Date: 20260318

Docket: IMM-9527-24

Citation: 2026 FC 366

Ottawa, Ontario, March 18, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Aylen

BETWEEN:

A.A., B.B.

Applicants

and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1] The Applicants are a Palestinian couple currently living in Gaza. In January 2024, they submitted applications for temporary resident visas [TRVs] under the Temporary Public Policy to Facilitate Temporary Resident Visas for Certain Extended Family Affected by the Crisis in Gaza [Policy].

[2] Having not received a decision on their application, on May 30, 2024, the Applicants commenced this application for a writ of mandamus compelling the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [Minister] to complete the processing of the Applicants’ applications for TRVs under the Policy, in a timely and lawful manner pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR].

[3] For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that the Applicants have demonstrated that all of the prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus have been met. Accordingly, this application for judicial review shall be dismissed.

I. The Policy

[4] On December 22, 2023, the Minister announced the creation of a new temporary resident pathway under the Policy, enacted pursuant to section 25.2 of the IRPA, which came into effect on January 9, 2024. The Policy was intended to provide a family-based temporary refuge for Palestinian nationals directly affected by the crisis in the Gaza Strip who have Canadian citizen or permanent resident family members in Canada willing to support them during their temporary stay. These Canadian citizen or permanent resident family members act as “anchor relatives”.

[5] The Policy exempts foreign nationals applying for a TRV from listed provisions of the IRPA and the IRPR provided they meet the following eligibility criteria and conditions prescribed in Part 1 through 3 of the Policy:

[6] Under the Policy, applicants who satisfy the above conditions are exempt from the requirements to not be financially inadmissible and to establish they would leave Canada at the end of their authorized period of stay. The Policy makes clear that all other applicable statutory eligibility and admissibility requirements continue to apply, which would include the requirements to provide biometric information (fingerprints and photographs) and to pass a security screening.

[7] The Policy sets out the following distinct stages in the application process:

1. The first stage requires the Canadian citizen or permanent resident anchor relative to: (a) complete a statutory declaration form and a consent to disclose personal information form; and (b) promise to support their family members for one year after they have arrived in Canada.

2. The second stage requires the anchor relative or their representative to submit a web form attaching the completed statutory declaration form, a copy of the anchor relative’s government-issued photo identification, proof of the anchor relative’s proof of status in Canada and proof that the anchor relative lives or intends to live in Canada. Once received, IRCC reviews the submission for completeness. If the submission meets the requirements and there are spaces available, IRCC issues a unique reference code for each eligible applicant listed in the statutory declaration.

3. The third stage requires applicants to submit their TRV applications through the IRCC portal. The unique reference code issued in the second stage must be used when completing this stage. Applicants are also required to provide a copy of the stage one statutory declaration, proof of their relationship to the anchor relative, a copy of their passport or travel document issued by the Palestinian Authority showing their residence in Gaza, consent to disclose personal information form and an additional background information form.

[8] Upon receiving the TRV application, IRCC conducts a preliminary eligibility and security screening while an applicant is in Gaza. Upon successful completion of the preliminary eligibility and security screening, IRCC will forward an applicant’s name to the Israeli and Egyptian governments and will work with the local authorities to advocate for the applicant’s exit from the Gaza Strip, as Palestinians cannot freely exit the Gaza Strip. Canada does not decide who can leave the Gaza Strip and cannot guarantee that an applicant will be authorized to leave. Once an applicant has exited the Gaza Strip, an applicant who is between the ages of 14 and 79 and who has not previously provided biometric data in the last 10 years needs to provide their biometrics to IRCC. This biometric data enables IRCC to complete a full admissibility assessment. Unfortunately, biometrics can only be provided after an applicant exits the Gaza Strip as there is no biometric collection facility in Gaza.

II. Exiting the Gaza Strip

[9] As noted above, Palestinians cannot freely exit the Gaza Strip. They must obtain exit permits from Israel, which are issued by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories [COGAT], a unit within the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

[10] Prior to the conflict, there were three operational border crossing in Gaza: (i) Rafah (which borders Egypt), Beit Hanoun (which borders Israel) and Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom (which borders Israel). During the course of the conflict, some Palestinians were able to flee Gaza through the Rafah border by paying large bribes to Egyptian companies. However, in May 2024, the Israeli military seized and shut down the Rafah border crossing. Between July 2024 and October 2024, COGAT only permitted a small number of medical evacuees and their companions to exit the Gaza Strip.

[11] From early 2025 to the present, COGAT has allowed foreign visa holders and, in some cases, visa applicants, to exit the Gaza Strip through the Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom border crossing, provided that a foreign government can ensure their onward travel to a third country. The foreign government must share the individual’s name with COGAT, who then forwards it to Israel’s intelligence agency to perform a security screening. If the security screening is passed, COGAT issues an exit permit to the individual.

[12] In 2025, the Government of Canada evacuated 41 Palestinians through the Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom border crossing. Each of these individuals had pending TRV applications under the Policy, had passed preliminary security screening and had previously provided biometrics.

[13] On the day of the hearing of this matter, it was reported that the Rafah border was set to reopen on a limited basis, with a daily limit on the number of individuals permitted to exit the Gaza Strip, and following the same process as noted above.

III. The Applicants’ Applications under the Policy

[14] The Applicants are an 83-year-old husband (AA) and a 68-year-old wife (BB). Their anchor relative is their daughter/stepdaughter [Anchor]. Since the outbreak of the conflict in October 2023, the Applicants’ home was bombed and destroyed. The Applicants currently live in a room in the ruins of their home with other family members. They have no electricity, no running water and no access to food or clean water. AA has run out of medication for his diabetes and his heart condition. According to the Applicants, they live under the constant threat to their lives and safety while they await the outcome of their TRV applications.

[15] In January 2024, the Anchor submitted a crisis web form for the Applicants and on March 19, 2024, unique reference codes for the Applicants were sent by IRCC to the Anchor.

[16] On March 20, 2024, the Anchor updated the web form submissions with a new statutory declaration form because of mistakes in the initial statutory declaration form.

[17] On April 12, 2024, the Anchor submitted TRV applications on behalf of the Applicants through the IRCC portal. On his application, AA answered “no” to the question: “Did you serve in any military, militia, civil defence unit, security organization or police force (including non-obligatory service, reserve, or voluntary units?”. He also indicated that he was unemployed from 1962 onward.

[18] That same day, the Applicants received letters from IRCC confirming that their applications were received and advising that processing times varied. BB also received a biometric instruction letter advising that she is required to have her fingerprints scanned and her photograph taken at a biometric collection service point. AA did not receive a similar letter as, given his age, he is exempt from providing biometrics.

[19] On May 3, 2024, IRCC wrote to the Anchor requesting a copy of her original birth certificate as she had only submitted a translation thereof for her father’s TRV application. The Anchor submitted the requested document two days later.

[20] On May 9, 2024, IRCC determined that both Applicants passed the preliminary eligibility requirements and their applications were sent for security screening. The Officer who reviewed the applications noted that there were employment/government/military concerns for AA, as it was indicated in his application that he had been unemployed since 1962 (when he was 20 years old). The Officer determined that an Additional Background Information Form was required to document AA’s employment.

[21] Between May and June 2024, the Anchor received a number of letters from IRCC requesting further information about the Applicants’ birth certificates, social media accounts and employment histories. These letters included a request that AA submit a completed Additional Background Information Form, including his full employment history since completing school, without any gaps.

[22] By letter dated June 5, 2024, the Applicants’ counsel advised IRCC that the Applicants would not be providing an Additional Background Information Form for AA because he was 82 years old (at the time) and was therefore not required by statute or policy to provide the information requested in the form. The Applicants did provide responses to all other requested made by IRCC in May and June 2024.

[23] On May 20, 2025, IRCC sent AA another letter, again requesting an Additional Background Information Form, advising that it is within an officer’s discretion to request the document in question.

[24] By letter dated June 2, 2025, the Applicants provided IRCC with the completed Additional Background Information Form for AA, submissions from their new legal counsel and an affidavit from the Anchor. The form revealed that AA had served in the Palestinian Army for approximately two years in the 1960s. In her affidavit, the Anchor stated that it was only upon completing this additional form that she learned her father had served in the Palestinian Army and that, from what he had told her, he had completed mandatory military service with the Palestinian Army as a chef in the kitchen and a traffic security guard and was not involved in any conflict during his time in the army. The Anchor indicated that she was unable to obtain more details about her father’s time in the army, or about the specific dates of his other employment, due to his declining health and failing memory. She apologized for the omission of this information from his original application and stated that there was no intention to mislead IRCC.

[25] In July through September 2025, the Anchor contacted IRCC multiple times seeking to have the processing of the Applicants’ applications expedited given the dire circumstances in which the Applicants found themselves. IRCC responded to each inquiry advising that the applications remained in progress

[26] On November 21, 2025, the Anchor requested a biometrics exemption for the Applicants pursuant to section 12.8 of the IRPR, which allows for biometric exemptions in circumstances where biometric collection is impossible and not feasible. IRCC has not provided any substantive response to this request.

[27] As of the date of the hearing, the security screening of the Applicants remains outstanding and BB has not provided her biometrics.

IV. Preliminary Evidentiary Issues

A. The Liew Affidavit

[28] In their Further Memorandum of Fact and Law, the Applicants advised that they were no longer relying on the affidavit of Dr. Jamie Liew sworn November 9, 2024 [Liew Affidavit], as an expert affidavit. Dr. Liew is Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa. No expert certificate, as required by Rule 52.2 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, accompanied her affidavit. The Applicants requested leave of the Court to have the Liew Affidavit admitted as a lay affidavit for “the purposes of retaining the policies and news articles exhibited therein.” In their written submissions, the Applicants did not specify which paragraphs of, and/or exhibits to, the Liew Affidavit should be struck. At the hearing, the Applicants proposed that paragraph 17 of the Liew Affidavit, wherein she offers an opinion on the effectiveness of the Policy, should be struck.

[29] The Respondent takes issue with more than just paragraph 17 of the Liew Affidavit, asserting that other paragraphs of the affidavit “appeal” to her expertise, offer a comparison between the Policy and other temporary policies enacted by the Minister and opines on Canada’s reliance on temporary policies, all of which the Respondent asserts is inappropriate for a lay affidavit. The Respondent is content to have Exhibits G, L, M and N to the Liew Affidavit remain as part of the evidentiary record.

[30] In response to the Respondent’s concerns, the Applicants stated that they really only want to rely on the exhibits to the Liew Affidavit and are content to only keep those paragraphs that introduce the exhibits plus the exhibits themselves.

[31] I find that nothing in this case turns on any of the evidence contained in the Liew Affidavit. The effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the Policy and any other temporary policies that the Government of Canada has enacted in relation to Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Turkey or Syria, are not relevant to the issues before the Court. I also note that the Applicants did not even attempt to advance any arguments in support of their relevance.

[32] I find that the opinions offered by Dr. Liew are not limited to paragraph 17 as suggested by the Applicants, as, for example, paragraphs 15 and 16 also provide clear expressions of her opinion. However, as the Applicants are content to only rely on the exhibits to the affidavit, I need not go further in my analysis of each paragraph.

[33] With respect to the exhibits, while the Respondent is content to leave Exhibit G in the evidentiary record (an article from The Hill Times about Turkish earthquake victims), I fail to see how it is relevant, but given that no request has been made to strike it, I will leave it in, together with the limited language of subparagraph (a) of paragraph 12 that introduces the exhibit. I am satisfied that Exhibits K through N are properly before the Court as providing necessary general background information to this case and may remain in the evidentiary record, together with only that portion of paragraph 16 that introduces those exhibits. While repetitive of evidence already in the record, I find there is no basis to strike paragraph 14 and Exhibit J. The balance of the Liew Affidavit, with the additional exception of paragraph 1, is hereby struck.

B. Ezeddin Affidavit

[34] The Respondent takes issue with Exhibits S through DD of the affidavit of Tala Ezeddin sworn December 25, 2025 [Ezeddin Affidavit]. Ms. Ezeddin is a legal assistant for counsel for the Applicants. Her affidavit exhibits a compilation of news articles, reports and press releases, without any commentary thereon. Exhibits S through DD consist of various news articles related specifically to the evacuation of Palestinians from Gaza.

[35] The Respondent asserts that the disputed exhibits are inadmissible to the extent that the Applicants are relying on them to suggest that it is within Canada’s ability to facilitate the exit of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, which goes to the merits of the mandamus application. The Respondent asserts that these exhibits go beyond background information and, in any event, are unnecessary as there is other evidence before the Court from those who claim to have personal knowledge of the means that have been used to facilitate the exit of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

[36] I find that there is no merit to the Respondent’s objection. The news articles address the freedom of movement across the Gaza border; namely, that limited evacuations are occurring, as described above, and that the situation has changed from what it was in May 2024, when none of the border crossings were open. I find that these articles provide useful background information to this case. Moreover, the current state of the border crossings and the limited exits of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip is not a point of controversy between the parties. While it should go without saying, the fact that this evidence may appear elsewhere in the evidentiary record from those with greater personal knowledge is not a basis to strike this evidence. Accordingly, I reject the Respondent’s request to strike Exhibits S through DD to the Ezeddin Affidavit.

C. Behrens Affidavit

[37] The Respondent takes issue with Exhibit A to the affidavit of Matthew Behrens sworn December 15, 2025 [Behrens Affidavit]. Mr. Behrens, the coordinator of the Rural Refugee Rights Network, has been working with many Palestinian families in Canada trying to bring their family members to Canada under the Policy and has been in direct contact with applicants under the Policy who remain in Gaza and/or are stranded in Egypt. Exhibit A to his affidavit is a compilation of Canadian news articles reporting on cases that he and his colleagues have been involved with. The Respondent takes issue with any opinions expressed by Mr. Behrens on the efficacy of the Policy, as reported in the news articles, although the Respondent has not identified the particular pages of Exhibit A on which such opinions are expressed. The Applicants acknowledge that they are not relying on any such opinions and thus have no issue with those portions of any articles being struck. However, as the Respondent has not proposed specific portions of Exhibit A to be struck, I will simply assign no weight to any such opinions.

[38] At the hearing, the Respondent advised that they also take issue with paragraphs 33-36 of the Behrens Affidavit and Exhibits E and F on the basis that this evidence relates to experiences of Palestinians under a different temporary policy in 2021. The Applicants did not respond to the Respondent’s criticism of this evidence. I agree with the Respondent that this earlier policy and the experiences of applicants thereunder are not relevant to the issues before the Court. As such, paragraphs 33-36 and Exhibits E and F of the Behrens Affidavit shall be struck.

V. Analysis

A. The Test for Mandamus

[39] In Wasylynuk v Canada (Royal Mounted Police), 2020 FC 962 at para 76, Justice Little concisely explained the discretionary equitable remedy of mandamus:

Mandamus is an order that compels the performance of a public legal duty. The duty is typically set out in a statute or regulation. An order of mandamus is the Court’s response to a public decision-maker that fails to carry out a duty, on successful application by an applicant to whom the duty is owed and who is currently entitled to the performance of it. The test for mandamus thus requires careful consideration of the statutory, regulatory or other public obligation at issue, to determine whether the decision-maker has an obligation to act in a particular manner as proposed by an applicant and whether the factual circumstances have triggered performance of the obligation in favour of the applicant.

[40] A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and mandamus applications must be assessed on the particular facts of each case [see Tapie v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1048 at para 7].

[41] The legal test for an order of mandamus is well-established. The following eight preconditions must be satisfied by an applicant for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus:

• (1)There must be a legal duty to act;

• (2)The duty must be owed to the applicant;

• (3)There must be a clear right to performance of that duty;

• (4)Where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional principles apply;

• (5)No other adequate remedy is available to the applicant;

• (6)The order sought will have some practical value or effect;

• (7)The Court finds no equitable bar to the relief sought; and

• (8)On a balance of convenience an order of mandamus should be issued:

[see Apotex v Canada (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 742 (CA) at 766–769, aff’d 1994 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1100; AR v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 236 at paras 28–29].

[42] To satisfy the third requirement above, a clear right to the performance of a public legal duty to act, applicants must establish that: (i) they have satisfied all the requirements for a decision to be made; (ii) they have made a prior request that a decision be made; (iii) there was a reasonable time to comply with the demand; and (iv) the decision-maker has either expressly refused to make a decision or has taken unreasonably long to do so [see Apotex, supra at 767].

[43] Furthermore, three additional requirements must be met for a delay to be considered unreasonable: (i) the delay in question has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie; (ii) the applicant is not responsible for the delay; and (iii) the authority responsible for the delay has not provided a satisfactory justification [see Conille v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9097, [1999] 2 FC 33 at 43]. There is no uniform standard for what constitutes a reasonable length of time. Each case turns on its facts, especially in light of the relevant immigration regime [see Bidgoly v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 283 at para 33].

B. The Relief Sought on this Application

[44] In their Notice of Application, the Applicants sought the following relief:

1. A declaratory order for a finding that the Minister refused to process the applications in a timely manner and has unreasonably delayed the processing of the applications;

2. An order for a writ of mandamus to compel the Minister to complete the processing of the Applicants’ applications in accordance with the IRPA;

3. A declaratory order that the processing of the Applicants’ applications be completed within five days of the Court’s determination of the application for judicial review;

4. A declaratory order that the Minister has inordinately delayed the conclusion of this case and acted unfairly in failing to disclose to the Applicants the reason for delay in concluding the processing of this case;

5. The Applicants’ costs for this proceeding; and

6. Such further and other relief as may be advised and as this Court considers appropriate in the circumstances.

[45] However, in their written representations and at the hearing of the application itself, the Applicants sought entirely different relief, namely:

1. An order compelling IRCC to expedite the preliminary security screening of the Applicants;

2. Provided that the preliminary security assessments of the Applicants are complete, an order compelling IRCC to work with local authorities to advocate for the exit of the Applicants out of the Gaza Strip in accordance with the updated Policy within 15 days of the completion of the preliminary security assessments; and

3. Provided that the admissibility assessments of all Applicants are completed, an order compelling IRCC to issue TRVs, or, in the alternative, temporary resident permits for all Applicants within 15 days of the completion of the admissibility assessments.

[46] In essence, the Applicants are now breaking down the processing of their TRV applications into several steps and asking this Court for a series of mandamus or mandatory orders compelling the performance of acts by IRCC that are dependent upon the outcome of prior steps in the processing of their applications. This new relief is problematic for a number of reasons.

[47] The first problem is that the Applicants did not seek this relief in their Notice of Application. At the hearing, the Applicants argued that their failure to plead the relief now sought should not be an impediment to the Court’s consideration thereof. Relying on Justice Grant’s decision in Leung v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 CanLII 69305 (FC), the Applicants assert that a more relaxed approach is taken when considering pleadings in immigration matters and that the same relaxed approach should be taken here given the context.

[48] I reject this assertion. Justice Grant’s decision considered the sufficiency of the applicant’s pleading in that case solely as it related to the grounds of review, not the relief sought. Moreover, his endorsement of a less stringent approach to pleadings in immigration matters (limited as it was to only the grounds of review) was premised on a recognition that, in many cases, applicants must commence an application for leave and judicial review prior to receiving the reasons for decision, which prevents them pleading the grounds of review with precision. Importantly, Justice Grant’s decision was also addressing the state of an applicant’s pleading in the context of an urgent motion for a stay of removal, where requiring pleading amendments to specify the precise grounds of review may be impractical, if not impossible, due to timing considerations.

[49] Here, the context is very different. It is not the grounds of review that are at issue, but rather the relief sought. Rule 5(1)(e) of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22, requires that an application for leave shall set out “the precise relief to be sought on the application for judicial review”. This language is similar to the language contained in Rule 301(d) of the Federal Courts Rules (which applies to other applications for judicial brought before this Court), which requires that a notice of application set out “a precise statement of the relief sought”.

[50] The Court’s decision on an application for judicial review is limited to the relief set out in the notice of application. While declaratory relief that is necessarily ancillary to the pleaded relief may be granted under a basket clause in circumstances where the party opposite is not taken by surprise, or prejudiced in any way, this exception does not extend to mandatory orders [see Canada (Attorney General) v Iris Technologies Inc, 2021 FCA 244 at paras 36, 40; SC Prodal 94 SRL v Spirits International BV, 2009 FCA 88 at para 11; Native Women’s Association of Canada v Canada, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627]. The Federal Court of Appeal has recognized that the requirements of Rule 301 are not mere technicalities. They ensure, among other things, that a respondent has adequate notice of the case being brought against them so that they can meaningfully respond [see Iris Technologies, supra at para 41].

[51] It is also of note that the change in the relief sought by the Applicants did not occur in urgent circumstances akin to a stay of removal. The Applicants had ample time to consider their legal position and seek an amendment to their pleading. In that regard, I note that counsel for the Applicants appeared before Justice Henry Brown of this Court on November 3, 2025, and argued for similar relief by way of sequential mandatory orders in another mandamus application, where they had also not amended their pleading to reflect the relief sought at the hearing [see AA v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1811 [AA]]. In his decision, released November 12, 2025, Justice Brown agreed with the Respondent’s criticism that the relief sought at the hearing was not consistent with the relief as framed in the notice of application. Thus, counsel for the Applicants were well aware that their failure to amend their pleading in that case was problematic and should have anticipated a similar issue in this case. However, despite having ample time to do so, as this application moved forward to a hearing on February 2, 2026, the Applicants took no steps to amend their pleading.

[52] Second, and importantly, the relief now sought by the Applicants is inherently problematic. As framed, the Applicants seek a series of mandamus or mandatory orders that are contingent on a positive outcome in the previous stage of processing. For example, the Applicants ask the Court to compel IRCC to work with local authorities to advocate for the exit of the Applicants out of the Gaza Strip, provided that the outcome of the previously granted order was a positive preliminary security screening.

[53] However, mandatory obligations or mandamus cannot be imposed without first determining whether their exacting legal prerequisites are met [see Canada v Boloh 1(a), 2023 FCA 120 at para 63]. That principle applies to each mandatory obligation or mandamus sought to be imposed. It is a prerequisite to obtaining a writ of mandamus that there be proof that performance of the duty is actually due and incumbent upon the decision-maker because mandamus will not be issued to enforce a future obligation. Courts will not simply grant this relief in anticipation of a potential or supposed future omission or refusal of a public officer to discharge their duty. There must be a prior demand that the duty be performed and a refusal to do so [see Clifton v Hartley Bay Village Council, 2005 FC 1594 at para 6; Karavos v Toronto and Gillies, [1948] 3 DLR 294, 1947 CanLII 326 (ON CA)]. In this case, IRCC would be under no duty to take further steps in the processing of the Applicants’ TRV applications if the Applicants do not pass their preliminary security screening. Moreover, unless and until they pass their preliminary security screening, IRCC cannot be found to have refused or omitted to discharge their public duty to take any subsequent steps in the processing of the Applicants’ TRV applications. In issuing mandamus relief, the Court must consider the circumstances as they exist as of the date of the hearing [see Apotex, supra at 770–771]. As of the date of the hearing of this application, I cannot find that the legal prerequisites exist for the issuance of the sequential orders now sought by the Applicants.

[54] The Applicants assert that the relief now sought is in keeping with similar relief granted by Justice Gascon in ABCD v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1296. In that case, Justice Gascon was faced with a situation where Global Affairs Canada [GAC] had failed to process an expression of interest received from one of the applicants (Mr. D) to initiate a verification of their eligibility under the Temporary Public Policy for the Resettlement of Afghan Nationals with a Significant and/or Enduring Relationship to Canada, which resulted in IRCC never processing their application before that policy expired. Justice Gascon found that the applicants met the test for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. In terms of the precise relief granted, Justice Gascon issued the following orders: (i) an order compelling GAC to process Mr. D’s expression of interest and determine whether to refer him to IRCC within 30 days of this Court’s decision; (ii) provided that he is referred, an order compelling IRCC to process his referral and determine whether to issue him an Invitation to Apply [ITA] within 30 days of his referral; and (iii) provided that he is issued an ITA, an order compelling IRCC to process and determine his application for permanent residence within 30 days of receipt of his application. While I acknowledge that sequential relief was granted in ABCD, supra, the reasons for decision do not contain any analysis of the basis for granting such relief and it is unclear if the issue of whether the legal prerequisites for a mandatory or mandamus order were met for each order was fully briefed before Justice Gascon. As such, I am not prepared to follow ABCD.

[55] Turning to the specific orders sought by the Applicants, the third problem relates to the Applicants’ request for an order requiring IRCC to “work with local authorities to advocate for the exit of the Applicants out of the Gaza Strip in accordance with the [Policy] within 15 days of the completion of the preliminary security assessments”. The Respondent asserts, relying on the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Boloh, supra, that such an order must be denied, as working with local authorities constitutes diplomatic advocacy and is not part of the processing of a visa. The Applicants deny that the relief sought constitutes diplomatic advocacy, as they assert that they are not asking the Court to tell IRCC how they are to work with local authorities. The Applicants stress that the relief sought simply mirrors the language used by IRCC in the Policy and, thus, it is open to IRCC to simply work with local authorities as they originally contemplated under the Policy.

[56] I agree with the Respondent that the Court must defer to the Executive when it acts on matters involving sensitive issues of foreign relations and international affairs [see Boloh, supra at para 66]. Compelling the Government of Canada to undertake diplomatic negotiations with the Israeli and Egyptian governments to facilitate the exit of Palestinians within a set time frame, in the context of complex and ever-changing circumstances in the Gaza Strip (as well as the broader context of on-going events in the Middle East), are just such matters. As such, I find that it is not open to the Applicants to seek such an order from the Court.

[57] The fourth problem is that the Applicants now request, by way of alternative relief, that the Court compel IRCC to issue them temporary resident permits [TRPs]. However, the Applicants have never applied for TRPs and thus there is no TRP application for which mandamus relief can be granted.

[58] For all of the aforementioned reasons, I find that it is not open to the Court to consider the amended relief now sought by the Applicants. Accordingly, the Court will consider this application as originally pleaded, namely, whether a writ of mandamus should be issued to compel the Minister to complete the processing of the Applicants’ applications, together with related declaratory relief.

C. Horizontal Stare Decisis

[59] Before turning to consider whether the Applicants have demonstrated that they have met all prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, I want to address the impact of prior jurisprudence specific to the Policy on this determination.

[60] Much of the focus of the parties in their written and oral submissions was spent on the issue of horizontal stare decisis and whether there was any basis for this Court to depart from the decisions of Justice Brown in four prior mandamus applications brought by applicants awaiting decisions on their TRV applications under the Policy [AA, supra; AB v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1514 [AB]; AA v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1812; AB v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1813]. In each of those cases, Justice Brown rejected the requests for a writ of mandamus, finding that the applicants in those cases had not met all of the prerequisites to be granted a writ of mandamus. Of particular note, the applicants had not provided their biometrics and in AA, the preliminary security screening remained ongoing at the time of the hearing.

[61] Justification is required to depart from an earlier decision of a different judge of the same court on the same issue and a failure to do so constitutes an error of law [see Canada v Bowker, 2023 FCA 133 at para 37]. Horizontal stare decisis requires a judge to examine the prior decision and first determine whether the ratio is binding or distinguishable. If binding, the judge must then determine whether the precedent must be followed or can be departed from. The judge can only depart from a binding case if one or more of the exceptions described in Hansard Spruce Mills Limited (Re), [1954] 4 DLR 590, 1954 CanLII 253 (BC SC) apply, namely, (i) the rationale of an earlier decision has been undermined by subsequent appellate decisions; (ii) the earlier decision was reached per incuriam (through carelessness or by inadvertence); or (iii) the earlier decision was not fully considered, e.g., taken in exigent circumstances [see R v Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 at para 75].

[62] The Applicants have not attempted to bring Justice Brown’s decisions within the Spruce Mills criteria, as they assert that the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis has no application due to Justice Brown’s decisions being factually distinguishable. The Applicants point to new evidence before the Court that was not before Justice Brown, namely, that: (a) Canada has been able to evacuate Palestinians under the Policy through the Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom border crossings (which was not known to Justice Brown when he made his decisions) and the Rafah border crossing (which was closed at the time of Justice Brown’s decisions) has now reopened; and (b) COGAT has loosened requirements for exit from the Gaza Strip.

[63] The Respondent concedes that this evidence was not before Justice Brown but argues that these factual differences are not material as the Policy has not changed. Applicants must still pass preliminary security screening prior to their exit from the Gaza Strip and applicants must continue to provide biometrics under the Policy. The new evidence demonstrates that those applicants that Canada has been able to evacuate had, unlike the Applicants here, passed their preliminary security screening and had already previously provided biometrics.

[64] I accept that there are factual distinctions between the circumstances that existed in the Gaza Strip at the time of Justice Brown’s decisions and today. I have considered those factual distinctions in rendering my decision. However, for the reasons that follow, I agree with the Respondent that those factual distinctions are not determinative of the issues before the Court and do not render Justice Brown’s decisions distinguishable.

[65] The Applicants further assert that Justice Brown’s determinations that the applications before him were not complete given the absence of biometrics, and therefore the conditions precedent for the issuance of a writ of mandamus were not met, was based on an “incorrect premise”. The Applicants assert that biometrics are not required at this stage of processing and only need to be provided once the Applicants exit the Gaza Strip, with the assistance of the Canadian Government. The Applicants assert that the creation of a multi-step process cannot shield the Minister from their responsibility to act at the preliminary steps of the process.

[66] I agree with the Respondent that this argument, when properly considered, is tantamount to arguing that Justice Brown’s decisions were wrong, not simply that they are distinguishable. The Applicants’ argument is rooted in their staged approach to the processing of their applications and request for sequential relief. However, I have rejected this approach, just as it was rejected by Justice Brown in AA.

[67] While the Respondent urged the Court to dismiss this application solely on the basis that the Applicants had failed to demonstrate that they meet one of the narrow exceptions to depart from Justice Brown’s decisions, I am not prepared to do so. Mandamus applications must be assessed on the particular facts of each case, as they relate to the status of the applications of the applicants, the terms of the Policy and the current circumstances in the Gaza Strip. In considering whether the Applicants have met the prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, I have considered Justice Brown’s decisions, together with the other relevant jurisprudence.

D. The Applicants have not met all prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus

[68] The Applicants seek a writ of mandamus compelling the Minister to complete the processing of their TRV applications. The processing of an application is completed by the rendering of a decision on the application. While the Applicants would rather separate the processing of the application into sequential steps or stages, for the reasons already given above, I am not satisfied that relief of that nature can be granted. Moreover, I find that it would be inherently problematic to endorse an approach to mandamus applications in immigration matters whereby the government’s legal duty to act is broken down into subcategories that are considered by the Court individually. I agree with Justice Brown that such an approach would be too formalistic and that the government’s legal duty to act should be considered holistically [see AA, supra at para 48–49].

[69] As such, I find that the Court must approach this matter as the Applicants requesting an order compelling the Minister to make a decision on their TRV applications.

[70] In order to grant a writ of mandamus, the Court must be satisfied that all eight of the aforementioned prerequisites are met [see Cheloei v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 820 at para 13; AA, supra at para 31].

[71] In this case, the problematic prerequisite is the third one; namely, that there must be a clear right to the performance of IRCC’s duty to process the Applicants’ TRV applications. To satisfy this requirement, the Applicants must establish that: (i) they have satisfied all the requirements for a decision to be made; (ii) they have made a prior request that a decision be made on their TRV applications; (iii) there was a reasonable time to comply with the demand; and (iv) the decision-maker has either expressly refused to make a decision or has taken unreasonably long to do so. I find that there are two deficiencies that render the Applicants unable to meet this prerequisite. Each of these deficiencies provide a sufficient basis upon which to deny the Applicants’ request for a writ of mandamus. As such, I will not go on to consider the remaining prerequisites that must be met for a writ of mandamus to be granted.

[72] First, I find that the Applicants have not satisfied all of the requirements for a decision to be made on their TRV applications, as biometrics remain outstanding for BB. The Policy provides no exemptions from the requirement to provide biometrics and requires BB to exit the Gaza Strip to provide them, which I acknowledge she cannot freely do. I appreciate that with the opening of the Karem Abu Salem/Kerem Shalom border crossing (evidence that was not before Justice Brown), there is now another border crossing available to the Applicants to exit the Gaza Strip, provided the required permission is obtained from the foreign authorities. However, that does not change the fact that BB has not yet provided her biometrics, which is a prerequisite to obtaining both of their TRVs as their applications are being processed together.

[73] I appreciate that the Applicants are caught in an unworkable situation where they want to provide BB’s biometrics but, for reasons outside of their control, are prevented from doing so. As sympathetic as I am the Applicants’ circumstances, as recognized by Justice Brown, it is not open to the Court on this application for judicial review to set, vary or grant exemptions to the Policy’s requirement to provide biometrics [see AA, supra at para 66; AB, supra at para 91; Universal Ostrich Farms Inc v Canada (Food Inspection Agency), 2025 FCA 147 at para 6].

[74] Second, I am not satisfied that the Applicants have demonstrated that the delay in deciding their applications has been unreasonable or that they are not responsible for a significant portion of the delay. The reasonableness of the delay is factually infused and a highly contextual matter. As such, there is no uniform length of time considered unreasonable [see Almuhtadi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 712 at para 37].

[75] As mentioned in paragraph 43 above, three requirements must be met for a delay to be considered unreasonable: (i) the delay in question has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie; (ii) the applicant is not responsible for the delay; and (iii) the authority responsible for the delay has not provided a satisfactory justification [see Conille, supra at 43].

[76] Under the first Conille factor, the Applicants must demonstrate that the delay in question has been longer than the nature of the process required, prima facie. Here, the Applicants assert that the Policy was enacted to respond to a humanitarian crisis and thus the delay must be assessed in a manner that reflects the urgency of the Applicants’ situation. The Applicants assert that the delay in question (just under two years from the date of filing) has been much longer than the nature of the process required.

[77] Unfortunately, I cannot agree with the Applicants. The majority of the delay, up until this point, has arisen due to the need to complete preliminary security screening. IRCC commenced the Applicants’ security screening in early May 2024 and, at that time, requested additional information regarding AA, which was only provided 13 months later, in June 2025.

[78] While the Policy recognizes that there is a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the Minister did not exempt applicants under the Policy from the need to undergo security screening. This is not surprising given that the objectives of the IRPA with respect to immigration include “to protect public health and safety and to maintain the security of Canadian society” and “to promote international justice and security…by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks” [see paragraphs 3(1)(h) and (i) of the IRPA]. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); Esteban v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539, 2005 SCC 51 at paragraph 10, the objectives as expressed in the IRPA indicate an intention to prioritize security. I find that the urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza cannot take precedence over the statutory requirement to complete comprehensive security screenings of applicants seeking entry into Canada.

[79] Security screenings require that IRCC work with its security partners (who may have to work with foreign agencies), such that the amount of time a security screening takes is not entirely under IRCC’s control. I appreciate that the amount of time that the security screening has taken thus far is at the longer end of the spectrum, but I cannot find that it is prima facie unreasonable given the broader context in which these applications arise (i.e., the October 7, 2023 attacks and the ongoing conflict).

[80] That said, considering the issue of unreasonable delay based solely on how long it has taken to conduct the security screening is problematic; it improperly breaks down the determination of the application into its constituent steps rather than considering it as a whole. This approach taken by the Applicants is not surprising given that, in most mandamus applications that this Court sees, the delay is occasioned by the need to complete security screening. Once the security screening is complete, the underlying applications are generally ready for a determination.

[81] However, mandamus applications under the Policy are distinct, as the preliminary security screening is not the final step before a decision can be rendered and there may well be further delays that arise during the facilitation of the exit of applicants from the Gaza Strip. Canada has no control over the amount of time that it will take to facilitate an applicant’s exit from the Gaza Strip and, with the demonstrated volatility in the region and the limited border crossings now occurring, it is impossible to estimate when any given application may be ready for a decision. As such, it is not surprising that IRCC has not made any representations on its website or in the Policy regarding estimated processing times (as it does with other types of temporary resident visas). To the contrary, Canada’s guidance related to the Policy warns applicants about the lack of control that Canada has over the time that it will take the complete the processing of their applications, stating that “the Government of Canada does not decide who can leave Gaza and cannot guarantee that [an applicant] will be authorized to cross”. This will make it difficult for any applicant to establish the three Conille factors necessary to demonstrate that the overall delay in deciding their application has been unreasonable.

[82] Turning to the second Conille factor, I find that the Applicants are responsible for a significant portion of the delay. The Applicants refused to provide an Additional Background Information Form for AA for 13 months and then, once provided, it revealed that AA had served in the Palestinian Army. This information was inconsistent with the information previously provided by the Applicants and, having revealed military service, would have required further scrutiny for the completion of AA’s preliminary security screening.

[83] Turning to the third Conille factor, BB, through no fault of her own and no fault of IRCC, has been unable to provide her biometrics. Until such time as she has done so (or until the Policy is amended), I find that IRCC cannot be faulted for the delay in making a determination on their TRV applications.

VI. Conclusion

[84] As the Applicants have not demonstrated that all of the prerequisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus have been met to compel the Minister to complete the processing of their TRV applications, this application for judicial review shall be dismissed.

[85] The parties proposed no question for certification and I agree that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-9527-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The following portions of the affidavit of Dr. Jamie Liew sworn November 9, 2024, are hereby struck: (a) paragraphs 2-11, 13, 15 and 17 in their entirety; (b) paragraph 12, except the subparagraph that introduces Exhibit G; (c) paragraph 16, except the subparagraphs that introduce Exhibits K, L, M and N; and (d) Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, H and I.

2. Paragraphs 33-36 and Exhibits E and F to the affidavit of Matthew Behrens sworn December 15, 2025, are hereby struck.

3. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

4. The parties proposed no question for certification and none arises.

“Mandy Aylen”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-9527-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:	A.A., B.B. v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING:	FEBRUARY 2, 2026
JUDGMENT and reasons:	AyLEN J.
DATED:	MARCH 18, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Damey Lee Hana Marku	For The Applicants
Gregory George Teresa Ramnarine	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Marku & Lee Immigration and Refugee Lawyers Barristers and Solicitors Toronto, Ontario	For The Applicants
Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario	For The Respondent