Date: 20100517
Docket: A-218-09
Citation: 2010 FCA 124
CORAM: SHARLOW
J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
TRUDEL
J.A.
BETWEEN:
LEHIGH CEMENT LIMITED
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SHARLOW J.A.
[1]
The
appellant Lehigh Cement Limited (“Lehigh”), a corporation resident in Canada,
is appealing a judgment of the Tax Court of Canada (2009 TCC 237) upholding
assessments made under Part XIII of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
1 (5th Supp.). Lehigh was assessed for unpaid non-resident
withholding tax on interest paid in the years 1998 to 2002 to Bank Brussels
Lambert (the “Belgian Bank”). The issue in this appeal is whether the
assessments were justified by the general anti-avoidance rule in section 245 of
the Income Tax Act.
The statutory scheme
[2]
The Income
Tax Act imposes a tax on all income of a person resident in Canada, and on
certain Canadian source income of a person not resident in Canada. One provision that imposes
tax on the Canadian source income of a non-resident is subsection 212(1) of the
Income Tax Act. Generally, subsection 212(1) applies to investment or
other passive income (including interest, dividends and rent) paid by a resident
of Canada to a non-resident. Interest
is dealt with in paragraph 212(1)(b).
[3]
Paragraph
212(1)(b) has a long history. Its first statutory predecessor is found
in section 9B of the Income War Tax Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.97. It became paragraph
96(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1948, c. 52, and then paragraph
106(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148. An amendment
enacted as S.C. 1953, c. 40, subsection 81(1) changed the structure of
paragraph 106(1)(b) so that the exemptions that had been included in the
text of the charging provisions were instead listed as subparagraphs 106(1)(b)(i),
(ii) and (iii). Paragraph 106(1)(b) became paragraph 212(1)(b) (see
the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63). By 1974 there were 6 listed
exemptions. By 2007 there were 11.
[4]
The
exemption in issue in this case is the seventh listed exemption, subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii). The original version of that provision was enacted by
S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 71, section 11, applicable in respect of any debt obligation
issued after June 23, 1975. It provided an exemption from non-resident
withholding tax for interest payable by a corporation resident in Canada to a non-resident person,
subject to two main conditions. First, the resident of Canada and the person to whom the interest was
payable had to deal with each other at arm’s length (the “arm’s length test”).
Second, the resident of Canada could not be obliged to pay
more than 25% of the principal amount of the debt within 5 years of the date of
the issuance of the evidence of indebtedness, except in the event of a default
(the “5 year test”).
[5]
Subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii) has been amended many times since 1975, but there are no
amendments relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. The arm’s length test
and the 5 year test remained the two main conditions for entitlement to the
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) exemption throughout the period to which
this appeal relates.
[6]
In the
years under appeal, paragraph 212(1)(b) and the exemption in issue,
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii), read in relevant part as follows:
212. (1) Every non-resident person shall pay an income tax of
25% on every amount that a person resident in Canada pays or credits, or is
deemed by Part I to pay or credit, to the non-resident person as, on account
or in lieu of payment of, or in satisfaction of,
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212. (1) Toute personne non-résidente doit payer un impôt sur le revenu de
25 % sur toute somme qu’une personne résidant au Canada lui paie ou porte à
son crédit, ou est réputée en vertu de la partie I lui payer ou porter à son
crédit, au titre ou en paiement intégral ou partiel :
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…
(b) interest
except …
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[…]
b) d’intérêts, sauf : […]
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(vii) interest payable by a corporation
resident in Canada to a person with whom that corporation is dealing at arm’s
length on any obligation where the evidence of indebtedness was issued by
that corporation after June 23, 1975 if under the terms of the obligation or
any agreement relating thereto the corporation may not under any
circumstances be obliged to pay more than 25% of
…
(B) … the principal amount of the obligation,
within 5 years from the date of issue
of … that obligation ….
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(vii) les intérêts payables sur un
titre par une société résidant au Canada à une personne avec laquelle cette
société n’a aucun lien de dépendance, lorsque le titre de créance a été émis
par cette société après le 23 juin 1975, si, selon les modalités du titre ou
d’une convention s’y rapportant, la société ne peut, en aucun cas, être tenue
de verser plus de 25 %:
[…]
(B) […] du montant du
principal de l’obligation,
dans les 5 années suivant la date de l’émission […] de
cette obligation […].
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[7]
The 25% rate of tax specified in subsection
212(1) of the Income Tax Act may be reduced by an international income
tax convention. During the period relevant to this appeal, the rate of tax on
interest paid to a resident of Belgium was reduced to 15% by virtue of the Canada-Belgium
Income Tax Convention (1976), enacted as a law of Canada by An Act to
implement conventions for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to
income tax between Canada and France, Canada and Belgium and Canada and Israel,
S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 104. (The 1976 convention was replaced effective 2004, see
S.C. 2002, c. 24.)
[8]
I note
parenthetically that paragraph 212(1)(b) was changed substantially by
S.C. 2007, c. 35, subsection 59(2), applicable after 2007. Paragraph 212(1)(b)
now provides for two categories of interest that are subject to non-resident
withholding tax. One category is “participating debt interest”, defined in
subsection 212(3) as interest payable on the basis of the production from or
the use of property (subject to numerous exceptions). The other is interest that
is not “fully exempt interest” (as defined in subsection 212(3)) if the
interest is paid or payable to a person with whom the payer is not dealing at
arm’s length. The definition of “fully exempt interest” encompasses some of the
exemptions that had previously appeared in one of the subparagraphs of 212(1)(b),
but not the exemption in subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii). Thus, it would
appear that after 2007, interest (except “participating interest”) is not
subject to non-resident withholding tax if it is paid by a resident of Canada to a non-resident person with
which the resident of Canada deals at arm’s length. It was
not argued in this appeal that the 2007 amendments shed any light on the issues
that arise in this case.
[9]
The
assessment under appeal was issued under the general anti-avoidance rule in
section 245 of the Income Tax Act. Section 245 reads in relevant part as
follows:
245. (1) In this section,
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245. (1) Les définitions
qui suivent s’appliquent au présent article.
|
“tax benefit” (« avantage
fiscal ») means a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other
amount payable under this Act …;
“tax consequences” (« attribut
fiscal ») to a person means the amount of … tax or other amount
payable by … the person under this Act … .
“transaction” (« opération »)
includes
an arrangement or event.
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« attribut fiscal » (“tax
consequencest”) S’agissant des attributs fiscaux d’une personne, […] impôt
ou autre montant payable par cette personne […] en application de la présente
loi […].
« avantage fiscal » (“tax
benefit”) Réduction,
évitement ou report d’impôt ou d’un autre montant exigible en application de
la présente loi […].
« opération » (“transaction”) Sont
assimilés à une opération une convention, un mécanisme ou un événement.
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(2)
Where a transaction is an avoidance transaction, the tax consequences to a
person shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to
deny a tax benefit that, but for this section, would result, directly or
indirectly, from that transaction or from a series of transactions that
includes that transaction.
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(2) En cas
d’opération d’évitement, les attributs fiscaux d’une personne doivent être
déterminés de façon raisonnable dans les circonstances de façon à supprimer
un avantage fiscal qui, sans le présent article, découlerait, directement ou
indirectement, de cette opération ou d’une série d’opérations dont cette
opération fait partie.
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(3) An avoidance
transaction means any transaction
(a) that, but for this
section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the
transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged
primarily for bona
fide
purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit; or
(b) that is part of a
series of transactions, which series, but for this section, would result,
directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes
other than to obtain the tax benefit.
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(3) L’opération
d’évitement s’entend :
a) soit de
l’opération dont, sans le présent article, découlerait, directement ou
indirectement, un avantage fiscal, sauf s’il est raisonnable de considérer
que l’opération est principalement effectuée pour des objets véritables —
l’obtention de l’avantage fiscal n’étant pas considérée comme un objet
véritable;
b) soit de
l’opération qui fait partie d’une série d’opérations dont, sans le présent article,
découlerait, directement ou indirectement, un avantage fiscal, sauf s’il est
raisonnable de considérer que l’opération est principalement effectuée pour
des objets véritables — l’obtention de l’avantage fiscal n’étant pas
considérée comme un objet véritable.
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(4) Subsection
(2) applies to a transaction only if it may reasonably be considered that the
transaction
(a) would, if this Act
were read without reference to this section, result directly or indirectly in
a misuse of the provisions of any one or more of
(i) this Act,
… or
(b) would result directly
or indirectly in an abuse having regard to those provisions, other than this
section, read as a whole.
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(4) Le paragraphe
(2) ne s’applique qu’à l’opération dont il est raisonnable de considérer, selon
le cas :
a) qu’elle
entraînerait, directement ou indirectement, s’il n’était pas tenu compte du
présent article, un abus dans l’application des dispositions d’un ou de
plusieurs des textes suivants :
(i) la présente loi,
[…]
b) qu’elle
entraînerait, directement ou indirectement, un abus dans l’application de ces
dispositions compte non tenu du présent article lues dans leur ensemble.
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Facts
[10]
The facts
are not in dispute. Lehigh is a Canadian corporation that carries on business
in Canada as a manufacturer of cement
and other building materials. During the period covered by the assessments
under appeal, Lehigh was a member of a related group of corporations (the “HZ
group”) led by a German corporation, Heidelberger Zement. The HZ group included
a Belgian corporation named CBR International Services S.A. (“International
Services”) which acted as the treasury centre for the HZ group.
[11]
In 1986, Lehigh borrowed $140 million from a consortium of Canadian banks.
The loan (the “Lehigh debt”) was later sold to one of the corporations within
the HZ group using financing from one of the foreign corporations within the HZ
group. Ownership of the Lehigh debt changed from time to time until August of
1997 but was always within the HZ group.
In August of 1997, International Services held the Lehigh debt. While the
Lehigh debt was held by a foreign corporation within the HZ group, the interest
was subject to non-resident withholding tax at the rate of 15% pursuant to
paragraph 212(1)(b). Lehigh withheld the tax as required and remitted it to the
Crown.
[12]
Until
August of 1997, the Lehigh debt bore interest at a floating rate based on the
Canadian prime rate. In August of 1997, the rate of interest payable on the
Lehigh debt was at a historic low, 4.75%, but it was expected to increase to
6%. The term of the Lehigh debt was scheduled to end on September 15, 2009,
subject to an option given to Lehigh to extend the term for successive periods
of five years.
[13]
In January
of 1997, Lehigh began to look for ways to restructure the Lehigh debt to avoid non-resident
withholding tax. An analysis in the spring of 1997 determined that, depending
on the interest rate chosen, the present value of the tax saving that could be
achieved by avoiding non-resident withholding tax would range from $13.1 to
$19.7 million. The HZ group determined, and the Minister has accepted, that the
market rate of interest for the Lehigh debt was 7%.
[14]
In August
of 1997, the terms of the Lehigh debt were amended as follows:
(a)
The
interest rate was changed from the Canadian prime rate to a fixed rate of 7%
for the first five years.
(b)
Except in
the event of a default, Lehigh was not obliged to repay more than 25% of the
principal amount within 5 years of the date upon which the new terms were
agreed to.
(c)
The holder
of the Lehigh debt (then International Services) was given the right to sell to
a third party all or any portion of the right to be paid interest on the loan.
(d)
A
withholding tax gross-up clause was added. That is, Lehigh agreed that if any
withholding tax was payable on the interest, Lehigh would effectively bear the
increased cost.
[15]
In that
same month, the Belgian Bank purchased from International Services, for
approximately $42.7 million, the right to be paid all interest payable on the
Lehigh debt before September 16, 2002, totalling approximately $49.5 million.
[16]
As a
condition of purchasing the right to be paid the interest on the Lehigh debt, the
Belgian Bank required that its risk be mitigated in two ways. First, it
required an agreement providing that, in the event of a default by Lehigh, International
Services would be obliged to buy from the Belgian Bank, for a specified price,
the right to be paid the interest. Second, International Services entered into
a funding indemnity in favour of the Belgian Bank that protected the Belgian
Bank from any hedging losses that could arise in the event of an early payout
of interest. The Crown does not allege that either of these risk mitigation
measures is relevant to the application of the general anti-avoidance rule.
[17]
After
August of 1997, Lehigh paid the Belgian Bank directly all interest payable on the
Lehigh debt. It is undisputed that the arm’s length test and the 5 year test in
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) were then met. On that basis, Lehigh did not
withhold any amount from the interest payments on account of non-resident
withholding tax.
[18]
The Minister took
the position that even though interest payable to the Belgian Bank on the
Lehigh debt was within the subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) exemption, non-resident
withholding tax was payable on the interest on the basis of the application of the
general anti-avoidance rule in section 245. If the Minister’s reliance on the general anti-avoidance
rule is well founded, Lehigh had a legal obligation to withhold the tax from the
interest payments and to remit the withheld amounts on the Belgian Bank’s
account, failing which Lehigh itself would be liable to pay the amount that
should have been withheld (see subsections 215(1) and (6) of the Income Tax
Act).
[19]
The
argument of the Crown in the Tax Court and in this Court is essentially the
same. The Tax Court judge accepted that argument. He dismissed Lehigh’s appeal
for reasons encapsulated in the following excerpts from paragraphs 39, 45 and
46 of his reasons (my emphasis):
¶39 Subparagraph (vii) is
relatively straightforward. It is not drafted in the arcane hieroglyphics
that so often decorate other parts of the Act. Left to myself, I might
well have concluded that this exemption was intended to help Canadian
corporations borrow from foreign arm's length lenders who would receive
interest free from withholding tax. Having reviewed the articles quoted in
paragraphs 37 and 38 above, I find that the purpose of subparagraph (vii) is
to help Canadian corporations needing to borrow money by increasing their
access to international capital markets. The cost of the withholding tax on
interest paid to foreign lenders is often shifted to the Canadian borrower,
thereby increasing the cost of capital. The exemption from withholding tax on
arm's length borrowing from foreign lenders makes such borrowing more
competitive with domestic borrowing in Canada.
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…
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¶45 … In my
opinion, the tax benefit in subparagraph (vii) of paying interest to a
non-resident person free from withholding tax applies only to the arm's
length borrowing of capital from a non-resident lender. That is the
transaction "with a certain commercial purpose". In this appeal,
[Lehigh] did not borrow any money from [the Belgian Bank] or any other
non-resident lender. The absence of a non-resident lender causes me to
infer that the sale transaction between [International Services and the
Belgian Bank] abused subparagraph (vii).
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¶46 … I find that the
relationship between [International Services and the Belgian Bank] with
respect to the sale of 20 quarterly interest amounts for $42 million; and the
relationship between [Lehigh and the Belgian Bank] with respect to the
payment of those 20 quarterly interest amounts are wholly dissimilar to
the arm's length borrower/lender relationship contemplated by subparagraph
(vii). The sale transaction between [International Services and the Belgian
Bank] frustrated the object, spirit and purpose of subparagraph (vii).
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Analysis
(a) The Canada
Trustco case and subsection 245(4)
[20]
Lehigh
concedes that the
transaction in issue in this case was an avoidance transaction within the
meaning of subsection 245(3) of the Income Tax Act, and that it was
intended to achieve the tax benefit that arose from the right to rely on the
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) exemption to avoid liability for
non-resident withholding tax. However, Lehigh takes the position that the
general anti-avoidance rule cannot apply because the transaction was not a
misuse of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) within the meaning of subsection
245(4).
[21]
The
leading case on the application of the general anti-avoidance rule is Canada
Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, 2005 SCC 54. The
principles relating to subsection 245(4) are summarized in paragraph 66 of that
case. Much of the discussion about subsection 245(4) is aimed at explaining the
meaning of the phrases “misuse of the provisions” of the Income Tax Act
and “abuse having regard to those provisions … read as a whole”. In this case
the Crown alleges a misuse of a single provision, subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii).
[22]
According
to Canada Trustco, Lehigh is entitled to the benefit of the exemption in
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) unless allowing the benefit would be
inconsistent with its object, spirit or purpose. The meaning of the phrase “object,
spirit or purpose” is not fully explained but in the context of this case I
take it as a reference to the purpose of the exemption in subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii),
determined on the basis of a textual, contextual and purposive interpretation.
[23]
The
burden is on the Minister to establish the purpose of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
and to establish that allowing Lehigh the benefit of the exemption in
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) would be a misuse of that provision, in the
sense that it would achieve an outcome that subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
is intended to prevent or is not intended to permit. Most importantly, if there
is any doubt as to whether the transaction in issue results in a misuse of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii), Lehigh is entitled to the benefit of that
doubt.
(b) Positions of the parties
[24]
I
summarize as follows the argument of Lehigh. The purpose of subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii) should be discerned from its words, interpreted
textually, contextually and purposively. According to the words of subsection
212(1)(b)(vii), interest payable on the Lehigh debt is free of
non-resident withholding tax if the arm’s length test and the 5 year test are
met. Both tests were met in this case, and there is nothing about the
transaction in issue that defeats or could tend to defeat the purpose of either
of those tests. The 5 year test is intended to ensure that the debt is medium
to long term debt, as the debt in issue clearly is. The arm’s length test is
intended to ensure that the contractual conditions governing the debt,
particularly the interest rate, fairly reflect the applicable market. The Crown
has admitted that the interest rate in this case is the market rate, and the
Crown has not argued that there are any contractual terms that make the Lehigh
debt or the transaction in issue inconsistent in any way with normal commercial
practice. Since the statutory conditions of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
have been met as a matter of both legal and economic substance, there can be no
basis for the Crown’s conclusion that the transaction has resulted in a misuse
of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii).
[25]
The
Crown agrees that in this case the statutory conditions for the application of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) are met, technically and substantively.
However, the Crown argues that the subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) exemption
is not intended to benefit a non-resident person who is legally entitled to be
paid interest on a debt as a result of a transaction by which the right to be
paid the interest is split from the right to be paid the principal amount. Specifically, the Crown
asserts that, because the transaction in this case did not result in Lehigh “accessing
funds in an international capital market”, it is inconsistent with the
underlying rationale of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii).
(c) Discussion
[26]
Five
observations may be made about the scope of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
and the nature of the transaction that has given rise to this appeal.
[27]
First,
the parties agree that subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) provides for an
exemption from the imposition of non-resident withholding tax on interest
payable by a corporation resident in Canada to a non-resident. They
also agree that the scope of the exemption is discerned from its words alone,
and that no useful guidance is obtained by examining any of the other
exemptions.
[28]
Second,
the language of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) is broad enough to include any
interest payable by a corporation resident in Canada to a non-resident, no matter how the
non-resident may have become entitled to receive that interest. Such an
entitlement could arise in a number of ways – by a loan to a corporation
resident in Canada where the loan bears interest, by a sale of property to a
corporation resident in Canada where the unpaid portion of the purchase price
bears interest, or by a purchase of the right to be paid interest on a debt
obligation of a corporation resident in Canada, with or without the right to be
paid the principal amount of the debt.
[29]
Third, the
language of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) requires the arm’s length test
to be met in respect of the relationship between the person required to pay the
interest and the person entitled to be paid the interest. It does not require
the arm’s length test to be met in respect of the relationship between the
person required to pay the principal amount of the debt and the person entitled
to be paid the principal amount of the debt. If there had been a fiscal policy
concern requiring the exemption in subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) to be
available only where the same person was entitled to be paid the interest and
the principal amount, it would have been simple to say so.
[30]
Fourth,
the splitting of interest and principal has long been a normal aspect of
commercial financing transactions, including transactions involving government
debt obligations such as treasury bills. The Crown has provided no evidence
that that there is anything commercially unusual, in form or substance, about
the splitting transaction in issue in this case.
[31]
Fifth, in
the specific context of non-resident withholding tax, Parliament was aware of
the existence of such splitting transactions in 1975 when subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
was first enacted. The stripping of interest coupons is the subject of S.C.
1960-61, c. 17, s. 13, which provided for the enactment of section 132A of the Income
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, the predecessor to section 240 of the current
Income Tax Act. Section 240 refers to a bond, debenture or similar
obligation where the right to interest is evidenced by a coupon or other
writing that does not form part of, or is capable of being detached from, the
evidence of indebtedness. It requires such interest coupons to be marked “AX”
if the interest would be subject to non-resident withholding tax if paid to a
non-resident person, and otherwise to be marked “F”, failing which the issuer
of the debt obligation could be liable to a civil penalty.
[32]
The
Crown’s position is not based on an interpretation of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
or the statutory scheme of which it is a part. It is not based on any statutory
provision or jurisprudence. It is an echo of a sentence in the budget paper released by
the Department of Finance in 1975 when the enactment of the first version of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) was proposed. The publication is entitled “Budget:
Highlights and Supplementary Information” and is dated June 23, 1975. The
following appears at page 21 of that publication (the emphasis is mine):
WITHHOLDING TAX
EXEMPTION
The budget proposes to make it easier for Canadian
business to borrow funds abroad by providing an exemption from the normal
withholding tax on interest paid to non-residents.
A similar exemption for all government debt -- federal,
provincial and municipal -- was extended earlier this year to securities
issued before 1979.
Both these moves supplement the withdrawal on February 27,
1975 of foreign borrowing guidelines which since 1970 had requested borrowers
to exhaust Canadian sources before floating issues outside the country.
The new exemption for interest on private-sector loans is
restricted to interest paid by a corporation resident in Canada to a
non-arm’s length [sic] lender on bonds, debentures or other debt obligations
having a fixed term to maturity of not less than five years that are issued
after budget date and before 1979.
The term “arm’s length” is well defined in tax law and
generally means dealings between unrelated persons.
The proposed relief from withholding tax is
intended to increase the flexibility of Canadian business to plan long-term
debt financing and facilitate access to funds in international capital
markets.
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(The Crown says that in the fourth paragraph of this
quotation, the reference to “non-arms’ length” is wrong and should be read as
“arm’s length”.)
[33]
The Crown
has produced no other publication of the Department of Finance and no
Parliamentary document that purports to explain the underlying rationale of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) or to explain the last sentence in the
excerpt quoted above from the 1975 budget paper. I assume that no such
publication exists.
[34]
Although the
Crown has cited a number of articles that discuss the scope of subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii), some at great length and in great detail, those articles
say nothing about the fiscal policy underlying the enactment of that provision,
except to repeat what the 1975 budget paper said. A cursory review of the
income tax literature discloses that subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) has
spawned a great deal of learned comment, but the Crown has produced no
authority that supports, expressly or by necessary implication, its proposition
that a transaction that splits the interest and principal obligation between
separate creditors, as was done in this case, would have been considered in
1975 or at any later time to have offended the fiscal policy objective of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii).
[35]
It follows
that the Crown’s argument must be assessed only on the basis of the excerpt
quoted above from the 1975 budget paper, and what inferences might reasonably be
drawn from the sentence that uses the phrase “access to funds in international
capital markets”. In my view, that sentence is a shaky foundation for an
assessment under the general anti-avoidance rule in section 245 of the Income
Tax Act.
[36]
I agree
that the 1975 budget paper says something about the history of subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii) and the business conditions prevailing in 1975 that
motivated its enactment. However, in my view it does not address in any way the
question at the core of this case, which is whether Lehigh’s reliance on the
exemption in subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) is a misuse of that provision for
the sole reason that the Belgian Bank acquired the right to be paid the
interest but not the principal amount of the Lehigh debt.
[37]
When
Parliament adds an exemption to the Income Tax Act, even one as detailed
and specific as subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii), it cannot possibly describe
every transaction within or without the intended scope of the exemption.
Therefore, it is conceivable that a transaction may misuse a statutory
exemption comprised of one or more bright line tests such as, in this case, the
arm’s length test and the 5 year test. However, the fact that an exemption may
be claimed in an unforeseen or novel manner, as may have occurred in this case,
does not necessarily mean that the claim is a misuse of the exemption. It
follows that the Crown cannot discharge the burden of establishing that a
transaction results in the misuse of an exemption merely by asserting that the
transaction was not foreseen or that it exploits a previously unnoticed
legislative gap. As I read Canada Trustco, the Crown must establish by
evidence and reasoned argument that the result of the impugned transaction is
inconsistent
with the purpose of the exemption, determined on the basis of a textual,
contextual and purposive interpretation of the exemption.
[38]
In
this case, the Crown
is inviting the Court to conclude that entitlement to the subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
exemption is not only subject to the express statutory conditions, but is also subject
to a condition necessarily implied by the existence of a fiscal policy, evidenced
only by a sentence in a 1975 budget paper that is said to explain why
the exemption was enacted. In my view, the principles stated in Canada
Trustco require that invitation to be rejected.
[39]
I reach
that conclusion because no trace of the alleged fiscal policy can be discerned
or reasonably inferred from subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) itself, from the
statutory scheme of which subsection 212(1)(b)(vii) is a part, or from
any other provision of the Income Tax Act that could possibly be
relevant to the textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii). In my view, it is fatal to the Crown’s
misuse argument that it finds no support in any provision of the
Income Tax Act, or in any jurisprudence or other authority saying or
suggesting that the splitting of the interest and principal obligations of a
debt have any income tax implications in relation to subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii),
or any analogous provision or relevant statutory scheme.
[40]
I would
add that the Crown’s argument also seems to suffer from an irreconcilable
inconsistency. The Crown concedes that if International Services (the Belgian
corporation related to Lehigh) had sold the Belgian Bank the right to be paid
both the principal amount of the Lehigh debt and the interest, subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii) would apply to exempt the interest from non-resident
withholding tax and there would be no basis for invoking the general
anti-avoidance rule. That is consistent with the well entrenched understanding
of the scope of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii). And yet, I cannot see how
such a hypothetical sale could be construed as a transaction that would give Lehigh
“access to funds in international capital markets”. In that hypothetical sale, the
only flow of money would have been from the foreign purchaser, Belgian Bank, to
the foreign seller, International Services. Lehigh’s financial position will
not have changed at all, and no foreign capital would have flowed to any
Canadian corporation.
[41]
If
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) were actually intended to apply only if a resident
of Canada “accesses” funds in an international capital market, there would seem
to be no reason for the Crown to concede that this hypothetical sale transaction
would not be a misuse of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii). And yet, it has
been established for many years that such a sale transaction will entitle the
foreign purchaser of the debt to claim the benefit of the subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii)
exemption if the arm’s length test and the 5 year test are met after the sale. I
am unable to discern any relevant distinction, in terms of the alleged underlying
rationale of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii), between such a hypothetical
sale proposed above and the transaction undertaken in this case.
[42]
The Crown also
argues that the transaction in issue in this case is abusive because the HZ
group was able to extract part of Lehigh’s Canadian source profits free of
Canadian tax, which is not an intended result of subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii).
This assumes that interest payments generally are funded out of profits and
that the consideration that the Belgian Bank paid International Services for
the right to be paid the interest payments is somehow funded by the flow of
profits from Lehigh to the Belgian Bank. Even if I were to accept those
assumptions, it seems to me that again there is no relevant distinction between
the hypothetical acceptable transaction described above, and the allegedly
abusive transaction in this case. The interest is paid and as a matter of law
is payable to the Belgian Bank, not to any member of the HZ group. It is true
that the Belgian Bank compensated the HZ group for the right to the interest
payments. However, the Belgian Bank would also have compensated the HZ group if
it had acquired the right to both principal and interest, although the pricing
would undoubtedly have been different because of the difference in risk.
[43]
The
Crown’s final argument is that the subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii) exemption
was intended to reduce the cost of borrowing, but in this case the interest
borne by Lehigh was increased from the floating rate (which as of August of
1997 was 4.75%) to a fixed rate of 7% for 5 years. Essentially, the argument is
that this change in the interest rate indicates a misuse of subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii). There is no merit to this argument. The subparagraph
212(1)(b)(vii) exemption applies only if the payer and recipient of the
interest deal at arm’s length with each other. In my view, that statutory
condition is an indication that Parliament intended the exemption to be
available only where the relationship between payer and payee provided some
assurance that the rate of interest would reflect a fair market rate. Here, the
payer and payee of the interest dealt at arm’s length with each other and, more
importantly, the 7% interest rate was in fact the fair market rate for Lehigh’s
$140 million debt (a point conceded by the Crown). On these facts it is not
reasonable to conclude that the 7% interest rate represents a misuse of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii).
[44]
For these
reasons, I have concluded that the Crown has failed to discharge the burden of
establishing that the transaction in issue resulted in a misuse of
subparagraph 212(1)(b)(vii). It follows that the reassessment under
appeal cannot be justified by the general anti-avoidance rule in section 245.
Conclusion
[45]
I would
allow this appeal with costs in this Court and in the Tax Court. I would set
aside the Tax Court judgment and, making the judgment that should have been
made, I would allow the appeal and refer this matter back to the Minister for
reassessment in accordance with these reasons.
“K.
Sharlow”
“I
agree
Eleanor
R. Dawson J.A.”
“I
agree
Johanne
Trudel J.A.”