve survenus depuis le rejet ou qui n’étaient alors pas normalement
accessibles ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’il n’était pas raisonnable, dans les
circonstances, de s’attendre à ce qu’il les ait présentés au moment du rejet;
b) une audience peut être tenue si le ministre l’estime requis
compte tenu des facteurs réglementaires;
c) s’agissant du demandeur non visé au paragraphe 112(3), sur la
base des articles 96 à 98;
d) s’agissant du demandeur visé au paragraphe 112(3), sur la base
des éléments mentionnés à l’article 97 et, d’autre part:
(i) soit du
fait que le demandeur interdit de territoire pour grande criminalité
constitue un danger pour le public au Canada,
(ii) soit, dans le cas de tout autre
demandeur, du fait que la demande devrait être rejetée en raison de la nature
et de la gravité de ses actes passés ou du danger qu’il constitue pour la
sécurité du Canada.
|
Provision from
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002‑227
167. For the purpose of determining
whether a hearing is required under paragraph 113(b) of the Act, the
factors are the following:
(a) whether there is evidence that
raises a serious issue of the applicant's credibility and is related to the
factors set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act;
(b) whether the evidence is
central to the decision with respect to the application for protection; and
(c) whether the evidence, if
accepted, would justify allowing the application for protection.
|
167. Pour l’application de l’alinéa 113b)
de la Loi, les facteurs ci-après servent à décider si la tenue d’une audience
est requise:
a) l’existence d’éléments de preuve
relatifs aux éléments mentionnés aux articles 96 et 97 de la Loi qui
soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la crédibilité du
demandeur;
b) l’importance de ces éléments de preuve
pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande de protection;
c) la question de savoir si ces éléments
de preuve, à supposer qu’ils soient admis, justifieraient que soit accordée
la protection.
|
Provision from the Regulations
Respecting the Designation of a Refugee Claimants Designated Class and Certain
Exemptions That Apply to That Class, SOR/90-40
3. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the
Refugee Claimants Designated Class is hereby designated for the purposes of
subsection 6(2) of the Act as a class the admission of members of which would
be in accordance with Canada’s humanitarian tradition with respect to the
displaced and the persecuted, and shall consist of those persons who
. . .
(b) signified, before January 1, 1989, an
intention to make a claim to be a Convention refugee
(i) to an immigration officer, who
recorded that intention before that date, or to a person acting on behalf of
an immigration officer, who an immigration officer is satisfied recorded that
intention before that date,
. . .
(c) have been determined to have a
credible basis for their claim to be a Convention refugee pursuant to
(i) subsection 46.01(6) or (7) of
the Act, or
(ii) subsection 43(1) of an Act to
amend the Immigration Act and to amend other acts thereof, R.S., c. 28 (4th
Supp.).
|
3. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2),
conformément à la tradition humanitaire suivie par le Canada à l’égard des
personnes déplacées ou persécutées, la catégorie admissible de demandeurs du
statut de réfugié est établie pour l’application du paragraphe 6(2) de la Loi
et est constituée des personnes, à la fois:
[…]
b) qui ont manifesté, avant le 1er
janvier 1989, leur intention de revendiquer le statut de réfugié au sens de
la Convention qui, selon le cas:
(i) a été communiquée à un agent
d’immigration qui l’a consignée avant cette date ou à une personne agissant
au nom d’un agent d’immigration, laquelle a, de l’avis d’un agent
d’immigration, consigné cette intention avant cette date,
[…]
c) dont la revendication a un minimum de
fondement selon ce qui a été conclu ou déterminé conformément ;
(i) soit aux paragraphes 46.01(6) ou (7)
de la Loi,
(ii) soit au paragraphe 43(1) de la Loi
modifiant la Loi sur l’immigration et d’autres lois en conséquence, L.R., CH.
28 (4e suppl.).
|
V. Analysis
A.
Procedural fairness
[18]
At the hearing, the applicant argued that there had
been a breach of procedural fairness owing to the PRRA officer’s failure to call
the applicant to a hearing prior to rendering his decision. The applicant
claims that the officer erred in rejecting the letter from the LF without first
meeting with the applicant. In the applicant’s view, the officer’s doubts as to
the date, signature and content of the letter were comparable to a question of
credibility. As such, a hearing would be required under paragraph 113(b)
of the Act and the prescribed factors of section 167 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002‑227 (hereafter the
“Regulations”).
[19]
In addition, the applicant submits that the
officer could not disregard the letter, as he needed only to contact the LF to dispel
his doubts as to its provenance and date. Moreover, the applicant insists that
the officer was familiar with the LF Web site, where he could have checked the
signatories’ titles. In the opinion of counsel for the applicant, the failure
to make these inquiries was all the more serious since the applicant was
incarcerated and had difficulty obtaining documents or clarifications himself.
[20]
First, it is important to note that this
argument had not been raised by counsel for the applicant in his written
submissions. This omission alone would be enough to dispose of this argument, as
one party cannot take its opponent by surprise at a hearing. Such practice must
be discouraged; even assuming that the argument may be considered, introducing
it in this late manner can only diminish its weight.
[21]
At this stage, it is important to point out that
the standard of review for a breach of procedural fairness is correctness: Latifi
v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 1388, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1738, at para. 31; Sketchley
v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2005 FCA 404, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 392.
[22]
Here, the applicant’s arguments cannot prevail,
for several reasons. First, the applicant bears the burden of establishing the risks
to which he would be personally subjected if removed: Pareja v. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté
et de l’Immigration), 2008 CF 1333, [2008] A.C.F.
no 1705, at para. 26. In addition, the officer has no obligation to
confront the applicant with the insufficiencies in the evidence: Lupsa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 311, [2007] F.C.J. No. 434, at paras. 13‑14.
An applicant’s incarceration in no way shifts this burden, especially when the
applicant has been, as in this case, continually represented by counsel.
[23]
As regards the obligation to hold a hearing, the
applicant’s argument is without merit. Only if all the factors set out in section
167 of the Regulations are present does holding a hearing under paragraph 113(b)
become an option. As Justice Michael L. Phelan wrote in Tekie v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 27, [2005] F.C.J. No. 39, at para. 16: “In my view,
section 167 becomes operative where credibility is an issue which could result
in a negative PRRA decision. The intent of the provision is to allow an
Applicant to face any credibility concern which may be put in issue”.
[24]
However, in this case, the letter in question does
not concern the applicant’s credibility. Although the assessment of the
probative value of certain documents may sometimes have an impact on an
applicant’s credibility (see for example Komahe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1521, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1909, at para. 38), these
two concepts seem to me nonetheless to be distinct. The probative value, or
even the authenticity, of a document corroborating an applicant’s narrative and
provided by the applicant is clearly related to the applicant’s credibility.
However, such is not the case when the probative value of a document from a
third party is called into question for reasons that have nothing to do with
its content.
[25]
Here, the officer attached little weight to the
letter from the LF essentially for reasons related to its form, not because of any
contradictions or doubts he had as to its content. Indeed, the officer seems to
believe that an undated letter that is not legibly signed in one of the
official languages is not enough to establish the applicant’s personalized risk
as a former LF member in Lebanon today, even assuming that the applicant actually was convicted for
murder in absentia in the 1990s. In this regard, the Court previously
wrote in Latifi, above, at para. 48:
I agree with the
Respondent that the distinction between “sufficiency” of evidence and
“credibility” is crucial in this case and that the distinction is well
recognized in the relevant jurisprudence.
See also: Iboude
v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1316, [2005]
F.C.J. No. 1595, at para. 14.
[26]
Moreover, even if the letter could be considered
to be evidence relating to the applicant’s credibility, the other factors set
out in paragraphs 167(b) and (c) of the Regulations are not
present in this case. A careful reading of the officer’s decision reveals that
the letter does not seem to have been a key factor in his assessment of the
risk. In his determination, the officer mainly relied on other documentary
evidence that did not indicate any risk for a little‑known member of the LF
such as the applicant, given the change in circumstances in Lebanon, in particular as regards the
legitimacy of the LF. Viewed this way, the acceptance of the letter and of the
applicant’s conviction would not affect the PRRA officer’s conclusion.
[27]
Lastly, I note the recent decision of my
colleague Justice Elizabeth J. Heneghan in Arias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 1207, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1500.
In that decision, my colleague distanced herself from the dominant tide in case
law requiring that a hearing be automatic and mandatory the moment that all the
factors set out in section 167 of the Regulations are present. On this
point, she stated the following:
19 The language of subsection 113(b) makes it clear, in my opinion,
that the availability of an oral hearing in the PRRA context lies solely in the
discretion of the Respondent, having regard to the “prescribed factors” that
are identified in section 167 of the Regulations. The fact that those
prescribed factors exist in a given case does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that an oral hearing must be held. In this regard, I respectfully
depart from the approach taken in the decision of Tekie v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 50 Imm. L.R. (3d) 306 (F.C.).
[28]
I do not need to rule on this issue here. I will
simply take the liberty of saying that, if this submission were to be accepted,
the PRRA officer’s decision in this case would be even more difficult to
challenge, insofar as it would require evidence that he did not reasonably
exercise his discretion, and no attempt was even made to submit such evidence.
In any event, and for all of the reasons given above, the applicant’s argument on
the obligation to hold a hearing must be rejected.
B. Error of law
[29]
Counsel for the applicant also raised a number
of errors of law that the officer allegedly made, errors relating to his
jurisdiction to assess the PRRA as he did. To the extent that the alleged errors
are serious enough to put in issue the officer’s jurisdiction, I am willing to
consider that they must be reviewed according to the standard of correctness: Kim
v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 437, [2005]
F.C.J. No. 540, at para. 15; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190, at para. 59.
[30]
In his memorandum, counsel for the applicant
claimed that the applicant had been determined to be a refugee in 1991. Consequently,
he argues, the applicant should have benefitted from the principle of non‑refoulement
according to subsection 115(1) of the Act, and should have been subject to
a decision of the Minister under paragraph 115(2)(a) of the Act
rather than a PRRA application.
[31]
At the hearing, counsel for the applicant
acknowledged that his client had not been formally determined to be a refugee
in 1991. This admission seems entirely justified. Even though the applicant had
claimed refugee status in July 1987, the IRB never declared him to be a
refugee. In fact, the former Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I‑2,
provided for the creation through regulations of classes of admissible persons in
accordance with Canada’s
humanitarian tradition. These designated classes of persons could obtain
permanent resident status through a simplified procedure, after being granted
landing. In 1990, a designated class was created by the Refugee Claimants
Designated Class Regulations, SOR/90‑40, from which the applicant
benefitted, since it was determined that his claim for refugee status had a
credible basis. However, persons who had been admitted to designated classes
similar to that of the applicant were later determined not to be refugees: Quintanilla
v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 726, [2006]
F.C.J. No. 923, at para. 16 ; Kim v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 437, [2005] F.C.J. No. 540, at paras. 39-44.
[33] Moreover,
a reading of the Act leaves no doubt as to the factors to be considered in
assessing the applicant’s PRRA. The applicant was inadmissible on grounds of
serious criminality under paragraph 36(1)(a) of the Act. As such,
he is a person described in paragraph 112(3)(b) of the Act.
Accordingly, his PRRA application may be assessed only in relation to the
factors in section 97, as expressly stated in paragraph 113(d).
Here, the officer did exactly that, thereby adhering to the existing
legislative scheme.
C. Reasonableness of the decision as regards the evidence
[32]
Thus, the remaining issue is the applicant’s arguments
concerning the officer’s assessment of the evidence and the risks. Quite
clearly, the Court must show deference when reviewing this aspect of a PRRA
decision, since such matters fall squarely within the officer’s jurisdiction.
It is therefore the standard of reasonableness that applies here: Roberto v.
Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 180, [2009]
F.C.J. No. 212, at para. 13.
[33]
Counsel for the applicant submits that the
officer did not really analyze the personalized risk to which the applicant
might be subjected. He claims, among other things, that the officer failed to
make a serious assessment of the risk related to the applicant’s membership in
the LF. Since arriving in Canada, the applicant has consistently maintained that he is a member of
the LF. Moreover, even though he never specified that he was an eminent member
of the movement, that is not to say that such is not the case. Counsel for the
applicant also contends that the officer’s conclusion is unreasonable given the
evidence of Syria’s continuing
omnipresence and the danger still faced by prominent LF members, as evidenced
by their wide‑scale immigration to countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia.
[34]
I cannot accept these arguments. The officer’s
decision is reasonable and based on both the evidence submitted to him by the
applicant and the documentation available to him. To begin with, the applicant submitted
no objective evidence to the PRRA officer in support of his claims that the
Lebanese government today is [translation]
“a puppet controlled by the Syrians” and that many LF members fear returning to
Lebanon because of their
membership in the movement. The officer was therefore justified in disregarding
these elements.
[35]
In addition, the officer thoroughly reviewed the
documentary evidence and presented an extremely compelling analysis of the political
and social context in Lebanon. The
officer aptly summarized the LF’s background and current situation, before
assessing the personalized risk faced by the applicant. When the evidence
indicates unequivocally that the LF became a political party following the
withdrawal of Syrian troops, that its leader was even released from prison, and
that it is part of the “March 14” coalition that ran in the June 2009
elections, it is difficult to find that it was unreasonable for the officer to
conclude that the applicant is no longer at risk by reason of his membership in
the LF during the 1980s. That conclusion is all the more justified because
nothing in the evidence shows that the applicant was—and, more importantly,
still is—a leading member of the LF, thus increasing his risk of being targeted
for attacks.
[36]
In short, the officer did not base his decision on
an erroneous finding of fact that he made in a perverse or capricious manner or
without regard for the material before him, to quote section 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F‑7. The Court can therefore not
substitute its assessment of the evidence for that of the PRRA officer.
[37]
For all of the above reasons, this application
for judicial review must therefore be dismissed. The parties did not propose a
question for certification, and no question arises on this record.
ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS that the application
for judicial review be dismissed. No question is certified.
“Yves de Montigny”
Certified true
translation
Tu-Quynh Trinh