Date:
20061222
Docket:
DES-1-04
Citation:
2006 FC 1552
BETWEEN:
THE OTTAWA CITIZEN
GROUP INC.
and KATE JAIMET
and
CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Applicants
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO
and
ABDULLAH ALMALKI
Respondents
REASONS
FOR ORDER
LUTFY C.J.
[1] The background
to this application under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act is set
out in reasons for order, issued on July 30, 2004, adjourning this proceeding sine
die: Ottawa Citizen Group Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC
1052. The adjournment was to continue pending the outcome of an application to
terminate or vary a sealing order under section 487.3 of the Criminal Code.
The proceeding before the courts of Ontario was between the same parties and
concerning the same information as in this application.
[2] The
relevant portions of the reasons for order explaining the adjournment include
the following:
1.
In November 2003, The Ottawa Citizen Group Inc., one of its journalists
Ms. Kate Jaimet and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation ("the
applicants") filed an application before the Honourable Célynne Dorval of
the Ontario Court of Justice to terminate or vary her sealing order of January
21, 2002 in respect of the documents concerning seven search warrants
("the documents in issue"). The sealing order and the application to
terminate or vary its terms were made pursuant to section 487.3 of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. …
2.
Later in November, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada was
notified that the documents in issue contained "potentially injurious
information" or "sensitive information" ("secret
information") as defined in section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-5. Secret information, in general terms, is information relating to
international relations, national defence or national security. …
3.
In January 2004, while the section 487.3 application was still under
consideration by the Ontario Court of Justice, this section 38 proceeding was
initiated by the applicants for an order authorizing the disclosure of the
documents in issue. …
…
5.
The hearing commenced on June 10, 2004. After further considering the
documents in issue and the parties' memoranda of fact and law, the Court
questioned the advisability of continuing the section 38 hearing with the
parallel proceeding in the Ontario Court of Justice not yet concluded. …
6.
In my view, the application before the Federal Court was launched
prematurely. Judicial economy and the scheme envisaged in section 38 support
the view that the Criminal Code proceeding should be completed before further
pursuing this application. Accordingly, an order will issue adjourning the
hearing of this application sine die for the reasons that follow.
…
15. In
each forum, the judge will be asked to assess whether disclosure of the same
documents in issue, referred to as the sealed documents in the Ontario Court of
Justice and the secret information in this Court, would compromise or cause
injury to the very same investigation.
…
18. To
repeat, the Ontario Court of Justice has all the information with no deletions.
When counsel first raised the spectre of section 38, Justice Dorval was not
informed specifically that the national security ground relied upon for the
non-disclosure of all the secret information was the risk to one or more
ongoing investigations. This was unfortunate. Also, she was not advised that a
second national security ground is raised for only some of the secret
information, an aspect disclosed to the applicants in this proceeding. The
invocation of section 38 may have unduly sidetracked the section 487.3 hearing.
…
22. If Justice Dorval decides to vary further
her sealing order and the Attorney General of Canada continues to object to
making public the information about to be disclosed, the parties would then
return to the Federal Court for the completion of this hearing.
23. Consideration of section 38 will be
timely when the determination under section 487.3 has been completed. The
reasons for decision would indicate which portions, if any, of the documents in
issue the judge of the Ontario Court of Justice was prepared to have
disclosed. The parties could then consider their positions and, if necessary,
pursue their rights under section 38 before the information was made public.
[Emphasis added.]
[3] There was no appeal from this decision and
the matter was returned to the Ontario Court of Justice to enable Justice
Dorval to complete the adjudication of the application to terminate or vary the
terms of her sealing order under section 487.3 of the Criminal Code.
[4] On December 17, 2004, Justice Dorval in
part varied her sealing order. With her decision, she issued her redacted version
of the seven search warrants and related material (the documents in issue).
[5] The principal documents in issue, apart
from the search warrants, are the ninety-eight page affidavit or the information
to obtain the search warrant (ITO or appendix D) filed by Sergeant Randal Walsh
of the Royal Canadian Mountain Police, including a forty-four page annex to his
ITO (appendix D-1).
[6] The Attorney General of Canada continued to object to the disclosure of some of the information ordered unsealed by Justice
Dorval.
[7] On April 29, 2005, the Attorney General of
Canada forwarded to the Federal Court his own redacted version of the documents
in issue. This made clear to the Court and the applicants those portions of
the documents in issue concerning which the Attorney General of Canada
continued to assert a privilege under section 38 in this proceeding (the
information in issue), despite Justice Dorval’s decision to release the
information. The Attorney General of Canada’s ongoing objection reactivated
this section 38 proceeding, the possibility envisaged in paragraph 22 of my
reasons for order of July 30, 2004, above at paragraph 2.
[8] In June and July 2005,
several hearings of various duration took place over some nine days in the
absence of the applicants. During these hearings, witnesses for the
Attorney General of Canada were examined concerning their affidavit evidence to
support the non-disclosure of the information in issue for reasons of national
security and international relations.
[9] The delay in both authorizing the
disclosure of some information and completing this proceeding occurred during
the course of resolving three issues: (i) the disclosure of the names of the
persons who were the subjects of the search warrants; (ii) the application of the
third party rule; and (iii) the delay orders issued by the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice.
(i) The
delay concerning the identity of the search warrant subjects
[10] The names of the targets of the seven
search warrants were an important part of the information in issue.
[11] On June 3, 2005, as part of the proceeding
under section 487.3 of the Criminal Code, the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered
that the names of the subjects of the search warrants be made available to the
applicants and other media, subject to a prohibition against the publication of
any information that might identify these subjects: Ottawa Citizen Group
Inc. v. R., [2005] O.J. No. 2209.
[12] On June 9, 2005, the Ontario Court of
Appeal issued an addendum to its reasons of June 3 to clarify that its
order applied to the names of all the subjects of the search warrants
redacted by Justice Dorval on December 22, 2003 and February 9, 2004: Ottawa
Citizen Group Inc. v. R., [2005] O.J. No. 2298.
[13] On June 24, 2005, after receiving
submissions concerning the Ontario Court of Appeal decisions, Justice Dorval
delivered oral reasons and concluded:
Although the court did not deal with
my reasons of January 4th, 2005, I must conclude that the intent of
the order remains to release the names of the subject of the search warrants
and ban publication of those names or any information which may tend to
identify them. I therefore do so, subject to the s. 38 application before the
Federal Court.
Justice
Dorval’s reasons of January 4, 2005 are a corrigendum of her decision
first issued on December 17, 2004, above at paragraph 4. Those reasons were not
the subject of the Ontario Court of Appeal decisions of June 3 and 9, 2005.
[14] During the hearings
of July 2005, this Court received ex parte evidence from witnesses for
the Attorney General of Canada as to whether the disclosure of the names would
be injurious to Canada’s international relations or national security. From July
12 through 14, 2005, three affiants testified on this issue. It became apparent
to the Court that one government institution no longer objected to the
disclosure of the names and that at least one other government institution
continued to object.
[15] On July 14, 2005, at a session involving
all counsel, I expressed my preference for Justice Dorval to indicate
specifically which names she intended to have disclosed. The designation of
other entities and addresses in the search warrants required, in my view, this
greater clarity. To this end, with the cooperation of counsel, this Court
issued the following direction on July 14, 2005:
This Court has been requested by
the applicants, pursuant to ss. 38.04 and 38.06 of the Canada Evidence Act, to
authorize the disclosure of the information which Justice Dorval was
prepared to unseal in her decision of June 24, 2005 (“the information”).
The Court is adjourning this issue sine
die to await a decision from Judge Dorval on whether she would unseal the
names of persons in these six search warrants in light of the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s decision dated June 3rd, 2005, and the Court of Appeal’s
Addendum issued June 9th, 2005.
[16] Later on July 14, 2005, after
the direction was issued, the transcript of Justice Dorval’s oral reasons for
order of June 24, 2005 were delivered to the Federal Court.
[17] By late November
2005, the Court had yet to hear from counsel concerning its direction of July
14, 2005.
[18] On December 6, 2005, during a conference
call to determine the reason for the delay, counsel advised that the documents
in issue had been misplaced within the administrative system of the Ontario courts. Justice Dorval’s work was carried out in Ottawa. The Ontario Court of
Appeal sat in Toronto. The documents in issue were no longer available to
Justice Dorval for her to make clear precisely which names on the search
warrants should be disclosed.
[19] Counsel subsequently made available to
Justice Dorval duplicate documentation to enable her to indicate which specific
names were to be disclosed.
[20] On January 23, 2006, Justice Dorval
provided to counsel for the Attorney General of Canada edited materials which
made clear which names were to be disclosed.
[21] In early May 2006, counsel realized that
the Federal Court had not been apprised of this development. Also, counsel for
the applicants assumed that the Attorney General of Canada had forwarded to the
Federal Court his position concerning the disclosure of the names when in fact
this had not been done.
[22] On May 11, 2006, it became apparent to all
concerned that the Attorney General of Canada no longer objected to the
disclosure of the names of the subjects of the search warrants.
[23] By July 10, 2006, after several exchanges
among counsel and the Court, all parties were satisfied that the names of the
subjects of the search warrants were delivered to the applicants as ordered
disclosed by Justice Dorval in a form which was unequivocally clear to all
concerned. Had it not been for these inadvertent delays, the names could have
been released within a reasonable time after July 2005 by court order or
otherwise.
(ii) The
delay concerning the third party rule
[24] During the hearings of June and July 2005,
the Attorney General of Canada highlighted those portions of the information in
issue with respect to which he was still objecting to disclosure on the grounds
of injury to international relations and national security, more specifically
because of the third party rule.
[25] The third party rule, in the context of
this case, concerns the exchange of information among security intelligence
services and other related agencies. Put simply, the receiving agency is
neither to attribute the source of the information or disclose its contents
without the permission of the originating agency.
[26] In June 2005, counsel for the Attorney
General of Canada undertook to make inquiries as to whether a waiver of the
third party rule could be obtained from the relevant foreign intelligence
agencies. These inquiries were made shortly after this undertaking. The replies
from the foreign agencies were not as timely.
[27] By January 30, 2006, the relevant government
institution had available to it information that there would be no waiver of the
third party rule by the foreign agency or agencies. Again, through
inadvertence, it was not until May 2006 that the refusal by foreign agencies to
waive the third party rule was communicated to the Federal Court.
[28] In June and July 2006, some five hearings
were conducted in the absence of the applicants and their counsel, principally
to receive evidence and submissions on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada
concerning the information in issue directly related to the refusal to waive
the third party rule.
[29] During nine conference calls since May 23,
2006, counsel for all parties were apprised of developments. During the
conference call of July 21, 2006, the Court indicated that the Attorney General
of Canada might authorize further disclosures pursuant to section 38.03 and that
further ex parte representations might be expected concerning the
application of the third party rule in September 2006.
[30] On October 23, 2006, the Attorney General
of Canada disclosed to the applicants all of paragraph 10.01 at pages 28, 29
and 30 of Appendix D-1, except for eight words. The words which have not been
disclosed concern the identity of the originating source of the information and
when it was received. Keeping in mind the balancing test required in subsection
38.06(2), I am satisfied that the public interest in non-disclosure prevails on
the basis of the third party rule.
[31] Other third party rule issues that remain
to be adjudicated are discussed at paragraph 59 and following of these reasons.
(iii) The
delay orders issued by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
[32] In an order issued on November 29, 2006, this Court
authorized the disclosure of information in a number of specified paragraphs in
Appendix “D”. That information has now been disclosed to the applicants. These
are my reasons for having authorized the disclosure of the information in
question.
[33] Prior to the issuance of Justice Dorval’s orders in
January 2002, the Honourable B. Durno of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
authorized the interception of private communications, pursuant to Part VI of
the Criminal Code and issued a general warrant to enter premises covertly,
pursuant to section 487.01 of the Criminal Code (the Durno orders).
[34] From time to time, delay orders were authorized by
Justice Durno extending the time for notifying the persons concerned of the
electronic surveillance and the covert entries (the delay orders). These delay
orders were extended until October 10, 2006 when they were not renewed.
[35] Earlier disclosure of the information related to the
Durno orders would have been inconsistent with the rationale for the delay
orders. Of equal importance, an informed reader would have linked the disclosed
information with other investigative measures authorized by the Durno orders.
[36] When Justice Dorval issued the search warrants in
January 2002, she knew of the original Durno orders but in all likelihood could
not have been aware of the delay orders. In view of Justice Dorval’s conclusion
that much of the information in Appendix “D” could not be disclosed because of
the ongoing investigation and in view of the delay orders, I was satisfied that
the information in issue should not have been disclosed until the delay orders
expired or were otherwise modified by a judge or court with jurisdiction under the
Criminal Code.
[37] Subsequent to October 10, 2006, I was of the view
that the disclosure of the information related to the Durno orders would no
longer be injurious to international
relations or national security and that, in any event, the public interest in
the openness of court proceedings outweighed the importance of the public
interest in non-disclosure. On November 20, 2006, during a conference call
among all parties, counsel for the Attorney General of Canada advised that a
substantial portion of the information related to the Durno orders was not
likely to be disclosed pursuant to subsection 38.03. This position differed
from my view.
[38] After verification during a short ex
parte exchange with government counsel, the order of November 29, 2006 was issued
authorizing disclosure of the information.
Guiding
principles
[39] This is a case of two competing
public interests.
[40] The applicants assert the
principle of the openness of court proceedings, one which is inextricably
linked to the fundamental freedom of expression guaranteed by subsection 2(b)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Vancouver Sun (Re),
2004 SCC 43 and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario, 2005 SCC 41.
[41] The Attorney General of Canada advances the state’s interest in protecting Canada’s national security and international
relations.
[42] As early as fifteen
years ago, Justice George Addy, acting as a judge designated to hear national
security matters, grappled with these competing interests in Henrie v.
Canada (Security
Intelligence Review Committee), [1989] 2 F.C. 229, [1988] F.C.J. No. 965. In his analysis
assessing the extent of any injury to national security as the result of the
disclosure of sensitive information, Justice Addy differentiated between
national security and criminal law investigations (at paragraphs 26 and 28):
… one must bear in mind that the fundamental purpose of
and indeed the raison d'être of a national security intelligence investigation
is quite different and distinct from one pertaining to criminal law
enforcement, where there generally exists a completed offence providing a framework
within the perimeters of which investigations must take place and can readily
be confined.
…
Criminal investigations are generally
carried out on a comparatively short-term basis while security investigations
are carried on systematically over a period of years, as long as there is a
reasonable suspicion of the existence of activities which would constitute a
threat to the security of the nation.
[43] Justice Addy was sensitive to the principle
of “complete openness of the judicial process” even prior to the important
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagenais v. Canadian
Broadcasting
Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 and R. v. Mentuck [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442,
2001 SCC 766. He was also conscious of the balancing required between the
competing interests of public access to the courts and the secrecy that might
be required to protect national security (Henrie at paragraph 18):
… Public interest in the
administration of justice requires complete openness of the judicial process. …
That cardinal rule … is fundamental to the public interest in the preservation
of our free and democratic society. There are, however, very limited and well
defined occasions where that principle of complete openness must play a
secondary role and where, with regard to the admission of evidence, the public
interest in not disclosing the evidence may outweigh the public interest in
disclosure. This frequently occurs where national security is involved. …
[44] In 2004, in the context of a criminal
investigation concerning terrorism, the Supreme Court of Canada in Vancouver Sun (Re) highlighted the principle of openness in court
proceedings (at paragraph 26):
The open court principle is
inextricably linked to the freedom of expression protected by s. 2(b) of
the Charter and advances the core values therein: … The freedom of the
press to report on judicial proceedings is a core value. Equally, the right of
the public to receive information is also protected by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression: … The press plays a vital role in being the
conduit through which the public receives that information regarding the
operation of public institutions: … Consequently, the open court principle, to
put it mildly, is not to be lightly interfered with.
[Citations
omitted]
[45] One year later, in
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., the Supreme Court of Canada considered
sealing orders concerning search warrants in a criminal investigation with no
national security implications. Justice Morris Fish once again reiterated the
importance of the open court principle (at paragraph 7):
… In my view, the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies
to all discretionary court orders that limit freedom of expression and
freedom of the press in relation to legal proceedings. Any other conclusion
appears to me inconsistent with an unbroken line of authority in this Court
over the past two decades. And it would tend to undermine the open court
principle inextricably incorporated into the core values of s. 2(b) of
the Charter.
[46] In this proceeding, I have also been guided
by the decisions of Justice Dorval. On December 17, 2004, she concluded that
the investigation, which led the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to seek the
search warrants in January 2002, was still ongoing. She accepted that the
sealing order was required with respect to some material in order to protect
the nature and extent of the ongoing investigation. Nevertheless, she found
that a portion of the documents in issue should be made public.
[47] I have also kept in mind the public process
before Justice Dorval. It was one which did not allow for the presentation of
the evidence this Court received in ex parte sessions. Also, the
representations before Justice Dorval were generic and without reference to any
of the particular passages in Appendix D. It was only after Justice Dorval
determined which information she would unseal that the Attorney General of
Canada could address in a specific way the national security issues which were
of concern.
[48] As noted earlier, this proceeding was reactivated
in late April 2005 when the Attorney General of Canada continued to object to
the disclosure of information which Justice Dorval had ordered to be unsealed.
[49] The position of the Attorney General of
Canada has evolved during the ensuing period. The affiants proffered by the
Attorney General were examined by his counsel and the Court in the absence of
the applicants and their counsel. Many exhibits were filed by the Court in
testing the assertions made on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada. During
this process, the Attorney General has, from time to time, authorized further
disclosures of some of the information in issue pursuant to section 38.03. Consequently, there now exists a relatively small number of issues
to be adjudicated by the Court.
[50] The Attorney
General of Canada continues to assert his objection to the disclosure of the
information still in issue for one of two grounds. In his view, the disclosure
of the information would breach either the informer privilege, including the
concern not to reveal the identity of persons of interest, or the third party
rule. On the records filed with the Court, this information still in issue has
been grey-marked (the grey-marked information).
The informer
privilege
[51] The importance of the
informer privilege was emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Leipert, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281 at paragraph 9: “an ancient and
hallowed protection which plays a vital role in law enforcement”.
[52] The privilege belongs to
the Crown and to the informant, even the anonymous informant. Courts must take
great care not to unwittingly deprive informers of the privilege. In the case
of an anonymous informant, none of the information should be disclosed, subject
only to “the innocence at stake” exception. See: Leipert at paragraphs
15, 16 and 32. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Leipert
makes no explicit reference to the balancing test envisaged in the Canada
Evidence Act.
[53] In the two instances in
this case where the Attorney General of Canada objects to the disclosure of
information concerning anonymous informants, I have taken into account the
requirements of subsection 38.06(2).
(a) Paragraphs 28 and
28.A of the Information to Obtain
[54] The Attorney General urges that
the grey-marked information be redacted to prevent the person whose name and
address are indicated in the fourth line of paragraph 28 from identifying
himself and, in turn, enabling that person to identify the anonymous caller.
Justice Dorval protected the identity of the person elsewhere. The individual
continues to be a person of interest in the ongoing Project A-O Canada
investigation.
[55] On
the basis of the other redactions made by Justice Dorval in paragraphs 28 and
28.A, I am satisfied that she would have also redacted the grey-markings had
she had the benefit of the evidence received in this section 38 proceeding.
[56] I
have considered the disclosure of a summary or of a portion of the grey-marked
information. Such an exercise cannot be done without risking the person of
interest being able to identify himself from the information in issue. This is
particularly so because of the information in paragraphs 28 and 28.A previously
made public. In the circumstances, the interests of national security outweigh
the competing public interest. No further disclosures will be authorized
concerning these paragraphs.
(b) Paragraphs
73 and 73.A of the Information to Obtain
[57] In
considering paragraphs 73 and 73.A, I have kept in mind Justice Dorval’s decision
not to disclose the name and place of location of the individual about whom the
anonymous source was sharing information through the National Hotline of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
[58] On
the basis of the evidence received in private sessions, I am satisfied that the
disclosure of the grey-markings in paragraphs 73 and 73.A would tend to
identify the anonymous source to the person whose name has been redacted by
Justice Dorval. That person might then be able to identify and put in peril the
anonymous caller. Also, disclosure might allow the anonymous caller to identify
himself or herself. This could raise concerns about preserving the anonymity of
this source, who called the National Hotline on a nameless basis. I accept the
testimony of the witness for the Attorney General of Canada on this issue. In
my view, the harm to national security by putting even an anonymous source in
jeopardy outweighs the interest being asserted by the applicants in the context
of this file. An
order will issue prohibiting the disclosure of the grey-marked information in
paragraphs 73 and 73.A.
The Third Party Rule
[59] The importance for Canada of respecting the third
party rule, described above at paragraph 25, was highlighted in Ruby v.
Canada (Solicitor General), 2002 SCC 75. Writing for the unanimous Supreme
Court of Canada, Justice Louise Arbour relied on an extract from one of the
affidavits filed in the Federal Court, the court of first instance in Ruby,
in describing Canada as a “net importer” of information exchanged among
intelligence services (at paragraph 44):
Canada is not a great power. It does not have the
information gathering and assessment capabilities of, for instance, the United States, the United Kingdom or France. Canada does not have the same quantity or quality
of information to offer in exchange for the information received from the
countries which are our most important sources. If the confidence of
these partners in our ability to protect information is diminished, the fact
that we are a relatively less important source of information increases our
vulnerability to having our access to sensitive information cut off.
[60] With this teaching in mind, I now turn to
the information in issue characterized by the Attorney General of Canada as
falling within the third party rule.
[61] On the basis of an
affidavit filed on May 20, 2004, the Attorney General of Canada objected to the
disclosure of the words “involved in terrorism activities” in paragraph 87.B on
the ground of the third party rule. Concerning the
other information in paragraph 87.B, the only privilege asserted at the outset
of this proceeding was that disclosure would detrimentally affect the
R.C.M.P.’s ongoing investigation in a matter relating to national security.
[62] However, the Attorney
General of Canada modified his position concerning the words in paragraph 87.B
to be protected under the third party rule. On or about April 29, 2005, the
disclosure of the words “involved in terrorism activities” was authorized,
apparently pursuant to section 38.03.
[63] In testimony during
June and July, 2005, one affiant from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
acknowledged that, from the point of view of his police agency, he no longer
had any objection to the disclosure of the other information in the paragraph.
[64] In an ex parte
affidavit filed on June 23, 2006, which dealt with several issues, a second
officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police purported to characterize the
grey-marked words in paragraph 87.B as originating from one or more foreign
intelligence services. Previously, no other affidavit evidence had objected to
the disclosure of these words on the basis of the third party rule. The Court
noted its concern but, under reserve, allowed further questioning of the affiant.
[65] On closer
examination, the document under exhibit 5 of the affidavit of June 23, 2006
(excerpts showing the information the affiant claimed fell under the third
party rule) did not include an excerpt of paragraph 87.B.
[66] After a careful review
of the affidavit and
oral evidence of the witnesses, I am satisfied that the Canadian agencies were
aware of the information in this paragraph, prior to whatever other information
may have been received from one or more foreign agencies. Again, on my review
of the record, the third party rule has no bearing on this paragraph. No other national
security interest has been invoked by the Attorney General of Canada which, in
my view, would support the non-disclosure of the grey-marked information, surely
not one which outweighs the public interest in releasing the information.
Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada did not appear to take issue with
this conclusion in comments she made on July 19, 2006. An order to this effect
will issue.
[67] During the conference
call of December 7, 2006, the Court advised all counsel that reasons for order
would be issued within a matter of days.
[68] On December 15, 2006, the Attorney General of Canada disclosed
to the applicants the grey-marked information in paragraph 86.D. In view of
this late development, the Court prefers to review further the position of the
Attorney General of Canada with respect to the grey-marked information in
paragraphs 75.C.4, 84.A, 86.A and 86.C. The Court also grants the Attorney General’s
request for a final opportunity to clarify his position concerning paragraph 84.B.
“Allan Lutfy”
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