Docket: IMM-20375-24
Citation: 2026 FC 738
Toronto, Ontario, June 4, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Furlanetto
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BETWEEN:
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ABDIAZIIZ MOHAMED ALI
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for judicial review of an August 21, 2024 decision [Decision] of a Senior Immigration Officer of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC], refusing the Applicant’s Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] under subsections 112(3) and 113(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. The Officer found the Applicant was not at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment and did not address the Applicant’s request to hold his PRRA in abeyance pending a determination on the Applicant’s application for Ministerial relief from an inadmissibility finding made by the Immigration Division [ID] under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA.
[2] The Applicant asserts that the Decision is unreasonable, that it should have addressed the compelling reasons exception under subsection 108(4) of the IRPA and the abeyance request. He asserts that any denial of an abeyance in this context would be contrary to his section 7 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. He asks this Court to set aside the Decision, grant a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter and to hold his PRRA in abeyance until his application for Ministerial relief is determined.
[3] For the following reasons, the application is granted in part. While I find the Officer’s risk analysis to be unreasonable as it does not comply with the principles of responsive justification, I do not find any error relating to subsection 108(4) of the IRPA. Further, I will not grant the relief requested under subsection 24(1) of the Charter but will order that the Applicant’s abeyance request be determined by IRCC as a preliminary matter before any redetermination of the PRRA.
I. Background
[4] The Applicant, Addiaziiz Ali, is a 28-year-old citizen of Ethiopia who arrived in Canada in July 2015 and made a claim for refugee protection alleging persecution by Ethiopian authorities. The Applicant is an ethnic Somali from Ogaden, which is the region that lies on the border between Somalia and Ethiopia.
[5] The Applicant’s refugee claim was suspended pending determination of his admissibility to Canada on security grounds under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA. In December 2017, the Applicant was found inadmissible by the ID for being a member of an organization (the Ogaden National Liberation Front [ONLF]) that there were reasonable grounds to believe engages, or will engage in, acts of subversion (paragraph 34(1)(b)) and terrorism (paragraph 34(1)(c)). The Applicant sought judicial review of this inadmissibility determination (Court File No. IMM-5603-17). He also sought judicial review of another decision that concluded the Applicant’s refugee claim was ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division (Court File No. IMM-5604-17).
[6] In a decision of this Court reported at Ali v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1187 [Ali], Justice Ivan Roy found the ID’s inadmissibility decision reasonable but granted the application for judicial review, and sent the matter back to the ID because the ID had failed to determine whether section 7 of the Charter was engaged at the admissibility hearing.
[7] On June 30, 2020, the ID found the Applicant inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA on redetermination, concluding that paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA did not engage the Applicant’s section 7 Charter rights and even if it did, that this was consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. The Applicant sought judicial review of the redetermination decision (Court File No. IMM-3302-20) and while this judicial review was pending, in July 2023, initiated a PRRA. IRCC agreed to hold the PRRA in abeyance pending the outcome of the judicial review.
[8] In January 2024, the Applicant discontinued his application for judicial review and in May 2024, IRCC advised the Applicant it would no longer hold the Applicant’s PRRA in abeyance.
[9] The Applicant filed an application for Ministerial relief in June 2024. He asserts that he made several requests to IRCC to hold his PRRA in abeyance pending the outcome of the application for Ministerial relief, to which he did not receive any response.
[10] The Applicant’s PRRA was refused on August 21, 2024. In the Decision, the Officer limited their analysis to section 97 of the IRPA on the basis that the Applicant was not someone who fell within subparagraphs 113(e)(i) or (ii) of the IRPA. The reasons did not refer to the compelling reasons exception under subsection 108(4) of the IRPA nor to the request to hold the PRRA in abeyance pending the determination of the Applicant’s Ministerial relief application. The Officer found the evidence insufficient to establish a forward-looking risk of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual punishment if the Applicant returned to Ethiopia and denied the PRRA.
II. Issues and Standard of Review
[11] There are three issues for determination:
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Was the Officer’s risk analysis under section 97 of the IRPA reasonable?
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Did the Officer’s failure to consider the “compelling reasons”
exception under subsection 108(4) of the IRPA render the Decision unreasonable?
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Did the Officer err by not addressing the request to hold the PRRA in abeyance pending the outcome of the Applicant’s Ministerial relief application and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
[12] The parties assert, and I agree, that the standard of review is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov]. A reasonable decision is one that is “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”
: Vavilov at para 85. A decision will be reasonable if when read as a whole and considered in the context of its administrative setting, it bears the hallmarks of justification, transparency, and intelligibility: Vavilov at para 99.
[13] As set out in Vavilov, the principles of justification and transparency require that “an administrative decision maker’s reasons meaningfully account for the central issues and concerns raised by the parties”
(para 127). While a reviewing court cannot expect an administrative decision maker to respond to every argument or line of possible analysis, “the failure to meaningfully grapple with key issues or central arguments raised by a party may call into question whether the decision maker was actually alert and sensitive to the matter before it”
(para 128). This is particularly important where the stakes are high and the decision has consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood (at para 133).
III. Analysis
A. Was the Officer’s risk analysis under section 97 of the IRPA reasonable?
[14] The Applicant acknowledges that the Officer identified the three separate grounds of risk that he asserted, namely risk based on: a) Somali ethnicity; b) perceived support and membership in the ONLF; and c) perceived support for terrorism and subversion by force against the Ethiopian state. However, the Applicant asserts the Officer failed to separately assess these risks, unreasonably cherry-picked from the evidence, and considered risks only from the Ethiopian government and not from other sources. In doing so, he submits the Officer neglected critical evidence and arguments that were made and failed to provide a reasoned explanation for the Decision, which was required to comply with the principles of responsive justification: Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 157 at para 7.
[15] I agree that the Decision overall lacks a rational chain of analysis and provides insufficient justification in view of the documentary evidence submitted.
[16] The Officer’s reasons focus on the Applicant’s risk as a perceived supporter and member of the ONLF. While the Officer conducts some analysis of the Applicant’s risk as an ethnic Somali, the Officer conflates this assessment with the Applicant’s risk as a perceived ONLF supporter and limits the analysis to persecution by the Ethiopian government.
[17] In the Decision, the Officer notes the Applicant’s fear of returning to Ethiopia and his assertions regarding the use of torture and inhumane practices against ethnic Somalis and Ogadenians. The Officer acknowledges ongoing human rights concerns and ethnic violence. However, the Officer states that the documentary evidence shows that the risk is “generally isolated to the Oromia, Tigray, and Amhara regions rather than the Somali Regional State in which the majority Ogaden ethnic Somalis reside”
. The Officer notes that there are articles referring to violent clashes between Oromia and Somali security forces along the Somali region, but states that these articles are related to historical land disputes. The Officer concludes that the articles do not “point to conflict between ONLF supporters and the Ethiopian government”
[emphasis added].
[18] I have several concerns with this analysis. First, the analysis comingles the risks alleged, making it unclear as to whether the Officer considered the evidence submitted as it related to the risk to the Applicant as an ethnic Somali. Further, the analysis stops short of engaging with the reports of ongoing human rights concerns and ethnic violence that do refer to the Somali region and to violence against civilians.
[19] The Officer broadly refers to the extensive country condition evidence cited by the Applicant in the introduction to the Decision but does not engage with this evidence in the analysis. The Officer indicates that they have conducted their own country condition research and cites to two reports but does not integrate any information from these reports into the analysis of risk.
[20] In the Decision, the Officer mentions that there is country condition evidence relating to the peace agreement signed between the ONLF and Ethiopian government in 2018. The Officer acknowledges that the agreement has not been fully enforced but then turns to a single article from the National Documentation Package ‒ a Danish immigration services document (item 4.9) [DIS Article] as the source for the Officer’s findings that based on these changes, “the applicant and his risk profile as an alleged ONLF supporter and member of a terrorist organization have dropped considerably”
. The Officer cites to the following passage from the DIS Article:
In May 2020, ONLF members were generally not harassed, arrested or threatened, neither at the federal nor at the regional level. Members and supporters may be at risk of ill-treatment from local militias and the Liyu police, and at the local level ONLF sympathisers were still exposed to violence and harassment. According to Ethiopia Insight, with direction from Jigjiga i.e. the regional state capital, zonal and district administrations and local militias conduct low level but persistent activities against ONLF.
In September 2020, ONLF members or people associated with ONLF were assessed as not at risk of being persecuted by the authorities.
[21] I agree with the Applicant that this analysis falls short of responsive justification in view of the evidence submitted, including documents dated after September 2020 which detail further violence in the Somali regional state: Dimitrijevic v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 719 at para 33. While the Respondent seeks to supplement the Officer’s reasons by referring to other passages from the DIS Article that allegedly delineate between ongoing harm to leaders of the ONLF instead of its members, this analysis is found nowhere in the Officer’s reasons. Nor is the more detailed analysis provided by the Respondent on the further reports from 2022 and 2023 found, or even touched upon, in the Decision. In my view, some analysis was necessary.
[22] The Officer’s analysis is similarly lacking as it relates to the Applicant’s separate alleged risk from being perceived as a supporter of terrorism and subversion against the Ethiopian state. Here again, the Officer conflates this risk with the Applicant’s risk as an ONLF supporter.
The applicant states that he would likely be arrested and detained immediately upon his return to Ethiopia. However, country condition evidence presented does not demonstrate that his labeling as an ONLF member by the Canadian Federal Court would lead to his likely arrest as the ONLF is not considered a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government.
The allegation that the federal court’s labelling of the applicant as a member of a terrorist organization thus clashes with this risk as those perceived or suspected by the government of involvement with ONLF are no longer being targeted by the alleged agents of persecution.
[Emphasis added]
[23] By failing to separately consider the Applicant’s risk as a perceived supporter of terrorism, it is unclear whether the Officer turned their mind to the evidence and arguments made by the Applicant relating to the alleged ongoing persecution of members of other formerly banned terrorist groups. There is simply no analysis.
[24] For all these reasons, it is my view that the Officer’s analysis is lacking sufficient justification, rendering the Decision unreasonable.
[25] While this finding is sufficient to quash the current Decision, in my view further comments are necessary in respect of the additional arguments made by the Applicant in order to consider the scope of any redetermination and/or whether any abeyance of the PRRA should be contemplated.
B. Did the Officer’s failure to consider the “compelling reasons”
exception under subsection 108(4) of the IRPA render the Decision unreasonable?
[26] While the Applicant asserts that he remains at risk in Ethiopia, before the Officer he also argued in the alternative that if the Officer found conditions in Ethiopia had changed during the time he was awaiting determination of his refugee status in Canada, then the Officer must consider his case under the compelling reasons exception found at subsection 108(4) of the IRPA.
[27] Pursuant to paragraph 108(1)(e) of the IRPA, a claim for refugee protection shall be rejected, and a person is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection if the reasons for which the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist.
[28] Under the compelling reasons exception in subsection 108(4) of the IRPA, paragraph 108(1)(e) does not apply to a person who establishes that there are “compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment for refusing to avail themselves of the protection of the country which they left, or outside of which they remained, due to such previous persecution, torture, treatment or punishment”
.
[29] In the Decision, the Officer states:
The documentary evidence shows that, under the conditions that existed in Ethiopia while the applicant resided there, members and supporters of the ONLF (real or perceived) may have had reason to fear persecution or section 97(1) harm at the hands of the government. However, past persecution is insufficient in itself to establish a fear of future persecution, although I acknowledge it may form the foundation for present fear. The issue to determine, at the time of this decision, is whether the applicant faces a forward looking risk of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if returned to Ethiopia.
[30] The Officer finds that because of the 2018 reforms, the Applicant’s risk profile “as an alleged ONLF supporter and member of a terrorist organization”
dropped considerably. Thus, his profile no longer supported a forward-looking risk under section 97 of the IRPA if he were removed to Ethiopia.
[31] The Officer does not address the compelling reasons exception. Instead, he characterizes the Applicant’s mental health evidence as referring to humanitarian and compassionate considerations that are beyond the scope of the PRRA:
Additionally, the applicant also submitted a psychiatric assessment, dated 2023/06/23, stating that he suffers from a Major Depressive Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder due to the prolonged uncertainty with respect to his immigration status in Canada and his ability to remain in this country. The letter advises the applicant to pursue continued counselling near his residence in Calgary and plans to refer him to doctors closer to Alberta. I acknowledge it would be in the applicant’s best interest to continue being treated for his mental health disorders. As the applicant's PRRA will not be assessed under Section 96, 1 note that pursuant to section 97(1)(b)(iv) of the IRPA,I am precluded from assessing risk that is caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. As a result, I find this is a humanitarian and compassionate consideration which falls outside the purview of a PRRA.
[32] The parties agree that as a precondition for the compelling reasons exception to apply, the Applicant must have qualified as a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection at the time of the past persecution: Zuniga v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 488 at para 19; Pazmandi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1094 at para 50; Castillo Mendoza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 648 at para 28; Krishan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1203 at para 77. However, they disagree on the application of the precondition to the facts of this case.
[33] The Respondent asserts that the Officer did not need to consider the compelling reasons exception because the precondition to the exception was not met: Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1865 at para 37; Marquez Posso v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1076 at para 21. The Respondent asserts that the Applicant could never have met the precondition because of his inadmissibility, the facts of which preceded the crystallization of the Applicant’s alleged fear and any change in country conditions. The Respondent relies on the Court’s decisions in Lozano Caceres v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 179 [Lozano] and Jalloh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 CanLII 123002 (FC) [Jalloh] as support for their argument. As stated at paragraph 34 of Lozano:
[34] The Applicant’s submission ignores the first requirement for the application of section 108(4). That is, it is a “condition precedent” that an applicant be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection (Castillo Mendoza at para 28). Refugee status is a condition precedent because section 108(4) is an exception to the cessation provisions in the IRPA, which take away refugee status (Pazmandi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1094 at para 46; Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v Obstoj, 1992 CanLII 14800 (FCA), [1992] 2 FC 739 (CA) at paras 13-14, 93 DLR (4th) 144). For section 108(4) to apply, section 108(1) must be engaged. As a matter of logic, it makes sense that an exception to the cessation provisions cannot apply to someone who is ineligible for refugee status in the first place.
[34] The Applicant argues that Lozano is not good law because it confuses the meaning of a “protected person”
with that of a “person in need of protection”
under the IRPA. The Applicant asserts that he is a person who would be restricted from refugee protection under subsection 112(3) and paragraph 114(1)(b) of the IRPA until he obtains Ministerial relief from his inadmissibility. However, as the Officer accepted the facts relating to the Applicant’s past persecution and in view of the Applicant’s evidence relating to the ongoing psychological impact of this harm on his mental health, the Applicant contends that he remains a “person in need of protection”
who meets the definition in section 97 of the IRPA as supplemented by subsection 108(4).
[35] The Applicant asserts that there is a division in the jurisprudence, which the Officer was required to resolve in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation: Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 at para 64. I do not agree with the Applicant.
[36] While the Applicant now raises issues with Lozano, he did not argue that there was a “division in the law”
before the Officer. Nor am I satisfied that one exists.
[37] As noted by Justice Favel in Lozano, subsection 108(4) is an exception to the cessation provisions of the IRPA, which are premised on the ability to obtain refugee status. This exception thus cannot apply to someone who is ineligible for refugee status in the first place.
[38] A finding that the Applicant’s situation did not meet the precondition for the application of the compelling reasons exception was consistent with both subsection 112(3) of the IRPA and with Lozano and Jalloh, which were the pertinent cases on inadmissibility in this context. Therefore, there was no need to consider subsection 108(4) in the Decision. The Officer was not required to do more. The Officer’s reasons were not unreasonable for failing to address subsection 108(4).
C. Did the Officer err by not addressing the request to hold the PRRA in abeyance pending the outcome of the Applicant’s Ministerial relief application and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
[39] The Applicant made an alternative argument to the Officer to either exercise statutory discretion or to grant a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter to hold his PRRA in abeyance pending a determination on his application for Ministerial relief. He argues that the Officer had an obligation to address the request as the issue engaged the Constitution and his Charter rights: Abdi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 FC 733 [Abdi] at para 86; B010 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 [B010] at para 75.
[40] The Applicant asserts that a refusal to hold his restricted PRRA in abeyance engages section 7 of the Charter because it would deny him the right to obtain protection under section 96 of the IRPA and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 [Refugee Convention] against refoulement even though the Minister had not yet considered whether he was actually a threat to Canada’s security under section 42.1 of the IRPA: Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 at para 110. The Applicant argues that a restricted PRRA is not a protection from refoulement (Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 [Mason] at para 110) and that sending someone to a country from which they may face refoulement is a breach of section 7 of the Charter (Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 17 [CCR] at para 158).
[41] The Respondent asserts that the jurisdiction of a PRRA officer is limited to the analysis of risk and as such, there was no authority for the Officer to consider the abeyance request.
[42] The Respondent asserts that the Supreme Court of Canada already considered and rejected the Applicant’s argument in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68 [Febles] and B010. The Respondent also asserts that the Federal Court of Appeal in Tapambwa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FCA 34 at paragraphs 82 and 83 (set out below) directly considered the argument as it related to a restricted PRRA:
[82] It follows that the appellants’ argument that they must have their risks assessed against section 96 criteria runs contrary to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. As the determination of exclusion or inadmissibility does not engage section 7, it necessarily follows that section 7 is not engaged by the denial of a section 96 risk assessment. This is the consequence of the trilogy of S.C.C. decisions (Suresh, Febles, B010). Exclusion removes the appellants from the refugee determination process, and, as a direct consequence, from a section 96 risk assessment.
[83] Nevertheless, it is clear that the appellants’ section 7 Charter rights are protected by the safeguards available to them under the IRPA. In Febles, the Court found that if excluded, the appellant can apply for a stay of removal in the face of section 97 risks. It is at the removal stage where the section 7 interests are engaged (Febles, at paragraphs 67, 68).
[43] I agree that the Officer should have at least engaged with the Applicant’s abeyance request. In light of Mason and CCR, in my view, there was a matter to be resolved; it was not so clearly established that the Applicant’s request had no merit.
[44] As noted earlier, IRCC previously agreed to hold the PRRA in abeyance pending the judicial review in IMM-3302-20.
[45] Even if the Officer was of the view that they did not have jurisdiction to consider the abeyance request, this should have been addressed in the Decision, which would have allowed the Applicant some form of review of that determination. It was an error to ignore the request entirely: Abdi at para 86; Canada (Attorney General) v Robinson, 2022 FCA 59 at para 28.
[46] While the Applicant now invites the Court to make an order pursuant to subsection 24(1) of the Charter directing the IRCC to hold the PRRA in abeyance pending the decision on his application for Ministerial relief, I decline to do so. No breach of a Charter right nor future interference has been established at this stage to ground relief under subsection 24(1) of the Charter: R v Varennes, 2025 SCC 22 at paras 69-70.
[47] Further, it is not the role of the Court to step into the shoes of the administrative decision-maker to determine this issue: Ali at para 98; Vavilov at para 140. In my view, the request for an abeyance must be considered by IRCC as a preliminary issue before the redetermination of the PRRA.
[48] For these reasons, the application shall only be allowed in part, and the matter shall be referred back to be redetermined by a different PRRA officer with direction to consider as a preliminary issue the abeyance request before engaging in the PRRA analysis.
IV. Certified Question
[49] The Respondent proposed the following certified question in the event that the last issue was dispositive of this judicial review:
Has Mason v Canada (MCI), 2023 SCC 21, changed the law such that a restricted pre-removal risk assessment limited to the grounds set out in s. 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act no longer meets the requirements of Charter s.7?
[50] The Applicant argued that the question was too broad, instead proposing that the question should read as follows:
Where an applicant has not been excluded from refugee protection, has not been found to pose a danger to the security of Canada and has a pending application for Ministerial Relief under s. 42.1 of the IRPA, must IRCC exercise its discretion to await the outcome of the application for Ministerial Relief before refusing a PRRA under s. 113(d) of the IRPA?
[51] The parties agreed that if the question of abeyance was not solely dispositive of the judicial review, then no question should be certified: Nguesso v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FCA 145 at para 21; Sran v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FCA 16 at paras 3, 5. I agree.
[52] As I have found that the issue of abeyance is not solely dispositive of this application, neither version of the proposed question shall be certified.
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